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4 
Abstract 
 
This thesis, inquiring into the permissibility of long-term incarceration, maintains 
that two sets of reasons determine the moral limits of punishment. 
 
First, the reasons that justify the infliction of penal harm will only license “propor-
tionate” or “parsimonious” means of realizing our penal aims. Part I, searching for 
these reasons, conceives of the criminal law as a system of protections, upon which 
all citizens rely for their assured liberty. An offender weakens this system by con-
tributing to the threat of “criminality.” The state is thereby entitled, and only 
entitled, to harm him as a means of “erasing” his criminality contributions, generally 
by deterring would-be future offenders. This precludes long-term incarceration in 
most, but not all cases, given the tenuous relationship between penal severity and 
deterrence. 
 
The second set of reasons opposes degrading punishments. Is long-term incarcer-
ation impermissibly degrading, irrespective of its proportionality or usefulness 
otherwise? Part II gains traction by considering torture, the exemplar of degrading 
treatment. I define torture as the intentional infliction of a suffusive panic. I argue that it 
is egregiously “disrespectful” of the human capacity to realize value. It converts a 
diachronic being capable of building a good life through time into a synchronic being 
whose awareness is restricted to a maximally terrible present. Meanwhile, a prison 
sentence is “long-term,” I argue, if it severely risks ruining an inmate’s life, just in 
virtue of the amount of time that he is separated from society and thereby deprived 
of certain associational goods (e.g. a family and career). Long-term incarceration 
for reasons of retribution or deterrence intentionally inflicts this life-ruining harm. It 
is thus impermissibly disrespectful of a person’s value-generating capacities, I con-
clude, akin to penal torture. Long-term incarceration for the reason of 
incapacitation, however, whereby the state is not motivated to harm the offender, 
can be legitimate.  
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6 
Introduction 
Is long-term incarceration a legitimate form of punishment? That is, does it 
inflict an impermissible degree or type of penal harm? This thesis maintains that 
two sets of reasons determine the moral limits of punishment. First, the reasons 
that justify the positive infliction of penal harm will contain “internal” punishment 
limits. They will only license penal harms that are “proportionate” or “parsimoni-
ous” means of realizing our penal aims. The second set of reasons are those that 
resist the infliction of degrading punishments. These reasons are relatively distinct 
from those that justify the infliction of penal harm; the latter may authorize a pun-
ishment that is nonetheless impermissibly degrading. In this Introduction, I will 
outline the thesis’s main arguments, while also considering the relationship between 
these two sets of reasons. 
Part I. Internal Limitations 
Chapter 1, seeking to establish the appropriate internal punishment limits, 
inquires into the justification of state punishment. Why—if at all—is the state en-
titled to harm people when they commit offenses? Chapter 1 conceives of the 
criminal law as a system of protections—against murder, rape, theft, etc.—upon 
which all citizens rely for their assured liberty, and which depends for its effective-
ness on the deterrent threat of punishment. But Chapter 1 also accepts a moral 
principle. It is a variation of the prohibition on using people as a mere means to 
the greater good1: we must not sacrifice individuals as a means of mitigating harms 
or threats for which they have no responsibility. The challenge is to explain how 
punishing offenders for the sake of deterrence—for the sake of a reliable system 
of criminal law protections—is consistent with this “non-sacrifice principle.” For 
deterrent punishments seem to violate the principle rather straightforwardly, with 
                                               
1 See Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals [1785], in ed. and trans. Mary J. Gregor, 
Practical Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 37-108, at 80 (4:429) (“So act that 
you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time 
as an end, never merely as a means.”). 
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the state harming an offender as a prudential warning to would-be future offenders, 
for whom the offender has no responsibility. 
In responding to this challenge, I argue that the criminal law, as a system of 
protections, operates somewhat counterintuitively. It rests ultimately not on police 
intervention, but rather on people self-applying criminal legal norms. That is, when I 
walk down a street, I am not relying upon the police to protect me like personal 
guards, but rather upon other people within the jurisdiction to self-apply the rules 
that prohibit assaulting me, stealing my wallet, and so forth. This analysis clarifies 
the nature of criminal wrongdoing. When an individual offender fails to self-apply 
the criminal law, then, in combination with other offenders, he contributes to a wider 
social threat. This is “criminality”—not merely the perceived, but the objective 
threat of crime. Criminality hinders the institutional aims of the criminal law. It 
chills the exercise of our rights, forces us to take expensive precautions, and sub-
jects us to unreasonable risks of harm. The more criminality there is in society, the 
less worth the criminal law has as a guide to the possible incursions of other people 
in society, and the less assured is our liberty. Deterrent punishment, as a means of 
holding an offender responsible for his criminality contributions, is thereby per-
missible. When the state harms an offender to deter would-be future offenders, it 
is forcing him to “erase” his past and possibly ongoing contributions. The state is 
not merely sacrificing him to limit the problem of future crime, for which he has 
no personal responsibility. It is rather forcing him to fulfill his own duty, owed to 
society as a whole, to repair his criminality contributions and restore the reliability 
of the criminal law system. Over time, ideally—with would-be future offenders ap-
propriately deterred—it would be as if he had never contributed to criminality at 
all, in terms of the average threat of crime faced by society. 
While they are closely connected, this framework in fact generates two the-
ories of deterrent punishment. The “corrective justice theory of punishment” 
concerns the offender’s duty to rectify his past criminality contributions. The “social 
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defense theory of punishment,” meanwhile, concerns the offender’s duty to mitigate 
his ongoing contributions. The social defense theory only applies to those offend-
ers who remain unreasonably unreliable with regard to upholding the criminal law; 
in addition to justifying deterring punishment, this theory can in special circum-
stances also justify forms of incapacitation. While the past offense is dispositive 
proof that the offender contributed to criminality in the past and therefore owes a 
duty of rectification, what evidence suffices to prove that he is also contributing to 
criminality in the present, and therefore that he also owes a duty of mitigation, is a 
much more challenging issue. 
The corrective justice and social defense theories contain a number of in-
ternal punishment limitations. First, the infliction of penal harm is justified only so 
long as it deters crime, given that these theories deny that the suffering of offenders 
is an intrinsic good. Second, penal harm is justified only so long as it is the most 
efficient use of crime prevention resources. Third, if inflicting penal harm is indeed 
an effective and maximally efficient means of generating deterrence, once the of-
fender’s personal duty of repair is fulfilled, then the state cannot harm him further 
permissibly. Consider Alex, whose intention to steal a car increased criminality in 
the past by, say, 10 units. According to this third internal limitation, the state would 
be entitled to harm him so as to decrease future criminality by 10 units, but no more. 
Fourth, it is impermissible to harm an offender to a degree that is entirely out of 
proportion to the stringency of the offender’s duty of repair, even if that meant that 
his duty went to some degree unfulfilled. A 20-year prison sentence for Alex, even 
if it were the singular means by which he could decrease criminality by 10 units, 
would be entirely out of proportion to the reparative benefit gained by society. 
This collection of internal limits rules out long-term incarceration in most 
cases, I argue, given the tenuous relationship between penal severity and crime de-
terrence. To sentence an offender to a 20-year term is generally a wasteful and 
inefficient use of crime prevention resources, let alone entirely out of proportion 
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to the stringency of his duty of repair. Nonetheless, the corrective justice and social 
justice theories could license such a punishment, and any other potentially degrad-
ing punishment, such as penal torture, were the offender’s criminality contribution 
sufficiently grave and, as an empirical matter, were such a punishment an effective 
means of deterrence. For crime deterrence does correlate to some degree with penal 
severity, even if it correlates more robustly with the likelihood of receiving some 
amount of punishment.2 And if it were indeed the case, as some have suggested,3 
that extreme or degrading punishments were effective means of deterrence, then 
the two theories would lack the internal resources to categorically rule out such 
punishments ex ante, as a matter of principle. 
Part II. Degradation Limitations 
Part I thus examines the set of reasons that justify the maintenance of a state 
institution dedicated to the infliction of penal harm, and then the punishment lim-
itations that are “internal” to these reasons, that is, those limits associated with the 
demand to inflict penal harm only to the extent that it furthers the realization of its 
justificatory goods. Part II has two central aims. 
 
 
                                               
2 For evidence that the certainty of punishment is more important for deterrence than the severity of 
punishment, see Daniel S. Nagin, “Deterrence in the Twenty-First Century: A Review of the Evi-
dence,” in ed. Michael Tonry, Crime and Justice in America: 1975–2025 (Chicago: Chicago University 
Press, 2013); Andrew von Hirsch, et. al., Criminal Deterrence and Sentence Severity: An Analysis of Recent 
Research (Portland: Hart, 1999), 27, 36, 45; Steven N. Dulauf and Daniel S. Nagin, “Imprisonment and 
crime: Can both be reduced?” Criminology & Public Policy 10 (2011): 13-54. 
3 See Lawrence Katz, Steven D. Levitt, and Ellen Shustorovich, “Prisons Conditions, Capital Punish-
ment, and Deterrence,” American Law and Economics Review 5 (2003): 318-43 (arguing that penal severity, 
as revealed through prisoner death rates, correlates robustly with decreasing crime rates); Hashem 
Dezhbakhsh, Paul H. Rubin, and Joanna M. Shepherd, “Does Capital Punishment Have a Deterrent 
Effect? New Evidence from Postmoratorium Panel Data,” American Law and Economics Review 5 (2003): 
344-76 (suggesting that each execution prevents eighteen murders on average); H. Naci Mocan and R. 
Kaj Gittings, “Getting off Death Row: Commuted Sentences and the Deterrent Effect of Capital Pun-
ishment,” The Journal of Law and Economics 46 (2003): 453-78 (finding that each execution decreases 
homicides by about five, while each commutation increases homicides by about five); but see John J. 
Donohue and Justin Wolfers, “Uses and Abuses of Empirical Evidence in the Death Penalty Debate,” 
Stanford Law Review 58 (2005): 791-846. 
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A. Independent Reasons 
The first aim is to examine the set of reasons that opposes the infliction of 
degrading punishments. Beyond “degrading,” other relevant adjectives include, at 
least, “cruel,” “inhuman,” “inhumane,”4 “barbaric,” and “brutal.” There is consid-
erable overlap between the terms, however, and we ought to conceive of the 
reasons that oppose such punishments as a unified or general category.5 It seems 
unlikely that the reasons that oppose, say, cruel punishments are very different from 
the reasons that oppose, say, inhumane punishments. And, indeed, a number of 
treaties and constitutions group these considerations together. The Universal Dec-
laration of Human Rights provides, for instance: “No one shall be subjected to 
torture or to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.”6 Let us refer 
to this category of sentencing considerations as “degradation-limiting penal rea-
sons” (“degradation-limiting reasons” or “degradation limitations” for short). 
                                               
4 See Jeremy Waldron, “Inhuman and Degrading Treatment: The Words Themselves,” Canadian Journal 
of Law & Jurisprudence 23 (2010): 269-286, at 278-79 (arguing that “inhumane” treatment is distinct from 
and milder than “inhuman” treatment). 
5 For attempts to parse the meanings of the various terms, see Waldron, id. and John Vorhaus, “On 
Degradation - Part One: Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights,” Common Law World 
Review 31 (2002): 374-99; but see Tomasi v France (App no 12850/87) [1992] ECHR 53 (making a finding 
of “inhuman and degrading” treatment without distinguishing between the two terms); Ribitsch v. Aus-
tria (App no 18896/91) [1995] ECHR 55 (same). 
6 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 5. The International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, the European Convention on Human Rights, the American Convention on Human Rights, and 
the Brazilian Constitution all contain a clause with this exact language (though, the Brazilian clause is 
in Portuguese). See also United States Constitution, am. 8 (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor 
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”); New York State Constitution, 
art. 1(5) (“Excessive bail shall not be required nor excessive fines imposed, nor shall cruel and unusual 
punishments be inflicted, nor shall witnesses be unreasonably detained.”); Texas State Constitution, 
art. 1(13) (emphasis added) (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor 
cruel or unusual punishment inflicted.”); Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, art. 12 (“Everyone 
has the right not to be subjected to any cruel and unusual treatment or punishment.”); Federal Consti-
tution  of the Swiss Confederation, art. 10(3) (translation): (“Torture and any other form of cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment is prohibited.”); New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, 
sect. 9 (“Everyone has the right not to be subjected to torture or to cruel, degrading, or disproportion-
ately severe treatment or punishment.”); South African Constitution, art. 12(1) (“Everyone has the right 
to freedom and security of the person, which includes the right not to be tortured in any way; and not 
to be treated or punished in a cruel, inhuman or degrading way.”); UN Convention Against Torture, 
art. 16(1): (“Each State Party shall undertake to prevent in any territory under its jurisdiction other acts 
of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment which do not amount to torture as defined.”).  
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Robert Nozick conceives of rights as categorical “side constraints” upon the 
pursuit of consequentialist reasons.7 Part II focuses on degradation-limiting penal 
reasons that operate in a morphologically similar manner. That is, it will focus on 
dispositive versions of such reasons. They are dispositive in that they represent true 
“limits” that positively bar certain punishments—say, penal torture—regardless of 
the reasons pushing in the other direction to punish in such a manner or degree. 
“You cannot do that to a human being” captures the ideal in broad brush, though, given 
our focus on penal reasons, we are concerned ultimately with a more precise vari-
ant: “You cannot do that a human being (as a form of state punishment).” We should 
recognize, though, that not every degradation-limiting reason is dispositive. That is, 
they need not all or always represent categorical “side constraints” upon the pursuit 
of our penal objectives. For instance, that a punishment will humiliate an offender 
is a degradation-limiting reason against its infliction, let us assume. I doubt that 
such a reason will always be dispositive, though, given that all punishments will 
likely humiliate to some degree.8 Thus, between two mildly humiliating punish-
ments—both of which achieve our penal aims equally without implicating any other 
sentencing concerns—our degradation-limiting reason would cause us to select the 
punishment that humiliated less, rather than simply ruling out both options. 
Though, for the sake of completeness, such a reason might be non-dispositive at 
one level of saliency, but then dispositive at another. There may be a degree of 
humiliation that no punishment should ever inflict, for instance, regardless of the 
offender’s retributive desert, of deterrence considerations, and so forth. 
 Degradation limitations operate with relative independence from other pe-
nal considerations, as stated above. This is a key point. To make sense of it, let us 
                                               
7 Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974), 28-33. 
8 See Tyrer v UK [1978] 2 EHRR 1, par. 3 (finding that, for Article 3 to apply, the punishment must 
humiliate beyond the “usual element of humiliation” inherent to all punishments); Graham Zellick, 
“Corporal Punishment in the Isle of Man,” International and Comparative Law Quarterly 28 (1978): 665-71, 
at 669 (defining punishment as degrading when it “is inescapably humiliating and debasing beyond the 
normal limits of punishment…”). 
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consider Antony Duff’s treatment of the “rape the rapist” sentencing proposal.9 As 
I discuss in Chapter 1, Duff conceives of punishment as a form of rational dis-
course between a community and an offender.10 The offender commits a “public” 
wrong and thus deserves the community’s censure, on Duff’s view. The community 
should not simply lash out at him, Duff continues, but rather ought to express its 
disapproval rationally, providing him with reasons to regret his actions and to desist 
from wrong in the future. While Duff maintains that hard treatment is the means 
by which the community censures offenders, he argues that such treatment must 
remain within the bounds of rational communication. As such, he concludes that 
his theory forecloses penal rape, because such a punishment “does not address [the 
rapist] as a rational moral agent—it simply seeks to traumatize and humiliate him.”11 
We should be careful to recognize which reasons are doing the heavy lifting 
for Duff.  Duff opposes penal rape here not because it is impermissibly degrading, 
not because it traumatizes and humiliates, but because, by traumatizing and humili-
ating, it would fail as a form of rational communication. The only legitimate reason 
for the state to inflict penal harm, Duff believes, is to censure a moral agent for 
committing a public wrong; and given that penal rape would not qualify as censure 
or would not qualify as the appropriate form of censure, the state cannot inflict that 
form of penal harm legitimately. The offender deserves a particular form of com-
munication, and penal rape does not qualify. The fact that penal rape is extremely 
degrading would thus stand as an independent reason against its infliction. Perhaps 
one could foreclose all impermissibly degrading punishments as a matter internal 
to the pursuit of her penal aims. Duff seems to believe that he can achieve this via 
the constraint that hard treatment must remain a form of rational communication. 
If that were the case, however, it would not mean that degradation-limiting reasons 
were somehow irrelevant or non-existent. It would mean that the impermissibility 
                                               
9 R.A. Duff, Punishment, Communication, and Community (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 143-45. 
10 See Chapter 1 at 32. 
11 Duff, Punishment, Communication, and Community, supra note 9 at 143. 
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of such punishments was over-determined, ruled out by the demand to pursue our 
positive penal aims with proportionality or parsimony, in addition to the separate 
fact that such punishments are impermissibly degrading.12 
In general, criminal law theorists seem overeager to tie every intuitive sen-
tencing consideration to the base of their positive theory of punishment, that is, to 
argue that every intuitive sentencing consideration is a matter of “internal” princi-
ple, flowing directly from the set of reasons that justifies the positive infliction of 
penal harm. However, we can appeal to sentencing reasons, such as degradation-
limiting reasons, that do not have a very tight relationship with our justificatory 
penal reasons—even if, as I discuss in Chapter 2, they share a deeper foundation 
of principle in the commitment to human inviolability.13 For instance, if Duff is 
wrong that his justificatory penal reason—the imperative to censure a wrongdoer 
via the infliction of genuinely communicative hard treatment—rules out penal rape, 
then he is not thereby committed to the legitimacy of such punishment. He could 
appeal to the relatively independent degradation-limiting reasons to foreclose its 
infliction. And, indeed, it seems to me that Duff is wrong that his theory definitely 
rules out penal rape. Duff writes of the communicative nature of hard treatment: 
“It is a way of trying to focus [the offender’s] attention on his crime. It provides a 
structure within which, we hope, he will be able to think about the nature and im-
plication of his crime, face up to it more adequately than he might otherwise (being 
human) do, and so arrive at a more authentic repentance.”14 But what better way 
                                               
12 See Waldron, “Inhuman and Degrading Treatment,” supra note 4 at 277 (“The provisions we are 
considering prohibit treatment or punishment which is cruel, inhuman, or degrading, whatever else it is. 
So, for example, if someone thinks that water-boarding is necessary in certain circumstances to prevent 
terrorist attacks, that does not affect the question of whether it is inhuman, nor does it affect the 
consequences of its being judged inhuman. If it is inhuman, then it is prohibited by the provisions we 
are considering whether it is necessary for defense against terrorism or not.”); id. at 278 (“It is quite 
consistent to say of a punishment that it is cruel and that God ordains it: God may be cruel. The ques-
tion of whether something is cruel or inhuman is one aspect of its overall evaluation; the question of 
whether God ordains it is another.”) 
13 See Chapter 2 at 168-70. 
14 Duff, Punishment, Communication, and Community, supra note 9 at 108. 
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to focus an offender’s attention on his crime than to make him suffer the same 
offense? Why not rape the rapist? The act of penal rape in and of itself might not 
constitute the form of communication that Duff has in mind, but penal rape fol-
lowed by the offender’s inevitable reflection on what the state has done to him (and 
therefore what he has done to his victim) might indeed qualify. So long as the of-
fender’s capacity for rational reflection remained intact, it would seem that Duff’s 
theory, without appealing to degradation-limiting reasons, might entail highly de-
grading forms of punishment. Duff’s theory, to be sure, is not the only one that 
would have to appeal to degradation-limiting reasons to foreclose such punish-
ments. Consider “traditional” retributivists, who are concerned to deliver to 
wrongdoers a deserved allotment of suffering.15 If an offender has done something 
absolutely heinous to multiple people, would he not deserve, following traditional 
retributivist proportionality, to have something absolutely heinous done to him? 
Jeffrie Murphy, committed to the “fair play” variant of traditional retributivism,16 
accepts this point, as well as the role played by dispositive degradation limitations 
in preventing such punishments: “Even when proportionality is satisfied, however, 
we shall not use a certain punishment if it is intrinsically degrading to the humanity 
of the criminal—e.g. we shall not torture the torturer.”17 And, as discussed above, 
even what I take to be the two legitimate theories of punishment—the corrective 
                                               
15 On “traditional” retributivism, see Chapter 1 at 27-32. 
16 See Chapter 1 at 28. 
17 Jeffrie G. Murphy, “Cruel and Unusual Punishments,” in Retribution, Justice, and Therapy: Essays in the 
Philosophy of Law, ed. Wilfrid Sellars (Dodrecht: D. Reidel Publishing, 1979), 223-249, at 236. See also 
Alec Walen, “Retributive Justice,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2016 Edition), 
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/justice-retributive/ 
 (“[P]roportionality should rule out certain punishments on the ground that they are disproportionately 
large. But there is no reason for retributivists not to look to other criteria, such as respect for human 
dignity, to prohibit those forms of punishment that seem cruel or degrading.”); Youngjae Lee, “Desert 
and the Eight Amendment,” Journal of Constitutional Law 11 (2008): 101-112, at 102 (distinguishing be-
tween the “desert model” of Eight Amendment jurisprudence, which is concerned to prevent 
retributively disproportionate sentences, and the “dignity model,” which is concerned to guarantee to 
offenders “a minimum standard of decency and humanity.”).  
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justice and social defense theories—cannot foreclose degrading punishments as an 
internal matter of principle.  
B. Torture and Long-Term Incarceration  
The second aim of Part II is to examine the meaning of long-term incarcer-
ation, and the permissibility of that form of punishment by reference to degradation 
limitations. I argue in Chapter 3 that long-term incarceration—say, a 20-year 
term—severely risks ruining an inmate’s life. And the central question I am con-
cerned with is when and whether it is impermissibly degrading to do this to 
someone—to ruin his life or to severely risk ruining his life—as the official re-
sponse to his crime. In this way, long-term incarceration serves as the test case for 
our broader inquiry into degradation-limiting penal reasons.  
Part II tries to gain traction in this realm of reasons via moral analogy. That 
is, it does not consider these reasons completely a priori or de novo and then apply 
the abstract findings to the question of long-term incarceration. Rather, it tries to 
push off, as it were, from a state practice—torture—that is commonly viewed as 
impermissibly degrading, as implicating a hard stop on the reasons, penal or other-
wise, in favor of its infliction. Even more to the point, if we look just to penal 
torture—torture as a form of punishment—this practice is considered the exemplar 
of an impermissibly degrading punishment. In Furman v. Georgia, for instance, Jus-
tice Brennan writes that the “primary principle” by which the US Supreme Court 
assesses whether a punishment is “cruel and unusual” and thus in violation of the 
8th Amendment is whether it is “degrading to human dignity”18; and he deems “tor-
turous punishment” to be the “paradigm violation of this principle” (his emphasis).19 
Furthermore, prohibitions on degrading punishments are often grouped together 
with prohibitions on torture in legal texts: “No one shall be subjected to torture or 
to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.”20 Drafters and 
                                               
18 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 281 (1972). 
19 Id. 
20 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 5. See supra note 6. 
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signatories seem to have understood that both prohibitions—(a) no torture and (b) 
no cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment—implicate the same set 
of considerations. In this way, if degradation-limiting reasons exist, then a close 
examination of the practice of torture should illuminate their nature and content. 
Murphy writes: 
“Are there certain punishments which one would want to oppose in 
principle, as unjust violations of the rights of the person being pun-
ished, regardless of the social utility (e.g. deterrence) which might 
flow from such punishments? Since I believe the answer to this ques-
tion obviously is yes (will anyone stand up for torture and 
mutilation?), another and much more difficult question must next be 
confronted—namely, what is it about such punishments which make 
them cruel and unusual in the sense of being wrong in principle?”21 
 
The hypothesis that I pursue in Part II, in response to Murphy’s second question, 
is that the general reasons that oppose the infliction of torture simply are our deg-
radation-limiting reasons, or the most fundamental of such reasons. The moral 
analogy, then, works like this: what are the “wrong-making” features of torture, and 
does long-term incarceration share any such features? 
C. Disrespect and Degradation 
In Chapter 2, I argue that disrespect is the metric of degradation, such that the 
central wrong-making feature of torture is the egregious disrespect it demonstrates 
toward a victim. I follow Joseph Raz in arguing that “respect” involves having the 
appropriate response to the presence of value.22 To respect something involves 
aiding or at least not interfering with the possibility of that thing’s exhibition of 
value, as well as potentially expressing or honoring its value in a symbolic manner. 
For instance, to pour water on a beautiful sandcastle is to disrespect the sandcastle’s 
value, while pouring water on a plant, generally, is to respect the plant’s value—
with the understanding that such objects have value only insofar as people might 
                                               
21 Murphy, “Cruel and Unusual Punishments,” supra note 17 at 223-24. 
22 See Joseph Raz, Value, Respect, Attachment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). 
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engage with them meaningfully. The demands of respect thus depend on what the 
object actually does to exhibit value, on the “mechanism” of its value exhibition, as 
it were, and the ways in which our actions help or hinder the working of that mech-
anism. To apply this logic to human beings directly—and thus to understand what 
respecting or disrespecting a person means—we need an understanding of what 
humans do, exactly, to exhibit value.  
I argue that human beings exhibit value due to their meta-capacity for prac-
tical reason—the combination of their capacities for, at least, autonomy, value-
recognition, memory, and imagination—which enables them to stitch moments to-
gether through time and construct a good life. They are diachronic creatures with 
pasts and futures of their own construction to a significant degree, capable not only 
of experiencing “momentary” goods, like enjoying an ice-cream cone, but also of 
achieving “temporal” goods, like maintaining a marriage. While suffering may play 
a role in the production of temporal goods, as with the suffering involved with 
certain forms of professional training, I argue that humans retain the capacity to 
generate disvalue, which constitutes merely wanton suffering.  
With this conception of human value in mind, I conclude that torture is the 
archetype of disrespect for a person and her special capacities for generating value 
and disvalue. After examining a number of first-hand accounts of torture victims, 
I define torture as the intentional infliction of a suffusive panic. I then argue that torture, 
by inflicting a make it stop right now panic, (a) completely halts the victim’s value 
generating capacities, as she loses the thread of her diachronic identity and (b) max-
imizes her capacity for disvalue, with her consciousness saturated with suffering. 
Torture is thus perverse from the perspective of respecting human value. It takes a 
being capable of living broadly and purposefully through time and, via the infliction 
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of a suffusive panic, converts her into a “shrilly, squealing piglet,” in Jean Améry’s 
words, restricting her ken to a maximally terrible present.23  
Certain forms of torture, however, are yet more disrespectful than others, 
depending on the degree to which they risk long-term psychological or physical 
damage. Disrespect, in this way, is on a spectrum, with torture for an eternity—
suffusive panic forever—at the very top. Treatment can be less disrespectful than this, 
however, and still be impermissibly degrading. But where, exactly, on the spectrum 
of disrespect shall the “dispositive” line be drawn, beyond which we would say that 
such treatment is absolutely impermissible? Given that respect involves the process 
of responding to something’s value, disrespect for a person always embodies a re-
jection, to some degree, of her value. But, as I explain in Chapter 2, there are 
different modes of disrespect; one might just disrespect another’s value as, say, a 
playwright (e.g. the symbolic disrespect of saying “your play is not very good.”). 
When delivered in a certain manner and degree, however, disrespect can embody a 
rejection of someone’s essentially human value, which is grounded on her essentially 
human capacity to build a good life through time. Such treatment expresses the 
conviction that this creature does not matter, at least not like a person does, such 
that we can do whatever we want with it, as if it were a mere thing or animal. Above 
the “dispositive” line, we can say, more particularly, that a punishment rejects the 
offender’s standing as a human, by ruining his essentially human capacity to realize 
value in a diachronic, life-building manner, or by embodying the legitimacy of doing 
so. While this will usually take the form of a non-symbolic, physical interference with 
someone’s value-generating capacities, certain essentially symbolic forms of disre-
spect can be so extreme as to qualify. Consider “Derby’s Dose,” by which a slave 
overseer forced runaways to eat human excrement as a form of punishment.24 
                                               
23 Jean Améry, At the Mind’s Limit: Contemplations by a Survivor on Auschwitz and its Realities, trans. Sidney 
Rosenfeld and Stella P. Rosenfeld (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1980), 35. 
24See Malcolm Gladwell, Outliers: The Story of Success (London: Penguin Books, 2009), 282. For discussion, 
see Chapter 2 at 167-68. 
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Where on the ladder of disrespect does long-term incarceration reside? Is it 
so disrespectful that, like penal torture, it embodies a rejection of the offender’s 
standing as a human? In Chapter 3, I begin the investigation by examining the dep-
rivations of incarceration simpliciter. What valuable activities or states of being does 
incarceration limit one’s access to, regardless of sentence length? There is a great 
diversity in prison quality, as I explain, from a foul dungeon where inmates are 
packed in tightly and encouraged to commit suicide to a calm island with beaches 
and farm animals. This diversity means that incarceration for even a short period 
of time can entail a wide array of deprivations. There is, however, one deprivation 
inherent to all prisons: inmates will be unable to freely associate with other citizens 
in society. I refer to it as the denial of “the freedom of general association.”  
I then add the variable of sentence length to the analysis, moving from the 
meaning of incarceration simpliciter to that of long-term incarceration, and consid-
ering what it means to remove someone from free society for, say, 20 years. I 
ultimately define a prison term as long-term if it represents a severe risk of ruining an 
offender’s life, just in virtue of the amount of time that he is denied the freedom of general associa-
tion. It is a slow-forming, essentially non-phenomenological injury to one’s life 
project. Long-term confinement away from society inhibits the realization of cer-
tain temporal and associational goods, that is, those goods which require cultivation 
over time in association with other people, like maintaining a family and having a 
meaningful career. Such goods are foundational to almost all conceptions of the 
good life. 
Impermissible degradation, I argue in Chapter 3, must be intentional. Only 
then could it embody an affirmative rejection of the offender’s humanity. Thus, if 
torture represents the intentional infliction of a suffusive panic, can we say that the 
state intends to ruin an offender’s life when it long-term incarcerates him, or intends 
to severely risk that outcome? This depends on the underlying theory of punish-
ment. If the only reason to long-term incarcerate is incapacitation, the state is not 
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necessarily motivated to harm the offender. The resulting cost to his life project 
can represent an unintended byproduct of the state’s aim to prevent him from com-
mitting very serious offenses in the future. It would pose no problem on a genuine 
incapacitation theory, for instance, if prison were somehow an inmate’s private 
Xanadu, where he could lead a flourishing (and crime-free) life. Long-term incar-
ceration for reasons of retribution or deterrence, however, is different. On those 
rationales, the state is motivated to harm the offender. It sees harming him, and 
indeed harming him in a way that severely risks ruining his life, as a reason for action. 
Long-term incarceration for reasons of retribution or deterrence involves using the 
resulting harm to generate moral desert or crime prevention, respectively. Retribu-
tivists would argue, for instance, that the offender does not deserve Xanadu; and 
deterrence theorists would argue that allowing him to live there would incentivize 
crime. Chapter 3 thus concludes that long-term incarceration could only be justified 
for reasons of incapacitation. Long-term incarceration for reasons of retribution or 
deterrence affirmatively rejects the offender’s humanity by intentionally inflicting a 
life-ruining harm. This is egregiously disrespectful of his essentially human value-
generating capacities and is therefore impermissibly degrading, just like penal tor-
ture. 
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Chapter 1. Two Theories of Deterrent Punishment* 
As discussed in the Introduction, “internal” punishment limitations are mo-
tivated by the reason or reasons that we have to punish offenders. That is, these 
reasons will justify the infliction of harm upon an offender, but likely not an unlim-
ited amount of harm. If the only reason to punish an offender was, say, that 
wrongdoers deserve to suffer in proportion to their wrongdoing, then that penal 
reason would not justify the punishment of torture for, say, a bicycle thief. For that 
degree of suffering would be out of proportion to the bicycle thief’s wrongdoing. 
And thus to oppose penal torture in that case we would not need to appeal to 
“degradation limitations,” which, as discussed in the Introduction, forestall ex-
tremely degrading punishments that a punishment theory might otherwise license, 
were the offense particularly heinous or such punishments somehow beneficial for 
the wider society. This chapter is concerned, ultimately, with determining the ap-
propriate internal punishment limits and it therefore inquires into the justification 
of state punishment. What reason or reasons explain why the state is entitled to 
harm people when they commit offenses? Only by answering this question could 
we understand when those reasons “switch off,” as it were, and fail to justify the 
infliction of further penal harm. 
In developing this question this chapter relies upon two premises. The first 
premise is that, to justify its extreme institutional costs, state punishment must 
deter crime to some sufficient degree.1 The second premise is a moral principle. It 
                                               
* Parts of this chapter appear in Jacob Bronsther, “Two Theories of Deterrent Punishment,” Tulsa 
Law Review 53 (2018): 461-95. 
1 See Douglas Husak, “Holistic Retributivism,” California Law Review 88 (2000): 991-1000, at 996 (“Re-
tributivists must show not only that giving culpable wrongdoers what they deserve is intrinsically 
valuable, but also that it is sufficiently valuable to offset what I will refer to as the drawbacks of pun-
ishment…The first such drawback is the astronomical expense of our system of criminal justice.”); 
Victor Tadros, The Ends of Harm: The Moral Foundations of Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2011), 88–110 (arguing that while it is permissible for the state to harm offenders in order to 
encourage them to recognize that what they have done is wrong, only the project of general deterrence 
could justify the creation of costly state institutions); Michael T. Cahill, “Punishment Pluralism,” in ed. 
Mark D. White, Retributivism: Essays on Theory and Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 25-
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is a variation of the prohibition on using people as a mere means to the greater 
good2: we must not sacrifice individuals as a means of mitigating harms or threats 
for which they have no responsibility. This “non-sacrifice principle,” in one ver-
sion or another, founds the liberal legal order and its conception of the individual 
as an inviolable bearer of rights.3 The challenge—I think the central challenge of 
criminal law theory—is to explain how we can accept both premises and justify 
state punishment. For deterrent punishment seems to violate the non-sacrifice 
principle rather straightforwardly, as the state inflicts suffering upon an offender 
as a prudential warning to would-be future offenders, for whom the offender has 
                                               
48, at 39 (“Punishment is not free; it costs money. Whether to punish, and how, and how much, are 
all questions that might be influenced by the financial cost of punishing. The adjudicative system that 
determines punishment, and the correctional system that imposes it, create direct costs and also op-
portunity costs, as time and money are dedicated to criminal justice rather than other things.”); Andrew 
von Hirsch, Fairness, Verbrechen und Strafe: Strafrechtstheoretische Abhandlungen (Berlin: Berliner Wissen-
schafts-Verlag, 2005), 42 (denying the need to punish if acts of violence and theft are rare); Claus 
Roxin, “Prevention, Censure, and Responsibility: The Recent Debate on the Purposes of Punish-
ment,” in eds. A.P. Simester, Antje du Bois-Pedain and Ulfrid Neumann, trans. Antje du Bois-Pedain, 
Liberal Criminal Theory: Essays for Andreas von Hirsch (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2014), 23-42, at 26 (ar-
guing that “the protective function of the state” is “a basic precondition for the justified imposition 
of any penal sanction”). Even Michael Moore, who denies that crime prevention is necessary to justify 
the costs of state punishment, accepts that it is nevertheless an important reason in its favor: “[I]n any 
accounting about setting up institutions to achieve justice, against enforcement and other costs we 
must balance any benefits. One obvious benefit punishment gives is crime prevention, through deter-
rence, education, and incapacitation.” Michael S. Moore, Placing Blame: A Theory of Criminal Law 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 151. 
2 See Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals [1785], in ed. and trans. Mary J. Gregor, 
Practical Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 37-108, at 80 (4:429) (“So act that 
you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time 
as an end, never merely as a means.”). 
3 See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1971), 3–4 (“Each person pos-
sesses an inviolability founded on justice that even the welfare of society as a whole cannot override. 
For this reason justice denies that the loss of freedom for some is made right by a greater good shared 
by others.”); Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974), 32-33 (“Why 
not…hold that some persons have to bear some costs that benefit other persons more, for the sake 
of overall social good? But there is no social entity with a good that undergoes some sacrifice for its own 
good. There are only individual people, different individual people, with their own individual lives. 
Using one of these people for the benefit of others, uses him and benefits the others. Nothing more. 
What happens is that something is done to him for the sake of others. Talk of an overall social good 
covers this up.”); Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1977), at xi (“Individual rights are political trumps held by individuals. Individuals have rights when, 
for some reason, a collective goal is not a sufficient justification for denying them what they wish, as 
individuals, to have or to do, or not a sufficient justification for imposing some loss or injury upon 
them.”). 
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no responsibility. I call this the “Means Problem.” Why, if at all, is the state entitled 
to use offenders as a means of bringing about general deterrence? 
In responding to the Means Problem, this chapter conceives of the criminal 
law as a system of protections—against murder, rape, assault, theft, drunk driving, 
etc.—upon which all citizens rely for their assured liberty. This, I argue, is the func-
tion of the criminal law. The maintenance of a relatively cooperative, non-violent 
civil society, and the confident planning and execution of an individual life within 
such a society, depends upon reliable criminal law protections. How these protec-
tions work, however, is perhaps counterintuitive. They rest, ultimately, not on 
police intervention, but on people self-applying criminal legal norms. This, I argue, 
is the method of the criminal law. To what degree can we rely upon the legal pro-
tection against, say, car theft? It depends on how much intent there is within the 
jurisdiction to steal cars. That is, when I park my car, I am not relying upon the 
police to protect it like personal guards, but rather upon other people within the 
jurisdiction to self-apply the rule against stealing cars. 
Given this conception of the criminal law’s function and method, we can 
more precisely understand the nature of criminal wrongdoing. When an individual 
offender fails to self-apply the criminal law, then, in combination with other offenders, 
he contributes to a wider social threat. This is “criminality.” It is the objective, 
rather than the perceived, threat of crime. The more criminality there is within a 
jurisdiction, whether in a given moment or when considered over time, the less 
worth the criminal law has as a system of protections and as a guide to the possible 
incursions of others, and the less assured is our liberty. Criminality chills the exer-
cise of our rights, forces us to take expensive precautions, and subjects us to 
unreasonable risks of harm. Deterrent punishment, which aims to decrease the 
amount of criminality in society moving forward and to reinforce the reliability of 
the criminal law’s protections, is thereby permissible—that is, consistent with the 
non-sacrifice principle—in two possible ways. 
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First, in accordance with what I call the corrective justice theory of punishment, we 
can use an offender via general deterrence as a means of repairing the damage to 
our assured liberty caused by his past criminality contributions. He increased the 
level of criminality in the past to some degree, and the way to repair that, as a 
matter of corrective justice, is to use him to decrease the level of criminality in the 
future. Over time, ideally—with would-be future offenders appropriately de-
terred—it would be as if he had never contributed to criminality at all, in terms of 
the average threat of crime faced by society. In this way, the state would not “sac-
rifice” him to mitigate a problem for which he lacks responsibility, but rather force 
him to repair his own wrongdoing. 
The corrective justice theory of punishment is at least partly backward look-
ing, given its concern with an offender’s past criminality contributions. It is the 
primary theory of punishment presented here, since it aims to justify the punish-
ment of all offenders. By comparison, the second theory this chapter introduces—
the social defense theory of punishment—is entirely forward looking, and would provide 
an additional reason of punishment for some but not all offenders. It applies to 
those offenders whose intention or willingness to offend is ongoing, that is, those 
offenders whom we still cannot reasonably rely upon to uphold the law. Such an 
offender would have partial responsibility for the ongoing, present threat of crim-
inality, and his deterrent punishment could be justified on grounds of collective 
self-defense. Here again the state would not be “sacrificing” him to mitigate a 
problem for which he lacks responsibility. 
Section I (pages 27-34) discusses the inability of the two dominant schools 
of criminal law theory—utilitarianism and retributivism—to resolve the Means 
Problem. Section II (pages 34-41) examines Alan Brudner’s Hegelian argument 
that state punishment does not use offenders impermissibly, since offenders have 
effectively consented to their punishment. Section III (pages 41-8) introduces and 
defends the conception of the criminal law as a system of protections, contrasting 
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it with retributivist views and Joshua Kleinfeld’s “reconstructivist” theory. Section 
IV (pages 48-54) explains how this system depends on people self-applying crimi-
nal legal norms and how offenders create the threat of criminality as a byproduct 
of their unreliability with regard to upholding the criminal law. The analogy is to 
factories contributing to smog and global warming as a byproduct of their pollu-
tion. Section V (pages 54-9) introduces two moral principles to derive the 
corrective justice and social defense theories of punishment from this framework. 
Section VI (pages 59-71) considers two objections, discussing the place of the act 
requirement and the role of the victim within the two theories. The offender is not 
punished on either view for the criminal act, in and of itself. The completed act—
just like an attempt or a conspiracy—is rather evidence of the offender’s prior and 
possibly ongoing criminal commitments, and thus of his prior and possibly ongo-
ing criminality contributions. As to victims, I argue that while they do not play a 
direct or necessary role in justifying state punishment—given that the criminal 
wrong is to contribute to a threat that impacts everybody in the jurisdiction nega-
tively—the state may have liability as a co-defendant to compensate victims for 
their civil damages. Section VII (pages 71-80) contrasts these views with Victor 
Tadros’s “duty” theory of punishment, which introduced the idea that deterrent 
punishments can remedy an offender’s wrong. Section VIII (pages 81-3) considers 
the empirical assumption upon which this justification of state punishment rests: 
social peace and cooperation in modern society depend on effective threats of 
criminal punishment. Finally, Section IX (pages 83-96) returns us to our initial 
question and discusses the “internal” sentencing limits of the two theories. I argue 
that they would license a mild system of punishment by comparison to the current 
federal and state sentencing schemes in the US, given the tenuous relationship be-
tween punishment severity and crime deterrence. 
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I. Utilitarian and Retributivist Responses 
Utilitarian and retributivist theories of punishment cannot provide satisfac-
tory answers to the Means Problem. With regard to utilitarian theories, this 
conclusion is easy to establish. On the utilitarian view, punishment is an “evil,” as 
Jeremy Bentham writes, insofar as it causes suffering, and its justification depends 
on, and only on, whether it prevents “greater evils.”4 One’s responsibility for those 
“greater evils” is not, in and of itself, a relevant moral consideration, and utilitari-
ans—unlike retributivists—have a famously hard time explaining what is wrong 
exactly with “punishing” an innocent person if doing so would happen to prevent 
crime and maximize happiness (or whatever the utilitarian in question wants to 
maximize).5 If we accept the non-sacrifice principle—whereby we refuse to use 
people to mitigate harms or threats for which they have no responsibility—then 
our theory of the criminal law and state punishment cannot be utilitarian. 
“Traditional” retributivists, meanwhile, who see the good of punishment as 
analytically connected to an offender’s suffering, would argue that they are exempt 
from the Means Problem.6 They would argue that to cause an offender to suffer 
                                               
4 Jeremy Bentham, Theory of Legislation [1871], ed. C.K. Ogden (New York: Harcourt Brace Co., 1931), 
360. 
5 See Saul Smilansky, “Utilitarianism and the ‘Punishment’ of the Innocent: The General Problem,” 
Analysis 50 (1990): 256-61, at 257 (arguing that the question of punishing the innocent is not merely 
philosophical, because “in the creation and daily application of the criminal law we are constantly 
facing a general situation in which utilitarians would be obliged to promote the ‘punishment’ of the 
innocent”); John Rawls, “Two Concepts of Rules,” Philosophical Review 64 (1955): 3-32 (arguing that a 
form of “rule utilitarianism” could save utilitarianism from punishing the innocent). But see J. Angelo 
Corlett, “Making Sense of Retributivism,” Philosophy 76 (2001): 77-110 (criticizing Rawls). I place the 
word “punishing” in quotes here because, according to some theorists, only the non-innocent can be 
punished, as an analytical matter internal to the concept of punishment. On this view, the concept of 
punishment refers only to a particular response to wrongdoing, such that one who has committed no 
wrong cannot be punished. Rawls, for instance, refers to the infliction of penal harm on the innocent 
not as punishment, but as “telishment.” Rawls, “Two Concepts of Rules,” supra at 11. See also Patrick 
Tomlin, “Innocence Lost: A Problem for Punishment as Duty,” Law & Philosophy 37 (2017): 225-254, 
at 229. 
6 While I distinguish between “traditional” and “censuring” retributivists, in considering them as part 
of the same tradition (and in defining retributivism simpliciter), I follow Mark Michael, who writes, “For 
a utilitarian, the event that justifies punishment occurs subsequent to the punishment, whereas for the 
retributivist the punishment and its justifying event/state of affairs begin simultaneously.” Mark A. 
Michael, “Utilitarianism and Retributivism: What’s the Difference?” American Philosophical Quarterly 29 
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in proportion to his wrongdoing is not to use him as a means toward any end; it is 
to generate the intrinsic good of moral desert. Traditional retributivists understand 
this desert claim in one of two ways. First, according to “strict” retributivists like 
Michael Moore (and maybe Kant) it is grounded in the unadorned conviction that 
wrongdoers deserve to suffer.7 Second, “fair play” retributivists like Herbert Mor-
ris, Jeffrie Murphy, and Richard Dagger understand this desert claim to derive from 
a commitment to fairness.8 If we assume that an offender has benefitted from 
everyone else’s restraint in following the law—not always a safe assumption, Mur-
phy argues9—then he has gained an unfair advantage by breaking the law and 
failing to restrain himself in turn; and the harm or suffering of punishment is thus 
deserved as a means of stripping away the offender’s unfair gain. Retributivists of 
either stripe would argue that if crime deterrence happens to result from retribu-
tivist punishment, the state has not thereby used an offender impermissibly for the 
purpose of achieving that outcome. Any social benefit that results from giving—
and intending to give—an offender what he deserves is a “happy surplus,” as Mi-
chael Moore writes.10 In this way, they would conclude, the state can kill two birds 
                                               
(1992): 173-82, at 175. Retributivists, according to Michael, see the justifying good of punishment (say, 
the intrinsic good of deserved suffering) as being connected analytically to punishment itself. For util-
itarians, by comparison, the relevant good (say, crime deterrence) is “epiphenomenal” to punishment. 
Id. at 178. Michael’s theory thus entails that “negative” retributivists, like Anthony Quinton, are not 
genuine retributivists. Negative retributivists believe that wrongdoing makes offenders liable to pun-
ishment, but that other positive reasons or goods, like crime deterrence, justify the actual infliction of 
punishment; the justifying good that punishment creates on this view is thereby epiphenomenal to 
punishment itself. See Anthony Quinton, “On Punishment,” Analysis 14 (1954): 133-42. 
7 See Moore, Placing Blame, supra note 1; Michael S. Moore, “The Moral Worth of Retribution,” in ed. 
Ferdinand Shoeman, Responsibility, Character, and the Emotions: New Essays in Moral Psychology (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1987), 179-219, at 179 (arguing that criminal punishment, like a person’s 
right to equal treatment, is justified “because, and only because” it is morally deserved). 
8 See Herbert Morris, “Persons and Punishment,” The Monist 52 (1968): 475-501; Jeffrie G. Murphy, 
“Marxism and Retribution,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 2 (1973): 217-43; Richard Dagger, “Playing Fair 
with Punishment,” Ethics 103 (1993): 473-88. See also George Sher, Desert (Princeton: Princeton Uni-
versity Press, 1987), 69–90. 
9 Murphy, “Marxism and Retribution,” supra note 8 at 232–43. 
10 Moore, “The Moral Worth of Retribution,” supra note 7 at 179–80. 
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with one stone, generating sufficient deterrence to justify maintaining the institu-
tion of punishment as a mere byproduct of giving offenders their just deserts.11 
But even if offenders deserve to suffer in accordance with traditional re-
tributivism, do they deserve to suffer to a degree and in a manner that would 
generate a sufficient amount of general deterrence as a byproduct? Do traditional 
retributivists hit the second bird (of sufficient crime deterrence)? There are two 
basic lines to this objection. First, consider one influential ideal of traditional re-
tributivist sentencing: the state ought to injure an offender to the same degree that 
the offender injured his victim.12 In the case of minor offenses, this sentencing 
logic would seem to entail sentences that are too lenient for the purpose of deter-
rence. Tadros writes: 
“Consider theft of a compact disc. In this case, it is surely permissi-
ble to impose on the thief a greater magnitude of harm than he has 
culpably caused. The idea that taking one of the thief’s compact 
discs away would be sufficient punishment in this case is unappeal-
ing. There is an obvious instrumentalist rationale for this 
conclusion—given the low rate of detection of theft, such a modest 
punishment would result in a great deal of theft.”13 
 
The principle of an eye-for-an-eye does not entail an eye-for-a-compact disc, but 
a compact disc-for-a-compact disc, and, as such, we have good reason to doubt 
the principle’s effectiveness as a form of regulation for minor offenses.14 
                                               
11 Moore uses the “two birds, one stone” metaphor in this general way to refer to the process of 
bringing about deterrence as a byproduct of securing retribution (though he would deny that deter-
rence is necessary to justify state punishment). Moore, Placing Blame, supra note 1 at 28. 
12 For sophisticated defenses of this sentencing ideal (lex talionis), see Jeremy Waldron, “Lex Talionis,” 
Arizona Law Review 34 (1992): 25-52; Jeffrey Reiman, “Justice, Civilization, and the Death Penalty: 
Answering Van den Haag,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 14 (1985): 115-48; Morris Fish, “An Eye for an 
Eye: Proportionality as a Moral Principle of Punishment,” Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 28 (2008): 57-
71. 
13 Tadros, The Ends of Harm, supra note 1 at 345. 
14 There are problems with the lex talionis ideal beyond its inability to generate sufficient deterrence for 
minor offenses. With serious offenses, for instance, it can demand sentences that are unduly harsh or 
degrading, such as the rape of a rapist. And, with regulatory offenses, such as driving violations, it 
seems to offer no sentencing guidance at all. As Blackstone writes: “[T]here are very many crimes, that 
will in no shape admit of these [matching] penalties, without manifest absurdity and wickedness. Theft 
cannot be punished with theft, defamation by defamation, forgery by forgery, adultery by adultery, and 
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The second line of the objection is, I think, more fundamental. If we as-
sume that effective general deterrence requires that individual cases of punishment 
be a matter of public knowledge, it is not clear that traditional retributivists can 
justify that practice, given offenders’ right to privacy. The traditional retributivist 
concern is to deliver a deserved amount of suffering to a wrongdoer, with no direct 
concern for the interests of the wider society. It is not as if a traditional retributivist 
state could generate an offender’s allotment of retributive harm in any way it 
pleases, with no concern at all for his pre-existing rights. What if forcing offenders 
to work as slaves in fields, or to serve as medical test subjects, was the most effi-
cient way to “spend” the suffering the state was entitled to inflict upon them? It 
would not suffice to say, as a “limiting retributivist” might want to, that the state 
could “pay” for the extra humiliation and degradation by punishing for a shorter 
period of time, so that the offender ultimately experiences the same amount of 
harm.15 To violate an offender’s most basic privacy rights, which protect his inter-
est in controlling how he presents himself to others, by publicizing his wrongdoing 
and punishment would seem to be similarly unjustified, unless the rationale for punish-
ment itself demanded public punishment.16 Unless, that is, what he “owes” is to the 
community and inherently requires a violation of his privacy. Thus, a traditional 
                                               
the like.” William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, Vol. 4 [1769] (Chicago & London: 
University of Chicago Press, 1979), 13. 
15 “Limiting” retributivists, like Norval Morris and Richard Frase, believe (a) that while retributive 
desert may be a sufficient reason to punish, our conclusions about how much harm a particular offense 
warrants are imprecise, with vague upper and lower limits, such that any punishment within that range 
would be retributively legitimate and (b) that consequentialist considerations should determine the 
choice of punishment within that range. See Norval Morris, Madness and the Criminal Law (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1982), 182–87, 196–200; Richard S. Frase, “Punishment Purposes,” Stan-
ford Law Review 58 (2005): 67-84. Limiting retributivists appeal to what I call the “while we’re here” 
argument: “while we’re here exacting retribution,” they argue implicitly, “we might as well maximize 
other social goods.” The “two birds” argument is still doing the heavy lifting, but limiting retributivists 
aim to move beyond it by foregrounding deterrence as an important sentencing consideration, so long 
as its pursuit remains within the bounds of desert. 
16 On the right to privacy as protecting one’s interest in controlling his presentation to others, see 
Andrei Marmor, “What Is the Right to Privacy?” Philosophy & Public Affairs 43 (2015): 3-26; James 
Rachels, “Why Privacy Is Important,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 4 (1975): 323-33; Adam Moore, “Pri-
vacy: Its Meaning and Value,” American Philosophical Quarterly 40 (2003): 215-27. 
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retributivist state may not be able to justify the practice of publicizing an offender’s 
punishment, which we are assuming is necessary to bringing about a sufficient level 
of general deterrence. 
There are at least two replies to consider. First, one might reply that, even 
in a traditional retributivist state, a concern with having publicly accountable trials 
would override offenders’ privacy interests.17 Nonetheless, it seems that a genuine 
traditional retributivist should view public trials and punishments as sub-optimal, 
given the privacy interests of offenders and innocent defendants. And she should 
seek out creative institutional solutions that would enable trials and punishments 
to stay private, at least when so desired by defendants and offenders, while ensur-
ing a legitimate criminal process. Second, one might reply that people could be 
sufficiently deterred, even without public trials and punishments, due to a more 
abstract or general awareness of the system of punishment.18 Perhaps. That would 
seem to be a legitimate—and uncertain—empirical question. Consider, for in-
stance, the drumbeat of securities fraud prosecutions in recent years in the 
Southern District of New York.19 Of those in a position to commit securities fraud, 
would their general awareness of federal securities laws and federal prosecutors 
sufficiently replace the deterrent impact of these very public prosecutions? 
I will not pursue that question or this broader argument any further, for the 
central weakness of the traditional retributivists’ “two birds” argument for our pur-
poses is much more straightforward. It requires accepting the premise that the 
suffering of offenders, regardless of the severity of their offense, is an intrinsic good, to be 
realized even if their punishment occurred in total secrecy, and thus had no impact 
                                               
17 Thanks to Nicola Lacey for raising this objection. 
18 Thanks to Kimberly Kessler Ferzan and Patrick Tomlin for raising this objection. 
19 See Jeffrey Toobin, “The Showman: How U.S. Attorney Preet Bharara Struck Fear into Wall Street 
and Albany,” The New Yorker, May 9, 2016, https://www.newyorker.com/maga-
zine/2016/05/09/the-man-who-terrifies-wall-street; N.Y. Times: Dealbook, “Preet Bharara’s Key 
Insider Trading Cases, Oct. 6, 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/07/09/busi-
ness/dealbook/09insider-timeline.html. 
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on the level of crime, or even if it were somehow criminogenic. It is an analytic 
truth that when an intrinsic good is realized, all else equal, the world is a better 
place. To say nothing of regulatory offenses like speeding, would the world be a 
better place if, say, car thieves were made to suffer to some degree in total secrecy, 
with no impact on the crime level? At an absolute minimum, people’s convictions 
differ on this question, and we should be very hesitant to hang the legitimacy of 
the law against car theft upon answering it in the affirmative—or the legitimacy of 
every other criminal law upon affirmatively answering a parallel question. 
The “censuring” retributivism of Antony Duff and Andrew von Hirsch, for 
different reasons than the traditional retributivists, also fails to provide a safe har-
bor from the Means Problem.20 By violating “public,” communal values, on this 
view, offenders deserve the community’s censure. This censure aims at the wrong-
doer’s repentance, reformation, and reintegration into the community—a project 
internal to all censuring, Duff argues.21 Duff, though, believes that deterrence is an 
inappropriate penal aim at any level. To address citizens “in the coercive language 
of deterrence,” he writes, “is to cease to address them as members of the normative 
community.”22 Penal hard treatment is “the means by which the offender can make 
apologetic reparation to the victim,” and nothing else.23 It is a necessary part of the 
communication between the public and the offender, Duff argues, and not a 
method of scaring or threatening would-be future offenders. As a response to the 
Means Problem, Duff would thus be resorting to a version of the “two birds” 
argument. By aiming at the first bird of censure, which inherently requires penal hard 
treatment, we hit the second bird of crime prevention. 
                                               
20 See R. A. Duff, Punishment, Communication, and Community (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); 
Andrew von Hirsch, Censure and Sanctions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993). See also John Ta-
sioulas, “Punishment and Repentance,” Philosophy 81 (2006): 279-322. 
21 Duff, Punishment, Communication, and Community, supra note 20 at 80–82, 106–12. 
22 Id. at 83. 
23 Id. at 98. 
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Von Hirsch, however, is more straightforward than Duff about the need to 
prevent crime and about the limits of delivering deserved censure as a means of 
achieving that aim. He argues, I think rightly, that censure need not take the form 
of hard treatment, and could be communicated, for instance, by the mere fact of 
public conviction.24 Von Hirsch views hard treatment not as an essential compo-
nent of censure, but as a supplemental, prudential reason a legal system offers to 
citizens to desist from crime, offered in addition to the underlying moral reasons.25 
Von Hirsch attempts to mask the prudential reason in various ways, in particular 
via the argument that (a) penal hard treatment is a means of communicating cen-
sure (even if not an inherently necessary means), (b) the censure deserved for a 
given offense, in accordance with “ordinal” proportionality, depends on the 
amount delivered for other offenses, such that (c) we can incorporate hard treat-
ment into our system, while still giving offenders the censure they deserve, by 
giving more hard treatment—that is, more censure—to those who commit worse 
offenses.26 He side-steps the “cardinal” proportionality issue, though, and fails to 
explain why, even if what offenders deserve is relative to one another, the state is 
entitled to raise the entire scale of sentences upwards for the purpose of deterrence. 
That is, he fails to explain why the state is entitled to use offenders and their suf-
fering as a tool for mitigating future crime.27 
                                               
24 Von Hirsch, Censure and Sanctions, supra note 20 at 9–14. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. at 15–19, 29–70.   
27 Andrew von Hirsch and Andrew Ashworth, in outlining their joint version of censuring retributiv-
ism, argue that society should set the punishment scale as low as possible, consistent with its crime 
prevention needs, but never so high that punishment loses its status as moral communication. Within 
these bounds, they argue, ordinal proportionality ought to rule. Andrew von Hirsch and Andrew Ash-
worth, Proportionate Sentencing: Exploring the Principles (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 141–43. 
They fail to address the primary worry here about why the state is entitled to scale up sentences to any 
degree, and thereby use offenders for the purpose of crime prevention. But there is the separate ques-
tion of whether scaling up is consistent with their aim of delivering to offenders a deserved amount 
of censure. Intuitively, a punishment’s cardinal severity is highly determinative of the level of censure 
communicated. It cannot only be a matter of ordinal severity. And it seems, then, that consistent with 
their concern with delivering a proportionate amount of censure, they cannot ignore cardinal propor-
tionality, and cannot be so strategic in anchoring the punishment scale. On the complexities and 
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The framework presented below aims to secure the benefits of both utili-
tarianism and retributivism, but without their respective costs, and in so doing 
exhibit what Patrick Tomlin calls “constrained instrumentalism.”28 Like a utilitar-
ian theory, it conceives of punishment as an instrumental “evil,” rather than an 
intrinsic good, to be used for the direct purpose of crime reduction but, like a 
retributivist theory, it licenses punishment only as a proportionate response to 
someone’s culpable choices, consistent with the liberal conception of people as 
non-sacrificeable ends in themselves and a principled refusal to punish the inno-
cent. 
II. The Offender’s Consent 
Before developing that positive theory further, let us consider Alan 
Brudner’s Hegelian solution to the Means Problem.29 It relies on the basic principle 
that it is permissible to use someone as a means if he has so consented.30 If I 
volunteer for military service, for instance, it is permissible to send me into battle 
as a tool of the wider community. For the consent principle to solve the Means 
Problem offenders would have to consent to being used for the purpose of general 
deterrence. But how could this work, given that offenders rarely volunteer for pun-
ishment? It is not the consent of an offender’s “empirical self,” Brudner explains, 
but rather of his fiduciary, “someone the empirical individual could accept as a rep-
resentative consenting on its behalf.”31 This is the offender’s “thinking Agent” 
according to Brudner, a “notional person” who has neither subjective ends of its 
                                               
limitations of the retributivist ideal of the proportional penal sentence, see Nicola Lacey and Hanna 
Pickard, “The Chimera of Proportionality: Institutionalising Limits on Punishment in Contemporary 
Social and Political Systems,” Modern Law Review 78 (2015): 216-40 (arguing that the proportionality 
ideal is a “chimera” and incapable, as a purely ideational or philosophical matter, of determining sen-
tence length). 
28 Tomlin, “Innocence Lost,” supra note 5 at 226. 
29 I am grateful to Peter Ramsay for illuminating discussions on the Hegelian theory of punishment. 
30 There are likely limits to this principle. As Brudner himself argues, consent could not legitimate 
slavery. Alan Brudner, Punishment and Freedom: A Liberal Theory of Penal Justice (Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2009), 299. 
31 Id. at 3. 
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own (i.e. no particular desires or purposes) nor knowledge of its “principal’s” sub-
jective ends, and who is exclusively concerned with its principal’s formal 
“independence,” that is, its principal’s formal freedom to choose and pursue sub-
jective ends.32 The concept of the “thinking Agent” seems to be a stand-in for our 
unencumbered, unadulterated capacity for formal agency. As this capacity forms 
part of our metaphysical essence and identity, Brudner seems to imply, it can make 
commitments on our behalf. The relationship between the thinking Agent and its 
principal—and the ontological status of the thinking Agent—is, in the end, 
opaque. 
The “right” for Brudner, broadly following Hegel, consists of the “frame-
work of mutual respect” that follows from the principle of “securing the greatest 
extent of equal liberty” for agents.33 Legal rights, by guaranteeing each agent’s in-
dependence, constitute the framework of mutual respect. When an offender chooses 
to violate one of these rights, say, by assaulting someone, he rejects this framework 
of mutual respect, Brudner argues. His action denies, implicitly, that there are “in-
violable spheres of liberty” around agents, and thereby upholds the principle that 
rights do not exist.34 Let us call this principle the Criminal Principle. Actions for 
Brudner (and Hegel) are something like laws for Ronald Dworkin; what they are, 
all the way down, is in part the principles that justify them.35 To assault someone, 
then, is not just to assault someone; it is also to espouse or lay down the Criminal 
Principle, the “claim to an unlimited liberty” that would justify the assault.36 The 
Criminal Principle is “self-contradictory,” Brudner continues, because its denial of 
the existence of rights means, for instance, that the assaulter could not complain if 
                                               
32 Id. at 4. 
33 Id. at 78. 
34 Id. at 77. 
35 Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986). 
36 Brudner, Punishment and Freedom, supra note 30 at 40. 
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someone assaulted him in turn.37 Almost as a matter of logical necessity in response 
to the Criminal Principle’s self-contradiction, the system of mutual recognition—
the law—will act to deny its validity.38 This denial will take the form of punishment. 
The reason for punishing, in sum for Brudner, is to establish the normative au-
thority of the law; it “is to deny a practical denial of rights that would appear valid 
were its self-contradictoriness not practically demonstrated,” thereby “vindicating 
the normative authority of mutual recognition.”39 
The offender has no complaint to being used as a means to vindicate the 
authority of the law, Brudner argues, because via his offense he has affirmed the 
general validity of the Criminal Principle, and thus has consented to its application 
against himself in the form of punishment. As a response to the Means Problem, 
then, Brudner would resort to the “two birds” argument, as well. As a byproduct 
of “realizing right” and vindicating the authority of the law—consistent with the 
offender’s own consent—the state acts to deter crime. Indeed, Brudner explicitly 
endorses a form of “limiting retributivism,” arguing that (a) the state will, ideally, 
limit the offender’s liberty to same degree that he limited the liberty of his victim, 
but given that (b) this determination is extremely vague, then (c) “within the 
bounds of ordinal proportionality, crime prevention concerns can militate against 
punishments that are too light…”40 
While I find the general thrust of the Hegelian theory of punishment at-
tractive, insofar as it conceives of punishment as reinforcing a system of legal 
norms, I do not see how Brudner’s theory of consent could ground a resolution to 
the Means Problem. Let us outline his conception of consent in a little more detail. 
                                               
37 Alice Ristroph questions whether the Criminal Principle is necessarily self-contradictory, given that 
one could at least coherently endorse an “every-man-for-himself view.” Alice Ristroph, “When Free-
dom Isn’t Free,” New Criminal Law Review 14 (2011): 468-485, at 476. 
38 See Alan Brudner, “The Contraction of Crime in Hegel’s Rechtsphilosophie,” in ed. Markus D. Dubber, 
Foundational Texts in Modern Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 141-62, at 153-59. 
39 Brudner, Punishment and Freedom, supra note 30 at 51. 
40 Id. at 55. See discussion supra note 15. 
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It is the consent of the offender’s thinking Agent rather than his empirical person 
that counts for Brudner, and this consent is forthcoming via the thinking Agent 
generalizing the Criminal Principle as a principle applicable for all agents.41 The 
thought—not spelled out by Brudner—is that thinking Agents, by representing 
pure formal agency in the German idealist mold, act only for reasons (rather than 
animalistic instinct) and it is the nature of such reasons that they are generalizable, 
applying with equal force to all similarly situated agents. Thus, when the offender 
assaults his victim, “the thinking Agent standing in [his] shoes,” to use Brudner’s 
phrase, will have acted on a reason, that reason being the Criminal Principle, which 
the thinking Agent therefore affirms as a general principle to be applied by others 
against itself, ultimately in the form of punishment of the empirical person.42 The 
central problem with this argument is that the thinking Agent, as constituted by 
Brudner, would never have broken the law in the first place, so maintaining that 
the Agent nonetheless affirms the principle that justifies breaking the law seems 
unavailable. As Brudner writes of the thinking Agent: “having no subjective ends, 
it forbears from wrong (wills the right) for the sake of its dignity alone.”43 It is only 
by flouting the principles of one’s thinking Agent that one could ever lay down the 
Criminal Principle. The thinking Agent, concerned only with formal freedom, and 
armed with the Hegelian and Kantian understanding that law and only law can 
guarantee this freedom, will demand that its principal follow the law. Indeed, given 
the thinking Agent’s ignorance of subjective ends, following the law amounts to 
its singular purpose and principle. It demands and only demands that its principal 
follow the law. As such, we could never impute affirmation of the Criminal Prin-
ciple to the thinking Agent and could not thereby hang this affirmation on the 
empirical person that is the offender. The notion of a thinking Agent binding a 
                                               
41 Id. at 40. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. at 45. 
 
 
 
 
38 
principal makes more sense in the frame of social contract theory, arguably, which 
is not the one chosen by Brudner. It seems misguided to argue, as Brudner does, 
that a thinking Agent can bind its principal in the real world—as opposed to a 
hypothetical contract writing setting—via the principal’s own decisions, which the 
thinking Agent would never have endorsed were it in charge.44 Thus, I believe, we 
cannot resolve the Means Problem through the complex Hegelian theory of con-
sent.   
But what of traditional social contract theories as a method of resolving the 
Means Problem?  Could we not point to a hypothetical social contract to demon-
strate the offender’s consent to his punishment? I am skeptical. I follow those who 
argue that as a method of establishing bonafide moral consent, in parallel to a legal 
contract, a hypothetical contract is “not worth the paper it isn’t written on.”45 As 
Ronald Dworkin writes, “A hypothetical contract is not simply a pale form of con-
tract; it is no contract at all.”46 If a social contract is, rather, “only an idea of reason,” 
as Kant writes, then contract theorists are back to square one with regard to the 
Means Problem, though with a particular intellectual toolkit based on a conception 
of the polity as a system of mutual restraint that benefits each member.47 Neither 
should we accept John Rawls’ conception of “pure procedural justice,” where the 
                                               
44 This echoes Alan Norrie’s criticism of Kant’s punishment theory. “In designing a justification of 
punishment in terms of an abstract ideal being,” Norrie writes, “Kant unavoidably only justifies pun-
ishment of abstract ideal beings—who never commit crimes anyway.” Alan Norrie, Law, Ideology, and 
Punishment (Norwell, MA: Kluwer, 1991), 62; see also Jeffrie G. Murphy, “Kant’s Theory of Criminal 
Punishment,” in Retribution, Justice, and Therapy: Essays in the Philosophy of Law, ed. Wilfrid Sellars (Dor-
drecht: D. Reidel Publishing, 1979), 82-92.  For further criticism of Brudner’s idea that a thinking 
Agent can bind its principal, see Ristroph, “When Freedom Isn’t Free,” supra note 37 at 473-74.  
45 G.A. Cohen uses this phrase to describe the “anti-contractarian” argument. G.A. Cohen, Rescuing 
Justice and Equality (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2008), at 341. Cohen rejects the “con-
structivist” approach to social justice more generally. See Cohen, id. at 274-343. 
46 Ronald Dworkin, “The Original Position,” in ed. Norman Daniels, Reading Rawls: Critical Studies on 
Rawls’ ‘A Theory of Justice’ (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1975), 16-52, at 18. See also Dworkin, Taking Rights 
Seriously, supra note 3 at 150-183; Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, supra note 3 at 183-231. 
47 Immanuel Kant, “On the common saying: That may be correct in theory, but it is of no use in 
practice” [1793], in ed. and trans. Mary Gregor, Practical Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1996), 296 (8:297). 
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hypothetical contract procedure, even if only an “idea of reason,” generates nec-
essarily valid principles that are unimpeachable by reference to non-contractual 
reasons.48 Any political principle will generate winners and losers, and we need to 
provide a genuine explanation to someone who is worse off as a result of that 
principle as to why she has no complaint or at least no dispositive complaint.49 
Asserting, without further explanation, that the principle derives from the logic of 
the Original Position will not suffice. As Hume explains in relation to Locke’s so-
cial contract theory, if a social agreement, hypothetical or otherwise, is a source of 
authoritative reasons, it will be so as a result of the very reasons that the parties 
themselves had to contract with one another, not the bare fact of the contract 
itself.50 Though, as Samuel Freeman explains, Hume’s critique does not rule out 
the possibility that the concept of a social contract is necessary for organizing and 
inferring our political reasons.51    
What explanation, then, using the toolkit of this “moderate” contractual-
ism, could the state offer to offenders to explain why it can use them for the 
purpose of mitigating crime, given that, in accordance with the moderate view, it 
can assert neither (a) that they have genuinely consented to such punishment nor 
(b) that the results of the hypothetical contract are inherently just and immune 
from external criticism? Murphy’s fair play retributivism—the explanation that of-
fenders took advantage of others’ restraint and deserve to have their unfair 
advantage stripped away via punishment—is the primary punishment theory stem-
ming from this form of contractualism.52 But aside from viewing the suffering of 
                                               
48 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 3, at 85-86, 201. 
49 See Thomas Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press, 1998). 
50 David Hume, “Of the Original Contract” [1748] in his Essays: Moral, Political, and Literary [1777] 
(reprinted Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1985), 465–87. 
51 Samuel Freeman, “Original Position,” in ed. Edward N. Zalta, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philoso-
phy (Winter 2016 Edition), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/original-position/. 
52 For other contractualist theories, see, e.g., Christopher W. Morris, “Punishment and Loss of Moral 
Standing,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 21 (1991): 53-79; Emmanuel Melissaris, “Toward a Political 
Theory of Criminal Law: A Critical Rawlsian Account,” New Criminal Law Review 15 (2012): 122-55; 
Claire Finkelstein, “A Contractarian Approach to Punishment,” in eds. Martin P. Golding and William 
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offenders’ as an intrinsic good, as discussed above, this view depends upon the 
conclusion that offenders have in fact “gained” from their offenses, at least in the 
sense that they have been able to live in an unrestrained manner. M. Margaret Falls 
outlines some of the challenges of maintaining that an offender has profited from 
his wrongdoing: 
“One must acknowledge, for example, that the unpunished rapist is 
really better off than men and women who resist the temptation or 
feel no temptation to rape. Also one has to reject seemingly healthy 
and reasonable emotions generally felt towards criminals as inappro-
priate or at least as misleading and based on illusions. Amidst our 
anger at a Charles Manson or a Lizzie Borden, we feel a mixture of 
disgust, pity, and horror—disgust at what they allowed themselves 
to become, pity over what they have done to themselves in becom-
ing that, and horror that becoming such is a possibility for each of 
us. These are not the emotions we have towards someone who has 
gained an advantage over us; and while to some these emotions may 
seem the residue of a fairytale-picture of humanity, their strength 
and intuitive appropriateness should make us slow to accept the rec-
iprocity theory’s view.”53 
Beyond concluding that a murderer or rapist has profited from his offense, 
the fair play theory requires the further conclusion that the central reason we pun-
ish him is to strip away such gain. Would the criminal trial thus be centered on the 
question of how much advantage the offender acquired, in terms of the extent to 
which he allowed himself to be unrestrained, such that offenses that we are more 
tempted to commit deserve more punishment? But what then of the fact that we 
seem less tempted by mala in se offenses than by mala prohibita offenses, as Antony 
Duff argues?54 Would fair play theory entail that the former deserve less 
                                               
A. Edmundson, The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory (Malden, MA: Blackwell 
Publishing, 2005), 207-20; Corey Brettschneider, “The Rights of the Guilty: Punishment and Political 
Legitimacy,” Political Theory 35 (2007): 175-99. 
53 M. Margaret Falls, “Retribution, Reciprocity, and Respect for Persons,” Law and Philosophy 6 (1987): 
25-51, at 31-2; see also Don E. Sheid, “Davis and the Unfair-Advantage Theory of Punishment: A 
Critique,” Philosophical Topics 18 (1990): 143–70. 
54 See R.A. Duff, Trials and Punishments (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 213 (“[T]alk of 
the criminal’s unfair advantage implies that obedience to the law is a burden for us all: but is this true 
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punishment than the latter? Should we take into account the offender’s ill-gotten 
material advantage, as well, such that the successful fraudster perhaps deserves 
more punishment than the murderer? Fair play theory, as Duff explains, makes 
more sense in the realm of mala prohibita offenses (e.g. it seems that we all are 
tempted to speed while driving, and that the speeder has indeed profited from 
everyone else’s restraint). Though, even there, once more, it requires the conclu-
sion that harming the offender—the speeder—is justified as the creation of an 
intrinsic good, to be realized even if it happened entirely in secret, with no deterrent 
impact at all. And, regardless, it is surely fatal to a theory of punishment if it fails 
to justify, or to easily justify, mala in se offenses like murder and rape.   
III. A System of Protections 
A. The Function of the Criminal Law 
In responding to the Means Problem, as indicated above, this chapter con-
ceives of the criminal law as a system of protections. The criminal law aims to 
protect us from, say, the “specific crimes” listed in Part II of the Model Penal 
Code: homicide, assault, reckless endangering, terroristic threats, kidnapping, false 
imprisonment, rape, arson, burglary, theft, forgery, deceptive business practices, 
bribery, corruption, perjury, riot, public drunkenness, and so forth.55 We rely upon 
these protections in our interactions with other people and, crucially, in planning 
such interactions. Beyond our safety, we also rely upon them to secure our privacy 
away from others in, say, our homes and cars. In this way, our assured liberty, un-
derstood broadly in accordance with neo-republican theorists, depends on the 
reliability of the criminal law.56 People with assured liberty, as Philip Pettit writes, 
                                               
of such mala in se? Surely many of us do not find it a burden to obey the laws against murder and rape, 
or need to restrain ourselves from such crimes: how then does the murderer or rapist gain an unfair 
advantage over the rest of us, by evading a burden of self-restraint which we accept?”). 
55 Model Penal Code (American Law Institute 1962), §§ 210–251 [hereinafter MPC]. 
56 See Philip Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1997); Quentin Skinner, Liberty Before Liberalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Philip 
Pettit, “Freedom as Antipower,” Ethics 106 (1996): 576-604; John Braithwaite and Philip Pettit, Not 
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are “possessed, not just of non-interference by arbitrary powers, but of a secure or 
resilient variety of such non-interference.”57 To be sure, regulatory “violations” 
like speeding form part of this narrative.58 By promulgating such offenses, the state 
aims to protect people from dangerous drivers, so that they can drive on public 
roads with a relative degree of safety and reasonably rely upon that safety in plan-
ning their days and lives. 
An effective criminal law, on this view, is nothing less than the fundament 
of the modern social world. It is central to the “King’s Peace” and the existence of 
society itself, insofar as the reasonable reliability of at least its major provisions 
renders Hobbesian, preemptive violence irrational.59 We are bathed in these most 
basic criminal law protections when we, say, walk in a busy public park with relative 
confidence, or when we sleep soundly in our beds. The criminal law is central to a 
                                               
travels only so far with republican theorists. While it accepts—and aims to clarify—the republican 
ideal of an assured and reliable civic liberty, it questions the republican conception of liberty itself, of 
what, exactly, is meant to be assured in society. Republicans understand liberty to be the state of “non-
domination,” whereby other people lack the capacity to interfere with your life in a discretionary or 
arbitrary manner. See Pettit, Republicanism, supra at 51–79. “[F]ree persons,” Pettit writes, “do not de-
pend on anyone’s grace or favour for being able to choose their mode of life.” Philip Pettit, 
“Criminalization in Republican Theory,” in eds. R.A. Duff, et. al., Criminalization: The Political Morality 
of the Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 132-50, at 138. But, as I will discuss below, 
an effective criminal law depends on the self-application of criminal legal norms by people within the 
jurisdiction. As such, there is no escaping dependence on others’ “grace or favour,” at least to some 
degree, given that they could choose not to self-apply the criminal law. The assured liberty ideal, in 
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people to exercise such power reasonably and in accordance with promulgated rules. See Thomas W. 
Simpson, “The Impossibility of Republican Freedom,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 45 (2017): 27-53 
(arguing that “freedom as non-domination” is unachievable, because either the state dominates the 
citizens or the citizens retain the power to dominate each other). 
57 Pettit, Republicanism, supra note 56 at 69. 
58 See MPC, supra note 55 at § 1.05 (providing that an offense is a noncriminal “violation” if no sentence 
other than a fine or other civil penalty is authorized upon conviction). The view presented here would 
not make such a hard distinction between “noncriminal” violations and truly “criminal” offenses, un-
derstanding them both to be part of the same regulatory project. 
59 See Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan [1651], ed. Richard Tuck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1996), 86–90 (arguing that the state of nature is marked by preemptive violence, a “warre of every man 
against every man”); Alice Ristroph, “Hobbes on “Diffidence” and the Criminal Law,” in ed. Markus 
D. Dubber, Foundational Texts in Modern Criminal Law  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 23-38 
(Markus D. Dubber ed., 2014) (explaining that Hobbes understood the formation of the criminal law 
to be a response to “diffidence,” the anxiety that people have about their security and standing in 
relation to each other). 
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well-functioning society, too, by enabling the possibility of relatively assured mutually 
beneficial cooperation.60 I cooperate with people in the creation of a marketable 
product, for instance, only if I am relatively secure in the knowledge that neither 
they nor others could steal it with impunity. As Lindsay Farmer writes, “The crim-
inal law’s role in the management of social life is to curb passions and impulsive 
behavior, stabilizing expectations about the conduct of others and helping to es-
tablish relationships of trust.”61 Of course, other forms of law, like contract law, 
and non-legal social norms,62 like the practice of being “neighborly” with those 
who live nearby, enable cooperation as well. I would venture, though, following 
Hobbes, that these more refined means of civilization depend for their possibility 
on a background of relatively effective criminal law. I consider the empirical foun-
dations of this view in Section VIII. 
This conception of the criminal law is connected to Nicola Lacey’s com-
munitarian theory, where we punish not for crude moralistic or utilitarian reasons, 
but for a particular function, to preserve, as Lacey writes, “a framework of com-
mon values within which human beings can develop and flourish.”63 It also 
                                               
60 See Lindsay Farmer, Making the Modern Criminal Law: Criminalization and Civil Order (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2016), 37–60. 
61 Id. at 193. 
62 See generally Robert C. Ellickson, Order Without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes (Cambridge, Mass 
and London: Harvard University Press, 1991); Eric A. Posner, “The Regulation of Groups: The In-
fluence of Legal and Nonlegal Sanctions on Collective Action,” University of Chicago Law Review 63 
(1996): 133-97. 
63 Nicola Lacey, State Punishment: Political Principles and Community Values (London and New York: 
Routledge, 1988), 169–201. See also John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Ox-
ford University Press, 2011) (“The ‘goal’ of the familiar modern systems of criminal law can only be 
described as a certain form or quality of communal life, in which the demands of the common good 
indeed are unambiguously and insistently preferred to selfish indifference or individualistic demands 
for licence but also are recognized as including the good of individual autonomy, so that in this mode 
of association no one is made to live his life for the benefit or convenience of others, and each is 
enabled to conduct his own life (to constitute himself over his span of time) with a clear knowledge 
and foreknowledge of the appropriate common way and of the cost of deviation from it.”); Neil Mac-
Cormick, Institutions of Law: An Essay in Legal Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), at 293 
(“An effective and properly functioning system of criminal law and criminal justice is essential for that 
relative security of mutual expectations which is a condition of the civility of civil society.); Hyman 
Gross, A Theory of Criminal Justice (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), 10 (“The criminal 
law…establishes rules of conduct whose observance allows us to enjoy life in society, and in addition 
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dovetails with Farmer’s argument that “securing civil order is a general and contin-
uing aim of the criminal law,”64 where “civil order” is understood as a distinctly 
legal form of social order, which “is not primarily about moral community, but 
about the co-ordination of complex modern societies…”65 In sum, on the view 
presented here we punish not to give wrongdoers a deserved allotment of suffering 
or condemnation, nor merely to reduce the aggregate level of harm or pain, but to 
enable and protect a community—a community of strangers living together in so-
ciety—and the system of rules that offers these strangers the possibility of assured 
liberty and thereby of human flourishing.  
An effective criminal law, in this way, is partly constitutive of the Rule of 
Law ideal. Respect for the Rule of Law is a virtue of societies, not merely of govern-
ments, as Rule of Law theorists tend to suggest. The Rule of Law demands fidelity 
to law by the government, of course, but also by the citizenry. More substantive 
conceptions of the Rule of Law, which dovetail with the neo-republican concep-
tion of assured liberty, maintain that the Rule of Law has value because it provides 
individuals with a secure place to stand within society, and secure pathways in 
which to move. We can appreciate how, on such a view, knowing when and where 
other citizens may be waiting to strike, in addition to knowing when and where the 
state itself may be waiting, is of paramount importance.66 
B. A Distinctive View 
This interpretation of the criminal law’s function—as a system of protec-
tions upon which a cooperative civil society and the assured liberty of each citizen 
depends—is relatively provocative and distinctive within contemporary criminal 
                                               
provides punishment for violation of these rules, for the rules would not be taken seriously enough by 
enough people to be generally effective if they could be broken with impunity.”). 
64 Farmer, Making the Modern Criminal Law, supra note 60 at 27 (emphasis added). 
65 Id. at 193; see also id. at 299. 
66 On the distinction between “formal” and “substantive” conceptions of the Rule of Law, see Paul P. 
Craig, “Formal and Substantive Conceptions of the Rule of Law: An Analytical Framework,” Public 
Law 21 (1997): 467-87; Jeremy Waldron, The Rule of Law and the Measure of Property (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2012). 
 
 
 
 
45 
law theory (I think surprisingly). Let us compare it with the retributivist and “re-
constructivist” conceptions of the criminal law’s function. The aim is to 
demonstrate the distinctiveness of this view, but also to critique these theories in-
directly, by establishing their inability to account for what is, I hope, an intuitive 
and attractive understanding of the criminal law’s function. 
My discussion of retributivism here will be brief. What is the function of 
the criminal law on the retributivist view? Rather than a system of protections, 
retributivists would understand the criminal law to be a public schedule of interpersonal 
wrongs, the commission of which demands the imposition of suffering or censure, 
as discussed above. The retributivist narrative is of the state punishing a wrongdoer 
for creating a victim. The reliance interest of non-victims on the criminal law plays 
no role in the story, or at least no direct role. A retributivist criminal law is, in these 
ways, an essentially moral rather than political project, and it lacks the resources to 
articulate the idea that an effective criminal law is constitutive of the Rule of Law 
and a source of assured liberty for all people within the jurisdiction.67  
Let us now consider Joshua Kleinfeld’s “reconstructivist” theory of the 
criminal law, which he believes captures the perspectives of a disparate group of 
historical and contemporary authors, in particular Hegel and Durkheim.68 Whereas 
Brudner focuses on Hegel’s conception of freedom, Kleinfeld argues that the func-
tion of the criminal law is to maintain society’s “embodied ethical life”—what 
Hegel termed Sittlichkeit—upon which its solidarity depends69:  
“Ethical life is broad: it is not just a set of moral imperatives (thou-
shalts and thou-shalt-nots) but also rights, values, teleologically 
structured social institutions and practices, conceptions of good and 
bad character and good and bad lives, normatively laden social roles 
                                               
67 On the distinction between “moral” and “political” theories of punishment, see Peter Ramsay, “Im-
prisonment and Political Equality” (LSE Legal Studies, Working Paper No. 8/2015); Corey 
Brettschneider, Democratic Rights: The Substance of Self-Government (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2007), 96–113. 
68 Joshua Kleinfeld, “Reconstructivism: The Place of Criminal Law in Ethical Life,” Harvard Law Review 
129 (2016): 1485-1565. 
69 Id. at 1487 (defining Sittlichkeit); id. at 1489 n. 2 (distinguishing his approach from Brudner’s). 
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and social structures, evaluative understandings and outlooks, and 
more.”70 
 
It is a conception of society as a dense network of norms. Like Brudner, Kleinfeld 
understands social practices and institutions—as well as individual actions—to be 
constituted in part by the principles and values that justify them. And a crime, in 
this way, represents a rejection of society’s norms. A murder is not just a killing, 
but also an expressive denial of the norm, say, that people have a certain priceless 
worth. Unlike Brudner, however, Kleinfeld does not argue that, as a result of his 
actions, the offender has consented to his punishment. Kleinfeld emphasizes the 
communitarian rather than the liberal aspects of his guiding theorists. And the 
function of punishment, Kleinfeld argues, is to expressively reaffirm the values 
that a crime has rejected. Punishment thus ensures that the value in question is 
“real” and “embodied,” rather than merely abstract and notional. “The state in the 
criminal context,” Kleinfeld concludes, “should be the embodiment and protector 
of society’s lived moral culture—its way of life.”71 
Kleinfeld views his project as, in part, a sociological inquiry. And if he is 
right about the criminal law’s function as a sociological matter, then a jurisdiction’s 
criminal law should be nothing less than the negative image of its entire normative 
universe. An alien anthropologist should be able to understand the American (or 
French or Spanish) “embodied ethical life” or “way of life” by reverse engineering 
its criminal law. But of all the norms that guide social interactions in modern soci-
ety, it seems that the criminal law guarantees the “reality” of only a small fraction. 
When reporting back to its esteemed colleagues on the culture of “the Americans,” 
the alien anthropologist, with only the Model Penal Code to show for its journey, 
would state that they are a people that believe it is wrong to kill, to steal, to rape, 
to move about in public spaces recklessly, and so forth, recounting all the crimes 
                                               
70 Id. at 1490. 
71 Kleinfeld, “Reconstructivism,” supra note 68 at 1555. 
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listed in Part II. Its colleagues might then reply: “Yes, yes, we understand that they 
live in relative peace—that they are relatively civilized. But tell us about their culture, 
about their lived normative universe. You are an anthropologist, after all. All you 
have to show us is their criminal code?” 
As Vincent Chiao notes, Durkheim claimed in The Division of Labor in Society 
that punishment was a privileged means of maintaining societies with “mechani-
cal” solidarity, which are characterized by the similarities and undifferentiated 
social roles of their members.72 But it did not play such a fundamental role, Durk-
heim continued, in societies with “organic” solidarity, which exhibit complex 
forms of cooperation enabled by the differences of their members. In the latter 
forms of society, like contemporary America, Durkheim understood that citizens 
generate solidarity and a shared normative order not only, or even primarily, 
through the criminal law, but as a result of an interdependent civil society. For 
instance, the (defeasible) norm against insubordination to one’s boss, while surely 
part of the American “embodied ethical life,” is not enforced through the criminal 
law, but rather through the mechanisms of a capitalist civil society; if you are in-
subordinate you may get fired and lose your income. Kleinfeld the sociologist 
would have difficulty explaining this outcome. And Kleinfeld the philosopher 
would have difficulty explaining why the criminal law ought not to expand to en-
force this norm, and all other norms in our “collective consciousness.”73 
The point of this section, once more, has not been to engage with the merits 
of retributivism or reconstructivism directly.74 Beyond demonstrating the relative 
distinctiveness of the conception of the criminal law as a system of protections 
upon which a cooperative civil society and the assured liberty of each citizen 
                                               
72 Vincent Chiao, “A Response to Professor Kleinfeld’s Reconstructivism: The Place of Criminal Law 
in Ethical Life,” Harvard Law Review Forum 129 (2016): 258-67, at 264-65; Emile Durkheim, The Division 
of Labor in Society (1893), trans. W.D. Halls (London: Macmillan, 1984), 31–87. 
73 Kleinfeld, “Reconstructivism,” supra note 65 at 1493 (explaining that his conception of “embodied 
ethical life” parallels Durkheim’s notion of a society’s “collective consciousness”). 
74 I consider reconstructivism further below. See infra note 97. 
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depends, the aim has been to critique these two views indirectly, by demonstrating 
their inability to articulate and justify this understanding of the criminal law’s func-
tion. Retributivists, viewing the criminal law as a public schedule of interpersonal 
moral wrongs, prove far too little, while reconstructivists, viewing the criminal law 
as the enforcer of a society’s entire normative universe, prove far too much. 
IV. Criminality and Legal Reliance 
A. The Method of the Criminal Law 
Moving forward, what we want from the criminal law is a system of pro-
tections that we can reasonably rely upon in the planning and execution of our 
lives, but we want to secure this system consistent with a commitment to human 
inviolability, that is, consistent with a refusal to sacrifice people as a means of mit-
igating harms or threats for which they lack responsibility. The linchpin of this 
project is an understanding of how, exactly, the criminal law works—how it oper-
ates to provide protection and secure our reasonable reliance. The criminal law, as 
a distinctly legal form of protection, depends upon the normative capacities of 
people within the jurisdiction. This is the method of the criminal law, as indicated 
above. As opposed to the brutish and unpredictable coercion of non-legal modes 
of governance, legal systems ask citizens to grasp prospective rules and standards 
and regulate their own conduct accordingly. As Jeremy Waldron writes: 
“Self-application is an extraordinarily important feature of the way 
legal systems operate. They work by using, rather than short-circuit-
ing, the agency of ordinary human individuals. They count on 
people’s capacities for practical understanding, for self-control, for 
self-monitoring and modulation of their own behaviour in relation 
to norms that they can grasp and understand.”75 
 
                                               
75 Jeremy Waldron, “How Law Protects Dignity,” Cambridge Law Journal 71 (2012): 200-222, at 206. See 
also HLA Hart, Punishment and Responsibility (Oxford: Clarendon, 1968), at 227-30; Farmer, supra note 
60 at 166.  
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Legal systems, in this manner, are more efficient and powerful means of 
governance than non-legal systems.76 When it comes to the latter, the state must 
be more involved; when you get citizens to do things at the barrel of a gun, you 
need to actually be there, with a gun. When it comes to law, the state can simply 
promulgate a rule, which citizens are then expected to perceive and self-apply. 
Thus, when someone relies upon a legal protection, she is relying, in large part, 
upon the self-application of the relevant norm by other people in the jurisdiction. 
More than an assurance that the state will be there, positively intervening to pre-
vent people from doing X or Y, the criminal law assures, or rather aims to assure, 
that people will uphold the legal rules that prohibit X or Y. When I rely upon the 
criminal laws against car theft or murder, as indicated above, I am not relying upon 
the police to wait by my car or my person, like personal guards, but rather upon 
people self-applying the legal norms against stealing cars and murdering people. If 
the threat of punishment generates much of our reliance upon the law’s protec-
tions—that is, if people self-apply legal norms for prudential rather than moral 
reasons, out of fear of the criminal sanction—it does not ruin this story; indeed, 
that is the very purpose of punishment on this view, as I will explain. 
B. Criminality 
With this framework in mind—of the criminal law as a system of protec-
tions that depends for its effectiveness on people self-applying legal norms—we 
can begin to understand the antagonistic relationship between the objective threat 
of crime and the function of the criminal law to provide people with a map of 
when and where they can be safe from the incursions of others. Crime, considered 
as a general phenomenon within a jurisdiction, diminishes the reliability of this 
map. Can I rely upon the protection against car theft? In considering this question, 
I need to know the prevalence of car theft within the jurisdiction. Or, more 
                                               
76 See Joseph Raz, “The Rule of Law and Its Virtue,” in The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), 210-229. 
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specifically—and here is the point—I need to know how much ongoing intent 
there is within the jurisdiction to steal cars. The greater the aggregate intent, the 
less reasonably I can rely upon the protection. If Alice intends to steal a car, then, 
in combination with others intending to steal cars, she weakens the reliability of 
the legal protection against car theft upon which citizens are meant to rely. She 
contributes to a social threat that makes buying, leasing, and using cars more ex-
pensive and perilous. 
We want to know, then, how many people are failing to self-apply each 
criminal law, and to what degree. What this means will depend on the mens rea of 
the offense. A failure to self-apply a criminal law with intent mens rea, like the law 
against car theft, involves having an intention to commit the prohibited act. A failure 
to self-apply such a law can come in degrees when considered over time, as be-
tween someone who has an intention to steal a car only one time and a professional 
car thief who has such an intention repeatedly; they have both failed to self-apply 
the law, but the latter to a greater degree. A failure to self-apply a criminal law with 
recklessness or negligence mens rea, meanwhile, involves having a willingness to act 
in a manner that the law deems overly risky or careless.77 Consider, for instance, a 
person who has few qualms about driving recklessly, and who occasionally drives 
at very high speeds through school zones, among other reckless driving acts. He 
does not intend to hurt anybody with his car, but he is willing to bring into the 
world an unreasonably high risk of that outcome. In this way, he would be failing 
to self-apply the legal norm against reckless driving—though to a lesser degree 
                                               
77 This assumes that the norm was non-coercive and genuinely legal, following Lon Fuller’s theory of 
law, such that self-application was possible. This would require at least a due diligence defense for 
negligence offenses, but I will not engage with those issues here. See Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law, 
rev. ed. (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1969) (arguing that purported legal rules 
count as genuine law only if they cohere with the “principles of legality”: generality, publicity, prospec-
tivity, intelligibility, consistency, feasibility, constancy through time, and congruence between the rules 
as announced and as enforced). 
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than someone who has absolutely no qualms about driving recklessly, and who 
routinely drives at very high speeds through school zones.78 
If an offender exhibits any such form of mens rea, the broader point is that 
he is normatively committed to performing the prohibited act in the normal course of 
future events.79 He could change his view as to the authority of the relevant legal 
reasons and “unsettle” his commitment, to be sure, but that does not alter the fact 
that until this happens he is, to some degree, coming for us (and thereby contributing 
to the objective threat of crime). How does the impulsive offender fit into this 
story?80 First, he does so as soon as he has an intention or willingness to perform 
a prohibited act, even if, due to his impulsivity, the intention or willingness is es-
tablished only thirty seconds before he commits the act. The threat of crime will 
vary over time, of course, and his surprising act could mean, perhaps, that we have 
underestimated the threat level for that time and place; in such cases, less than 
chilling the exercise of our rights or forcing us to take expensive precautions, the 
threat of crime exposes us to unreasonable risks of harm. In short, an intention or 
willingness to break the law need not be the enduring and regular commitment of 
the professional criminal. An intention or willingness to break a law only one time, 
whether formed impulsively or otherwise, would suffice. Second, we might under-
stand someone’s unchecked and aggressive impulsivity to constitute a willingness 
to act recklessly in a diffuse criminal fashion, such that we can depend on him to 
perform a range of criminal acts in the normal course of future events. But how 
could we know that someone was impulsive in this manner? How could we know, 
indeed, that anybody was “normatively committed” to offending? As I discuss fur-
ther below, the central piece of evidence just is someone’s past offense, which 
                                               
78 Thanks to Peter Ramsay for helpful discussion on this point. 
79 By normal course of future events, I mean assuming that nothing entirely unexpected occurs, like 
an asteroid strike or the offender’s untimely death. 
80 Thanks to Nicola Lacey and Patrick Tomlin for pressing me to clarify this point. 
 
 
 
 
52 
represents dispositive evidence of his past intention or willingness to offend, but 
merely some evidence of his ongoing intention or willingness to offend.81 
Let us say that someone with an intention or willingness to perform a crim-
inal act is unreasonably unreliable with regard to the self-application of the associated 
criminal law (with the understanding that there are varying degrees of unreliability). 
Let us say, furthermore, that to be unreliable in this way is to contribute to society’s 
level of criminality. At least two distinctions are key to understanding this concept 
of criminality. First, we can distinguish between the synchronic criminality level (in a 
specific moment) and the diachronic criminality level (over time). The former relates 
particularly to the question: What is the threat of crime that we are facing right 
now? The latter, meanwhile, relates particularly to the question: What is the average 
threat of crime that we face, moving forward, as we plan our lives? Second, we can 
distinguish between “general” and “specific” criminality. We tend to focus on the 
level of “general criminality,” since we tend to rely on the criminal law as a whole 
as a general provider of effective protections. When we walk down the street, for 
example, we are relying on homicide offenses, non-fatal offenses against the per-
son, driving offenses, and so forth. It is in this sense that we refer to the criminal 
law as a system of protections. A 1998 study was concerned with general criminality 
levels when it reported that, in the prior 12 months, 25% of the residents of Amer-
ica’s largest cities had avoided leaving their homes at night to prevent becoming a 
victim of crime, and 25% had avoided going out alone.82 Sometimes, however, we 
are concerned with the “specific criminality” level of a particular offense, say, of 
car theft when purchasing car theft insurance or parking our car. Regardless, the 
“general criminality” level is just composed of the “specific criminality” levels for 
each offense. 
                                               
81 See discussion infra at 65-6.  
82 Steven K. Smith, et. al., Criminal Victimization and Perceptions of Community Safety in 12 Cities, 1998 
(Bureau of Justice Statistics: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, May 1999), 20-21. On 
the relationship between the objective threat of crime and the perception of crime, see infra at 59-63. 
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One’s criminality contribution will vary with the mens rea level of the of-
fense. One may be reasonably reliable, for instance, with regard to self-applying 
the norm against intentional killing, but not the norm against reckless killing, or 
the norm against grossly negligent killing. If we seek assurance against other people 
killing us, each homicide offense addresses a separate component of that aim. We 
want assurance against people who would kill us purposefully, as well as those who 
would kill us as a result of their conscious risk-taking or their extreme carelessness. 
And to be unreliable with regard to the law against intentional killing is to make a 
different and generally more severe criminality contribution than to be unreliable 
with regard to the laws against reckless killing or grossly negligent killing. It would 
be possible, though, for someone to be so wildly reckless with regard to the possi-
bility of causing others’ deaths that his criminality contributions would be even 
greater than those of an intentional killer. All of these issues will be relevant for 
sentencing, as I discuss in Section IX. 
On this view, in sum, criminality is the joint product of people in society 
who are failing to self-apply criminal legal norms, in the specific sense of having 
an intention or willingness to offend. The greater the amount of criminality in so-
ciety, whether in a given moment or when considered over time, the less worth the 
criminal law has as a system of protections and as a guide to the possible incursions 
of other people, and thus the less assured is our liberty (and the more difficult it is 
to flourish). But how, one might object, could we understand criminality to be the 
joint product of offenders, such that we could hold them responsible for its im-
pact? It is not as if a car thief wishes to diminish the reliability of the law against 
car theft; all he wants to do, let us assume, is to make money. To say that criminality 
is the joint product of offenders, however, is not to argue that criminality is a pur-
poseful joint product akin to organized crime. The better analogy is to pollution. 
Polluters are not working together purposefully to create a societal threat, but each 
of them, as a byproduct of their actions, contributes to the social harm of smog or 
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global warming, and we can hold them responsible for their proportional contri-
butions, morally if not legally.83 Likewise, offenders contribute to the wider social 
threat of criminality as a foreseeable, necessary, and causally “close” byproduct of 
their unreliability with regard to upholding the criminal law, and we can hold them 
responsible for their proportional contributions to this social threat (both morally 
and legally). We can take the metaphor one step further, indeed, and understand 
criminality to represent a form of socio-legal pollution. 
V. Two Principles of Permissible Using 
This conception of the criminal law and of criminality allows us to resolve 
the Means Problem, if we appeal to either of two moral principles. These are prin-
ciples that provide exceptions to the general prohibition on using people as a 
means to the greater good. In other words, to use someone as a means consistent 
with either principle is not to use him to mitigate a harm or threat for which he 
lacks responsibility. 
A. Corrective Justice Means Principle 
The principle of “corrective justice” provides that an individual has a duty 
to rectify the losses or damage caused by his wrongful conduct, and that he can 
permissibly be forced to fulfill this duty.84 The classic statement is found in Aris-
totle’s discussion of justice in Book V of the Nicomachean Ethics.85 An individual 
                                               
83 A. P. Simester and Andrew von Hirsch refer to pollution as a “conjunctive” harm, the prevention 
of which involves proscribing an act that is “a token of the type of conduct that cumulatively does the 
harm.” A. P. Simester and Andrew von Hirsch, Crimes, Harms, and Wrongs: On the Principles of Criminali-
sation (Oxford: Hart, 2011), 85. Criminality is such a “conjunctive” harm, with the intention or 
willingness to offend being the relevant “token.” On the parallel notion of “cumulative” harms, see 
Andrew von Hirsch, “Extending the Harm Principle: ‘Remote’ Harms and Fair Imputation,” in eds. 
A. P. Simester and A. T. H. Smith, Harm and Culpability (Oxford: Clarendon, 1996), 259-77, at 263. 
84 See Jules L. Coleman, “The Practice of Corrective Justice,” Arizona Law Review 37 (1995): 15-31; 
Ernest J. Weinrib, “Corrective Justice in a Nutshell,” Toronto Law Journal 52 (2002): 349-52. See also 
Tadros, The Ends of Harm, supra note 1 at 131-32 (introducing the concept of an “enforceable duty,” a 
duty that one can permissibly be forced to uphold). For further discussion of “enforceable duties,” see 
infra at notes 122 and 128. 
85 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. and ed. Roger Crisp (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2000), 87-89. 
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can be used as a means permissibly, according to the Corrective Justice Means 
Principle, to restore the ex-ante status quo that he disturbed. To use him in this 
manner would be consistent with a commitment to human inviolability, since he 
would not be sacrificed to mitigate a problem for which he lacks responsibility. He 
would be used, rather, to repair his own wrongdoing. This principle, of course, 
grounds one of the central theories of tort law.86 
B. Defensive Means Principle 
The second principle, the Defensive Means Principle, is derived from the 
right to self-defense. In the paradigmatic form of self-defense, where an aggressor 
attacks a victim physically and the victim responds in kind, the victim is not using 
the aggressor as a means of mitigating or preventing a threat, since the aggressor 
himself is the threat.87 We could imagine self-defense situations that were other-
wise. If two people are attacking me, for instance, I could grab one of them and 
use him as a shield, as a means of blocking the other’s blow. It is permissible, in 
this way, for victims or would-be victims of an ongoing threat to use an aggressor 
as a proportional means of mitigating or preventing that threat. It reflects Tadros’s 
view that “there is a permission manipulatively to harm a person who is culpable 
and responsible for creating a threat of serious harm to avert that threat.”88 
                                               
86 See, e.g., Ernest J. Weinrib, Corrective Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012); Jules L. Cole-
man, “Corrective Justice and Wrongful Gain,” Journal of Legal Studies 11 (1982): 421-440; Jules L. 
Coleman, Risks and Wrongs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Stephen R. Perry, “The 
Moral Foundations of Tort Law,” Iowa Law Review 77 (1992): 449-514; Scott Hershovitz, “Corrective 
Justice for Civil Recourse Theorists,” Florida State University Law Review 39 (2011): 107-28. 
87 See Tadros, The Ends of Harm, supra note 1 at 245. 
88 Id. at 189. On the distinction between harming someone as a means versus harming someone to 
eliminate a threat, see Warren S. Quinn, “Actions, Intentions, and Consequences: The Doctrine of 
Double Effect,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 18 (1989): 334-51; Jeff McMahan, Killing in War (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2011, reprinted edition), 155-202; Helen Frowe, “Equating Innocent Threats 
and Bystanders,” Journal of Applied Philosophy 25 (2008): 277-90; Jonathan Quong, “Killing in Self-De-
fense,” Ethics 119 (2009): 507-37. 
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The Corrective Justice and Defensive Means Principles are not radically 
distinct.89 They both involve forcing people to fulfill a duty to repair their wrongdoing, 
broadly conceived. Forcing someone to rectify his past wrongdoing, consistent 
with the former principle, undoubtedly involves forcing him to fulfill such a duty 
of repair. Forcing someone to mitigate an ongoing wrong, consistent with the latter 
principle, seems to as well, given that mitigating an ongoing wrong is a form of 
repairing that wrong. With this, we can bring the various threads of the argument 
together to resolve the Means Problem. By appealing to either of these two prin-
ciples, in the context of the conceptions of the criminal law and criminality detailed 
above, we can generate two theories of permissible deterrent punishment. While 
the theories have somewhat distinct grounding reasons, and require distinct forms 
of evidence to secure convictions, they are united in that, broadly, they both in-
volve forcing people to repair their criminality contributions. In this way, we might 
conceive of the theories as two sub-theories of the same unified theory of deterrent 
punishment. 
C. Corrective Justice Theory of Punishment 
There are four basic steps to the corrective justice theory of punishment. 
First, an offender contributed in the past to society’s level of criminality via his 
intention or willingness to flout the criminal law. He contributed, that is, to a social 
threat in the past that limited the assured liberty of people within the jurisdiction. 
Second, the purpose of deterrent punishment is to reduce the level of criminality 
                                               
89 See Victor Tadros, “Causation, Culpability, and Liability,” in eds. Christian Coons and Michael We-
ber, The Ethics of Self Defense (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 110-30, at 118 (“Why should 
the permission to harm a person to prevent a threat being realized be grounded in very different 
considerations to the permission to harm a person to ensure that the person harmed is compensated? 
Given the close relationship between negating harm and compensating a person for harm, it would be 
surprising if very different considerations determined these two realms of the ethics of harm.”). But 
see Jonathan Quong, “Liability to Defensive Harm,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 40 (2012): 45-77, at 45 
(“Liability to defensive harm is only one type of liability, however, and we must not assume that things 
true of liability to defensive harm are necessarily true for other types of liability. Other kinds of liabil-
ity—for example, the liability to pay taxes, pay damages, or suffer punishment—may have very 
different normative bases.”). 
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in society. Deterrence is not targeted toward specific offenders, but rather toward 
the general threat of crime faced by citizens. The third step is an appeal to the 
Corrective Justice Means Principle. And, thus, fourth: Deterrent punishment is 
permissible in proportion to an offender’s past criminality contributions. We are 
using him as a means of repairing—by way of general deterrence—the damage to 
our assured liberty caused by his own criminality contributions. He is not, as in the 
standard conception of deterrent punishment, merely sacrificed to scare off would-
be future offenders, for whom he has no responsibility. He has increased the level 
of criminality in the past, and so the way to repair that, as a matter of corrective 
justice, is to use him to decrease the level of criminality in the future. Over time, 
ideally—with would-be future offenders appropriately deterred—it would be as if 
he had never contributed to criminality at all. This builds off of Tadros’s idea that 
deterrent punishment can represent a form of equitable remedy; though, as I ex-
plain in Section V, very different conceptions of the criminal wrong and of the 
state’s role in remedying that wrong ground Tadros’s “duty theory.” 
D. Social Defense Theory of Punishment 
The corrective justice theory is at least partly backward looking, as stated 
above, given its concern with offenders’ past criminality contributions. It is the 
primary theory of punishment presented here, since it aims to justify the punish-
ment of all offenders. The social defense theory of punishment, by comparison, is 
entirely forward looking, and would provide an additional punishment reason for 
some but not all offenders. It applies to those offenders whose normative com-
mitment to offending is ongoing—that is, those offenders whom we still cannot 
reasonably rely upon to uphold the law. For those offenders, we can appeal to the 
Defensive Means Principle to justify additional deterrent punishment. We would 
be using an offender as a means, yes, but for the purpose of mitigating the ongoing 
threat of criminality for which he has partial responsibility. He would not merely be 
sacrificed for the greater good, to mitigate a problem for which he lacks 
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responsibility. Instead, we would be using him as a means of defending ourselves 
against a current social threat that impacts us all and for which he shares partial 
responsibility. Below I discuss the evidential challenges of this view—of establish-
ing with sufficient confidence that we cannot reasonably rely on someone to 
uphold the criminal law moving forward. 
We can appeal to the social defense theory of punishment to explain the 
intuition (and sentencing policy) that a recidivist offender may in some cases de-
serve more punishment than a first-time offender or someone who is 
demonstrably apologetic and reformed.90 His recidivism could be evidence that he 
maintains his criminal normative commitments as an ongoing matter. If this evi-
dence were sufficiently strong—a big if, as I discuss below—then we could 
conclude that he has a duty to mitigate the current threat of criminality, consistent 
with the social defense theory. Meanwhile, first-time and reformed offenders, 
while lacking this duty of mitigation, would still have a duty of rectification con-
sistent with the corrective justice principle. 
Let us consider an immediate issue: Why use an offender for the purpose 
of general deterrence on the social defense view? If all we want is, essentially, for 
him to erase his contributions to the ongoing threat of criminality, why not simply 
incapacitate him in prison? We should be wary, though, of assuming that carceral 
incapacitation represents a perfectly neat application of the social defense theory 
for two reasons. First, it may simply shunt the costs of an offender’s unreliability 
with regard to the criminal law from the wider public onto other imprisoned of-
fenders; this is especially true with violent offenders.91 There is no reason to believe 
that offenders lose their right to the criminal law’s protections inside prison. And 
                                               
90 See U. S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (US Sentencing Commission, 2016), § 4A1.1, at 392; Julian 
V. Roberts, “The Role of Criminal Record in the Sentencing Process,” Crime & Justice 22 (1997): 303-
62 (surveying the history and purposes of recidivist enhancements). 
91 See Catherine Appleton and Bent Grøver, “The Pros and Cons of Life Without Parole,” The British 
Journal of Criminology 47 (2007): 597-615, at 604. 
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we would not think, in parallel, that confining someone to a particular zip code 
outside of prison would somehow perfectly erase his ongoing criminality contri-
butions. As such, the offender’s duty to mitigate the threat of criminality would 
often remain unfulfilled unless his imprisonment acted to deter other offenders. 
And if it did not deter others, as an empirical matter, then his imprisonment would 
represent a wanton and illegitimate injury on the social defense view. Perhaps, 
though, we could structure prison in such a way that an offender did not represent 
any risk to other prisoners, akin to a quarantine situation. Except for the most 
dangerous and violent offenders, however, this would likely be a disproportionate 
and inefficient means of forcing an offender to fulfill his duty of mitigation; I dis-
cuss this issue further in Chapter 3.92 Second, and related to this last point, we 
should be hesitant to assume that prison is always the preferred method of pun-
ishment. Imposing a fine, a term of community service, or perhaps a form of 
monitoring may be a more efficient and humane method of reducing the level of 
criminality in society, even if that means that an offender remains free and potentially unre-
formed in society.93 Given that this is not a retributivist view, we must—on general 
consequentialist grounds—prefer those methods of punishment that enable an of-
fender to fulfill his duty with the smallest degree of injury in the process. 
VI. Two Objections 
To flesh out the corrective justice and social defense views I will consider 
two objections. 
 
                                               
92 See Chapter 3 at 247-50. 
93 See, e.g., Alexander C. Wagenaar, et. al., “General Deterrence Effects of U.S. Statutory DUI Fine and 
Jail Penalties: Long-Term Follow-Up in 32 States,” Accident Analysis & Prevention 30 (2007): 982-994 
(comparing from 1976–2002 the DUI rates in twenty-six states that implemented a mandatory mini-
mum fine for first time DUI offenders with eighteen states that implemented a mandatory minimum 
jail penalty for such offenders and concluding that the pattern suggested a greater deterrent effect from 
the mandatory fines than the mandatory jail sentences); Oliver Roeder, et. al., What Caused the Crime 
Decline? (New York: Brennan Center for Justice, 2015) (concluding that the effectiveness of increasing 
rates of incarceration as a crime control tactic in America has been limited since 1990 and non-existent 
since 2000). 
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A. What About the Act Requirement? 
The first objection asks: If we punish (a) to rectify prior contributions to 
criminality and (b) to diminish the ongoing threat of criminality, why wait for an 
offender to commit a criminal act, consistent with the “act requirement”? Why not 
punish people for merely seeming “dangerous,” an outcome that Peter Ramsay 
worries our system is increasingly headed toward?94 If someone seems dangerous 
is he not contributing to criminality? Or, put differently, why not lock up every-
body who actuarial statistics indicates is “likely” or “very likely” to offend, and 
thereby dramatically decrease criminality and increase legal assurance?  
Self-defense principles undergird the conception of the criminal law as a 
system of protections, and of criminality as an attack on the people who rely on 
those protections. There are internal limits to these principles that can prevent 
such abuses. Within the realm of interpersonal self-defense, for instance, there is 
no right to attack any person that may pose a threat to you (for example, any person 
that may punch you). To activate traditional self-defensive logic, there must be an 
ongoing attack against you. Within the socio-legal realm, in the context of the two 
theories, the ongoing attack against people within the jurisdiction just is criminality, 
which is composed of offenders’ intentions or willingness to flout criminal legal 
norms, as discussed above. To hang out in the “wrong crowd,” say, to be friendly 
with drug dealers, is not in and of itself to have any such commitment. One could 
be friendly with drug dealers and then be entirely reliable with regard to the self-
application of the criminal law, such that he was not in any way liable to punish-
ment. 
                                               
94 See Peter Ramsay, “Preparation Offences, Security Interests, Political Freedom,” in eds. R.A. Duff, 
et. al, The Structures of Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 203-28; Peter Ramsay, 
The Insecurity State: Vulnerable Autonomy and the Right to Security in the Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2012). See also Lucia Zedner, Security (London: Routledge, 2009); Mark Neocleous, Critique 
of Security (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2008); Ian Loader and Neil Walker, Civilizing Security 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Paul Robinson, “Punishing Dangerousness,” Harvard 
Law Review 114 (2001): 1429-56. 
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But what about preemptive defense? If there is a right to preemptive self-
defense, it applies only where the aggressor exhibits an intention to attack (for 
example, a person has angrily raised his fist to punch me). Given (a) that the “at-
tack” in the context of criminality is the intention to violate a law with intent mens 
rea or a willingness to violate a law with recklessness or negligence mens rea, then 
(b) preemptive social defense could only apply where someone had an intention to 
have an intention to offend, or an intention to have a willingness to offend. Both 
are essentially meaningless formulations that collapse into having the intention to 
offend, bringing us back to square one. Preemptive social defense for the purpose 
of diminishing criminality is thus incoherent. One either has a normative commit-
ment to flout a criminal law, or not. 
The legal assurance promised by the two theories is thus primarily objective 
rather than subjective.95 It is a matter of reducing the actual risk of crime in the 
future, not simply reducing people’s perceptions of the risk of crime. The reason 
to punish is to create reliable legal protections—that is, to have criminal legal 
norms that people in society are in fact upholding and self-applying, so that citizens 
can confidently plan and successfully execute their lives. Objective legal assurance 
increases along with the objective reliability of legal protections. Subjective legal 
assurance, one’s personal feeling of the law’s reliability, is an important, but ulti-
mately derivative concern; subjective assurance should, of course, increase along 
with objective assurance, but this is not always the case.96 If we knew, then, that 
someone was flirting with the possibility of, say, grievously assaulting someone, 
                                               
95 On the related distinction between objective and subjective “security,” see Ramsay, “Preparation 
Offences,” supra note 94; Zedner, Security, supra note 94 at 14–19; Loader and Walker, Civilizing Security, 
supra note 94 at 155–61. 
96 See John Gramlich, “Voters’ Perceptions of Crime Continue to Conflict with Reality,” Pew Research 
Center, November 16, 2016, http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/11/16/voters-percep-
tions-of-crime-continue-to-conflict-with-reality (reporting that 57% of those who had voted or who 
planned to vote in the 2016 presidential election believed that crime had gotten worse since 2008, 27% 
believed it had stayed the same, and 15% believed it had gotten better, even though violent crime and 
property crime had fallen by 26% and 22%, respectively, between 2008 and 2015). 
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then while this may worry us and diminish our subjective sense of security, it is not 
until he actually holds an intention to commit the act that he is, as indicated above, 
coming for us. And it is only then that he has contributed to criminality and dimin-
ished our objective assurance, making himself liable to our collective rights to 
corrective justice and self-defense. 
In the other direction, there could be a situation in which we have an un-
justified level of subjective assurance. We might blithely assume, say, that the 
specific criminality level for car theft was vanishingly low, while in fact the juris-
diction was filled with people intending to steal cars. If we then left our car doors 
unlocked or failed to purchase car theft insurance, our subjective assurance would 
be unreasonable. We would be relying on the criminal law’s protections unreasona-
bly, and thereby taking unreasonable risks. We can see here how criminality does 
not merely chill the exercise of our rights or force us to take expensive precautions; 
especially when we underestimate its current or future level, criminality also ex-
poses us to unreasonable risks of harm. Along these lines, if one conceals his 
criminal intentions from public knowledge by being a very professional and secre-
tive criminal—or by being an impulsive and surprising one-time criminal—he has 
still contributed to criminality.97 We want people to exercise their liberties 
                                               
97 Thanks to Antony Duff for pressing me to address the example of the professional and secretive 
offender. Kleinfeld’s reconstructivist theory, by comparison, cannot easily escape this challenge. Klein-
feld understands a crime to expressively reject a social norm, as discussed above, and a punishment to 
expressively deny that rejection. If the crime goes unpunished, he argues, then the social norm that it 
rejects will ultimately wither away. He writes that “crime not only offends the norms on which social 
solidarity is based but, by showing that those norms can be violated, saps them of authority.” Kleinfeld, “Re-
constructivism,” supra note 68 at 1506 (emphasis added). He appeals to Durkheim’s example of the 
classroom. “If students start cheating on their exams and see that teachers, who could do something 
about it, turn a blind eye, the norm against cheating will dissolve and dissolve quickly—and likewise if 
citizens are known to frequently cheat on their taxes or spouses on one another.” Id. In this way, he 
writes that crimes “endanger—genuinely endanger—ethical life.” Id. But it is not the crime itself that 
would endanger the norm, but (a) the public flouting of the norm followed by (b) the non-punishment 
of that public flouting. If the flouting were to happen entirely in secret then the reconstructivist penal 
logic would fail to apply, it seems, or at least would apply with far less stringency than if the offender 
happened to get caught in public. For the secret flouting of a norm, even if unpunished, would not 
impact the norm’s public standing. For related discussion, see infra note 129. 
 
 
 
 
63 
confidently, but not unreasonably or foolishly. Subjective assurance, in and of it-
self, is thus not our ultimate aim. The criminal law, in sum, aims for objective 
assurance over time, and then for the subjective assurance level to be appropriate 
given the degree to which it achieves that primary goal. 
There are now some bullets to bite. First, is the act of offending on this 
view merely evidence that one had or has an intention or willingness to commit a 
prohibited act? As it relates to the justification of deterrent punishment: Yes. Were 
liability dependent only upon the criminal act itself, as on traditional theories, our 
understanding of criminality and our response to the Means Problem would dis-
solve. This is a central point. An act that occurred in the past could not, in and of 
itself, contribute to an ongoing social threat. Erin Kelly argues, for instance, that 
beyond the harm borne by the victim, we could hold an offender partially respon-
sible for people’s “fear” of offenses of the type he committed.98 John Braithwaite 
and Philip Pettit make a similar point.99 They argue that an offender’s primary 
wrong is to diminish or destroy his victim’s “dominion,” the state of being free 
from others’ arbitrary interference. The offender also commits a wrong against 
society as a whole, they argue, by diminishing the “reassurance” of non-victims 
regarding the security of their own dominion.100 But the “fear” or lack of “reassur-
ance” would be in relation to the risk of future offenses—of, say, future robberies—
and the offender’s past robbery, which is what Kelly, Braithwaite, and Pettit want 
to hold him responsible for, could not, in and of itself, contribute to that future 
risk. It may, in combination with other such robberies, indicate to the population 
an ongoing risk of future robberies. But merely to indicate the existence of an 
ongoing risk—as a reporter might—is surely not to be responsible for that risk. 
                                               
98 Erin I. Kelly, “Criminal Justice Without Retribution,” Journal of Philosophy 106 (2009): 440-62, at 457. 
99 Philip Pettit and John Braithwaite, “Not Just Deserts, Even in Sentencing,” Current Issues in Criminal 
Justice 4 (1993): 225-39, at 230. 
100 Id. (“If I see that crimes are committed against others—especially when the victims of crime do not 
have their complaints taken seriously or redressed—then the basis for believing that I enjoy resilient 
non-interference is undermined. My dominion is endangered.”). 
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Only if we see the act as evidence of an offender’s past and perhaps ongoing norma-
tive commitments, and understand the objective risk of crime (criminality) to be 
composed of such commitments, could we aim to hold him proportionally respon-
sible for the impact of that risk on people’s legal assurance. 
But does this mean that if we knew that a citizen had an intention or will-
ingness to offend, but he had not yet taken any steps in the real world to achieve 
this aim, that we could punish him as a means of mitigating criminality? Yes—but 
with the understanding that we would never, even if it decreased criminality to 
zero, grant the state authority to look into our minds like this; to do so would 
increase our objective assurance against other citizens, but profoundly decrease it 
vis-à-vis the state itself. Whether to protect ourselves against the state, in particular 
against broad, discretionary, and intrusive powers of investigation, or against of-
fenders, is the question at the center of controversial police practices like “stop-
and-frisk.” As Farmer writes: “A…dimension of civil order concerns the civility 
of the criminal law itself. The criminal law not only has to secure trust between 
individuals, but also the trust of individuals in the order of law.”101 There is, in this 
way, a seemingly irresolvable conflict within the Rule of Law ideal introduced 
above, wherein we seek assurance against both crime and an intrusive state. Re-
gardless, through its concern with assurance against the state, the two theories have 
the internal resources to forestall an overbearing, illiberal system. The conclusion, 
then, is that we absolutely need an act requirement, given our need for proof of 
offenders’ normative commitments, when coupled with our concern for assurance 
against the state. The act requirement would, however, involve some costs in terms 
of principle, by granting immunity to those with unrevealed criminal normative 
commitments. Is this not, though, accepting thought crime or perhaps character 
                                               
101 Farmer, Making the Modern Criminal Law, supra note 60 at 301. 
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liability, at least in principle?102 Yes, but with the understanding that the criminal-
ized thought or character “flaw” is a very particular one connected essentially to 
action, namely, the intention or willingness to commit a prohibited criminal act.103 
To be clear, the commission of a prohibited criminal act would serve dif-
ferent evidential purposes within the two theories. Within the corrective justice 
theory, the criminal act would serve as dispositive proof that one contributed to 
criminality in the past; the act is dispositive evidence that he was normatively com-
mitted to offending—that he had an intention or willingness to offend.104 Within 
the social defense theory, the act would represent evidence, but not necessarily 
dispositive evidence, that one maintains his criminal commitments as an ongoing 
matter. Perhaps the offender has changed his normative commitments with regard 
to the authority of the law in the interim. As stated above, that an offender has a 
history of offending would indeed represent evidence of his ongoing commit-
ments.105 What would qualify as sufficient evidence for that conclusion I will not 
engage with here; though, it must be emphasized that the legitimacy of social de-
fensive punishment hangs on finding a satisfactory answer to that difficult 
question. I consider this issue further in Chapter 3.106 We must be vigilant, gener-
ally, against the dangers of licensing punishment upon merely armchair predictions 
of dangerousness, as A.E. Bottoms and Roger Brownsword seem to flirt with in 
justifying a system of “civil” preventive detention beyond an offender’s “criminal” 
                                               
102 For a critical history of “character” liability, see Nicola Lacey, In Search of Criminal Responsibility: Ideas, 
Interests, and Institutions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016). 
103 For related commentary on the act requirement, see Douglas Husak, “Does Criminal Liability Re-
quire an Act?” in ed. Antony Duff, Philosophy and the Criminal Law: Principle and Critique (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998), 60-100 (arguing against the view that criminal liability is and ought 
to be imposed only for an act). 
104 To be sure, if the evidence was of multiple criminal acts—say, multiple car thefts—none of which 
had been addressed before by the legal system, then that would be dispositive proof of a greater crim-
inality contribution than evidence of a single theft. See supra at 45-6 (discussing diachronic criminality).  
105 For thoughtful discussion of the value of propensity evidence, see Mike Redmayne, Character in the 
Criminal Trial (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 111–43. 
106 See Chapter 3 at 245-47. 
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sentence.107 For to punish someone who is not in fact contributing to criminality 
would violate our most basic liberal commitments—and his most basic rights—by 
sacrificing an innocent person for the greater good. Nonetheless, that the eviden-
tial question is difficult does not vitiate the underlying analysis regarding the 
liabilities and duties of those people whom we cannot reasonably rely upon to up-
hold the criminal law as an ongoing matter. 
Finally, the corrective justice and social defense views can easily explain the 
practice of interpreting the act requirement flexibly enough to account for inchoate 
liability doctrines like attempt and conspiracy. This is an important point in their 
favor. With attempt liability, they would understand the offender taking “substan-
tial” steps or “more than merely preparatory” steps toward the commission of an 
offense to be proof of his intention to offend, and thus of his criminality contri-
bution.108 The idea is that some lesser form of preparation would not qualify as 
sufficient evidence of an intention. Likewise, with conspiracy liability, they would 
understand the agreement to offend, when combined with the overt act in further-
ance of that agreement, to be proof of the parties’ intentions to offend.109 The 
attempt and the conspiracy serve the exact same role as the completed act itself—
as evidence of an offender’s normative commitments. Inchoate liability doctrines 
pose difficult interpretative challenges, by comparison, for retributivist theories, 
and also for Tadros’s “duty” theory, which I discuss in the following section.110 
B. Where’s the Victim? 
Unlike incomplete attempts or standalone conspiracies, when offenders 
have actually created victims, one might object to the negligible role such victims 
                                               
107 A.E. Bottoms and Roger Brownsword, “The Dangerousness Debate After the Floud Report,” 
British Journal of Criminology 22 (1982): 229-54. 
108 See MPC, supra note 55 at § 5.01(1)(c) (outlining the “substantial step” standard for attempt liability 
in the U.S.); Criminal Attempts Act 1981, c. 47 (codifying the “more than merely preparatory” standard 
for attempt liability in England and Wales). 
109 See MPC, supra note 55 at § 5.03 (outlining the requirements for conspiracy liability). 
110 See Larry Alexander, “Can Self-Defense Justify Punishment?” Law & Philosophy 32 (2013): 159-75 
(arguing that Tadros’s theory cannot justify punishment for inchoate offenses). 
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play on this view. Surely, the second objection goes, the reason to punish has to 
do with the offender’s responsibility for the harm borne by the victim. He has 
wronged the victim, it continues, and deserves to suffer or to be censured, accord-
ingly, for that wrong.111 In reply to this objection, I am skeptical that retributivist 
and expressivist reasons do in fact address victims sufficiently. If I have been as-
saulted, it may be important to me that the state recognizes that I have been 
wronged by punishing the offender. But I am still left with the damage of the as-
sault, which may well be more detrimental to my interests and also to my self-
respect than the offender’s non-punishment. To say that the civil system can ad-
dress this component of the wrong seems inadequate, especially if the offender 
lacks the resources to provide sufficient compensation. 
Here is a tentative solution: the state should bear some responsibility for 
any civil damages that may result from a crime, as a co-defendant of sorts. A crime 
occurs when someone violates a legal protection. By promulgating such a protec-
tion, as argued above, the state invites its citizens to rely upon its validity. When 
someone flouts the law, then, the victim has a civil claim against that person, yes, 
but maybe also against the state.112 The claim might sound in (social) contract, with 
the victim’s own restraint and respect for the law given in consideration for the 
institution of reliable legal protections, and with the gravamen of the victim’s claim 
being the unreliability of the protection flouted by the offender. Or maybe it could 
be a form of promissory estoppel, whereby society has invited the victim to detri-
mentally rely upon the promise of protections. Or, following Alan Norrie, we 
might argue that the state bears responsibility for the social conditions that were 
                                               
111 Duff, Punishment, Communication, and Community, supra note 20 at 28 (“[C]ensure of conduct declared 
to be wrong is owed to its victims, as manifesting that concern for them and for their wronged condi-
tion that the declaration itself expressed.”). 
112 Pettit and Braithwaite mention the possibility of a public “restitution fund,” though not one moti-
vated by the state’s own duty to the victim as a co-defendant. Pettit and Braithwaite, “Not Just 
Deserts,” supra note 68 at 236–37 (“If restitution is possible, but not within the means of the offender, 
then it may be that extra help should be provided from a restitution fund, with the offender contrib-
uting only a part.”). 
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in part determinative of the offender’s intention to offend.113 If such an argument 
works, the state would have some responsibility to rectify a victim’s losses, possibly 
to fill in the gaps left by an offender’s lack of resources and, following Nicola Lacey 
and Hanna Pickard, possibly to provide non-pecuniary forms of compensation as 
well.114 The state, aware of its duty of repair, might even initiate the civil process 
on the victim’s behalf, aiming to reach a negotiated settlement out of court. The 
general framework, then, is of the criminal system protecting the interest of society 
as a whole in diminishing criminality and maintaining a reliable system of criminal 
protections, and then of the civil system protecting the interests of individual crime 
victims, but with the government now involved in that project to some degree. Of 
course, the civil system on this view would cover non-criminal tortious actions, as 
well, but the state would not bear any liability in those cases.115 
                                               
113 See Alan Norrie, “Freewill, Determinism and Criminal Justice,” Legal Studies 3 (1983): 60-73, at 72 
(quoting Karl Marx, “The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte,” in ed. David McLellan, Karl 
Marx: Selected Writings (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), 329-55, at 329) (“Men make their own 
history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen 
by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past.”). 
114 Nicola Lacey and Hanna Pickard insightfully call for two distinct institutional tracks for criminal 
justice, “with one track of the system designed to serve the interests and needs of victims, and one 
track of the system designed to determine criminal responsibility and convict and sentence offend-
ers…” Nicola Lacey and Hanna Pickard, “A Dual-Process Approach to Criminal Law: Victims and 
the Clinical Model of Responsibility Without Blame,” Journal of Political Philosophy 26 (forthcoming 
2018) (manuscript at 26) (on file with author). They envision an entirely new institution dedicated to 
crime victims, one separate from the existing tort system. But incorporating state liability into the tort 
system would seem to be a more efficient institutional solution, providing a single forum for making 
victims whole. Accepting Lacey and Pickard’s argument, furthermore, that making victims whole is 
often a symbolic and emotional process, id. at 12–16, 21–24, an augmented civil system could allow 
for non-pecuniary forms of compensation, such as an apology from the offender or access to state-
sponsored therapy. Moreover, involvement of a court might aid in this expressive process, given its 
capacity for making public, authoritative pronouncements regarding the losses borne by victims and 
the responsibilities of the various parties. Regardless, even if Lacey and Pickard would reject the tort 
system as an appropriate forum for considering victims’ non-pecuniary needs with due care, given its 
adversarial and potentially combative nature, they do envision some role for state liability for victims’ 
pecuniary damages. And that process, at least, would have to be unified with the existing tort system, 
lest a victim receive double damages potentially from the offender and the state. 
115 The corrective justice and social defense theories are meant to justify the practice of deterrent 
punishment, which as argued above, must represent the centerpiece of any legitimate institution of 
punishment. But the two theories need not, as a matter of logic, fill the entire field of punishment 
reasons and—for the sake of completeness—it should be noted that one could incorporate victim-
centered penal reasons into the system of criminal justice demanded by the two theories. That is, the 
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Let us consider two objections to this proposal.116 First, one might object, 
would not state liability for criminal damages be extraordinarily, prohibitively ex-
pensive? We can respond, simply, that if the state is indeed liable as a moral matter, 
the ultimate cost will depend not only on the amount of unfulfilled criminal dam-
ages, but also on competing demands for state resources. How high a priority state 
liability for criminal damages would be I will not discuss here. But to clarify the 
point of principle: If the state had an enormous set of resources that for some 
reason it could only spend on crime victims, the idea is that when the state paid 
the victims’ unfulfilled damages, it would not do so merely out of a general duty 
of beneficence—a general duty to help people regardless of one’s relationship to 
them—but at least partly out of a duty of repair.117 And that conclusion, grounded 
on the idea that the state has to some degree failed a crime victim, strikes me as 
broadly intuitive and appropriate. However, one might object, secondly, that any 
level of state liability would create perverse incentives for the state, either to let 
offenders go unpunished or, conversely, to hyper-aggressively prevent the 
                                               
victim need not, as a matter of logic, exist only in the civil system on this view. One could consistently 
uphold corrective justice and social defensive reasons of punishment in addition to a “moderate” re-
tributivism that considers delivering retributive harm or expressive censure a legitimate, though non-
decisive penal rationale. Given that such retributive or expressive reasons are connected more closely 
to the wrong against the victim and the harm borne by the victim, one could perhaps add them to the 
two theories to partially address the “Where’s the victim?” worry—possibly as a sentencing enhance-
ment for especially heinous offenses. On “moderate” retributivism, see Mark S. Martins and Jacob 
Bronsther, “Stay the Hand of Justice? Evaluating Claims That War Crimes Trials Do More Harm Than 
Good,” Daedalus 146 (2017): 83-99; Jeffrie G. Murphy, “Retributivism and the State’s Interest in Pun-
ishment,” in eds. J. Roland Pennock and John W. Chapman, Criminal Justice: Nomos XXVII (New York: 
New York University Press, 1985), 156-64; Ramon M. Lemos, “A Defense of Retributivism,” Southern 
Journal of Philosophy 15 (1977): 53-65, at 62-63; Michael Philips, “The Justification of Punishment and 
the Justification of Political Authority,” Law and Philosophy 5 (1986): 393-416, at 401–10; Larry Alexan-
der, Kimberly Kessler Ferzan and Stephen Morse, Crime and Culpability: A Theory of Criminal 
Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 7-10; Alec Whalen, “Retributive Justice,” in ed. 
Edward N. Zalta, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2016 Edition), https://plato.stan-
ford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/justice-retributive. 
116 Thanks to Kimberly Kessler Ferzan for raising these objections. 
117 On the meaning and practical implications of “beneficence,” see Peter Singer, “Famine, Affluence, 
and Morality,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 3 (1972): 229-243; Liam B. Murphy, “The Demands of Be-
neficence,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 22 (1993): 267-92; Richard W. Miller, “Beneficence, Duty and 
Distance,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 32 (2004): 357-83; Garret Cullity, The Moral Demands of Affluence 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). 
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commission of offenses. To what degree, though, would the police, prosecutors, 
and judges ignore offenses, or prosecute offenders less vigorously, out of a concern 
that the state would have to pay damages to the offenders’ victims? And to what 
degree would a democratic populace accept further police intrusion, looking only 
to that same fiscal concern (and assuming that the money spent on police preven-
tion was indeed a good investment in terms of money saved on damages)? I am 
doubtful that either degree would be significant—to say nothing of the fact that 
they may to some degree cancel each other out, given that they work at cross-
purposes—but they are legitimate empirical questions. Whether they prove fatal 
would depend on the actual cost of state liability for criminal damages, taking into 
account competing demands for resources, as well as complex questions of insti-
tutional design, culture, and accountability.118 
Jean Hampton, in her later work, wrote that crime represents “an affront to 
the victim’s value or dignity,”119 and that it warrants a response intended “to vindicate 
the value of the victim denied by the wrongdoer’s action through the construction 
of an event that not only repudiates the action’s message of superiority over the 
victim but does so in a way that confirms them as equal by virtue of their human-
ity.”120 Though I am not endorsing this penal logic, it is an influential theory and 
it is worthwhile to point out that compensation from the state to crime victims 
might represent the expressive “event” in question. Hampton believed that her 
theory demanded—and only demanded—retributive punishment for the criminal 
wrongdoer. But it would seem that compensation from the state would act to 
                                               
118 See Barry Friedman and Maria Ponomarenko, “Democratic Policing,” NYU Law Review 90 (2015): 
1827-1907 (arguing that U.S. police forces have historically been democratically unaccountable, “aloof 
from the ordinary processes of democratic governance,” and suggesting legislative and judicial means 
of reform). 
119 Jean Hampton, “Correcting Harms Versus Righting Wrongs: The Goal of Retribution,” UCLA 
Law Review 39 (1992): 1659-1702, at 1666. 
120 Id. at 1686. 
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vindicate the victim’s value and restore her dignity, and in a less damaging and 
costly manner than penal hard treatment inflicted upon the offender. 
VII. The Duty to Rectify and the Criminal Law 
These two theories of deterrent punishment, in particular the corrective 
justice view, share a number of features with Victor Tadros’s “duty theory,” as 
stated above. It will sharpen their presentation to clarify how they differ from his 
theory, and to explain why I believe they present a more secure moral foundation 
for state punishment. The duty theory is motivationally similar to the two theories, 
given that it foregrounds the Means Problem and, in searching for a response, 
attempts to move beyond traditional retributivist and utilitarian theories.121 
Through a complex array of interlocking arguments, Tadros aims to bring us in 
The Ends of Harm from the moral to the political, from the duties that criminal 
wrongdoers owe to the individual people they have wronged to the exclusive right 
of the state to punish those wrongdoers for the sake of general deterrence. By 
comparison, the corrective justice and social defense views start with the legal and 
the political, with a conception of the criminal law as a system of protections foun-
dational to social cooperation, and then understand society’s rights against 
offenders to flow from people’s reliance upon that system. I will outline Tadros’s 
theory as a whole, before questioning whether he can make the jump from the 
moral to the political, and arguing for the advantages of starting with the political. 
A. Explication 
Beginning with the moral, Tadros introduces the (I think sound) notion of 
an “enforceable duty,” a duty that one can be forced to uphold because (a) uphold-
ing it “is necessary to avert a great harm” and (b) if it is breached, “compensation 
will be inadequate, or will be unlikely to be forthcoming.”122 Tadros continues by 
                                               
121 Tadros describes the Means Problem (or a close version thereof) in at least three places in The Ends 
of Harm. See Tadros, The Ends of Harm, supra note 1 at 113–14, 181–82, 266–67. 
122 Id. at 275. See also id. at 131-32, 279. 
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arguing that there are enforceable duties to avert the wrongful threats that one has 
created; this is the Defensive Means Principle. If one has hired a hit man, for in-
stance, he has a duty to stop him, and he could be forced to uphold this duty, by 
being used as a means if necessary—say, by being forced to stand in front of the 
bullet—as death is very serious and not compensable.123 Tadros thus identifies a 
way in which someone can be used as a means permissibly: when doing so forces 
him to uphold an enforceable duty. 
But what if the threat has already come to fruition and there is no ongoing 
or forthcoming attack to mitigate or prevent? Tadros argues that if one has already 
breached his duty, “he retains a duty to do the next best thing.”124 If I fail to turn 
up to paint your fence, as promised, then I ought to find someone to take my place, 
Tadros argues, or failing that, I ought to paint it as soon as possible.125 Or failing 
both, I could pay damages. But what if the wrong cannot be easily rectified by 
damages, as Tadros believes is the nature of criminal as opposed to civil wrongs?126 
What if Greg has assaulted Henry? What is “the next best thing” that Greg can do, 
given that he cannot take his assault back? Due to the inadequacy of damages as a 
remedy for assault, Tadros argues that Greg can best fulfill his duty to rectify his 
wrong by preventing another person, say, Xavier, from assaulting Henry.127 In this 
way, Greg could erase his assault, as it were, leaving Henry with the net result of 
having been assaulted once—just where he would have been had Greg refrained 
from assaulting him in the first place, with the difference that Xavier rather than 
Greg would have inflicted the assault. An offender’s duty of rectification toward 
his victim is “enforceable,” Tadros continues, such that victims can force offenders 
                                               
123 Id. at 192–94. 
124 Id. at 276. 
125 Id. 
126 Id. at 275-79. 
127 Id. 
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to uphold their duties by coercively using them as a means of preventing a future 
offense.128  
The Corrective Justice Means Principle, rather than the Defensive Means 
Principle, is thus doing the relevant work for Tadros. On Tadros’s theory, offend-
ers rectify their past wrongdoing by preventing or mitigating ongoing or future 
wrongs. Defending the victim is simply the means of compensation.129 It is an 
                                               
128 At various points, Tadros emphasizes the “urgency” of enforceable duties, where if someone does 
not act to uphold his duty right now, then very serious, uncompensated harm will result. “[A]s it is 
urgent that I do my duty and that I do it now,” Tadros writes, “you may force me to do it.” Id. at 268. 
See also id. at 189. Tadros ought to shed this “urgency” requirement, because it creates an unreasonable 
escape hatch for many wrongdoers: so long as they could fulfill their duty in the future—even if there 
is no reason to think that they will in fact do so—then the duty would not be enforceable. More to 
the point, if he insists on the “urgency” requirement, then the duty to rectify one’s wrongs would not 
be enforceable in most cases, and his theory (and the corrective justice theory of punishment, as well) 
would dissolve. For if we imagine a timeline of future offenses against Henry, whether Greg stops the 
very first one or not will not substantially impact Greg’s ability to fulfill his duty of rectification. If he 
fails to stop the first offender, this is in fact highly compensable, by stopping a later one; and so, 
consistent with the urgency requirement, we could not force him to fulfill his duty. But I cannot see 
why a duty of rectification in such cases would be unenforceable, assuming we had reason to believe 
that he would not fulfill the duty at any point in the future. Thanks to Patrick Tomlin for helpful 
discussion on this point. 
129 Daniel Farrell, by comparison, has developed a theory of deterrent punishment connected more 
directly to self-defense principles. His theory was the first, to my knowledge, to attempt to secure a 
non-consequentialist grounding for the pursuit of general deterrence—or at least the first contempo-
rary theory, if one wanted to include Hegel in that category. Farrell’s theory, while based upon self-
defense principles, relies not on the Defensive Means Principle, but on an interpretation of self-de-
fense as a right founded in distributive justice. “When someone knowingly brings it about, through 
his own wrongful conduct, that someone else must choose either to harm him or to be harmed her-
self,” Farrell writes, “justice allows the latter to choose that the former shall be harmed, rather than 
that she shall be harmed…” Daniel M. Farrell, “The Justification of Deterrent Violence,” Ethics 100 
(1990): 301-17, at 302. Farrell follows Warren Quinn in conceiving of the criminal law as a system of 
threats of punishment. See Warren Quinn, “The Right to Threaten and the Right to Punish,” Philosophy 
& Public Affairs 14 (1985): 327-73. But Farrell questions why, if someone has violated a criminal law, 
we are entitled to follow through on our threat and actually inflict penal harm. He makes the following 
argument in response: Given that the criminal law is a system of threats, when someone breaks the 
law he forces us to choose either to (a) harm him consistent with our threats or (b) allow ourselves to 
be harmed by future offenders, who have learned that we do not follow through on our threats. Thus, 
Farrell concludes, we are entitled to punish the offender, letting him rather than us suffer the relevant 
harm, given that he has forced the choice upon us through his wrongdoing. See also Daniel M. Farrell, 
“Deterrence and the Just Distribution of Harm,” Social Philosophy and Policy 12 (1995): 220-40; “The 
Justification of General Deterrence,” Philosophical Review 94 (1985): 367-94.  
 Tadros replies, I think correctly, that Farrell’s argument is “implausibly modest” as a theory 
of punishment, since it entails that the degree of punishment will be determined not by the offense 
itself, but by the extent to which the offender’s non-punishment would impact the public’s respect for 
the law. Tadros, The Ends of Harm, supra note 1 at 272–73. Tadros presents the counterexample of 
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offender’s duty to rectify his past wrong, rather than any standalone duty to pre-
vent or mitigate an ongoing or future wrong, that justifies punishment on his 
theory. The corrective justice view, to outline its basic mechanics once more, em-
ploys the same logic vis-à-vis an offender and society: the offender, by contributing 
to criminality in the past, has a duty to those reliant on the criminal law to rectify 
this contribution, which he can fulfill by preventing another’s criminality contribu-
tion, such that those reliant on the criminal law face the same level of criminality 
over time. 
Tadros enters the political realm by arguing that if a victim has a right to 
inflict harm upon his offender in order to protect himself from future offenses, 
then victims collectively have enforceable duties to donate their harming rights to 
the state.130 It costs victims very little—indeed, a reasonably just state pursuing 
general deterrence should prove far more capable of using offenders efficiently 
and proportionally to prevent future offenses than individual victims acting 
alone—and such public state punishment will, via general deterrence, protect those 
non-victims who have no independent right to protection. This duty of donation 
is, in effect, an enforceable duty of easy rescue, Tadros argues ingeniously.131 Crime 
victims can easily “rescue” non-victims by donating their punishment rights to the 
state, akin to saving a drowning person at the cost of wetting one’s clothes. Crime 
                                               
someone who offends away from the public eye. “Suppose that you destroy my car in circumstances 
where no one else will find out about it.” Id. at 273. It would seem, on Farrell’s theory, that the state 
would have no reason to punish such an offender, given that his non-punishment would not under-
mine the credibility of the system of threats, or at least that it would have a much less demanding 
reason than if the criminal damage occurred in a very public place. This parallels the discussion above 
regarding whether Kleinfeld’s reconstructivist theory can account for the professional and secretive 
offender. See supra note 97.  
 More generally, Farrell’s theory requires a rather circuitous dialogue between the state and the 
offender with regard to the justification of his punishment, one which would be difficult to understand 
as a normative interpretation of any real system of criminal punishment: “We punish you not because 
you broke the law per se, nor because your actions were in and of themselves harmful, but because if we 
did not punish you, then others would get the wrong idea about how serious we are about upholding 
the criminal law.” 
130 Id. at 293-311. 
131 Id. at 297-99. 
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victims, that is, can provide a great advantage to non-victims—protection from 
crime—at the cost of little if anything to themselves. 
Offenders, Tadros continues, have no complaint to being used to protect 
people who are not their victims. This is because when doing so is expedient or 
necessary, offenders have enforceable secondary duties to work together toward the 
fulfillment of their primary duties toward their victims. If only I can prevent a future 
assault against your victim, and only you can prevent a future assault against my 
victim, then we each have an enforceable secondary duty to agree to protect the 
other’s victim.132 Given that, in the real world, the best available method of pro-
tecting their victims is to threaten future offenders via a system of state 
punishment, offenders have enforceable duties to work together, as it were, to re-
ceive punishment and thereby maintain such a system. So, while offenders are 
being used to protect people who are not their victims, it is morally permissible 
because it is in the service of their own personal duties.133 Thus, for Tadros, with 
the state bound essentially to both the victim’s right to rectification and the of-
fender’s duty to rectify, the moral transforms into the political, and the state holds 
an exclusive right to punish (for the purpose of general deterrence). The Means 
Problem, meanwhile, is purportedly resolved because when the state uses offend-
ers as a means of preventing crime it is not using them merely to mitigate harms 
or threats for which they have no responsibility, but rather forcing them to fulfill 
their own (enforceable) duties of rectification. 
B. Critique and Comparison 
Given its complexity (and ingenuity), criticism of The Ends of Harm has been 
something of a group project.134 No single paper or chapter can engage with the 
work as a whole, and analyses tend to focus on one or maybe two links in its long 
                                               
132 Id. at 184, 192–94, 266–68, 274–76. 
133 Id. at 279–81. 
134 See symposia on the book in Jerusalem Review of Legal Studies 5 (2012); Law and Philosophy 32 (2013); 
and Criminal Law and Philosophy 9 (2015). 
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chain of arguments. While this may seem like a sign of strength, it is actually a 
weakness. By having so many interlocking components, all of which are necessary 
for the argument as a whole to work, the theory is wide open to potentially fatal 
attack, even if many of its individual components are sound (and inspiring). A 
chain is only as strong as its weakest link. I will focus here on only two aspects of 
the theory, accordingly: first, whether victims would have a duty to donate their 
right of protection to the state and, second, the implications of Tadros’s theory for 
tort law. 
As to the first issue, whether victims would have a duty to donate their right 
of protection to the state, it is not clear that preventing future offenses will al-
ways—or even usually—be the best means of rectification. In many situations, the 
payment of damages would be superior, I believe, given that (a) damages are not 
entirely inadequate as a means of rectification135 and (b) whether there will be future 
offenses of the same type to deter is uncertain. If my house was burgled and the 
chance of a second burglary is low, payment of damages might be better as a means 
of rectification, however inadequate, than the deterrence of a possible, but unlikely, 
future burglary. Tadros might reply that punishment could protect victims from 
other types of offenses. In that case, though, where my house is burgled and I use 
the offender ultimately to prevent, say, a car theft or an assault, that seems no 
better than damages at “matching up” with and erasing the initial wrong. As a 
means of rectifying the particular offense he suffered—the moral concern that 
drives Tadros’s theory—a victim might strongly prefer the certainty of damages in 
his pocket to protection from hypothetical future crimes. If the offender lacked 
                                               
135 See Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, “Rethinking The Ends of Harm,” Law and Philosophy 32 (2013): 177-98, 
at 189–92 (arguing that some crimes, especially but not only property crimes, would be fully compen-
sable with damages, such that the rich who could afford to pay such damages may be able to avoid 
punishment on Tadros’s view); Randy E. Barnett, “Restitution: A New Paradigm for Criminal Justice,” 
Ethics 87 (1977): 279-301 (arguing for a penal system centered on offenders providing financial resti-
tution for victims). But see Daniel McDermott, “The Permissibility of Punishment,” Law and Philosophy 
20 (2001): 403-32 (arguing that damages could never fully rectify denying someone the treatment she 
was owed as a rights-holder). 
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the resources to pay immediately, maybe the victim could receive a percentage of 
his wages for a period of time.136 
Aside from damages, perhaps the victim would prefer a form of equitable 
remedy other than punishing the offender to prevent future offenses, as Kimberly 
Kessler Ferzan argues.137 A victim of car theft, she writes, might prefer that the car 
thief wash his car regularly, rather than be punished to deter future car thefts.138 
Tadros misreads Ferzan, I think, when he replies that it would be disproportional 
to harm an offender significantly for the sake of providing a minor benefit to the 
victim like a car washing. He imagines a scenario in which a boulder rolls over an 
offender, breaking his legs, but somehow triggering a free car wash.139 But Ferzan’s 
vision is of the offender himself doing the car washing, and receiving no further 
punishment, so Tadros’s worry about the disproportionality of car washing as a 
means of rectification seems inapposite. 
If this holds, then donating to the state your right to rectification, and 
thereby giving up your right to damages or non-penal equitable remedies, would 
not be without cost; and Tadros’s “easy rescue” argument as an explanation for 
why the state can coercively take this right away from victims would be placed into 
doubt. Tadros (very interestingly) conceives of victims’ personal rights to rectifi-
cation as “protective resources,” almost akin to a natural resource that ought to be 
distributed fairly within society.140 But consistent with a liberal conception of indi-
vidual rights, it seems that victims ought to have a choice over how they wish to 
proceed with their own rights to rectification: to sue for damages or an equitable 
remedy unrelated to preventing future attacks, to force the offender to serve as a 
                                               
136 See Barnett, “Restitution,” supra note 135 at 288–90. 
137 Ferzan, “Rethinking The Ends of Harm,” supra note 135 at 192–94. 
138 Id. 
139 Victor Tadros, “Responses,” Law and Philosophy 32 (2013): 241-325, at 304. 
140 Id. at 307. 
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personal bodyguard for some period, to donate their punishment right to the state, 
or to choose not to pursue any action at all. 
Tadros might reply that for a duty of rescue to be operative it need not be 
the case that fulfilling the duty be without cost or even without significant cost. 
But what is his principle, exactly, for determining when someone is obligated to 
exercise an otherwise personal right for the benefit of others? Does he endorse a 
version of Peter Singer’s famous principle of rescue: “[I]f it is in our power to 
prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of 
comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it”?141 Such a principle is 
extraordinarily demanding, as Singer understands.142 And were it enforced as a 
matter of law it would potentially conflict with a foundational liberal principle that 
Tadros himself elucidates in a different context: “people are entitled to determine 
for themselves which ends to pursue, even if their ends are not the most valuable 
ends considered impartially.”143 If the money spent on a dinner out or a fashionable 
piece of clothing could be used by Oxfam to save a life—as it could—and if a 
dinner out or fashionable piece of clothing is not of comparable moral significance 
to a life saved—as it is not—would such purchases be illegal?144 What about the 
choice of one’s career? Is that of comparable significance to a life saved? If it is not, 
would the government have the right to force one into the career path that enabled 
her to save the most lives by producing the most economic value? This is some-
what hyperbolic, but Tadros imagines that the state can coercively enforce a 
victim’s duty to rescue non-victims, even as it relates to a victim of a very minor 
offense protecting others from such an offense. At a minimum, then, Tadros owes 
                                               
141 Singer, “Famine, Affluence, and Morality,” supra note 117 at 231. 
142 Id. at 235. 
143 Victor Tadros, “Wrongful Intentions Without Closeness,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 43 (2015): 52-
74, at 65.  
144 For interesting discussion on the morality of a comparatively well-off person choosing to, say, go 
out to dinner, in the context of her duties to the global poor, see Miller, “Beneficence,” supra note 117. 
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us an explanation as to how far his own legally enforceable duty of rescue goes, 
and what its implications are when extended beyond the criminal law context. 
The corrective justice and social defense views, by comparison, can side-
step these complications. They do not require the victim’s personal right to recti-
fication to justify state punishment, given that the relevant wrong—a criminality 
contribution—is against the community as a whole. This coheres with the legal 
principle that it is the state, rather than the victim, that prosecutes individuals for 
criminal offenses: it is not Victim v. Offender, but The People v. Offender. The entire 
institution of the criminal law, from the police to courts to prisons to the parole 
system, is engineered for the state and the wider community to assert their own 
interests against offenders. The notion, then, that this institution is founded on the 
process of victims donating their moral rights to the state is at best an awkward fit 
as a matter of interpretation.145 
Secondly, if Tadros were able to reply effectively to these worries, and es-
tablish that victims in fact have a legally enforceable duty to donate their right of 
rectification to the state for the purpose of general deterrence—and in a principled 
manner that would have acceptable implications for liberal rights more broadly—
then his theory would have an extraordinary implication for tort law. Once more, 
Tadros believes that the nature of criminal as opposed to civil wrongs is that the 
former cannot easily be rectified by damages. The purpose of the criminal law, on 
his view, is to rectify criminal wrongs, while the purpose of tort law is to rectify 
civil wrongs. Here is the extraordinary implication: there is no place in this story 
for the victim of a criminal wrong to sue for tort damages. The rectification he 
                                               
145 There is a movement to increase the participation of victims in the criminal process; its very exist-
ence, though, is evidence that victims’ rights are not central to the institution as currently structured. 
See generally Douglas E. Beloof, Paul G. Cassell, and Steven J. Twist, Victims in Criminal Procedure, 3rd ed. 
(Durham: Carolina Academic Press, 2014); Markus Dirk Dubber, Victims in the War on Crime: The Use 
and Abuse of Victims’ Rights (New York: NYU Press, 2002); Lynn N. Henderson, “The Wrongs of 
Victim’s Rights,” Stanford Law Review 37 (1985): 933-1021; Erin Ann O’Hara, “Victim Participation in 
the Criminal Process,” Journal of Law and Policy 13 (2005): 229-47. 
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seeks would be secured by the prevention of future offenses against him, rather 
than damages. As a judge might explain in rejecting a victim’s suit, the victim has 
already forced his wrongdoer to suffer so as to prevent future wrongs against 
him—he has already, say, sent him to jail for his own personal benefit—and so he 
has already been made whole and can ask no more of his wrongdoer. Such an 
outcome—no tort damages for crime victims—is a dramatic consequence of 
Tadros’s theory, and we should very much prefer a theory that allows for such 
damages. The corrective justice and social defense theories, by comparison, are 
able to motivate the criminal law while maintaining a tort system for crime victims. 
Again, the distinctly criminal wrong on these views, that which makes one liable to 
state punishment, is not a wrong against an individual victim, but rather a wrong 
against the wider society in the form of a contribution to criminality.  
The corrective justice and social defense theories thus follow Farmer’s guid-
ance that theories of punishment must not merely identify discrete criminalizable 
wrongs, but must also account for the criminal law as a whole, as an institution 
central to the maintenance of social cooperation.146 The two theories do this very 
directly, as the criminal wrong on either view just is the hinderance of the criminal 
law’s institutional aims. Indeed, we can view the criminal wrong as a tort against 
society or, more precisely, against the individuals within society, all of whom rely 
upon the institution of the criminal law, and with the corrective justice and social 
defense principles working to repair that social damage. The offender’s tort against 
his individual victim—as well as the state’s potential liability for its failure to pro-
tect the victim, as discussed above—are distinct issues to be considered in the 
separate civil system. 
                                               
146 See Farmer, Making the Modern Criminal Law, supra note 60 at 299 (“What links disparate rules on, 
say, forgery of documents, the sale of poisons, the regulation of jurisdiction overseas and so on, is a 
common sense that they belong to something which can be described as the ‘criminal law’. What 
makes this intelligible as an idea is not only that the rules may share certain common properties (which 
is not always the case), or that the rules carry penal sanctions, but also that they are directed at securing 
civil order in some way.”). 
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VIII. Empirical Foundations 
The theory of the criminal law and of state punishment which I have set 
out and defended rests upon an empirical assumption: an effective, reliable crimi-
nal law is foundational to the maintenance of a cooperative civil society and to 
people’s assured liberty. If this assumption (or set of assumptions) were false, then 
consistent with this chapter’s first premise—that to justify its extreme institutional 
costs, state punishment must deter crime to some sufficient degree—there could 
be no legitimate system of state punishment.147 This is not just an issue for the 
corrective justice and social defense theories, then, but for all purported justifica-
tions of state punishment. If we could secure social peace and cooperation without 
the threat of punishment—if, say, the operation of non-legal social norms would 
suffice to diminish the threat of crime—then the enormous expense of the criminal 
justice system, with its police, prosecutors, defense attorneys, judges, prisons, pa-
role officers, and so forth, would be unjustifiable, given the great mass of suffering 
that even a relatively mild system of criminal punishment inflicts on offenders and 
their dependents, and given all that we might otherwise do with those resources. 
To be clear, it would be unjustifiable even if retributivists were right that, regardless 
of its deterrent impact, all offenders deserved to suffer or be censured. For the 
imperative of retributivist penal desert, even if legitimate, could not be an absolute 
trump.148 And if its infliction played a negligible role in deterring crime, then that 
imperative would be overridden by the wants and needs that we could otherwise 
fulfill with penal resources. 
What, then, should we make of the empirical claim regarding the impact of 
the criminal law—of the threat of criminal punishment—on society and social 
                                               
147 See supra note 1. 
148 Kant famously disagrees. Immanuel Kant, The Philosophy of Law: An Exposition of the Fundamental 
Principles of Jurisprudence as the Science of Right [1796], trans. William Hastie (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 
1887), at 198 (arguing that, even in a disbanding island society, “the last Murderer lying in the prison 
ought to be executed . . . in order that every one may realize the desert of his deeds, and that bloodguilt-
iness may not remain upon the people.”). 
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cooperation? It is difficult to know with certainty. It would require assessing a pol-
ity with, and then without, a functioning criminal law over a sufficiently long period 
of time. The historical examples we have—say, when German soldiers arrested the 
entire Danish police force in 1944,149 when US and coalition forces overthrew the 
Baathist regime in Iraq in 2003,150 and when the police force of the Brazilian state 
of Espirito Santo went on strike in 2017151—loudly support the thesis that the 
threat of criminal punishment plays a crucial role in decreasing the crime level. But 
these “experiments” were not run for long enough, one might argue, and perhaps 
over a longer period of time sufficient non-penal and possibly non-legal modes of 
regulation would emerge to guarantee people’s assured liberty.152 Perhaps. Claus 
Roxin writes perceptively on how we ought to interpret the lack of definitive social 
science evidence on the deterrent impact of state punishment, given the complex 
causal relationships at play in someone’s decision to offend. At the same time he 
articulates the reliance interest of non-victims on the criminal law: 
                                               
149 Johannes Andenaes, “The General Preventive Effects of Punishment,” Pennsylvania Law Review 114 
(1966): 949-83, at 962 (reporting that, during the German occupation of Denmark, when an unarmed 
watch corps served as a makeshift police force, the frequency of street crimes like robbery rose very 
sharply, though the incidence of crimes such as embezzlement and fraud was less affected.) 
150 See, e.g., Naomi Klein, “Baghdad Year Zero,” Harper’s Magazine, September 2004, 43–53 (reporting 
widespread lawlessness after the fall of the Baathist regime); John F. Burns, “Pillagers Strip Iraqi Mu-
seum of Its Treasure,” N.Y. Times, April 12, 2003, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/04/12/international/worldspecial/pillagers-strip-iraqi-museum-of-
its-treasure.html (reporting looting). 
151 See, e.g., Paulo Whitaker and Pablo Garcia, “Over 100 Dead in Brazil as Police Strike Spurs Anar-
chy,” Reuters, February 9, 2017, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-brazil-violence-espirito-santo-
idUSKBN15O1ZT (reporting widespread violence in the wake of the police strike); Lola Mosanya, 
“‘Crazy Violence’ in Brazilian State During Police Strike,” BBC News, February 11, 2017, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/newsbeat/article/38942911/crazy-violence-in-brazilian-state-during-police-
strike (same); BBC News, “Brazilian City of Vitoria Hit by Police Strike,” February 6, 2017, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-38879775 (same); Paulo Whitaker, “Some Brazil 
Police Break Strike Following Wave of Homicides,” Reuters, February 12, 2017, http://www.reu-
ters.com/article/us-brazil-violence-idUSKBN15R0SU (same). 
152 Even if that were the case, we might have reason, nonetheless, to prefer a legal to a non-legal system 
of protections. As Jeremy Waldron writes in discussing the treatment of Romeo and Juliet by the 
Montagues and Capulets: legal protections have the advantage of not depending upon the potentially 
fickle affections of a closely-knit social group. Jeremy Waldron, “When Justice Replaces Affection: 
The Need for Rights,” in Liberal Rights: Collected Papers 1981–1991 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1993), 370-91, at 377-79. 
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“This indeterminacy [in the social science evidence]…does not 
change the fact that a functioning system of social control and crim-
inal justice is—taken in the totality of its social effects—certainly 
capable of helping to maintain…civil peace for citizens. Some 
crimes will, of course, still be committed. But whereas in Germany 
one can walk the streets safely at night, there are other countries in 
which this is impossibly dangerous and where people hide away in 
their houses surrounded by high walls. One cannot seriously doubt 
that such a deplorable state of affairs is due to failures of preventive 
social management, ranging from police work to the operations of 
the criminal courts and the correctional system. (That these failures 
are, in turn, a consequence of poverty and other social problems, is 
a different point.)”153 
 
Let us continue, then, with the commonsense empirical view that a functioning 
criminal law decreases the threat of crime significantly, but with the understanding 
that should this claim prove false, or should there be less costly non-penal and 
possibly non-legal modes of securing sufficient crime reduction, that it would 
gravely damage any justification of the criminal law. To be sure, this is not to as-
sume that the criminal law’s deterrent impact depends upon any particular level of 
punishment severity, but merely upon the effective threat of at least some level of 
punishment, the infliction of which would be a matter of public knowledge.154 
IX. Sentencing Implications 
We have now filled in the basic contours of two novel (but closely related) 
theories of deterrent punishment. The offender, by contributing to criminality, has 
diminished the assured liberty of everybody in the jurisdiction, by contributing to 
a social threat that (a) chills the exercise of their rights, (b) forces them to take 
                                               
153 Roxin, “Prevention, Censure, and Responsibility,” supra note 1 at 29-30. See also MacCormick, Insti-
tutions of Law, supra note 63 at 207-08. 
154 There is considerable evidence that the certainty of receiving some level of punishment is more 
important for the purpose of deterring would-be offenders than the severity of the punishment that 
they receive. See Daniel S. Nagin, “Deterrence in the Twenty-First Century: A Review of the Evi-
dence,” in ed. Michael Tonry, Crime and Justice in America: 1975–2025 (Chicago: Chicago University 
Press, 2013); Andrew von Hirsch, et. al., Criminal Deterrence and Sentence Severity: An Analysis of Recent 
Research (Portland: Hart, 1999), 27, 36, 45; Steven N. Dulauf and Daniel S. Nagin, “Imprisonment and 
crime: Can both be reduced?” Criminology & Public Policy 10 (2011): 13-54. 
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expensive precautions, and (c) subjects them to unreasonable risks of harm. At the 
far extreme, indeed, criminality can threaten the maintenance of a cooperative, 
non-violent civil society. Deterrent punishment, which acts to reduce the amount 
of criminality in society going forward, is the means by which the offender rectifies 
or mitigates his past and possibly ongoing contributions to criminality. In this way, 
he is not punished so as to limit the problem of future crime, for which he has no 
responsibility, but rather to force him to fulfill his own duties of repair. And thus, 
in sum, we have a non-consequentialist justification for deterrent punishment, one 
that coheres with the principle of human inviolability, with a steadfast refusal to 
sacrifice offenders as mere means to the greater good.  
If this indeed works to answer the why question of criminal law theory—
Why is the state entitled to harm someone when he commits an offense?—the how 
much question remains nonetheless—How much harm should the state inflict?155 
More particularly, to return to the “internal” punishment limitations question de-
scribed at the outset: How much harm is the state entitled to inflict upon an 
offender, looking only to the reasons that positively justify the infliction of penal 
harm? That is, as we inflict more and more harm upon an offender, at what point 
do these reasons themselves stop providing a moral justification for doing so? The 
most basic sentencing implication of the two theories is as follows: The greater 
one’s criminality contribution, the greater the amount of criminality he has a duty 
to erase, and thus the more severe the punishment he is liable to receive. There 
                                               
155 Andrew von Hirsch writes that the latter question is often overlooked in criminal law theory: “Phil-
osophical writing has chiefly confined itself to the general justification of punishment, why the criminal 
sanction should exist at all.  Seldom addressed, however, has been what bearing the justification for 
punishment’s existence has on the question of how much offenders should be penalized.” Von Hirsch, 
Censure and Sanctions, supra note 20 at 6; see also Duff, Punishment, Communication, and Community, supra 
note 20 at 131 (“A normative theory of punishment must either include, or be able to generate, a 
theory of sentencing—an account of how particular modes and levels of punishment are to be assigned 
to particular kinds of offense and offender. Only then can it guide or even connect with the actual 
practice of punishment.”). 
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are, however, a number of subsidiary issues to consider in order to make sense of 
this claim.   
First, how do we know when one criminality contribution is greater than 
another?  Given that the ultimate aim is assured liberty, we can ask the following 
question: How important is it to people, in the planning and execution of their 
lives, to be able to rely upon others not performing those acts?156  We can see, in 
this way, how Inez’s intention to kill represents a greater criminality contribution 
than Ryan’s willingness to speed while driving or to drive recklessly.  
Second, we need to understand the fungibility of criminality when consider-
ing an offender’s duties. Given that the criminal law is a system of protections, such 
that people rely upon clusters of protections at any given time, as discussed above, 
one’s duties would not be limited to preventing his or her offense type.  That is, 
what Inez did, by making her criminality contribution, was—in concert with other 
offenders—to chill the exercise of our rights, to force us to take expensive precau-
tions, and to subject us to unreasonable risks of harm. She could rectify this by 
deterring offenses of a different type, given that the negative impact of those other 
offenses will register in the same manner. She need not deter only murderers, that 
is; and she would not be acquitted if she happened to be the only murderer in 
society.   
Given the fungibility of criminality, we can restate the basic sentencing prin-
ciple in the following manner: By increasing past and possibly present criminality 
by X units, the offender has a duty to decrease future criminality by X units. To be 
sure, the notion that we can measure criminality in precise, cardinal “units,” like 
we can measure inches or kilograms, is metaphorical. But, in the first instance, the 
                                               
156 For historical and theoretical analyses of why societies criminalize certain actions but not others, 
and how this deliberative process depends on a society’s particular conception of “civil order,” see 
Farmer, Making Modern Criminal Law, supra note 60.  
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metaphor provides some useful—and not especially distortive—structure to the 
sentencing inquiry. 
A. Proportionate Deterrent Punishment 
Assuming that this basic sentencing principle holds, when do the reasons 
that justify the infliction of penal harm switch off, as it were, failing to provide 
justification for the infliction of further harm? I will outline a number of guiding 
principles. 
1. Parsimonious Punishment 
Most fundamentally, according to the two theories, the infliction of penal 
harm at any level is justified only so long as it acts to deter crime, given that the 
theories are not retributivist and thereby deny that the suffering of offenders is 
intrinsically good. It may be more efficient, indeed, for offenders to fulfill their 
duties of rectification and mitigation in ways other than (or in addition to) hard 
treatment, such as fines and community service.157 Any marginal increase in penal 
harm that was not met with a marginal increase in crime deterrence would repre-
sent a wanton and illegitimate injury. We must endorse those methods of 
punishment that enable an offender to fulfil his duty with the smallest degree of 
injury in the process, as discussed above. Related, given that the suffering of of-
fenders is not an intrinsic good on this view, and given that the budget for crime 
prevention is limited, the state should ask, for each dollar spent, whether non-penal 
community investments would represent a more efficient means of reducing crim-
inality—with the understanding that, consistent with the discussion in Section 
VIII, not all resources could be diverted from the project of general deterrence via 
the threat of punishment.158 We can unite these two concerns—penal harm must 
                                               
157 See supra note 93. 
158 There is considerable evidence that early childhood development programs are effective in reducing 
crime. See James Heckman, Rodrigo Pinto, and Peter Savelyev, “Understanding the Mechanisms 
Through Which an Influential Early Childhood Program Boosted Adult Outcomes,” American Eco-
nomic Review 103 (2013): 2052-86; Alex R. Piquero, et. al., “Effects of early family/parent training 
programs on antisocial behavior and delinquency,” Journal of Experimental Criminology 5 (2009): 83–120.  
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generate deterrence and must be the most efficient means of generating deter-
rence—to conclude that the infliction of such harm must be parsimonious. 
2. Reparative Punishment 
But if inflicting harm upon an offender is indeed “parsimonious”—an ef-
fective and maximally efficient means of generating deterrence—what are the 
internal limits to inflicting more and more harm? Let’s consider Alex, whose in-
tention to steal a car increased criminality in the past by, say, 10 units. What are the 
internal limits with regard to his punishment? First, the state would be entitled to 
harm him so as to decrease future criminality by 10 units, but no more. Traditional 
Benthamite deterrence theories, by comparison, would license the infliction of pro-
gressively more harm upon offenders, so long as doing so was a “frugal” means of 
reducing pain and increasing pleasure overall in society—taking into account the 
offender’s own experience of pain as a result of his punishment.159 But the Ben-
thamite sentencer would be unconcerned ultimately with the severity of his 
offense, and she would be happy to make a vicious example of a minor offender—
or, indeed, of an entirely innocent person—if that happened to be an efficient 
means of securing deterrence and increasing the average incidence of pleasure in 
society. It is because the two theories can foreclose such an outcome, as discussed 
above, that they are “constrained” instrumentalist theories.160 Once his duty of 
repair has been fulfilled, even if the state could decrease future criminality very 
efficiently by inflicting even minor additional harms upon Alex, the two theories 
would not license the infliction of any further harm. He is only responsible for his 
own criminality contributions. He “owes” no more to society once he has been 
used, via general deterrence, to decrease future criminality by 10 units. He has at 
                                               
159 Bentham offered thirteen rules for determining a proportional utilitarian sentence, including a pro-
hibition on “unfrugal” punishments—punishments that, taking into account the offender’s pain as a 
result of the punishment, would fail to maximize utility overall. Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the 
Principles of Morals and Legislation [1789], ed. W. Harrison (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1948), chs. XIV and 
XV. 
160 See supra note 28. 
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that point made society whole, and to inflict any additional harm upon him is the 
moral equivalent of hurting an innocent person. In this way, we can say that pun-
ishments must be reparative, repairing the offender’s own wrongdoing, rather than 
merely being “useful.” 
3. Equitable Punishment 
What if the infliction of deterrent harm is parsimonious and reparative, but 
inefficient? That is, when inflicting penal harm is the most efficient means of gen-
erating deterrence and the offender has not yet fulfilled his duty of repair, are there 
any internal limits to inflicting more and more harm? What if, in the case of Alex 
and other car thieves, the only way to generate their respective 10 units of deter-
rence was to inflict enormous amounts of harm on them, say, by incarcerating 
them for 30 years each? What are the limits, if any, to how much harm one may 
undergo in order to repair his wrongdoing? This question would seem to be at 
home in tort law, except for the fact that the payment of damages is the standard 
means of repair in that realm. In that case, where the financial “harm” borne by 
the defendant tortfeasor and the rectificatory financial “benefit” gained by the 
plaintiff are in precise equipoise, the question of whether the cost to the defendant 
is disproportionate to the benefit to the plaintiff will never emerge.161 We can, 
however, find some coarse insights within the law of equity, examining when 
courts will grant an injunction in response to a tort, most notably in response to a 
nuisance or trespass, or specific performance in response to a breach of contract, 
most notably with real property contracts.162 In those cases, it would indeed be 
                                               
161 That is not to say that proportionality has no place is the realm of tort damages. As Jeremy Waldron 
argues, the financial harm borne by the defendant could be disproportionate to her own moral liability. 
See Jeremy Waldron, “Moments of Carelessness and Massive Loss,” in ed. David G. Owen, Philosophical 
Foundations of Tort Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 387-409. 
162 “Specific performance,” according to the Uniform Code of Contracts, “may be decreed where the 
goods are unique or in other proper circumstances,” especially with (but not limited to) real property 
contracts. U.C.C. § 2-716(1) (1999). The premise is that, given the uniqueness of what the claimant 
has contracted for, it will be difficult if not impossible for her to purchase a suitable substitute, and 
thus damages would be an inadequate as a means of making her whole. Real property is not the only 
type of “unique” good; see Triple-A Baseball Club Assocs. v. Ne. Baseball, Inc., 832 F.2d 214, 224 (1st Cir. 
 
 
 
 
89 
possible that the cost to the defendant in making the plaintiff whole could out-
weigh the plaintiff’s benefit. And while there is a diversity of authorities on the 
matter, to be sure, there is an established tradition within the common law of equity 
that strikes an intuitive balance.   
In Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970), for instance, 
the New York Court of Appeals held famously that a cement factory could con-
tinue polluting surrounding properties because the cost of abatement—closing 
down a $45 million plant that employed hundreds of workers—far outstripped the 
plaintiff’s damages.163 The court awarded continuing damages as a remedy. Simi-
larly, in Blackfield v. Thomas Allec Corp. 128 Cal.App. 348 (1932), the California Court 
of Appeal affirmed the denial of an injunction where a wall overhanging plaintiff’s 
property by 3 5/8 inches and causing $200 in damages would have cost $6,875 to 
be removed. In Christensen v. Tucker, the California Court of Appeal followed Black-
field among other cases in determining that denial of injunction in encroachment 
cases requires the presence of three factors, including that “the hardship to the 
defendant by the granting of the injunction must be greatly disproportionate to the 
hardship caused plaintiff by the continuance of the encroachment…”164 English 
                                               
1987) (holding that a minor league baseball franchise, for which the plaintiff had contracted, was 
“unique in character and cannot be duplicated,” and thus that specific performance of the contract 
was warranted); Leasco Corp. v. Taussig, 473 F.2d 777, 786 (2d Cir. 1972) (specifically enforcing contract 
for sale of business, as each business is “unique”). 
163 Jeff MacMahan distinguishes between “narrow” proportionality, which considers whether a harm-
ful action is proportional with regard to the harm it causes those who are liable to be harmed (e.g. 
opposing soldiers), and “wide” proportionality, which additionally considers the harm it causes those 
who are not liable to be harmed (e.g. civilians). Jeff MacMahan, “Proportionality and Time,” Ethics 125 
(2015): 1–24, at 2-4.  In considering the impact of the plant’s closure not only on the defendant cor-
poration, but also on its employees and the surrounding community, the court in Boomer was engaging 
in “wide” proportionality analysis. See also Jeff McMahan, “What Rights May Be Defended by Means 
of War?” in eds. Cecile Fabre and Seth Lazar, The Morality of Defensive War,  (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2014), 115-58, at 124-25; Killing in War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 21.  
164 Christensen v. Tucker, 144 Cal.App.2d 554, 563 (1952) (emphasis added). See also Wright v. Best, 19 Cal. 
2d 368, 386 (1942) (recognizing the “balancing of conveniences doctrine,” by which a “court of equity 
may deny injunctive relief and relegate the plaintiff to his remedy at law, if the benefit resulting to him 
from the granting of the injunction will be slight as compared to the injury caused the defendant 
thereby.”); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 941 (1965) (“The relative hardship likely to result to the 
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cases provide similar guidance. In Jordan v Norfolk County Council [1994] 1 WLR 
1353, for instance, an order for defendant council to replace trees on plaintiff’s 
land was varied when it emerged that the cost of compliance would be over 
£250,000. The plaintiff’s damage was valued at £200 and the value of the entire 
property was £25,000.  
Meanwhile, within contract law, the Second Restatement of Contracts pro-
vides that specific performance would be inappropriate when it “would work an 
unconscionable advantage to the plaintiff or would result in injustice.”165 In Kilarjian v. 
Vastola, the New Jersey Superior Court declined to specifically enforce a contract 
for the buyers’ “dream home,” since the seller’s health had deteriorated in the in-
terim, such that moving out of the house might “precipitate respiratory failure and 
hasten [her] demise.”166 English law provides, along the same lines, that specific 
performance may be refused where it would bring a “severe hardship to the de-
fendant,” 167 such as effectively requiring him to bring legal proceedings against a 
third party, which might disrupt family relations, or “hardship amounting to an 
injustice.”168 In Patel v Ali [1985] Ch 283—a case very similar to Kilarjian—the 
Chancery Division denied plaintiff home buyers specific performance, because the 
seller’s condition had worsened in the intervening period—losing her leg to am-
putation and her husband to prison, while gaining two children—and she would 
have lost crucial assistance from neighbors and nearby family had she been forced 
to move. The Court held that this qualified as an “extraordinary and persuasive 
                                               
defendant if injunction is granted and to the plaintiff if it is denied, is one of the factors to be consid-
ered in determining the appropriateness of an injunction against tort.”). 
165 Restatement (Second) Of Contracts § 359(3) (1981) (emphasis added). 
166 Kilarjian v. Vastola, 877 A.2d 372, 375 (2004). See also Van Wagner Adver. Co. v. S & M Enter., 492 
N.E.2d 756 (N.Y. 1986) (denying specific performance due to disproportionate hardship). 
167 See Thomas v Dering (1837) 1 Keen 729 at 747-48; Hartlepool Gas and Water Co v West Hartlepool Harbour 
and Rly Co (1865) 12 LT 366; Bulger v McManaway [1963] NZLR 427. 
168 Tamplin v. James (1880) 15 Ch.D. 215 at 221.  
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circumstance” whereby “hardship” could vitiate one’s duty to perform on a real 
property contract.169 
We can apply these principles of equity to our conception of penal propor-
tionality. First, we should avoid the (tempting) Benthamite conclusion that the 
harm borne by the offender must never be greater than the harm prevented in the 
process. For instance, we do not think that the sellers in Kilarjian or Patel ought to 
be able to avoid specific performance based on a showing that moving out would 
harm them slightly more than failing to move out would harm the buyers. Second, 
and more to the point, we should conclude that it is impermissible to harm an 
offender to a degree that is entirely out of proportion to the harm prevented by doing 
so, even if that meant that his duty of repair toward society went to some degree 
unfulfilled. As courts in equity have discerned, duties of repair have an internal 
limit in this manner—one which is vague both in terms of its practical application 
and indeed its precise conceptual foundation, but one which is, just the same, in-
tuitively compelling if not undeniable. A 30-year sentence for Alex, even if it were 
the singular means by which he could decrease criminality by 10 units, would be 
entirely out of proportion to the reparative benefit gained by society as a result—
just as removing the overhang in Blackfield, at a cost of $6,875, would be entirely 
out of proportion to the $200 in damages suffered by the plaintiff. And it would 
thereby be impermissible for reasons internal to the corrective justice theory and 
Alex’s duty of repair. It is not that such a punishment might degrade Alex or waste 
social resources—separate and legitimate considerations, to be sure—but that such 
a degree of harm bears the entirely wrong relationship or proportion to the strin-
gency of his own duty. And as we are taking our cue from the law of equity, we 
can say that such punishment would be inequitable.170   
                                               
169 Patel v Ali [1985] Ch 283 at 288. 
170 This dovetails—to a degree—with the internal limits to Tadros’s theory. Tadros argues that (a) the 
harmfulness of an offender’s punishment, inflicted as a means of protecting his victim from future 
harms, can be no greater than (b) the amount that the offender could have been harmed to prevent 
 
 
 
 
92 
B. Punishment as Policy 
Let us now step outside of the metaphor that criminality is like height and 
weight—that we can measure criminality, as well as the amount of criminality that 
punishment acts to deter, with cardinal precision. Measuring the deterrent impact 
of punishment is based on a counter-factual: How much crime would there be if 
we punished to X, Y, or Z degree? The state, of course, can only consider this 
question prospectively, in inherently broad brush, as a matter of general policy, deliv-
ering a set amount of penal harm for different classes of offenders. It is not as if 
the state could measure precisely how much criminality Alex’s individual punish-
ment prevents, releasing him once the mercury in his personal “criminality 
prevention thermometer” passes 10 units mark. To answer the prospective policy 
question requires us to leave the moral and enter the empirical, inquiring into how 
                                               
the attack in the first place. See Tadros, The Ends of Harm, supra note 1 at 331-60. He writes that an 
offender’s “liability to be punished is derived from his principal obligation not to harm others, and 
hence the costs that he must bear may not exceed the costs that he would have had to bear to avert 
his own threat.” Id. at 347. Tadros argues that the limits of preventive, defensive force are as follows: 
“One may not use the force necessary to avert a threat if that force is out of all proportion to the 
magnitude of the threat that one faces.” Id. at 331; see also id. at ch. 8. Imagine, for instance, that 
someone threatens to slap you and your only means of prevention is to shoot her dead; to do so would 
be “out of all proportion” to the threat and thus impermissible. Applying this logic to the duty theory 
of punishment entails that the state must not harm an offender, as a means of rectifying his prior 
wrong to his victim, to a degree that is “out of all proportion” to the harm risked by that prior wrong. 
While Tadros’s theory and the two theories thus share a broadly similar top-end limit, we should notice 
that they do not generate the same sentences up and down the offense spectrum. They seem to differ, 
most importantly, with regard to minor offenses and property offenses. More particularly, with regard 
to such offenses it appears that Tadros’s limiting principle might lead to sentences that are overly 
lenient for the purpose of deterrence. Consider again the case of the compact disc thief—the case 
which Tadros raises to establish the inadequacy of talionic, eye-for-an-eye punishments when it comes 
to deterring minor offenses. See supra at 29. To what degree could a record store owner permissibly 
harm someone as a means of preventing him from stealing a single compact disc? Or a record player? 
Or even his car? We might doubt whether inflicting only such a degree of harm on such offenders, as 
a means of punishment, would be adequate for the purpose of deterrence. The corrective justice and 
social defense theories, with their socio-political conception of criminal wrongdoing, and with their 
direct purpose to repair a criminality contribution, would not be so constrained. Tadros might reply 
that we ought to imagine how much defensive harm the victim would be entitled to inflict in a state 
of nature context, not within an established legal environment featuring professional police who might 
be able to, say, catch the thief and return your compact disc. But with at least property and regulatory 
offenses, such analysis would be impossible, since such offenses could only occur within a legal con-
text. That is, such offenses involve the violation of rights, like property rights, that only take shape 
within a relatively effective system of law. 
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much deterrence a particular sentencing regime or schedule generates as an empir-
ical matter.  
It is, to be sure, an inexact science. The challenge of making society whole, 
in this way, is interestingly different from the challenge of making an individual 
plaintiff whole in the context of tort damages. Such damages may rectify her losses 
only approximately, especially in non-commercial contexts, but that the plaintiff 
will receive these damages is not in doubt, assuming the defendant has sufficient 
resources. In the penal context, as understood here, the complication is reversed. 
Unlike damages in the civil context—but like an injunction or specific perfor-
mance—decreasing future criminality would, if delivered in full, represent a 
perfectly neat means of repair. However, the degree to which the offenders will in 
fact “perform,” in the form of decreased future criminality, is uncertain, and even 
if we assume that the state has vast penal resources at its disposal. 
Though, it is not as if those charged with determining deterrent sentences 
are completely in the dark. As discussed above, for instance, there is considerable 
evidence that the certainty of receiving some level of punishment is more important 
for the purpose of deterring offenders than the severity of the punishment re-
ceived.171 Steven Dulauf and Daniel Nagin carefully survey empirical studies on 
crime deterrence in America to conclude that the “marginal deterrent effect of 
increasing already lengthy prison sentences is modest at best.”172 While they do not 
define “already lengthy,” they are not making any statement as to the deterrent 
impact of increasing “short” sentences; they include the “already lengthy” modifier 
only because almost all of the studies that they look at examine the effect of in-
creasing multi-year sentences.173 Consider, for instance, California’s “Three Strikes 
and You’re Out” law. That law mandates a minimum sentence of 25 years after 
                                               
171 See supra note 154. 
172 Steven N. Dulauf and Daniel S. Nagin, “Overview of ‘Imprisonment and crime: Can both be re-
duced?’” Criminology & Public Policy 10 (2011): 9-11, at 9. 
173 Dulauf and Nagin, “Imprisonment and crime,” supra note 154 at 31. 
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conviction for a third strike-eligible offense. Franklin Zimring, Gordon Hawkings, 
and Sam Kamin concluded that only those individuals with two strike-eligible of-
fenses showed any indication of reduced offending, and that the law reduced the 
felony crime rate overall by at most 2%.174 Other studies have found similarly mod-
est evidence of the crime-preventative effects of the law.175 Dulauf and Nagin 
argue that the data strongly favors investments in the police. “Increasing the visi-
bility of the police by hiring more officers or allocating existing officers in ways 
that heighten the perceived risk of apprehension seems to have substantial mar-
ginal deterrent effects.”176 One policy, toward this end, is stationing officers in 
crime “hot spots.”177 Assuming a limited amount of crime prevention resources—
and assuming that the only policy options are police or incarceration—Dulauf and 
Nagin conclude that resources would be far more efficiently spent on increasing 
police presence than on lengthy sentences. Mark Kleiman and David Kennedy 
have reached similar conclusions.178  
While there are many variables at play, a number of European states have 
for decades now coupled low crime rates with mild sentencing regimes.179 This is 
surely the ideal outcome from the perspective of the corrective justice and social 
defense theories, given their concern to decrease criminality with as little injury to 
                                               
174 Franklin E. Zimring, Gordon Hawkins, and Sam Kamin, Punishment and Democracy: Three Strikes and 
You’re Out in California (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001). Cited in Dulauf and Nagin, “Im-
prisonment and crime,” supra note 154 at 28. 
175 See Lisa Stolzenberg and Stewart J. D’Alessio, “‘Three strikes and you’re out’: The impact of Cali-
fornia’s new mandatory sentencing law on serious crime rates,” Crime & Delinquency, 43 (1997): 457–
469; Peter Greenwood and Angela Hawken, An Assessment of the Effect of California’s Three-Strikes Law 
(Santa Monica: Greenwood Associates, 2002). Cited in Dulauf and Nagin, “Imprisonment and crime,” 
supra note 155 at 28. 
176 Dulauf and Nagin, “Overview,” supra note 174 at 9. 
177 Dulauf and Nagin, “Imprisonment and crime,” supra note 154  at 34-36. 
178 Mark Kleiman, When Brute Force Fails: How to Have Less Crime and Less Punishment (Princeton: Prince-
ton University Press, 2009); David Kennedy, Deterrence and Crime Prevention: Reconsidering the Prospect of 
Sanction (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009). 
179 See Nick Cowen and Nigel Williams, “Comparisons of Crime in OECD Countries,” CITIVAS: 
Institute for the Study of Civil Society, April 2012, http://www.civitas.org.uk/con-
tent/files/crime_stats_oecdjan2012.pdf (comparing rates of homicide, rape, robbery, assault, burglary, 
and vehicle theft within OECD states, as well as rates of punitiveness). 
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offenders as possible. Thus we ought to expect the two theories to bring about a 
system of punishment far less severe—and featuring far less long-term incarcera-
tion—than the one practiced in the United States as well as the United Kingdom 
in recent decades. Nonetheless, the effectiveness of penal harm in bringing about 
deterrence will vary from context to context, and we should not think that the 
corrective justice and social defense theories standing alone could ground, say, a 
Scandinavian system of criminal justice, given all the factors that enable such sys-
tems.180 
Furthermore, and importantly for what follows, we should not think that 
the corrective justice and social defense theories in any context could completely 
foreclose extreme or degrading punishments as a purely “internal” matter of prin-
ciple. For, as stated in the Introduction, crime deterrence does correlate to some 
degree with penal severity, even if it correlates to a higher degree with the likeli-
hood of receiving some amount of punishment. And if it were indeed the case, as 
some have suggested,181 that extreme or degrading punishments were effective 
                                               
180 See generally Nicola Lacey, David Soskice, and David Hope, “Understanding the Determinants of 
Penal Policy: Crime, Culture, and Comparative Political Economy,” Annual Review of Criminology 1 
(2018): 195-217 (analyzing four paradigmatic determinants of penal policy—crime rates, cultural dy-
namics, economic structures and interests, and institutional differences—and considering the impact 
of race as an independent determinant of US penal policies); Nicola Lacey, The Prisoners’ Dilemma: 
Political Economy and Punishment in Contemporary Democracies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2008) (examining political economic, institutional, and cultural determinants of penal severity); John 
Pratt, “Scandinavian Exceptionalism in an Era of Penal Excess, Part I: The Nature and Roots of 
Scandinavian Exceptionalism” British Journal of Criminology 48 (2008): 119-37 (arguing that high levels 
of social trust and solidarity have grounded Scandinavian criminal justice systems and considering 
demographic and economic factors conducive to those high levels); John Pratt, “Scandinavian Excep-
tionalism in an Era of Penal Excess, Part II: Does Scandinavian Exceptionalism Have a Future?” 
British Journal of Criminology 48 (2008): 275-292 (same); James Q. Whitman, Harsh Justice: Criminal Pun-
ishment and the Widening Divide between America and Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) 
(arguing that cultural and ideological differences explain the difference between the American penal 
regime, on the one hand, and French and German regimes, on the other); Nicola Lacey and David 
Soskice, “Crime, Punishment and Segregation in the United States: The paradox of local democracy,” 
Punishment & Society 4 (2015): 454-81 (arguing that local government autonomy in the United States, 
and the resulting fact that criminal justice policies are filtered through local electoral politics, presents 
unique challenges for garnering political support for integrative criminal justice policies). 
181 See, e.g., Lawrence Katz, Steven D. Levitt, and Ellen Shustorovich, “Prisons Conditions, Capital 
Punishment, and Deterrence,” American Law and Economics Review 5 (2003): 318-43 (arguing that penal 
severity, as revealed through prisoner death rates, correlates robustly with decreasing crime rates); 
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means of bringing about deterrence, then the two theories would lack the internal 
resources to rule out such punishments if the offender’s criminality contribution 
was sufficiently grave. Cruelty may very well be parsimonious, reparative, and eq-
uitable. This is a crucial point. And to oppose extreme or degrading punishments 
in such a case, we would need to appeal to a relatively distinct set of reasons, as I 
discuss in Part II. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
Hashem Dezhbakhsh, Paul H. Rubin, and Joanna M. Shepherd, “Does Capital Punishment Have a 
Deterrent Effect? New Evidence from Postmoratorium Panel Data,” American Law and Economics Re-
view 5 (2003): 344-76 (suggesting that each execution on average prevents eighteen murders); H. Naci 
Mocan and R. Kaj Gittings, “Getting off Death Row: Commuted Sentences and the Deterrent Effect 
of Capital Punishment,” The Journal of Law and Economics 46 (2003): 453-78 (finding that each execution 
decreases homicides by about five, while each commutation increases homicides by about five); but see 
John J. Donohue and Justin Wolfers, “Uses and Abuses of Empirical Evidence in the Death Penalty 
Debate,” Stanford Law Review 58 (2005): 791-846.   
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Degradation Limitations
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Chapter 2. Torture and Respect 
Part II has two aims. The first is to discern the nature and content of our 
“dispositive degradation-limiting penal reasons.” These reasons foreclose the in-
fliction of certain degrading punishments, regardless of the fact that our positive 
theory of punishment might otherwise license such treatment as the proportional 
response to an offense. For instance, as argued in the Introduction, even if Antony 
Duff’s communicative theory of punishment licensed penal rape for rapists—as it 
indeed might—Duff could foreclose such a punishment by appealing to the rela-
tively independent degradation-limiting reasons. The second aim of Part II is to 
examine the legitimacy of long-term incarceration by reference to these reasons. 
What is long-term incarceration, and when does its infliction surpass a dispositive 
degradation limitation?  
Torture, which is the primary subject of this chapter, is our guide into this 
realm of degradation-limiting penal reasons, and therefore into the permissibility 
of long-term incarceration. In the Introduction, I noted Justice Brennan’s conclu-
sion that “tortuous punishment” is the “paradigm” example of “cruel and unusual” 
punishment, as well as the fact that many legal documents group together prohi-
bitions on torture and prohibitions on penal degradation.1 It is with such 
jurisprudence in mind that Jeremy Waldron writes: 
“[T]he prohibition on torture is a point of reference to which we 
return over and over again in articulating legally what is wrong with 
cruel punishment or distinguishing a punishment that is cruel from 
one that is not: We do not equate cruelty with torture, but we use 
torture to illuminate our rejection of cruelty.”2 
Waldron argues that the legal prohibition on torture, beyond encapsulating the 
moral wrongness of torture, represents a “legal archetype”: “a particular provision 
                                               
1 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 281 (1972). 
2 Jeremy Waldron, “Torture and Positive Law: Jurisprudence for the White House,” Columbia Law 
Review 105 (2005): 1681–1750, at 1738. 
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in a system of norms which has a significance going beyond its immediate norma-
tive content, a significance stemming from the fact that it sums up or makes vivid 
to us the point, purpose, principle, or policy of a whole area of law.”3 David Luban 
extends Waldron’s idea, arguing that the prohibition on torture is a moral as well as 
a legal archetype, since “the prohibition closely connects with other values that the 
world has come to regard as fundamental—fundamental concepts of human dig-
nity, human equality, and the rejection of total domination of some people by 
others.”4 He concludes that torture represents an “archetype of evil.”5 The point 
here is that Brennan, Luban, and Waldron all conceive of torture as the exemplar of 
legal and moral wrongness and impermissible state action. An inquiry into torture’s 
normative features should thus teach us something about degradation limitations. 
At least that is the assumption of this chapter.   
Elaine Scarry dismisses the “deep sense of tact” from which people deem 
torture beyond analogy. She writes eloquently: 
“Torture is such an extreme event that it seems inappropriate to 
generalize from it to anything else or from anything else to it. Its 
immorality is so absolute and the pain it brings about so real that 
there is a reluctance to place it in conversation by the side of other 
subjects. But this reluctance, and the deep sense of tact in which it 
originates, increase our vulnerability to power by ensuring that our 
moral intuitions and impulses, which come forward so readily on 
behalf of human sentience, do not come forward far enough to be 
of any help: we are most backward on behalf of the things we believe 
in most in part because, like ancients hesitant to permit analogies to 
God, our instincts salute the incommensurability of pain by prevent-
ing its entry into worldly discourse.”6 
                                               
3 Id. at 1701. 
4 David Luban, Torture, Power, and Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 125. 
5 Id. at 112. 
6 Elaine Scarry, The Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World (New York and Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1983), 60.  
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Scarry explains that we should not understand our special revulsion for torture to 
mean that it exists in an incomparable realm of wrongness all of its own.7 Indeed, 
it can be a guide to wrongness simpliciter—or, more precisely, degradation sim-
pliciter—and we should be willing “to place it in conversation by the side of other 
subjects,” such as long-term incarceration (which I consider directly in Chapter 3). 
 This chapter proceeds as follows. Section I (pages 101-10) examines the 
legal conception of torture, concluding that it is far too broad. Section II (pages 
110-24) considers the work of Henry Shue, David Sussman, and Matthew Kramer, 
concluding that they, too, fail to capture what, if anything, is special about torture’s 
wrongness. With the ground thus cleared, Sections III-VI (pages 125-73) present 
an original theory of torture. I argue that torture is the intentional infliction of a suffusive 
panic, and that its central wrong-making feature is the egregious disrespect it demon-
strates toward the victim. Torture converts a diachronic being capable of building a 
good life through time into a synchronic being, whose awareness is almost completely 
restricted to a maximally terrible present. Section VI considers what this means for 
our understanding of degradation more generally, arguing that to surpass a dispos-
itive degradation limitation involves denying someone’s status as a human, by 
“ruining” her essentially human capacity to construct a good life through time, or 
treating her in a way that embodies the legitimacy of ruining this capacity. To so 
thoroughly reject someone’s worth, even someone who has committed a heinous 
offense, violates the liberal commitment to human inviolability. 
 
                                               
7 The philosophy of comparisons suggests that no two options (e.g. torture and incarceration) could 
be genuinely “incomparable” with regard to a particular predicate (e.g. degradingness), with reason 
having nothing to say whatsoever on the options’ relative exhibition of the predicate. If they were 
genuinely incomparable, then we could not make any judgment as to their relative exhibition; we could 
not even determine, say, that the worst torture imaginable is more degrading than one hour of incar-
ceration. See Ruth Chang, “Introduction,” in ed. Ruth Chang, Incommensurability, Incomparability, and 
Practical Reason (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998) and “The Possibility of Parity,” Ethics 
112 (2002): 659-88; Laurence Tribe, “Policy Science: Analysis or Ideology?,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 
2 (1972): 66-110; James Griffin, “Are There Incommensurable Values?,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 39 
(1977): 39-59.  
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I. The Legal Conception 
What is torture, and what are its wrong-making features? The two ques-
tions—the definitional and the normative—are connected: however one defines 
torture will inevitably impact her understanding and interpretation of its wrong-
ness, and vice versa, and so it is artificial to consider them entirely separately. Even 
if intertwined, the two issues nonetheless involve distinct methodologies; one is 
linguistic, sociological, and empirical, and the other—our true target—is norma-
tive, a moral interpretation of whatever slice of reality the definition selects. Let us 
consider first the law’s conception of torture and its wrong-making features. Per-
haps the law can illuminate or inform our moral inquiry.8 To reveal my conclusion, 
I believe that the law does provide such illumination in this instance, but only 
through its failure. The most prominent legal definition of torture—conceiving of 
torture as the intentional infliction of severe suffering—is over-inclusive, failing to pass a 
broad-brush test of conceptual analysis. This definitional failure muddies the related 
moral analysis, unsurprisingly, given the connection between the two. Apart from 
warping the law’s relationship to morality, the definitional failure weakens the law’s 
ability to realize its true goal of constraining and preventing state torture, as I dis-
cuss in Section III. It’s not only bad moral philosophy, then; it’s bad legal drafting 
and interpretation. 
As to the broad-brush test of conceptual analysis, we can agree about the 
central cases of “torture”: running electricity through someone’s body for the pur-
pose of interrogation, pulling someone’s body apart with “the rack” for the 
purpose of punishment, and so forth. Just the same, we can agree on what is defi-
nitely not torture. This includes most of the practices in the world (e.g. someone 
singing a song because she wants to is not torture), including many harmful 
                                               
8 In his work on human dignity Jeremy Waldron employs the method of looking to the law for moral 
insight. See Jeremy Waldron, Dignity, Rank, and Rights, ed. by Meir Dan-Cohen (Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2012). 
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practices (e.g. mocking or shoving somebody moderately is not torture). In this 
way, torture represents a significantly distinct set of practices. It deserves a word 
of its own. And even if there are practices that fall into a vague middle between 
torture and not-torture, any definition that encompass practices that are definitely 
not torture, or many such practices, fails as a matter of conceptual analysis.  
A. Explication 
The first legal instrument to define torture, which has undoubtedly influ-
enced later legal instruments and interpretations,9 was the United Nation’s 1975 
“Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture 
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.”10 Article 1 
presents two definitions: 
“1. For the purpose of this Declaration, torture means any act by 
which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is inten-
tionally inflicted by or at the instigation of a public official on a 
person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person 
information or confession, punishing him for an act he has commit-
ted or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating him or 
other persons. It does not include pain or suffering arising only 
from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions to the extent con-
sistent with the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of 
Prisoners. 
2. Torture constitutes an aggravated and deliberate form of cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.” 
How the two clauses interrelate is not entirely clear. If the first clause defines tor-
ture, essentially, as the deliberate infliction of severe pain or suffering, and the 
second clause defines it as an aggravated and deliberate form of cruel, inhuman, or 
degrading treatment, does that mean that cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment 
constitutes non-aggravated or non-severe pain and suffering? Is the first clause 
                                               
9 Nigel S. Rodley, “The Definition(s) of Torture in International Law,” Current Legal Problems 55 (2002): 
467-493, at 468.  
10 GA res. 3452 (XXX), Annex, 9 December 1975. 
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clarifying any qualities that are unique to torture, and not shared by cruel, inhuman, 
or degrading treatment? Could there be an aggravated and deliberate form of cruel, 
inhuman, or degrading treatment that was not torture? The terms cruel, inhuman, 
and degrading are not defined elsewhere the Declaration.  
In defining torture the 1984 Convention Against Torture and Other Forms 
of Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment and Punishment (CAT), an interna-
tional treaty with 161 parties including the United States and all of the EU states, 
follows the first clause of the Declaration’s definition, but adds coercion and dis-
crimination to the list of “purposes,” and weakens the state action requirement to 
include official acquiescence to torture. It drops the second clause, though, and fails 
to define cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment elsewhere.  Here is the definition 
in full: 
“For the purposes of this Convention, torture means any act by 
which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is inten-
tionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from 
him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him 
for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of 
having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, 
or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such 
pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the 
consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting 
in an official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising 
only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions.”11 
 
There are five central components: (1) severe mental or physical pain or suffering, 
(2) intentionally inflicted, (3) for such purposes as interrogation, punishment, in-
timidation, coercion, and discrimination, (4) by a state, meaning at least with the 
acquiescence of a public official, presumably while working in her official capacity, 
but (5) not including pain or suffering caused by lawful sanctions. 
                                               
11 UN Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punish-
ment, art. 1(1) (hereafter “CAT”). 
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I will consider the final two components first, since they are less important 
for our purposes. The meaning of the fifth component, a vestige from the Decla-
ration, is unclear and I think irrelevant to our search for torture’s wrong-making 
features. It would seem to erase the clause prohibiting penal torture, as Louis Seid-
man explains.12 The fourth component—state action or acquiescence—is 
complex, and not relevant at this ground floor of the inquiry. Private parties acting 
without the knowledge of state officials can surely inflict torture. State torture, 
though, may feature unique wrong-making features; it may, for instance, violate 
substantive Rule of Law values, as Jeremy Waldron argues, in addition to violating 
basic moral principles that apply to private actors.13 Nonetheless, we need a theory 
of torture’s wrongness as a straightforward moral matter before considering what 
additional wrong-making features state torture may exhibit. The presence of the 
state action or acquiescence component is unsurprising and perhaps unimpeacha-
ble, given that the CAT is meant to regulate the policies of states.14 That said, in 
interpreting Article 7 of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights—which bans torture, and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, but with-
out defining the relevant terms—the UN Human Rights Committee held that 
private parties could torture for the purposes of the treaty’s definition. “It is the 
duty of the State Party,” the Committee wrote, “to afford everyone protection 
through legislative and other measures as may be necessary against the acts pro-
hibited by Article 7, whether inflicted by people acting in their official capacity, 
outside their official capacity or in a private capacity.”15 
The first three components of the CAT’s definition have more to offer as 
a normative guide to torture simpliciter: (1) severe mental or physical pain or suffer-
ing, (2) intentionally inflicted, (3) for such purposes as interrogation, punishment, 
                                               
12 Louis Seidman, “Torture’s Truth,” University of Chicago Law Review 75 (2005): 881–918, at 895. 
13 Jeremy Waldron, “Torture and Positive Law,” supra note 2. 
14 Jeremy Wisnewski, Understanding Torture (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010), 5. 
15 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 20, 1992, §2. 
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intimidation, coercion, and discrimination. The phrase “such purposes as” in the 
third component implies that the enumerated list of purposes is not exhaustive. 
David Luban argues that the drafters should have been clearer with this, by ending 
the relevant sentence with the phrase “or any purpose whatsoever,” since “[t]hat 
would drive home the correct conclusion: torture is torture, regardless of its pur-
pose.”16 Nonetheless, given the open-ended nature of “such purposes as,” the first 
two components describe the gravamen of the wrong of torture according to the 
CAT, and also the Declaration: the intentional infliction of severe mental or phys-
ical pain or suffering. This is the core of the definition. The US statute codifying 
the CAT does not stray far, defining torture as “an act committed by a person 
acting under the color of law specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or 
suffering (other than pain or suffering incidental to lawful sanctions) upon another 
person within his custody or physical control.”17 One difference from the CAT is 
the inclusion of the “specifically” modifier: “specifically intended.” This implies 
that the oblique intent to cause severe suffering will not qualify as torture (e.g. situ-
ations where a bomb will cause severe suffering to innocent bystanders as an 
unintended, but very likely byproduct of blowing up a munitions factory). Addi-
tionally, the US statute adds a “custody or physical control” requirement, 
consistent with its reservations upon ratifying the treaty.18 
While not bound by the CAT, the International Criminal Court (ICC) has 
followed its definition closely. As defined by the Elements of Crime of the ICC, the 
first requirement of both “the crime against humanity of torture” and the distinct 
                                               
16 Luban, Torture, Power, and Law, supra note 4 at 119; see also Matthew Kramer, Torture and Moral Integrity: 
A Philosophical Enquiry (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 31.   
17 18 USC § 2340 (emphasis added). At the time of ratification, the US determined that existing state 
and federal law was sufficient to implement the CAT as it related to torture on US soil, but insufficient 
to cover torture abroad. 18 USC § 2340 is meant to fill this gap. As to meaning of “specific intent” in 
US law, see, e.g., U.S. v. Blair, 54 F.3d 639 (10th Cir. 1995); Thornton v. State, 397 Md. 704 (2007). 
18 U.S. Reservations, Declarations, and Understandings, Convention Against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Cong. Rec. S17486-01 (daily ed., Oct. 27, 
1990). 
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“war crime of torture” is as follows: “The perpetrator inflicted severe physical or 
mental pain or suffering upon one or more persons.”19 The “General Introduc-
tion” provides that such a material element must be committed with “intent and 
knowledge.”20 So, again, we have the intentional infliction of severe mental or 
physical pain. The differences between the two offenses concern against whom the 
severe pain or suffering is intentionally inflicted, and why. The crime against hu-
manity of torture can be committed for any purpose, so long as the conduct was 
part of a “widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population.”21 
The war crime, meanwhile, requires that the conduct take place in the context of 
an international armed conflict, against persons protected under the Geneva Con-
ventions of 1949, and “for such purposes as” those purposes listed in the CAT.22 
Finally, Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (“Prohi-
bition of torture”) provides: “No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman 
or degrading treatment or punishment.” In considering the meaning of Article 3’s 
terms, none of which the Convention itself defines, the European Court of Human 
Rights has followed the Declaration and the CAT closely. In Ireland v. United King-
dom, the Court considered whether the “interrogation in depth” used by the British 
government against suspected members or collaborators of the Irish Republican 
Army (IRA), in pursuance of emergency powers, violated Article 3.23 “Interroga-
tion in depth” involved the “five techniques” of sleep deprivation, stress positions, 
deprivation of food and drink, subjection to noise, and hooding. After holding that 
the treatment constituted inhuman and degrading treatment, in violation of Article 
3, the court considered whether it also amounted to torture: 
                                               
19 The Elements of Crimes (The Hague: The International Criminal Court, 2011), arts. 7(1)(f) and 
8(2)(a)(ii)-1. 
20 Id. at General Introduction(2). 
21 Id. at art. 7(1)(f)(4)-(5), note 14. The article also requires that the victim was in the perpetrator’s 
custody or control, and that the pain or suffering did not arise from lawful sanctions. Id. at art. 
7(1)(f)(2)-(3). 
22 Id. at art. 8(2)(a)(ii)-1. 
23 Ireland v. United Kingdom (App No 5310/71) [1978] ECHR 1. 
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“[W]hilst there exists on the one hand violence which is to be con-
demned both on moral grounds and also in most cases under the 
domestic law of the Contracting States but which does not fall 
within Article 3 (art. 3) of the Convention, it appears on the other 
hand that it was the intention that the Convention, with its distinc-
tion between ‘torture’ and ‘inhuman or degrading treatment’, should 
by the first of these terms attach a special stigma to deliberate inhu-
man treatment causing very serious and cruel suffering.”24 
 
The Court distinguishes here between (a) violence that is immoral and illegal but 
which is neither inhuman nor degrading, nor torture and (b) violence that is inhu-
man or degrading but which is not torture. As to the latter distinction, it 
understands the gravamen of torture to be “deliberate inhuman treatment causing 
very serious and cruel suffering.” The word “inhuman” performs less work than 
might be expected, given the conception of the term offered in Ireland: 
“The five techniques were applied in combination, with premedita-
tion and for hours at a stretch; they caused, if not actual bodily 
injury, at least intense physical and mental suffering to the persons sub-
jected thereto and also led to acute psychiatric disturbances during 
interrogation. They accordingly fell into the category of inhuman 
treatment within the meaning of Article 3 (art. 3).”25 
 
While this may not have been intended as a complete legal definition of “inhu-
man,” we can see that the Court understands the term broadly.26 And if we use this 
excerpt to define “inhuman” in the key phrase from that case—“deliberate inhu-
man treatment causing very serious and cruel suffering”—then torture becomes 
“the deliberate infliction of intense physical and mental suffering or acute psychiatric dis-
turbances that causes very serious and cruel suffering.” We are left, in the end, just 
where the Declaration, the CAT, the US Code, and the ICC left us, with a 
                                               
24 Id. at para [167]. 
25 Id. (emphasis added); see also The Greek Case (App Nos 3321-3/67, 3344/67) [1969] 12 ECHR Year-
book 1, p. 186 (“The notion of inhuman treatment covers at least such treatment as deliberately causes 
severe suffering, mental or physical, which in the particular situation is unjustifiable.”) 
26 For philosophical discussion of meaning of “inhuman,” see Jeremy Waldron, “Inhuman and De-
grading Treatment: The Words Themselves,” Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence 23 (2010): 269-
286, at 278-81. 
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conception of torture as a practice on the far end of a continuum of the intentional 
infliction of suffering.27  
In applying this understanding of torture, the Court concluded that even 
though the five techniques, as applied in combination, “undoubtedly amount to 
inhuman and degrading treatment…they did not occasion suffering of the partic-
ular intensity and cruelty implied by the word torture as so understood.”28 Their 
infliction did not warrant, that is, the “special stigma” associated with the word 
torture.29 The “special stigma” phrase is not further defined or grounded in the 
case law and does not seem to provide traction beyond emphasizing the extraor-
dinary nature of torture. The Court in Aydin, by comparison, applied this sliding-
scale analysis to conclude that the physical and mental injuries inflicted by Turkish 
forces upon a 17-year old detainee, most importantly the fact that she was raped, 
deserved that “special stigma” and qualified as torture.30 
B. Critique 
At first glance, the legal definition of torture seems unimpeachable. What-
ever torture is, surely it must involve the intentional or deliberate infliction of 
severe mental of physical suffering. And indeed it must, but there are a number of 
worries with this definition. The most important involves the test of conceptual 
analysis mentioned above. Given the vagueness of “severe suffering,” the legal 
definition seems to encompass practices that are definitely not torture. Consider a 
state dropping a bomb on enemy soldiers, or requiring candidates for elite military 
                                               
27 Indeed, the Court in Ireland notes the connection between its definition and that in Article 1(2) of 
the Declaration. Ireland v. UK, supra note 23 at para [167]. Meanwhile, the Court in Aydin v. Turkey 
(App No 23178/94) [1997] ECHR 75, at para [195] notes the connection between the Ireland definition 
of the torture and that in the CAT. 
28 Ireland v. UK, supra note 23 at para [167]. 
29 Id. To be clear, by holding that “interrogation in depth” amounted to inhuman and degrading treat-
ment in violation of Article 3, the Court categorically outlawed the practice, in accordance with Article 
15’s provision that no derogation from Article 3 shall be made, even in times of war or public emer-
gency. In terms of its legal impact, Article 15 makes no distinction between torture and inhuman or 
degrading treatment. See Waldron, “Torture and Positive Law,” supra note 2 at 1706. 
30 Aydin, supra note 27. 
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units to undergo extreme forms of testing, looking not to train them but to weed 
out the weak links. Or consider a landlord evicting a tenant out of spite, knowing 
and indeed desiring that the tenant would have to sleep on the streets for months 
before he could find other housing. Or consider someone beating up another per-
son in a bar fight. All seem to represent the intentional infliction of severe 
suffering, and yet none seems to qualify as torture as normally understood. Perhaps 
in the case of killing enemy soldiers, severe suffering is neither the intended aim 
nor means, assuming the state just wants to kill, and assuming that death in and of 
itself does not involve suffering. The question would then depend on whether the 
oblique intent to cause severe suffering qualified as torture—something the US 
statue specifically forecloses—given that dropping the bomb would very probably 
cause severe physical and mental suffering in some survivors and those who ulti-
mately die alike.31 
That a definition is over-inclusive is a problem or weakness only if a more 
precise definition is available. It is not as if the law defines torture as “a harmful 
practice,” such that it encompasses a huge array of actions. The “intentional inflic-
tion of severe suffering” does narrow our gaze meaningfully. There may be no 
more precise way to define the term; language has descriptive limits. However, 
below I will pursue the hypothesis that we can in fact do much better, and secure 
a definition that covers all practices that are definitely torture, and none that are 
definitely not torture. Of course, it would make this project easier project if the 
hypothesis failed. If the wrong of torture was indeed the intentional infliction of 
severe suffering, then Part II could proceed rather straightforwardly: (1) long-term 
incarceration involves severe suffering, (2) long-term incarceration for the pur-
poses of retribution or deterrence involves the intentional infliction of severe 
suffering, and thus (3) long-term incarceration for the purposes of retribution or 
deterrence is torture, and therefore is impermissible morally and legally, surpassing 
                                               
31 I consider the meaning of oblique intent in Chapter 3 at 242-245. 
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a dispositive degradation-limiting reason. As a more refined conception of torture 
emerges below, it will become evident that such an argument is unavailable, and 
that torture and long-term incarceration are distinct in important ways, while none-
theless sharing some fundamental wrong-making features.32  
In pursuing a more precise understanding of torture’s wrongness, I will 
leave the law now and consider several prominent academic theories, critiquing 
Henry Shue, David Sussman, and Matthew Kramer in Section II, and then aligning 
myself with Jean Améry and Elaine Scarry, among others, who understand tor-
ture’s wrong-making features to be connected to its “overwhelmingness.” 
II. Shue, Sussman, and Kramer 
A. Henry Shue: Torture as an assault on the defenceless 
 In his seminal 1978 article, Henry Shue unravels the following argument: 
since (a) killing is more harmful than torture and (b) killing is sometimes permissi-
ble, as in a just war, then (c) torture must sometimes be permissible.33 Shue explains 
that the argument is fallacious because killing is permissible when the victim is a 
threat—as in combat—while a torture victim is always defenseless. The central 
                                               
32 Waldron, very aware of the slipperiness of “severe suffering,” nonetheless takes umbrage at the 
desire to find a more precise definition of torture. He argues that any such effort, like the work of 
George W. Bush’s lawyers in the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC), could only be motivated by the aim 
to legalize conduct that would otherwise be swept up in the broad prohibition (e.g. to refine the legal 
meaning of “severe suffering” so that waterboarding does not qualify as such). See David Cole (ed.), 
The Torture Memos: Rationalizing the Unthinkable (New York: The New Press, 2009). Waldron argues that 
we should not be anywhere on the spectrum of the infliction of pain or suffering. Waldron, “Torture 
and Positive Law,” supra note 2 at 1698-1703. While Waldron’s argument is powerful, and represents 
trenchant criticism of the OLC’s torture memos, for at least three reasons we ought to reject his phil-
osophical conservatism with regard to a more precise torture definition. First, it is unclear how we can 
square his position with any intentionally inflicted suffering on the part of the state. Does his position 
rule out non-mild deterrent or retributive punishments? Does it entail pacifism? Second, only with a 
more precise definition of torture can we articulate the conviction, which Waldron must share, that 
torture is indeed qualitatively worse than lesser forms of aversive treatment. See discussion infra at 113, 
117-19. Related, without a more precise definition, torture is not worth very much as an “archetype” 
and source of comparison, with the concepts of intentionally inflicted “pain” and “suffering” doing 
all of the work. Our moral understanding of injuries, at least, would then be impoverished. Third, as I 
argue below, the vagueness of “severe suffering” represents a regulatory deficiency. A more precise 
definition would prove more capable at preventing torture, by providing a much higher interpretative 
hurdle for the torture-defending lawyers of the future. See discussion infra at 138-39. 
33 Henry Shue, “Torture,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 7 (1978): 124-43.  
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wrong-making feature of torture, he concludes, is that it is an “assault upon the 
defenseless.”34 Shue writes:  
“[T]orture begins only after the fight is—for the victim—finished. 
Only losers are tortured. A ‘fair fight’ may even in fact already have 
occurred and led to the capture of the person who is to be tortured. 
But now that the torture victim has exhausted all means of defense 
and is powerless before the victors, a fresh assault begins. The sur-
render is followed by new attacks upon the defeated by the now 
unrestrained conquerors. In this respect torture is indeed not analo-
gous to the killing in battle of a healthy and well-armed foe; it is a 
cruel assault upon the defenseless.”35  
 
Shue considers the reply that the victim is not in fact defenseless, since he 
retains the ability to end the torture by providing the information desired by the 
torturer. Shue offers two responses. First, such an act of compliance is unavailable 
for victims of “terroristic torture,” whose torture is meant to intimidate a wider 
group.36 Nothing is asked of them other than to suffer; they cannot do or say an-
ything to end the ordeal. Second, as to a victim of “interrogational torture,” to say 
that he can escape by informing is artificial, Shue argues, because it would demand 
of him a profound betrayal and violation of his integrity—at least for committed 
members of the opposition. Shue writes: “An alternative which is legitimately to 
count as an escape must not only be preferable but also itself satisfy some mini-
mum standard of moral acceptability. A denial of one’s self does not count.”37  
There are several critiques of Shue’s argument. First, as a number of theo-
rists have explained, Shue conflates being defenseless against torture with being 
completely non-threatening.38 Shue writes: “The torturer inflicts pain and damage 
                                               
34 Id. at 127-30. 
35 Id. at 130; see also Michael Ignatieff, The Lesser Evil (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2004), 
137. 
36 Shue, “Torture,” supra note 33 at 132-33. 
37 Id. at 136. 
38 See Frances Kamm, Ethics for Enemies: Terror, Torture and War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2011), 7; David Sussman, “What’s Wrong with Torture?” Philosophy & Public Affairs 33 (2005): 1-33, at 
16; Seamus Miller, “Is Torture Ever Morally Justifiable?,” International Journal of Applied Philosophy 19 
(2005): 179–92; Kramer, Torture and Moral Integrity, supra note 16 at 37-39. 
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upon another person who, by virtue of now being within his or her power, is no 
longer a threat and is entirely at the torturer’s mercy.”39 Someone entirely at another’s 
mercy, however, could still be threatening, say, by having engineered an ongoing 
or future attack and by retaining the ability to mitigate or prevent that attack. If 
Shue wants his theory to explain the wrongness of torturing in that case—as he 
does—he needs to say more. To torture that type of individual would be an attack 
on someone who was defenceless against torture, but unlike assaulting the tradi-
tional prisoner of war that Shue has in mind, it would not be an attack on someone 
who is completely non-threatening and powerless; it would not be an attack on 
someone entirely off of the battlefield. As it stands, then, Shue’s conception of 
torture’s wrongness seems to be overly narrow, covering only those who are de-
fenseless against torture and non-threatening.  
Second, victims of torture need not be defenseless and thus attacking a de-
fenseless person cannot be torture’s essential wrong-making feature. Uwe 
Steinhoff, in a somewhat involved hypothetical, shows how someone could inflict 
tortuous agony with a laser from some distance, even though the victim was not 
defenseless, given that she had a gun and could shoot at the perpetrator wildly.40 
We would maintain that such an individual was tortured, even though she was not 
defenseless. Third, as Kamm and Steinhoff argue, attacking the defenseless is not 
always impermissible. Kamm writes: “Individuals who have set off a missile against 
us could be defenseless against our counterattack because their new missiles are slow 
to arrive. Yet just war theory does not imply that these individuals are not combat-
ants. Nor does it imply that it is impermissible for us to counterattack to stop their 
further threat on the grounds that there is no ‘fair fight’ until their missiles arrive.”41 
                                               
39 Shue, “Torture,” supra note 33 at 130 (emphasis added). 
40 Uwe Steinhoff, On the Ethics of Torture (Albany: SUNY Press, 2013), 40-1; see also Kamm, Ethics for 
Enemies, supra note 38 at 5-9; William Twining, “Torture and Philosophy—I,” Proceedings of the Aristote-
lian Society, Supplementary Volumes 52 (1978): 143–68, at 160. 
41 Kamm, Ethics for Enemies, supra note 38 at 6; see also Steinhoff, On the Ethics of Torture, supra note 40 at 
94-5. 
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“Attacking the defenseless” thus seems to be a poor candidate for a wrong-making 
feature that is purportedly beyond the pale, and the essence of degradation. Fourth, 
as to Shue’s point that victims of interrogational torture do not have a “legitimate 
alternative” to torture, it does not seem, as David Sussman argues, that we should 
care, or care very much, about the personal integrity of, say, people who are forced 
to betray their commitments to extremely illiberal causes.42   
 Let us assume, though, that Shue could adequately respond to all these cri-
tiques. There would nonetheless remain something deeply unsatisfying about his 
theory. He would be unable to distinguish qualitatively between different types of 
assaults on the defenseless. There would be nothing extraordinary about the inflic-
tion of torture. It would represent a severe type of assault on a defenseless person, 
among the many possible types. Shue could not account for any qualitative moral 
difference between shouting at, slapping, or even moderately beating a prisoner, 
on the one hand, and positively torturing him with electricity or a waterboard, on 
the other. The gravamen of the slap and of running electricity through his body 
would be the same: an assault on a defenseless person.43 I share David Sussman’s 
conviction that “there is something morally special about torture that distinguishes 
it from most other kinds of violence, cruelty, or degrading treatment.”44 While it 
seems that Shue agrees with this, his conception of torture’s wrongness as an as-
sault on the defenseless cannot provide the underlying explanation. 
B. David Sussman: Torture as a Moral Perversion 
In pursuit of such an explanation, Sussman distinguishes torture from co-
ercion. “Coercion,” he argues, “requires only that its victim have the capacities 
needed for practical reasoning and intentional action, and that he be able to 
                                               
42 Sussman, “What’s Wrong with Torture?” supra note 38 at 18. 
43 Waldron seems unable to make such a distinction either, given his emphasis on the impermissibility 
of being anywhere on the spectrum of intentional pain or suffering. See discussion supra note 32. 
44 Sussman, “What’s Wrong with Torture?” supra note 38 at 3. 
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recognize the expression of these powers in those who are trying to pressure 
him.”45 It would be possible to coerce an agent with no emotional life, like a cor-
poration, so long as it were capable of pursuing its interests rationally and of 
anticipating the actions of other agents.46 Torture is different, Sussman argues: 
“[T]he torturer is not merely constructing a harsh set of options for the victim to 
navigate rationally as best he can. The felt experience of pain, fear, and uncertainty 
are essential elements of torture.”47 It is not the mere fact, though, that torture 
hurts or is frightening. What is special about torture for Sussman is that the victim’s 
own body, affects, and emotions are used to generate pressure upon him, such that 
he is “actively complicit in his own violation.”48 This is what makes torture a 
“moral perversion” and uniquely wrong on his view.49  
“What the torturer does is to take the victim’s pain, and through it 
the victim’s body, and make it begin to express the torturer’s 
will…My suffering is experienced as not just as something the tor-
turer inflicts on me, but as something I do to myself, as a kind of 
self-betrayal worked through my body and its feelings.”50  
 
Waterboarding victims, for example, are forced to struggle against their own desire 
to breathe, Sussman explains.51  
Orthodox Kantians, Sussman continues, fail to appreciate the role of 
pain—specifically, of one’s identification with her pain and with her affective re-
sponses to her pain—in explaining the wrongness of torture. They understand the 
victim’s lack of reasonable consent to be the gravamen of torture’s wrongness. 
That it is bodily pain that the torture victim could not reasonably consent to, rather 
some other “intensely unwanted imposition,” such as a blackmailer’s publication 
                                               
45 Id. at 8. 
46 Id. at 9. 
47 Id. at 10. 
48 Id. at 4. 
49 Id. at 4-5. 
50 Id. at 21. 
51 Id. at 23. 
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of compromising photographs, is for the Kantians of no moment.52 “[M]y black-
mailer is not doing anything of a piece with torturing me,” Sussman replies to the 
Kantians, “even though she is thwarting my will through a means to which she has 
no right.”53 The blackmailer’s autonomy violation is purportedly not “perverse” 
like the torturer’s autonomy violation, on Sussman’s view, because the blackmail 
victim is not complicit in his own violation; I discuss this further below. Sussman 
considers the Kantians’ response that they can in fact appreciate the importance 
of pain, insofar as it “is almost impossible to reflect, deliberate, or even think 
straight when one is in agony,” such that pain “compromises or undermines the 
very capacities constitutive of autonomous agency itself.”54 Sussman contends that 
this response, which I will also discuss further below, fails for two reasons. First, 
it cannot distinguish, in any way, between undermining one’s agency through pain 
or through pleasure. And, second, it cannot distinguish between undermining one’s 
agency through torture or through killing, and thus cannot capture his conviction 
that torture has a burden of justification even greater than that of killing.55 Sussman 
thus concludes that the standard resources of the Kantian tradition cannot account 
for torture’s wrongness, and he rests his conception of its wrongness on his theory 
of forced self-betrayal. 
There is a controversial conception of personal identity at the heart of Suss-
man’s theory. For his argument to get off the ground, we must to some degree 
identify with the capacities that torture exploits, such that when one faces her pain 
she is (or feels that she is) facing herself. It is not clear, though, that every person 
has such a reaction to her pain. It would seem possible for someone who was, say, 
repeatedly shocked with electricity, to feel in no way complicit in her own violation, 
to feel no shame at all by the fact that she responded instinctively to her agony, 
                                               
52 Id. at 14. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. at 14-15. 
55 Id. at 15-6. 
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and to put all the blame on her perpetrator. Would Sussman conclude that such a 
person was not tortured, or experienced something qualitatively less wrongful? Or 
would he insist that she was mistaken and that, perhaps as a metaphysical matter, 
she was indeed facing and betraying herself when she responded to her pain? Fur-
thermore, even if we all do identify with our pain receptors, fight-or-flight 
responses, and other such capacities in the relevant manner, there is the additional 
point that these capacities are not obviously failing or betraying torture victims. They 
are perceiving reality correctly. The message they communicate to a victim is ac-
curate: your body and possibly your life is in danger. To put the point differently: 
The torture victim desires not that her traitorous pain receptors would switch off, 
so that her tormentor can destroy her body painlessly, but rather for her body not 
to be destroyed. It is not clear, then, how the fact that she responds to her pain 
makes her complicit in her own violation. Perhaps it is the more basic fact that she 
wants and needs a functioning body; the torturer exploits that fact about her, and 
so she is or feels complicit in her torture. But, here as well, it seems that a torture 
victim might not—and indeed should not—feel like she has betrayed herself when 
the torturer exploits her need for a functioning body, as if it represented some 
failing on her behalf. And we would not think that someone who had the appro-
priate reaction, placing all of the blame on her perpetrator and feeling no shame at 
all, would have experienced something qualitatively less wrongful than someone 
who did feel a sense of complicity.   
Regardless, and yet more fundamentally, even if Sussman is right that (a) 
torture is “a kind of forced self-betrayal” and (b) that this is the central wrong-
making feature of torture, it is doubtful that he has achieved his primary mission 
of explaining what is special or unique about torture’s wrongness. In parallel to the 
legal conceptions of torture and to Shue’s theory, Sussman’s theory is over-inclu-
sive. Coercion involves introducing an unreasonable obstacle into someone’s 
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decision-making process.56 Sussman distinguishes coercion from torture, but given 
that torture must be in essential part an instance of coercion, we can understand 
his distinction to be between (a) coercion that introduces obstacles unrelated to 
bodily pain, like in his example of blackmail and (b) coercion that introduces the 
obstacle of bodily pain, like in torture. The first problem for Sussman is that he 
cannot distinguish between instances of the latter, similarly to Shue’s inability to 
distinguish between assaults on the defenceless. Any instance of painful coercion, 
no matter how minor or middling the pain, would qualify as torture on his view, 
as a “perverse” autonomy violation whereby one’s own pain receptivity is used 
against herself. If someone twists my arm very moderately until I agree to tell her 
a secret I have not thereby been tortured, even if we accept that the reason I speak 
is to stop the pain and that my coercer has thereby forced me to betray myself. But 
Sussman’s theory requires concluding otherwise.57 In short, while Sussman surely 
has severe, all-consuming pain in mind, the wrong-making features he identifies 
would apply to qualitatively lower degrees of pain.  
The second problem for Sussman is that if the gravamen of painful coer-
cion is forced self-betrayal, many instances of non-painful coercion share this 
feature. Sussman is somewhat aware of this possibility. He argues that, in addition 
to sexual desire, “[a]ny suitably intense and relentless craving, whether for food, 
                                               
56 See Robert Nozick, “Coercion,” in Philosophy, Science, and Method: Essays in Honor of Ernest Nagel, eds. 
Sidney Morgenbesser, Patrick Suppes, and Morton White (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1969); Roland 
J. Pennock and John W. Chapman (eds.), Nomos XIV: Coercion (Chicago: Aldine-Atherton, Inc., 1972). 
57 Interestingly, Bentham would be happy to understand arm-twisting as torture: “Torture…is where 
a person is made to suffer any violent pain of body in order to compel him to do something…which 
done…the penal application is immediately made to cease.” W.L. Twining and P.E. Twining, “Ben-
tham on Torture,” Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 24 (1973): 305–56, 308 (quoting Bentham 
Manuscripts, University College London, box 46, 63-70). Bentham includes a mother pinching a child 
to get her to stop playing with something as an instance torture. Unlike Sussman, Bentham defined 
torture broadly to enable debate over which forms of pain were legitimately inflicted, consistent with 
his utilitarianism, rather than ruling out all such instances ex ante. He wrote: “There is no approving 
[torture] in the lump, without militating against reason and humanity: nor condemning it without fall-
ing into absurdities and contradictions.” Id. at 337. (Bentham quotes from Waldron, “Torture and 
Positive Law,” supra note 2 at 11697, 1698 note 77.) 
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drugs, sleep, or just quiet, could be the medium [of torture].”58 The idea is that the 
victim, by identifying with the desire or craving used against her, would be or feel 
partly complicit in her own violation. While this extends the logic of self-betrayal 
beyond the infliction of bodily pain, Sussman nonetheless limits the extension to 
the realm of unthinking impulses and instincts—basic, first order desires and crav-
ings that one has limited power to amend via rational deliberation, desires and 
cravings that in Sussman’s imagining would be something like overwhelming.59 But 
we can extend the logic further yet, to non-first order and non-overwhelming de-
sires.60 In the blackmail case, for instance, where someone threatens to release a 
compromising photograph of the victim—say, one that reveals him to be a homo-
sexual—the victim’s desire for that information to remain private is what generates 
the pressure. If we can say that someone identifies with his desire to breathe, which 
the waterboarder exploits, then we can also say—indeed, much more confidently 
say—that someone identifies with the desire for his homosexuality to remain pri-
vate. While the victim is ultimately worried about what others will think of him, this 
worry is uniquely his own, such that he could feel complicit in his own violation, 
perhaps wishing desperately he was not so worried about such things, or had more 
courage. The blackmailer, then, seems to commits the torturer’s special wrong on 
Sussman’s view, as he uses the victim’s own affects, emotions, and desires as tools 
for exploiting the victim.61 But blackmail is not torture. And with this, we can 
                                               
58 Sussman, “What’s Wrong with Torture?” supra note 38 at 27. 
59 See Harry Frankfurt, “Identification and Wholeheartedness,” in ed. Ferdinand Schoeman, Responsi-
bility, Character, and the Emotions: New Essays in Moral Psychology (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1987) (distinguishing first and second order desires). 
60 Kramer seems aware of this point, noting, for instance, that a salesman could exploit the feelings of 
a potential customer; but he nonetheless agrees with Sussman that, when coercive, exploiting some-
one’s feelings in this way represents a central wrong-making feature of torture. Torture and Moral 
Integrity, supra note 16 at 175.   
61 In R v. Valderrama-Vega [1985] Crim LR 220, the defendant, charged with importing drugs, pleaded 
duress. He claimed that the offense was the result of three pressures: (1) he was threatened with the 
disclosure to his wife of his homosexual tendencies, (2) there were threats of serious violence against 
him and his family, and (3) he was under severe financial strain. The Court of Appeal upheld the 
principle that only threats of death or serious injury could form the basis of a duress defence (though 
they need not be the only reason for the defendant’s action). The threat to reveal his homosexual 
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conclude our analysis of the over-inclusiveness of Sussman’s conception of tor-
ture. The wrong-making features he identifies cover acts that are clearly not torture, 
in particular (a) “minor,” non-overwhelming instances of painful coercion, like 
very moderate arm-twisting and (b) non-overwhelming, non-painful instances of 
coercion, like blackmail. Sussman, in sum, has not identified what, if anything, is 
unique about torture’s wrongness.  
C. Matthew Kramer: Torture as Perpetrator Corruption 
Matthew Kramer’s book on torture contains many interesting analyses, 
most of which I lack the space to discuss.62 I will consider, though, his most orig-
inal, and most central, argument against torture. It is “perpetrator focused,” 
meaning that the wrong-making features he identifies focus on what torture means 
for or does to its perpetrators, rather than its victims. Kramer believes that, for at 
least three reasons, a “victim focused” perspective cannot explain the absolute 
wrongness of certain forms of torture. First, Kramer believes that with a suffi-
ciently heinous offender, as with his example of Khalid Sheik Mohammed, neither 
the offender’s interests nor his inviolability could justify an absolute ban on his 
interrogational torture, were he threatening future acts of terrorism.63 Kramer ar-
gues on retributivist grounds of “just deserts” that “the interests of a mass-
murdering terrorist in being free from excruciating pain are of no positive ethical 
weight.”64 He writes: 
“Were such a person to experience agonizing pain as a result of 
purely natural causes while in isolation from any society whose med-
ical resources might alleviate his suffering, the world would not be 
                                               
tendencies was, as such, irrelevant to the defence. For our purposes, however, we can understand that 
Valderrama-Vega, when bringing the drugs across the border, could have felt shamefully complicit in 
the way Sussman describes not only due to his fear of physical violence, but also due to his fear about 
the revelations to his wife. Any hard distinction between the two, just in terms of the victim’s own 
feelings of complicity, seems unwarranted. 
62 Kramer, Torture and Moral Integrity, supra note 16. 
63 Id. at 187-88. 
64 Id. at 187. 
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ethically inferior to an otherwise identical alternative world in which he 
never undergoes any agony.”65 
 
Kramer is willing to argue, even more forcefully, that such a world would 
be ethically superior (rather than merely “not ethically inferior”).66 In such contexts, 
Kramer explains that focusing on the torture victim (rather than the perpetrator) 
would lead to licensing his torture. Second, Kramer believes that killing in some 
situations, say, a hostage situation, has a lower burden of justification than tortur-
ing—as Sussman contends—and given that death is worse than at least most 
instances of torture for victims, only a perpetrator-focused perspective could ex-
plain this conviction.67 
Third, and most importantly for his overall view, Kramer argues that only 
by focusing on perpetrators can we distinguish—as he believes we must—between 
“ephemerally incapacitative” torture, by which we force people to omit from doing 
something (say, electrically shocking someone so she fails to depress a detonator) 
and “act-impelling” torture, by which we force people to act (say, electrically shock-
ing someone until she reveals the location of her co-conspirators).68 Given that 
both forms of torture implicate the same victim focused wrong-making features (e.g. 
the pain experienced by the victim), Kramer argues, only a perpetrator focused per-
spective could justify the conviction that act-impelling torture like interrogational 
torture, unlike ephemerally incapacitative torture, is “always and everywhere 
wrong.”69 Kramer introduces an unorthodox moral terminology, consistent with 
what could only be a most radical moral pluralism.70 He believes that act-impelling 
torture is “always and everywhere wrong,” but nonetheless “morally optimal” in 
                                               
65 Id. at 187-88 (emphasis added). 
66 Id. at 188. 
67 Id. at 188-89. 
68 Id. at 187-212. 
69 Id. at 115, 188-89, 194, 197, 201. 
70 Id. at 1-28. For critical discussion of his full terminology, the details of which I only glance upon 
here, see Uwe Steinhoff, “Review of Matthew Kramer, Torture and Moral Integrity: A Philosophical In-
quiry,” Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 25 (2015): E-1—E-6. 
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rare cases, such that its infliction would be permissible.71 In such cases, he con-
cludes, we can morally and legally censure the perpetrator of torture for 
committing a (permissible) wrong. Meanwhile, he believes that “omission-impel-
ling” torture may in rare cases be both permissible and not wrong, such that it would 
be inappropriate to censure the perpetrator. 
But why should we care about this distinction between act- and omission-
impelling torture? What is the special wrong-making feature that Kramer identifies 
for perpetrators of act-impelling interrogational torture that makes it “always and 
everywhere wrong” (even if sometimes morally permissible)? “Those people mor-
ally degrade themselves,” he writes, “because they aim with their torturous 
measures to achieve fine-grained control over the conduct of others through the 
subjection of the others to agony.”72 When forcing someone to perform an omis-
sion rather than action, Kramer argues that the level of control sought is not so 
“fine-grained,” given that the victim has the opportunity to perform any number 
of actions other than, say, depressing the detonator.73 When forcing someone to 
act, though, she has but one thing to do, and this, Kramer argues, makes an enor-
mous moral difference. 
“Striving for such control through the infliction of harrowing pain, 
the torturers sully their moral integrity by endeavouring to elevate 
themselves to a position of minutely directive dominance—godlike 
dominance—that exceeds what can legitimately be sought by human 
beings in their interaction with one another and with sentient beings 
more generally.”74  
It is the perpetrators’ self-aggrandizing pursuit of a “godlike dominance” over their 
victims, Kramer concludes, by forcing their victims to perform a singular action 
                                               
71 Kramer, Torture and Moral Integrity, supra note 16 at 115.   
72 Id. at 201. 
73 Kramer relies upon Jonathan Bennett’s understanding of acts versus omissions. Jonathan Bennett, 
The Act Itself (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995). While Kramer places great moral weight on the 
distinction, Bennett himself did not believe it had moral significance—as Kramer acknowledges. Id. at 
195. For critical discussion on this point, see Steinhoff, “Review of Matthew Kramer,” supra note 70. 
74 Kramer, Torture and Moral Integrity, supra note 16 at 201. 
 
 
 
 
122 
via the infliction of agony, that explains the special moral wrongness of act-impel-
ling torture. 
In reply to Kramer’s conclusion, that special wrong-making features super-
vene on act-impelling but not omission-impelling torture, consider the following 
hypothetical: A is a government agent and B and C are co-conspirators aiming to 
blow up a building, with B working logistics from afar and C working onsite to set 
up and detonate the bomb. Imagine that A tortures B to reveal C’s location, arriv-
ing just in time to torture C to prevent her from detonating the bomb (somehow 
torturing C is the only method of preventing the detonation). Kramer’s argument 
implies that A’s actions toward B are qualitatively more wrongful than her actions 
toward C, given that A forced B to do one thing (inform as to C’s location), while 
leaving C the opportunity to do anything she wanted to other than detonate the 
bomb. But both acts of torture would involve the infliction of agony as a means 
of preventing someone from realizing a singular, desperately desired aim. Yes, C 
has the opportunity to do a great multitude of things other than detonate the 
bomb, but she does not want to do those other things. And the realization of her 
aim requires her to do that one single thing that her torture forecloses. If Kramer’s 
concern is with a perpetrator’s “godlike dominance” over her victim, it is doubtful 
that B would feel significantly more dominated than C. They both had one goal—
indeed, the very same goal—and A tortured them both to prevent them from re-
alizing that goal. And, more to the point, it is doubtful that A herself would feel 
significantly less dominant of C than B; if she dominates one, she dominates the 
other. If this works, Kramer might argue that it does not invalidate his argument, 
but merely extends it, such that both act- and omission-impelling torture are now 
“always and everywhere wrong” (even if sometimes “morally optimal”), given what 
they entail for the integrity of the perpetrators. 
Is there anything, though, to the perpetrator-focus? Frances Kamm is skep-
tical: 
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“[I]t at least seems that torturing someone could be corrupting, only 
if torturing is wrong on other grounds. That is, the prospect of cor-
ruption seems to presuppose that what will be done is wrong, rather than 
providing a reason to believe it is wrong. If so, we would need an-
other explanation for why torturing is wrong, on the whole or in 
part, besides its leading to corruption of the torturer. Suppose we 
had an account of why torture is wrong. Then it seems misguided 
to think that the strongest objection to the wrong act is not what 
makes it wrong but that it makes an agent who does it into a wrong-
doer. It is especially misguided to think that agents themselves 
should avoid wrong acts because of the effect on themselves. Rather 
they should avoid wrong acts because of the properties that make 
the act wrong.”75 
 
Why is torturer impermissible? If Kramer’s response is that it would “sully [the] 
moral integrity” of perpetrators to so thoroughly dominate another person, then 
Kamm’s reply is that so dominating another person could only impact one’s integ-
rity if it were independently wrong. If arguendo we agreed with Kramer that 
someone like Khaled Sheik Mohammed has forfeited his rights, such that he has 
no self-regarding complaint to his torture, then how could forcing him to talk via 
torture corrupt one’s integrity? If it’s not wrong with regard to the victim, then 
why is it wrong with regard to the perpetrator?  
Perhaps this is too quick. Let us imagine an instance of “victimless” torture: 
an impeccable virtual reality simulation wherein people could immerse themselves 
in the experience of torturing another person; or maybe the simulation could occur 
in the real-world and involve totally life-like robots. Since the “victims” would be 
imaginary or fake, the “torturers” would violate no one’s rights, in parallel to Kra-
mer’s starkly retributivist conception of torturing Khaled Sheik Mohammad. There 
would seem, nonetheless, something grotesque about the simulation, and regard-
less of whether it increased participants’ likelihood of hurting people in the real 
world. The simulation would be bad for you. And perhaps we can say the same 
                                               
75 Kamm, Ethics for Enemies, supra note 38 at 51-52. 
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thing about real-world torture, such that, independently of what it does to its vic-
tims, torture is partly destructive of its perpetrators, of their integrity or their 
personas, as they fill their consciousnesses with perfectly cruel images and inten-
tions.76 Maybe delegating the actual torture to some horrible machine could lessen 
this impact. Regardless, completely ignoring the fact that the perpetrator is the 
culpable party, it would seem hyperbolic to equate the perpetrator’s own injury 
with that of the victim, as should become clearer below when we consider some 
first-hand accounts of torture victims. And I follow Kamm in thinking that such 
perpetrator-focused considerations, even if genuine reasons against torture, are 
low on the list of such reasons, far beneath the victim-centered reasons. All that 
said, there is a more basic sense in which the wrongness of torture does indeed 
require the perpetrator focus. It is not the idea that torture is bad or corrupting for 
perpetrators, but the separate notion that torture is an intentional wrong, whereby 
the perpetrator must intentionally inflict a certain experience on the victim for it 
to qualify as torture. I will return to this issue of intentionality below. 
There is a final point to make about Kramer’s proposal. The relationship 
between the infliction of agony and the “godlike dominance” associated with 
forcing someone to act is unclear. For it seems that any instance of coercing 
someone to perform a single action, even if it did not involve pain, would impli-
cate Kramer’s central concerns. That would lead us again to an over-inclusive 
definition of torture, as blackmailing someone so they perform a specific action 
would seem to be torture, or to implicate the exact same wrong-making feature 
as torture. 
 
 
                                               
76 See Lydia DePillis, “This is how it feels to torture: It’s followed by ‘toxic levels of guilt and shame,’” 
The Washington Post (December 11, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/story-
line/wp/2014/12/11/this-is-how-it-feels-to-torture/?utm_term=.24e3a4c35952. 
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III. Suffusive Panic 
In this and the following sections I develop a novel account of torture’s 
wrong-making features, as indicated at the outset. In this section (pages 125-41) I 
primarily follow Jean Améry and Elaine Scarry’s work on the “overwhelming” na-
ture of torture in developing a definition of the practice.77 Torture, I argue, is the 
intentional saturation of a victim’s consciousness with panic. Above a certain level 
of acute suffering, almost all of us lose the ability to reflect upon our experience, 
as instincts associated with the fight-or-flight response kick in, and we have but 
one thought, or at least one extremely dominant thought, which is to make it stop 
right now. Torture aims, in this way, to cabin a victim’s ken and sense of self into 
perfectly awful present. Sections IV – VI consider the moral reasons that oppose 
doing this to someone, looking to develop our understanding of degradation-lim-
iting reasons more generally. Section IV (pages 141-50) examines the concept of 
“respect,” explaining how it concerns having a certain attitudinal and practical re-
sponse to something’s value. At its most straightforward, to disrespect something 
involves interfering with its capacity to realize or exhibit value. To pour water on 
a sandcastle, in this way, demonstrates disrespect for the sandcastle’s value. To 
understand what it means to respect or disrespect a person, then, we need a basic 
theory of the human good, a basic theory of what humans do exactly to realize or 
exhibit value, and how an action might assist or hinder this process. Section V 
(pages 150-60) takes a broadly Aristotelean line, arguing that humans realize value 
diachronically, employing their practical reasoning capacities to stitch moments to-
gether through time to construct good lives as a whole. Section VI (pages 160-73) 
                                               
77 Jean Améry, At the Mind’s Limit: Contemplations by a Survivor on Auschwitz and its Realities, trans. Sidney 
Rosenfeld and Stella P. Rosenfeld (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1980); Scarry, The Body in 
Pain, supra note 6. For discussion of torture’s overwhelming nature, see also Seth Kreimer, “Too Close 
to the Rack and the Screw: Constitutional Constraints on Torture in the War on Terror,” University of 
Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law 6 (2003): 278-325, at 296-99; David Luban, “Liberalism, Tor-
ture, and the Ticking Bomb,” Virginia Law Review 91 (2005): 1425–61, at 1430-31; Kramer, Torture and 
Moral Integrity, supra note 16 at 161-173. 
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brings the threads of the argument together, explaining how intentionally inflicting 
a suffusive panic is profoundly disrespectful of a victim’s essentially human value. To 
torture a person is to force the diachronic into the synchronic, to take a being that 
realizes value through time and to force her into this awful moment only. Section VI 
then considers what this means for our understanding of degradation more gener-
ally. It concludes that to surpass a dispositive degradation-limiting reason involves 
demonstrating a degree of disrespect toward someone that embodies a rejection 
of her standing as a human. This is achieved by intentionally “ruining” her essen-
tially human capacity to build a good life through time, or intentionally treating her 
in a way that establishes the legitimacy of ruining this capacity. To so thoroughly 
reject someone’s worth, I conclude, violates the liberal commitment to human in-
violability. Even if the reasons that justify the infliction of penal harm—such as 
the corrective justice and social defense theories—endorse such treatment as a 
proportional means of realizing our penal aims, it is still impermissible. 
A. Blinding Pain 
Nazi interrogators tortured Améry though the method referred to as strap-
pado or corda. His hands were shackled behind his back. A chain was hooked to the 
shackles. The chain lead to the top of a vaulted ceiling, where it ran into a roll. The 
chain was pulled upwards until Améry’s arms and then body were raised off the 
ground, with his shoulders bearing all his weight. “[T]here was a crackling and 
splintering in my shoulders that my body has not forgotten until this hour,” Améry 
writes over two decades after the ordeal. “The balls sprang from their sockets. My 
own body weight caused luxation; I fell into a void and now hung by my dislocated 
arms, which had been torn high from behind and were now twisted over my 
head.”78 Améry describes the consuming nature of the pain:  
“Whoever is overcome by pain through torture experiences his body 
as never before. In self-negation, his flesh becomes a total real-
ity…[O]nly in torture does the transformation of the person into 
                                               
78 Améry, At the Mind’s Limit, supra note 77 at 32. 
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flesh become complete. Frail in the face of violence, yelling out in 
pain, awaiting no help, capable of no resistance, the tortured person 
is only a body, and nothing else beside that.”79  
 
During his thirty months of confinement in the late 1970s, agents of the Argentin-
ian military junta repeatedly tortured Jacobo Timerman, who had edited a 
newspaper critical of the regime. In describing the experience of being electrically 
shocked, Timerman echoes Améry’s point that for the torture victim “his flesh 
becomes a total reality.” 
“What does a man feel?  The only thing that comes to mind is: 
They’re ripping apart my flesh…It is impossible to shout—you 
howl…When electric shocks are applied, all that a man feels is that 
they’re ripping apart his flesh. And he howls. Afterwards, he doesn’t 
feel the blows. Nor does he feel them the next day, when there’s no 
electricity but only blows.”80 
 
Timerman’s distinction between “shouting” and “howling” seems to refer 
to the aural responses characteristic of people versus animals. The tortured person 
does not “shout” out like a person, with words, but rather “howls” like an animal.81 
Améry reaches a similar conclusion, replacing “howl” with “squeal”: 
“A slight pressure by the tool-wielding hand is enough to turn the 
other—along with his head, in which are perhaps stored Kant and 
Hegel, and all nine symphonies, and the World as Will and Repre-
sentation—into a shrilly squealing piglet at slaughter.”82 
Améry’s agony vitiated, or concealed, his personal principles, manners, memories, 
aesthetic and social theories, political identities, and so forth, all represented iron-
ically in the excerpt by his knowledge of Kant, Hegel, Beethoven, and 
                                               
79 Id. at 33. 
80 Jacobo Timerman, Prisoner Without a Name, Cell Without a Number (Weidenfeld and Nicolson: London 
1981), 32-33. 
81 See Jeffrie G. Murphy, “Cruel and Unusual Punishments,” in Retribution, Justice, and Therapy: Essays in 
the Philosophy of Law, ed. Wilfrid Sellars (Dodrecht: D. Reidel Publishing, 1979), 223-249, at 233 (arguing 
that a punishment is “in itself” degrading when it “treats the prisoner as an animal instead of a human 
being” or “perhaps even is an attempt to reduce him to an animal or a mere thing.”). On the connection 
between degradation and animalization, see infra at 167-68. 
82 Améry, At the Mind’s Limit, supra note 77 at 35. 
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Schopenhauer. Améry presents his book as a meditation on what it meant to be an 
intellectual under torture and in a concentration camp. The excerpts here encap-
sulate his conclusions on torture, which do not differ much from those of his time 
in a concentration camp. If an intellectual human being differs dramatically in his 
capacities and intrinsic value from a piglet, an intellectual in agony and a piglet in 
agony are the same “shrilly squealing” creature, Améry argues. Améry was a body 
in pain, “and nothing else beside that.”83  
Agony erased his refinement and cultivation, and his personal commit-
ments, too, as the Nazis restricted his ken to his excruciation, with the result—the 
intended result—that he was ready to betray himself and the Belgian resistance to 
realize his one undeniable desire and motive, which was for the pain to stop. Améry 
explains, though, how the concept of “betrayal” mischaracterizes the process of 
confessing or informing under the duress of torture.84     
“One cannot betray or be false to something that has ceased to exist 
and, in the most literal way possible, the created world of thought 
and feeling, all the psychological and mental content that constitutes 
both one’s self and one’s world, and that gives rise to and is in turn 
made possible by language, ceases to exist.”85  
Betrayal is not a strict liability offence, Améry explains. And the torture victim 
lacks awareness of—and thus cannot in fact betray—the values or people his im-
pulsive utterances may impact. Of course, he has some awareness of them, or else 
he would not be able to say anything related to them, but he lacks awareness of 
their meaning and importance.   
Elaine Scarry, in parallel to Améry and Timerman, emphasizes the atten-
tion-fixing capacity of severe pain: 
“As in dying and death, so in serious pain the claims of the body 
                                               
83 Id. at 33. 
84 In so doing, he presents further reasons to doubt Sussman’s conclusion that torture’s essential 
wrong-making feature is that it brings about “a kind of forced self-betrayal.” See discussion supra at 
113-19. 
85 Améry, At the Mind’s Limit, supra note 77 at 30. 
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utterly nullify the claims of the world. The annihilating power of 
pain is visible in the simple fact of experience observed by Karl 
Marx, ‘There is only one antidote to mental suffering, and that is 
physical pain,’ a pronouncement whose premises are only slightly 
distorted in Oscar Wilde’s ‘God spare me physical pain and I’ll take 
care of the moral pain myself.’”86  
She also writes: 
“Pain annihilates not only the objects of complex thought and emo-
tion but also the objects of the most elemental acts of perception. It 
may begin by destroying some intricate and demanding allegiance, 
but it may end (as is implied in the expression ‘blinding pain’) by 
destroying one’s ability simply to see.”87 
Of course, Scarry uses “blinding pain” and the notion that pain destroys “one’s 
ability simply to see” as metaphors. Torture does not ruin one’s capacity for sight 
literally. What a victim loses, to reinforce the point, is the ability to “see” the mo-
tivational relevance of anything other than her agony and the imperative of making 
it stop. Nothing else crosses her mind (to use another metaphor). 
 Scarry continues: 
“It is the intense pain that destroys a person’s self and world, a de-
struction experienced spatially as either the contraction of the 
universe down to the immediate vicinity of the body or as the body 
swelling to fill the entire universe. Intense pain is also language-de-
stroying: as the content of one’s world disintegrates, so the content 
of one’s language disintegrates; as the self disintegrates, so that 
which would express and project the self is robbed of its source and 
its subject.”88  
 
                                               
86 Scarry, The Body in Pain, supra note 6 at 33. 
87 Id. at 54. 
88 Id. at 35. David Luban articulates a similar view: “[T]orture is a microcosm, raised to the highest 
level of intensity, of the tyrannical political relationships that liberalism hates the most. I have said that 
torture isolates and privatizes. Pain forcibly severs our concentration on anything outside of us; it 
collapses our horizon to our own body and the damage we feel in it…The world of the man or woman 
in great pain is a world without relationships or engagements, a world without an exterior. It is a world 
reduced to a point, a world that makes no sense and in which the human soul finds no home and no 
repose.” Luban, “Liberalism, Torture, and the Ticking Bomb,” supra note 77 at 1430-31. 
 
 
 
 
130 
Why might torture be “language-destroying”? The central idea is that verbal ex-
pression depends upon an awareness of, and desire to engage with, the concepts 
and things to which words refer, but torture restricts one’s awareness and desire 
to her pain. And pain, Scarry explains, is itself largely inexpressible, given its lack 
of external referents.89 Scarry makes the further, somewhat obscure point that lan-
guage depends upon the presence of subjectivity—of an “I” who expresses 
herself—and torture robs a victim of this, as the self in extreme pain “disinte-
grates.” Accepting that point, though, would require the conclusion that when a 
torture victim feels pain, she does not conceive of it as her pain. And that seems 
very unlikely to be the case. We can say that a torture victim’s sense of self is “se-
verely restricted” or even “ruined” without concluding that it is positively 
obliterated. Regardless, Timerman provides support for Scarry’s “language-de-
stroying” argument, explaining that words were somehow inapposite tools for 
communicating his experience: 
In the long months on confinement, I often thought of how to 
transmit the pain that a tortured person undergoes. And always I 
concluded that it was impossible. It is a pain without points of ref-
erence, revelatory symbols, or clues to serve as indicators.90 
 
As does Améry: 
 
“[T]he created world of thought and feeling, all the psychological 
and mental content that constitutes both one’s self and one’s world, 
and that gives rise to and is in turn made possible by language, ceases 
to exist.”91 
 
                                               
89 Scarry, The Body in Pain, supra note 6 at 3-11. I will return to this point in Chapter 3 at 220-24, arguing 
that Scarry conflates (a) being unable to express one’s pain with precision and detail with (b) being 
unable to express the very presence of one’s pain. While I accept (a), I disagree with (b), at least when 
it comes to extreme pain. When it comes to extreme pain, its very presence is easy to communicate, 
as one wails involuntarily and everyone within earshot understands what is happening. 
90 Timerman, Prisoner Without a Name, supra note 80 at 32-33.   
91 Améry, At the Mind’s Limit, supra note 77 at 30. 
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If words are inherently external and social, and pain is inherently internal and per-
sonal, then the all-consuming pain of torture would indeed be an experience largely 
resistant to words, with only the beastly “howl” or “squeal” available as means of 
expression. 
B. Pan’s Shout 
Cesare Beccaria, writing in 1764, attempts to clarify the psychological pro-
cesses or mechanisms by which the severe pain attendant to torture consumes 
one’s attention: 
“Every act of our will is always proportional to the force of the sen-
sory impression which gives rise to it; and the sensibility of every 
man is limited. Therefore, the impression made by pain may grow 
to such an extent that, having filled the whole of the sensory field, it leaves 
the torture victim no freedom to do anything but choose the quick-
est route to relieving himself of the immediate pain.”92 
Beccaria explains that torture, by saturating someone’s senses with pain, will deter-
mine her actions. I doubt, though, that Beccaria’s “presentist” empiricism—if we 
can call it that—can explain this process. To make any sense of the view that our 
sense impressions determine our acts would require accepting what Beccaria seems 
to overlook: that many such acts are impelled by our prior sensory impressions, as 
Locke argues.93 Otherwise, there would be no way to understand my desire for, 
say, orange juice, if I was not at that moment looking at orange juice. As such, 
without saying more, it is not clear why filling one’s present sensory field would 
consume her attention and determine her will. Perhaps a prior sense impression 
could win that moment nonetheless. I take no position on empiricist psychology 
or any such issues. The general point is that we normally retain some discretion 
                                               
92 Cesare Beccaria, On Crimes and Punishments, in On Crimes and Punishments and Other Writings, ed. Richard 
Bellamy, trans. Richard Davies, Virginia Cox, and Richard Bellamy (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1995), 41 (emphasis added) (quoted in Kramer, Torture and Moral Integrity, supra note 16 at 165). 
93 See John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding [1689], ed. Roger Woolhouse (London: 
Penguin, 1997), Book II, Chapter X (“Of Retention”), 147-52. 
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over whether the data currently streaming in through our five senses determines 
our actions or not. This applies, indeed, to many instances of pain (e.g. a dull pain 
in my shoulder will not prevent me from going about my day). Another way to 
state the point is that in every waking moment our sensory field is saturated by 
whatever we see, hear, taste, touch, and smell. But these experiences do not always 
consume our attention and determine our will. We need to tell another story, then, 
about why extreme pain forces us into the moment, as it were, in the ways articu-
lated so effectively by Améry, Timerman, and Scarry. To say that it fills one’s 
sensory field is not enough, given that there usually is a lot of thinking going on 
“behind the scenes” of our sensory experience, and that this thinking often deter-
mines our decisions. To understand what extreme pain does to us, how it floods 
that behind the scenes action, shrinking us down in the ways described above, 
requires an additional concept: panic.  
The word comes to English from the French panique, which in turn derives 
from the Greek panikos, meaning “of Pan,” the ancient Greek god—half-man, half-
goat—of fertility, pastures, flocks, and shepherds, among other things.94 Normally 
conceived of as a peaceful, playful god, he was believed to retain a dark side affili-
ated with a shout that would cause flocks to stampede, fleeing in terror. Pan’s shout 
was believed to impact people, too, supposedly causing the Persians to flee in the 
battle of Marathon. The English word is associated with this aspect of the god. 
From the Oxford English Dictionary: “A sudden feeling of alarm or fear of suffi-
cient intensity or uncontrollableness as to lead to extravagant or wildly unthinking 
behaviour, such as that which may spread through a crowd of people; the state of 
experiencing such a feeling.”95 I lack the expertise to engage with the neurology of 
                                               
94 “Panic.” Merriam-Webster.com, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/panic. 
95 OED Online. December 2016. Oxford University Press, http://www.oed.com/view/En-
try/136852?rskey=EVMqyn&result=2 (accessed March 09, 2017). 
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panic.96 My central point, though, requires only a basic awareness of the self-
preservation instincts associated with the fight-or-flight response. When pain or 
suffering reaches a certain point, it can trigger these instincts, causing the “wildly 
unthinking behaviour” constitutive of panic. The concept of the stampede eluci-
dates. The victim’s pain or suffering, when coupled with her self-preservation 
instincts, will stampede over the other aspects of her consciousness and identity, 
dominating not only her sensory experience, but also the behind the scenes delib-
eration, too, in an immersive rush of make it stop right now panic.  
In 1958 Henri Alleg, a newspaper editor like Timerman, was tortured in a 
variety of ways by French Algerian authorities. They wanted the names and loca-
tions of the people who were protecting him while he was in hiding. Alleg, 
describing the first time he was waterboarded, expresses torture’s powers of deter-
mination: 
“When everything was ready, he said to me: ‘When you want to talk, 
all you have to do is move your fingers.’ And he turned on the tap. 
The rag was soaked rapidly. Water flowed everywhere: in my mouth, 
in my nose, all over my face. But for a while I could still breath in 
some small gulps of air. I tried, by contracting my throat, to take in 
as little water as possible as to resist suffocation by keeping air in my 
lungs for as long as I could. But I couldn’t hold on for more than a 
few moments. I had the impression of drowning, and a terribly ag-
ony, that of death itself, took possession of me. In spite of myself, 
all the muscles of my body struggled uselessly to save myself from 
suffocation. In spite of myself, the fingers of my two hands shook 
uncontrollably. ‘That’s it! He’s going to talk,’ said a voice.”97 
 
Extreme pain or suffering, in this way, does not just hurt more than lesser forms 
of pain or suffering, but also contains within it the possibility of a stampeding 
panic. 
                                               
96 See, e.g., John A. Wemmie, “Neurobiology of panic and pH chemosensation in the brain,” Dialogues 
in Clinical Neuroscience 13 (2011): 475-83. 
97 Henri Alleg, The Question, trans. John Calder (London: John Calder, 1958), 49. 
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Christopher Hitchens, interested in the question of whether waterboarding 
constituted torture, volunteered to be waterboarded by US Special Forces. His re-
counting echoes that of Alleg: 
“In this pregnant darkness, head downward, I waited for a while 
until I abruptly felt a slow cascade of water going up my nose. De-
termined to resist if only for the honor of my navy ancestors who 
had so often been in peril on the sea, I held my breath for a while 
and then had to exhale and—as you might expect—inhale in turn. 
The inhalation brought the damp cloths tight against my nostrils, as 
if a huge, wet paw had been suddenly and annihilatingly clamped 
over my face. Unable to determine whether I was breathing in or 
out, and flooded more with sheer panic than with mere water, I trig-
gered the pre-arranged signal and felt the unbelievable relief of being 
pulled upright and having the soaking and stifling layers pulled off 
me. I find I don’t want to tell you how little time I lasted.”98 
 
As to whether waterboarding constituted torture, Hitchens concluded: “I apply the 
Abraham Lincoln test for moral casuistry: ‘If slavery is not wrong, nothing is 
wrong.’ Well, then, if waterboarding does not constitute torture, then there is no 
such thing as torture.”99 Malcolm Nance was the Master Instructor and Chief of 
Training at the US Navy’s Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape School 
(SERE), which, among other activities, trains elite soldiers in surviving and ideally 
resisting torture. In addition to leading, witnessing, and supervising the water-
boarding of hundreds of people, he underwent the procedure himself “at its 
fullest.”100 He writes of the waterboard: “Unless you have been strapped down to 
the board, have endured the agonizing feeling of the water overpowering your gag 
reflex, and then feel your throat open and allow pint after pint of water to 
                                               
98 Christopher Hitchens, “Believe Me, It’s Torture,” Vanity Fair, July 2, 2008 (emphasis added). 
99 Id. 
100 Malcolm Nance, “Waterboarding is torture…Period (Links Updated…#9),” Small Wars Journal, 
October 31, 2007, http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/waterboarding-is-torture-period-links-up-
dated-9 
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involuntarily fill your lungs, you will not know the meaning of the word.”101 He 
continues:  
“It does not simulate drowning, as the lungs are actually filling with 
water. There is no way to simulate that. The victim is drowning.”102 
 
“Waterboarding is slow motion suffocation with enough time to 
contemplate the inevitability of black out and expiration—usually 
the person goes into hysterics on the board.”103 
 
“They all talk! Anyone strapped down will say anything, absolutely 
anything to get the torture to stop.”104 
 
In these excerpts, both Hitchens and Lance confirm that torture induces a make it 
stop right now panic, as well as the centrality of this feeling in explaining the aver-
siveness of torture. Hitchens expresses this point succinctly when he writes that he 
was “flooded more with sheer panic than with mere water…”105 
                                               
101 Id. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. 
105 Probably the most famous fictional account of this process is the climax to George Orwell’s 1984, 
when Winston is interrogated by O’Brien, the agent of the totalitarian regime. Winston—who has a 
phobia of rats—is strapped to a chair and threatened with a cage containing starving rats. The cage 
was configured so that it could be placed on his head like a mask. It had a wire door toward the face 
that could be lifted once the mask was secured, after which the rats would eat his face. For context, 
the character of Julia is Winston’s desperate lover and co-conspirator. This extract is a good demon-
stration, as well, of how mental torture, by resulting in a suffusive panic, belongs in the same category 
of injury as physical torture. 
 
“The cage was nearer; it was closing in. Winston heard a succession of shrill cries 
which appeared to be occurring in the air above his head. But he fought furiously 
against his panic. To think, to think, even with a split second left—to think was the 
only hope. Suddenly the foul musty odour of the brutes struck his nostrils. There 
was a violent convulsion of nausea inside him, and he almost lost consciousness. 
Everything had gone black. For an instant he was insane, a screaming animal. Yet he 
came out of the blackness clutching an idea. There was one and only one way to 
save himself. He must interpose another human being, the body of another human 
being, between himself and the rats.  
 
The circle of the mask was large enough now to shut out the vision of anything else. 
The wire door was a couple of hand-spans from his face. The rats knew what was 
coming now. One of them was leaping up and down, the other, an old scaly grand-
father of the sewers, stood up, with his pink hands against the bars, and fiercely 
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To my knowledge, there have been no serious scientific studies of the psy-
chological, psychiatric, or neurological experience of torture in the moment of 
agony. But ex post studies of survivors provide further evidence about the connec-
tion between torture and panic, given the prevalence of post-traumatic stress 
disorder and panic attacks after the fact.106 Consider Trung, a 61 years old Viet-
namese refugee living in Boston.107 He had served as a high-level officer in the 
South Vietnamese army before he was imprisoned for 12 years by the North Viet-
namese army and subjected to beatings and torture. He reported “orthostatic panic 
attacks,” panic attacks induced by standing upright. Researchers who were studying 
                                               
sniffed the air. Winston could see the whiskers and the yellow teeth. Again the black 
panic took hold of him. He was blind, helpless, mindless.  
 
‘It was a common punishment in Imperial China,’ said O'Brien as didactically as 
ever.  
 
The mask was closing on his face. The wire brushed his cheek. And then—no, it 
was not relief, only hope, a tiny fragment of hope. Too late, perhaps too late. But he 
had suddenly understood that in the whole world there was just one person to whom 
he could transfer his punishment—one body that he could thrust between himself 
and the rats. And he was shouting frantically, over and over.  
 
‘Do it to Julia! Do it to Julia! Not me! Julia! I don’t care what you do to her. Tear her 
face off, strip her to the bones. Not me! Julia! Not me!’” 
 
George Orwell, 1984 (New York: Harcourt, 1949), 273-74. 
106 See e.g., Brian Engdahl, et. al., “Posttraumatic Stress Disorder in a Community Group of Former 
Prisoners of War: A Normative Response to Severe Trauma,” American Journal of Psychiatry 154 (1997): 
1576-81; Metin Bas̨oğlu, “Severity of trauma as predictor of long-term psychological status in survivors 
of torture,” Journal of Anxiety Disorders 9 (1995): 339-50; Raija-Leena Punamäki, et. al., “Nature of tor-
ture, PTSD, and somatic symptoms among political ex-prisoners,” Journal of Traumatic Stress 23 (2010): 
532-36; C. Bower and D. Stein, “Panic disorder following torture by suffocation is associated with 
predominantly respiratory symptoms,” Psychological Medicine 29 (1999): 233-6; Alejandro Moreno and 
Michael Peel, “Posttraumatic Seizures in Survivors of Torture: Manifestations, Diagnosis, and 
Treatment,” Journal of Immigrant Health 6 (2004): 179-186; Devon Hinton, et. al., “Panic disorder 
among Cambodian refugees attending a psychiatric clinic: Prevalence and subtypes,” General Hospital 
Psychiatry 22 (2000): 437-44; Devon E. Hinton, et. al., “Orthostatic Panic Attacks Among Vietnamese 
Refugees,” Transcultural Psychiatry 44 (2007): 515-44; Marcello Ferrada-Noli, et. al., “Suicidal Behavior 
After Severe Trauma. Part 1: PTSD Diagnoses, Psychiatric Comorbidity, and Assessments of 
Suicidal Behavior,” Journal of Traumatic Stress 11 (1998): 103-112; Athanase Hagengimana, et. al., “So-
matic panic-attack equivalents in a community sample of Rwandan widows who survived the 1994 
genocide,” Psychiatry Research 117 (2003): 1-9. 
107 Devon E. Hinton, et. al., “Orthostatic Panic Attacks Among Vietnamese Refugees,” supra note 106 
at 523-24. 
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the pervasiveness of that phenomenon amongst Vietnamese refugees provided the 
following case study: 
“Trung had not received psychiatric care before presenting at our 
clinic. He complained of poor energy, flashbacks, hopelessness, in-
somnia (just over an hour’s sleep at night), and nightmares. Upon 
standing, he had dizziness, blurry vision, tinnitus, shortness of 
breath, chest tightness, sweating, palpitations, diaphoresis, and fear 
of death. Trung worried about a heart attack (đau tim) and danger-
ously high blood pressure. After sitting back down, these symptoms 
persisted for about 20 minutes. In these panic episodes, he had four 
different types of flashbacks. For one, as tinnitus (ù tai) began, he 
recalled his friend’s screams upon being taken out of his prison cell 
and escorted a short distance away, then shot and killed by five 
guards; the sound of bullets, the screams of his friend, the anxiety-
produced ear ringing, all seemed to combine in a dizzying mix. Sec-
ond, he recalled being tortured by having logs placed on his chest 
until he lost consciousness. (He was tortured this way several times.) 
Third, he recalled when the interrogators kicked and stomped upon 
his chest until he lost consciousness—and that when he awoke, his 
chest ached. And fourth, he recalled one day, when feeling ill and 
off balance, tripping and falling down a rocky, steep slope; he hit his 
head half way down the slope, losing consciousness. Each of the 
flashbacks came into his mind like a movie, one after another, each 
lasting about 1 minute. The flashbacks only stopped when he was 
able to pull himself from the vortex of memory, most usually by 
turning on the television.”108 
 
Given that even a memory of torture can induce feelings of panic in this way—
and given that such an experience is relatively common amongst torture survi-
vors—that is at least some further evidence, working backwards, that the 
experience of torture itself involves extreme panic.109 We can add this ex post evi-
dence to the compelling first-hand accounts provided by Améry, Timerman, Alleg, 
Hitchens, and Lance—as well as the intuitive evidence about what it might feel like 
to be tortured. 
                                               
108 Id. at 524. 
109 Below I consider the moral implications of the long-term damage of torture. See discussion infra at 
164-65. 
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With this, we can restate the definition of torture proposed above: Torture 
is the intentional infliction of a suffusive panic. Unlike the legal definition of torture (the 
intentional infliction of severe mental or physical pain or suffering), as well as those 
proposed by Shue, Sussman, and Kramer, this definition passes the broad-brush 
test of conceptual analysis discussed above, encompassing practices that are defi-
nitely torture but leaving out practices that are definitely not torture. The definition 
easily encompasses mental torture—torture which operates directly through psy-
chological mechanisms, rather than through bodily pain, as in the presence of 
constant light or darkness or loud noise—so long as the experience overwhelms 
in the way indicated above, culminating in the same phenomenology of panic.110 
But it leaves out lesser forms of painful coercion. Very moderately twisting my 
arm, for instance, will not induce suffusive panic. It also leaves out blackmail. A 
victim of blackmail will be able to reflect to some degree on how she might re-
spond to the threat. She will not flail about hysterically and impulsively upon 
receipt of the blackmailer’s letter, howling like an animal. It also leaves out incar-
ceration, thus precluding the “easy” comparison between torture and long-term 
incarceration enabled by the legal definition of torture.111 Whatever long-term in-
carceration does to someone, only very rarely does it induce feelings of utter terror 
and panic; I discuss this issue further in the following chapter.   
C. Interpretative Constraint 
This definition avoids much of the vagueness inherent to the legal defini-
tion of torture. President George W. Bush’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) 
lawyers, in considering whether waterboarding qualified as torture, interpreted the 
US statute codifying the CAT—excerpted above—which defines torture, in most 
                                               
110 For George Orwell’s fictional account of mental torture, see supra note 105. See David Luban and 
Henry Shue, “Mental Torture: A Critique of Erasures in U.S. Law,” Georgetown Law Journal 100 (2011): 
624-41 (analyzing the concept of mental suffering and arguing that US legal interpretation of anti-
torture laws entails the legalization of mental torture). 
111 See discussion supra at 109-10. 
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relevant part, as an act “specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental 
pain or suffering.”112 In attempting to define “severe pain or suffering,” the OLC 
lawyers looked to medical administration statutes, where Congress defines what an 
“emergency medical condition” is for the purposes of receiving health benefits.113 
These definitions only obliquely reference “severe pain.” Nonetheless, the OLC 
lawyers argued that “severe pain” for the purposes of the CAT amounts to what 
Congress defined as a “emergency medical condition.” They thus concluded, first, 
that to amount to torture under the CAT, the pain must be as intense as that asso-
ciated with serious physical injury, such as organ failure, impairment of bodily 
function, or death; and, second, they concluded that waterboarding did not inflict 
physical pain of such intensity, and therefore did not qualify as torture. Even if the 
arguments of John Yoo, Jay Bybee and their colleagues were circuitous and disin-
genuous,114 there is at least a patina of legality to them. And the contention here is 
that there would have been much less interpretative wiggle room for them to argue 
that waterboarding did not qualify as torture if the legal definition of torture was 
“the intentional infliction of overwhelming suffering,” “the intentional infliction of 
panic,” or, most precisely, “the intentional infliction of a suffusive panic.” In this 
way, as indicated above, the legal definition of torture represents a failure of legal 
drafting, insofar as a more precise definition, capable of more effective regulation, 
was available. 
D. Counter-Example 
Before considering the wrong-making features of intentionally inducing a 
suffusive panic, let us consider a potential counter-example for this proposed 
                                               
112 18 USC § 2340.  
113 Memorandum from Office of the Assistant Att'y Gen. to Alberto R. Gonz Counsel to the President 
(Aug. 1, 2002) (citing 8 USC § 1369 (2000); 42 USC § 1395w-22; id. § 1395x (2000); id. §1395dd (2000); 
id. § 1396b (2000); id. § 1396u-2 (2000)).   
114 For critical discussion of their legal reasoning, see Karen J. Greenberg and Joshua L. Dratel (eds.), 
The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Luban, “A 
Communicative Conception of Torture,” in Torture, Power, and Law, supra note 4 at 111-36; Waldron, 
“Torture and Positive Law,” supra note 2 at 1703-09. 
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definition. What about the unusual person who resists torture? Alleg may have 
moved his fingers when he was waterboarded the first time—“In spite of myself, 
the fingers of my two hands shook uncontrollably. ‘That’s it! He’s going to talk,’ 
said a voice”115—but he did not in fact talk. Not then, nor during any of his in-
creasingly vicious tortures, not even when they electrically shocked his mouth and 
genitals. He was regarded as something of a marvel by his tormentors. For, as 
Nance, the expert waterboarder, writes, “They all talk!”116 But does Alleg’s almost 
superhuman composure mean that he did not experience a “suffusive panic,” and 
thus entail that he was not tortured, according to my definition? That would surely 
be damaging to my proposal, given that there is absolutely no denying that Alleg 
was tortured. Let us consider, though, an alternative situation. Imagine that some-
one was provided with a strange drug cocktail, such that she was conscious that 
her tormentors were tearing apart her body, but without any pain or alarm, as if 
she was sleepily watching a program on a distant television. That my definition 
rules out such an experience as torture is, I think, a point in its favor. Perhaps when 
she regains full consciousness, she will experience the panic of genuine torture. 
During the ordeal itself, however, she was grievously assaulted, but she was not 
tortured. The point is that this imagined scenario bears little relationship to Alleg’s 
experience. He describes here what happened after he moved his fingers, but then 
refused to talk: 
“‘Well, then?’ I remained silent. ‘He’s playing games with us! 
Put his head under again!’  
This time I clenched my fists, forcing the nails into my palm. 
I had decided I was not going to move my fingers again. It was better 
to die of asphyxiation right away. I feared to undergo again that ter-
rible moment where I felt myself losing consciousness, while at the 
same time fighting with all my power not to die. I did not move my 
hands, but three times I knew again this insupportable agony. In  
 
                                               
115 Alleg, The Question, supra note 97 at 49. 
116 Nance, “Waterboarding,” supra note 100. 
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extremis, they let me get my breathe back while I threw up the water. 
The last time, I lost consciousness.”117 
 
It is not as if Alleg experienced his violations with equanimity, as if from a distance. 
His torturers pushed the buttons that every human has hidden away, buttons that, 
when pressed in the right way, will induce “insupportable agony” and terror. The 
right way to describe his experience is that he experienced a suffusive, instinctual 
panic, and so was tortured, even if he somehow resisted this panic, denying the au-
thority of the body and resolving to die. 
IV. Disrespect 
As stated above, the definitional and the normative are closely intertwined, 
but ultimately distinct. And if this works as a definitional matter, the normative 
question nonetheless remains. Why, exactly, is forcing someone into a perfectly 
awful moment, via the infliction of a suffusive panic, wrong? Or, more specifically, 
what are its wrong-making features? If its wrongness is obvious, that is not helpful 
for the present inquiry, which is not about torture in the end.118 We are looking to 
torture as a source of comparison, to see if it can provide any guidance on degra-
dation-limiting reasons more broadly. To realize that aim, we need to explain 
torture’s wrongness in terms of general concepts. My central conviction is that the 
concept of disrespect is central to this inquiry—that the fundamental wrong-making 
feature of torture is that it is egregiously disrespectful to victims. While not every 
instance of disrespect, such as gently mocking somebody, is degrading, the hypoth-
esis is that disrespect is the metric of degradation, and that every instance of 
degrading treatment will be degrading because it is disrespectful.  
                                               
117 Alleg, The Question, supra note 97 at 49-50. 
118 In Because it is Wrong, Charles and Gregory Fried do not offer any sort of argument as to why torture 
is wrong, with conclusions following from premises. Rather, they present images of torture, such as 
Leon Golub’s painting, “Interrogation 1,” and the wrongness of treating people in those ways is seem-
ingly meant to be obvious to any reasonable individual. This is not to say that their book is 
unpersuasive, but it is not of great value for our present purposes. Charles Fried and Gregory Fried, 
Because it is Wrong: Torture, Privacy and Presidential Power in the Age of Terror (New York: W.W. Norton, 
2010). 
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Rather than disrespect, the concept of “human dignity” is often invoked in 
this context: torture is wrong because it violates the victim’s human dignity.119 
Without an explanation of the underlying premises and reasons, however, there is 
not much force to the assertion that some treatment violates someone’s dignity. 
Respect is more basic than dignity, and more capable of elucidating the machinery 
of moral reasons at work in our revulsion to certain forms of treatment, as I hope 
to demonstrate. Indeed, the duty to uphold human dignity is commonly under-
stood to derive from or to be synonymous with having “respect for persons,” and 
so what follows should be understood as an attempt to understand certain aspects 
of human dignity.120  
A. Respect and Value 
What does it mean to “respect” something? Let us consider Joseph Raz’s 
theory of respect, and of respect for persons.121 For Raz, respect is a species of 
responding to value and thus to reason.122 On his view, respect has two basic com-
ponents. First, he writes, to respect things means “recognizing” them as things of 
value—“regarding [them] in ways consistent with their value, in one’s thoughts, 
understood broadly to include imaginings, emotions, wishes, intentions, etc.” and, 
                                               
119 See, e.g., John Vorhaus, “On Degradation - Part One: Article 3 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights,” Common Law World Review 31 (2002): 374-99, at 388 (“The essence of degrading pun-
ishment is the violation of humanity dignity…”); Waldron,  “Inhuman and Degrading Treatment,” 
supra note 26 at 281-84 (considering “four kinds of outrage to human dignity,” which he understands 
as equivalent to “four species of degradation”: “bestialization,” treatment fit for an animal, “instru-
mentalization,” treating people as a mere means to the greater good, “infantilization,” treating an adult 
as if she were an infant, and “demonization,” treating someone “as though he were simply a vile em-
bodiment of evil.”); Kevin J. Murtagh, “Is Corporally Punishing Criminals Degrading?” Journal of 
Political Philosophy 20 (2012): 481-89, at 485 (“[W]ith respect to legal punishment, a degrading punish-
ment is one that is inconsistent with the recognition of the basic dignity of the punished person.”); 
Murphy, “Cruel and Unusual Punishments,” supra note 81 at 233 (“A punishment will be unjust (and 
thus banned on principle) if it is of such a nature as to be degrading or dehumanizing (inconsistent 
with human dignity);” John Kleinig, “The Hardness of Hard Treatment,” in Fundamentals of Sentencing 
Theory, ed. A. J. Ashworth and M. Wasik (Oxford: Clarendon, 1998), 273-98 at 287 (“To degrade an-
other is to detract from the other’s dignity as a human being.”). 
120 I discuss dignity further infra at 146-48. 
121 Joseph Raz, Value, Respect, Attachment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). 
122 Id. at 160. 
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insofar as language is tied to thought, perhaps expressing this value recognition 
with words.123 To despise someone when he is generous and kind is to have an 
emotion inconsistent with his value, Raz explains, and thus is violative of this first 
reason of respect.124 Second, in light of the meta conviction that things of value 
are of value, respect requires that one preserve and not destroy something that she 
recognizes to have value.125 If one sees a masterpiece of painting, respect does not 
require her to spend time contemplating it—she might not be disposed to like it—
but it does require that she not spray-paint over it. That would be disrespectful. It 
would dishonor her belief that it was a good painting, a painting, that is, from 
which those who are disposed differently might derive pleasure or insight. Raz, by 
emphasizing both the psychological and the practical aspects of respect, is in ac-
cord with Robin Dillon, who writes, “In respecting an object, we often consider it 
to be making legitimate claims on our conduct as well as our thoughts and feel-
ings…”126 
On Raz’s view, the point of respecting a valuable object, like the painting 
masterpiece, is to protect the possibility of communion between valuer (person) 
and value or good: 
“[I]f engaging with value is the way to realise value, respecting value 
is the way to protect the possibility of that realization. The basic 
reasons that something being of value imposes are that it should be 
allowed to play its proper role, that is, that it should be allowed to 
be realised.”127 
 
One does not owe respect, on this view, to the painting qua inanimate object. Re-
spect is not owed to the dry paint in and of itself, but rather to the value that such 
paint can generate when appreciated by people. If wet paint is an instrumental good, 
                                               
123 Id. at 161. 
124 Id. at 161-62. 
125 Id. at 161-63. 
126 Robin Dillon, “Respect”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2016 Edition), Edward N. 
Zalta (ed.), <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/respect/>. 
127 Raz, Value, Respect, Attachment, supra note 121 at 167. 
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something to be used as a tool to create value; the completed painting is an intrinsic 
good, something constitutive of the good when appreciated by a person. Either 
form of value, Raz explains, depends on the presence of something of value in itself: 
“a certain category of value whose existence is established by the very nature of 
value, that is, if anything is of value at all then something is valuable in itself.”128 
Instrumental goods only have value insofar as they benefit, in the end, something 
that is good in itself: the water has value insofar as it nourishes the plant, which 
has value insofar as it grows the fruit, which has value insofar as it nourishes and 
provides pleasure to people, who have value in themselves.129 Intrinsic goods also 
depend for their value upon the possibility of being engaged with by beings of 
value in themselves. The painting—a potential source of intrinsic value in this 
world—would have no such value in a world without people (and without any 
possibility of generating people).  
Razian respect is not limited to valuable objects. It will apply with the same 
logic to people themselves, given their role in the process of value creation as be-
ings of value in themselves.130 The conclusion is that respect entails, as Raz writes, 
“stringent” general duties toward people,131 and while he does not finish the 
thought entirely, these would involve a duty to “recognize” each person’s capacity 
to engage with value, both in one’s thoughts and possibly as a form of verbal or 
symbolic expression, as well as a duty to “preserve” each person’s capacity to en-
gage with value. It is unclear whether Raz imagines these duties to be positive or 
negative in nature. A positive duty to preserve someone’s capacity to engage with 
value would be very demanding, probably impossibly so given the realities of aging. 
But since we are concerned with injurious actions, we can sidestep this issue, as 
                                               
128 Id. at 144-45 
129 Id. at 147 
130 Id. at 170. 
131 Id. 
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such actions implicate even a negative duty of practical respect—a duty not to 
purposefully harm or damage someone’s capacity to engage with value. 
Stephen Darwall, using different terminology than Raz, distinguishes be-
tween “recognition” and “appraisal” respect.132 To “recognition” respect 
something on his view means “giving appropriate consideration or recognition to 
some feature of its object in deliberating about what to do” (e.g. to “respect” a 
speed limit by lowering your driving speed).133 To “recognition” respect some-
thing, according to Darwall, is to believe that some fact about it ought to impact 
your practical deliberation. A form of recognition respect is owed to each person, 
Darwall argues, just in virtue of the fact that they are persons; it determines our 
general duties to people. “Appraisal” respect, meanwhile, is the respect we have 
for things in virtue of their excellence (e.g. “respecting” someone’s good character, 
or her tennis skills).134 So, while Darwallian recognition respect concerns practical 
deliberation, Darwallian appraisal respect concerns relative estimation. These two 
forms of respect, however, are related in ways that Darwall seems to overlook. 
And we should resist Darwall’s attempt to draw a sharp distinction between the 
two, in favor of Raz’s view whereby practical forms of respect follow rationally 
from an appreciation of something’s value. Darwallian appraisal respect, for in-
stance, rationally entails forms of Darwallian recognition respect (e.g. I appraisal 
respect an actor’s skills and so I recognition respect her skills by seeing her play; 
or I appraisal respect human beings as a very special type of creature and so I 
recognition respect all human beings in certain basic ways). Furthermore, Darwal-
lian recognition respect expresses one’s Darwallian appraisal respect. This could be 
explicit, as when someone says something out loud (e.g. “She’s a great actor!”), or 
                                               
132 Stephen Darwall, “Two Kinds of Respect,” Ethics 88 (1977): 36-49. 
133 Id. at 38. 
134 Id. at 41.  
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it could be implicit in one’s actions (e.g. seeing all of her plays impliedly expresses 
that you think highly of her acting skills).   
B. Symbolic and Non-Symbolic Respect 
If, in this way, practical responses to something’s existence express one’s 
view of that thing’s value (or lack thereof), we ought to clarify the difference be-
tween symbolic and non-symbolic forms of practical respect. Symbolic respect or 
disrespect for a person does not, as a matter of the laws of physics, impact one’s ability 
to be or to do anything. It is symbolic and therefore culturally determined. The 
most obvious means of symbolic respect or disrespect is, of course, language, as 
just indicated: “You’re beautiful!” or “You do not matter!” But there are non-ver-
bal means, as well. For instance, unlike running electricity through someone’s 
body, spitting on someone does not, as a matter of the laws of physics, have much 
of an impact. It is a non-verbal, but nonetheless symbolic means of communicating 
one’s belief about someone’s lack of worth. Non-symbolic disrespect, meanwhile, 
involves a physical interference with the means or mechanism by which the thing 
exhibits or realizes value (e.g. burning a painting makes it physically impossible for 
the painting to exhibit value and therefore disrespects the painting). We should 
follow Raz, though, in thinking that while symbolic forms of respect are often an 
essential part of practical value recognition, they are generally of lesser importance 
than actions that physically help or hinder that thing’s capacity to exhibit or realize 
value.   
To clarify this point, let us consider Michael Rosen’s critique of Jeremy 
Waldron’s theory of human dignity.135 Waldron unites (a) the egalitarianism within 
religious definitions of dignity, wherein everyone equally exhibits the dignity of 
standing above the unreflective, impulsive animal kingdom, with (b) the traditional 
                                               
135 Michael Rosen, Dignity: Its History and Meaning (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012) 
and “Dignity Past and Present” in Waldron, Dignity, Rank, and Rights, supra note 8 at 79-98. 
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notion that dignity refers to high social status (as in the “dignity” of a king).136 The 
resulting construction, which he believes is immanent within the law, creates a 
general human dignity, mirroring the French revolutionaries’ dignite de l’homme, such 
that each person deserves a quasi-aristocratic status in society.137 Everyone on this 
view, paupers included, merit the deferential, courteous, and caring treatment ac-
corded to nobility in previous centuries. Rosen believes that while Waldron’s 
interpretation of dignity is the right one, it means that either (a) every fundamental 
rights violation is essentially symbolic or (b) dignity cannot fulfill the foundational 
role assigned to it in basic rights documents, as it can only ensure the more sym-
bolic forms of decent treatment. Rosen takes the second view:  
“It seems to me evident that not all violations of rights are symbolic 
harms…[T]he worst of what the Nazi state did to the Jews was not 
the humiliation of herding them into cattle trucks and forcing them 
to live in conditions of unimaginable squalor; it was to murder 
them.”138 
 
While murder is surely worse than humiliation, we should be careful to see the 
connection between the more symbolic and the more physical, between a willing-
ness to profoundly humiliate and a willingness to murder. And whether or not 
both are forms of indignity, both are surely forms of disrespect. Of course, in some 
cases, like herding people into cattle trucks, symbolic and non-symbolic forms of 
disrespect are united. To herd people into any truck against their will is a non-
symbolic form of disrespect, insofar as it represents a physical interference with 
her ability to realize value; but to use a cattle truck adds an additional symbolic 
component, implying with cultural cues that they are equivalent to animals.139 
                                               
136 Waldron, Dignity, Rank, and Rights, supra note 8. 
137 Id. 
138 Rosen, “Dignity Past and Present,” supra note 135 at 95. 
139 See John Vorhaus, “On Degradation Part Two: Degrading Treatment and Punishment,” Common 
Law World Review 32 (2003): 65-92, at 79 (“Doubtless treatment that represents a threat to dignity often 
does so partly by virtue of what it causes to happen, but, however we choose to describe the nature 
of the threat, it is important not to lose sight of the many ways in which dignity is impinged upon by 
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Regardless, both forms of disrespect, the more symbolic humiliation and the en-
tirely non-symbolic murder, derive from the same denial of the victims’ value. Both 
are ultimately forms of expression, even if murder is undoubtedly the more em-
phatic statement.  
Avishai Margalit attempts to unite symbolic and non-symbolic forms of 
disrespect under a broader conception of “humiliation,” which he defines as “any 
sort of behaviour or conditions that constitutes a sound reason for a person to 
consider his or her self-respect injured.”140 While his book contains great insight 
into the meaning of humiliation, there are at least two reasons to think that even 
his broader conception of the term is an insufficient guide to degradation. First, as 
Anthony Quinton explains, one might endure terrible treatment while nonetheless 
maintaining her self-respect and composure; and we should not think in such a 
case that she was not victimized.141 Second, as Vorhaus argues, humiliation itself 
is not always indicative of degradation or impermissible treatment: 
“Consider a national football team, widely expected to prove victo-
rious in the World Cup Finals, only to return home after the first 
round, falling with little resistance to inferior and barely known op-
position. After such a tame and disappointing performance, we are 
apt to say that the team was humiliated, and even more so once they 
go before a contemptuous public and unrestrained press. But no one 
is likely to entertain the thought that what the footballers have suf-
fered is degradation on the pitch, and degrading treatment 
afterwards.”142 
 
Thus, while we must worry about symbolic forms of disrespect, and humiliating 
treatment more broadly, we should not use those concepts as our singular guides 
to degradation. 
                                               
the symbolic nature of much ill-treatment.”). On the connection between degradation and animaliza-
tion, see infra at 167-68. 
140 Avishai Margalit, The Decent Society (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996), 9. See also The 
Greek Case, supra note 25 at 186 (“Treatment or punishment of an individual may be said to be degrad-
ing if it grossly humiliates him before others...”). 
141 Anthony Quinton, “Humiliation,” Social Research 64 (1997): 77-89, at 79-80. 
142 See Vorhaus, “On Degradation Part Two,” supra note 139 at 68. 
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C. Respect as an Epistemic Virtue 
Respect, in sum, involves apprehending something’s value and then re-
sponding appropriately—both attitudinally and practically—given (a) the analytic 
connection between value and reason and (b) the principle that, to the extent it is 
in our power, we ought to think, say, and do that which is justified by reason. The 
reasons that ground respect on this view, to be clear, are object- rather than sub-
ject-generated: it is a thing’s objective value, whether instrumental or intrinsic, 
rather than our subjective desires, that determines the demands of respect.143 John 
Rawls argues along these lines that respect involves the recognition of something 
“as directly determining our will without reference to what is wanted by our incli-
nations.”144 This process of seeing the objective value in something and then 
responding appropriately in one’s thoughts and actions is suggested by the Latin 
source of respect: respicere, meaning “to look back at” or “to look again.”145 Willful 
blindness is perhaps the essence of disrespect, then, as one refuses to truly look at 
or see the value in front of him. If something were incapable of recognizing value, 
of looking back, as it were, then it would not be capable of disrespect. Consider a 
falling rock, an attacking shark, or someone who, in the moment of action, was 
legally insane146 or a legal automaton147—all are capable of causing harm to people, 
but none have the capacity to disrespect those they harm, given that they lack the 
capacity to perceive and then to reject the presence of their value. Along these 
lines, respect may be, as Dillon suggests, at least partly an epistemic virtue associated 
                                               
143 See Thomas H. Birch, “Moral Considerability and Universal Consideration,” Environmental Ethics 15 
(1993): 313–332 (arguing that respect involves a “deontic experience,” whereby one must pay attention 
and respond appropriately); see also Carl Cranor, “Toward a Theory of Respect for Persons,” American 
Philosophical Quarterly 12 (1975): 309–320; Allan Wood, Kant's Ethical Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999); but see Sarah Buss, “Respect for Persons,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 29 
(2013): 517-550. 
144 John Rawls, Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy, ed. Barbara Herman (Cambridge, Mass: Har-
vard University Press, 2000), 153. 
145 Latin source provided in Robin Dillon, “Respect,” supra note 126. 
146 See M’Naghten [1843] UKHL J16. 
147 See R v Quick [1973] 3 WLR 26. 
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with the responsible pursuit of and commitment to the truth, namely, the truth of 
something’s value.148  
V. Human Value 
Let us take stock of the overall argument. We have been inquiring into the 
nature of degradation-limiting reasons, which operate with relative independence 
from other penal considerations. We have been assuming that the general reasons 
that oppose the infliction of torture simply are our degradation-limiting reasons 
(or the most fundamental ones). We defined torture as the intentional infliction of 
a suffusive panic. We hypothesized that the concept of disrespect is the metric of 
degradation, such that it can clarify torture’s wrong-making features. And we have 
outlined the abstract framework of disrespect. Disrespect involves a failure to re-
spond appropriately to something’s capacity to realize value, most importantly by 
failing to “protect the possibility of that realization,” as Raz explains, as well as by 
failing to provide more symbolic forms of recognition or expression.149  
Given that respect is not purely symbolic, to apply this framework to a per-
son—to, say, assess how disrespectful torture is to a person—we need at least a 
basic theory of the human good, of what humans do to realize value, and of how 
they do this. Put differently, what is the mechanism or capacity by which humans 
realize value? Only with this information could we understand the degree to which 
an action expresses disrespect for a person by interfering with this mechanism (and 
thereby failing to protect the possibility of her realizing value). To pour water on a 
plant, for instance, is generally to respect the plant, insofar it enables or assists the 
mechanism by which it exhibits value. But to pour water on a sandcastle is generally 
to disrespect the sandcastle, insofar it hinders its respective value mechanism. We 
                                               
148 Robin Dillon, “Respect,” supra note 126. For the sake of completeness, if moral and ethical ques-
tions were non-objective, such that the “truth” of something’s value was determined by a context-
dependent system of meaning—one to which a society has committed itself—the demands of respect 
as outlined here would very likely still operate within such a system, given their rather straightforward 
logic (e.g. “do not destroy that which we deem valuable”). 
149 Raz, Value, Respect, Attachment, supra note 121 at 167. 
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can make these judgments only because we have an understanding of what plants 
and sandcastles do to exhibit value, and of the underlying capacities that enable 
this process. When, then, do people do to exhibit or realize value, and which ca-
pacities enable them to do this?150 Raz’s abstract notion that people are of value 
“in themselves” does not provide an answer to this question. 
A. Diachronic Human Value 
 I take a broadly Aristotelian line on human value. The conviction is that 
people’s value—or their essentially human value—derives from their capacity to 
stitch moments together through time and construct good lives. Aristotle, in Book 
1 of Nichomachean Ethics, inquires into the “human good.”151 He argues that the 
“characteristic activity” of humans is leading a “certain kind of life…in accordance 
with reason.”152 A characteristic activity is “accomplished well when it is accom-
plished in accordance with the appropriate virtue,” he continues, such that the 
“human good” is a life lived in accordance with the generally human virtues, which 
enable one to live in accordance with reason (or are constitutive of living in ac-
cordance with reason).153 Most importantly for our purposes, Aristotle emphasizes 
that the human good can only be realized “over a complete life.”154 He alludes to 
the migratory return of the swallows, which marks the beginning of summer: “For 
one swallow does not make a summer, nor one day. Neither does one day or a 
short time make someone blessed and happy.”155 The idea is that the human 
good—the realization of value by a person—is a diachronic achievement. 
                                               
150 Of course, the idea that plants and sandcastles have value that we might respect or disrespect 
presupposes a partial answer to this question, one in which people can have valuable engagements 
with plants and sandcastles. 
151 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. and ed. Roger Crisp (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2000). 
152 Id. at 12 (1098a). 
153 Id. at 16 (1000a). 
154 Id. at 12 (1098a) and 18 (1101a). 
155 Id. at 12 (1098a). 
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Aristotle argues, for instance, that we cannot say that a child has led a 
“blessed” life: 
“If he is called blessed, he is being described as such on account of 
the potential he has, since, as we have said, happiness requires com-
plete virtue and a complete life. For there are many vicissitudes in 
life, all sorts of chance things happen, and even the most successful 
can meet with great misfortunes in old age, as the story of Priam in 
Trojan times. No one calls someone happy who meets with misfor-
tunes like these and comes to a wretched end.”156 
 
Aristotle maintains that, since the human good is realized in the context of a life 
as a whole, we cannot say that a child has realized the human good. Such a judg-
ment is premature. Aristotle implies, indeed, that we cannot judge whether 
someone has realized the human good until his life is complete. Priam, for instance, 
was King of Troy at the time of its destruction by Agamemnon, with the implica-
tion being that an otherwise virtuous or glorious life can end so terribly that it 
warps or ruins one’s life as a whole. Ronald Dworkin makes a related point in the 
context of the debate over euthanasia: “We worry about the effect of life’s last 
stage on the character of life as a whole, as we might worry about the effect of a 
play’s last scene or a poem’s last stanza on the entire creative work.”157  
Aristotle goes even further yet to suggest that the quality of one’s life, 
viewed in this holistic manner, may be altered by posthumous events, such as the 
success or failure of one’s descendants, though he admits the “oddness” of this 
position.158 We need neither accept nor deny these more dramatic conclusions to 
                                               
156 Id. at 16 (1000a). 
157 Ronald Dworkin, Life’s Dominion: An Argument about Abortion, Euthanasia, and Individual Freedom (New 
York: Knopf, 1993), 199. 
158 Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, supra note 151 at 16-17 (1000b) (“For both good and evil are thought 
to happen to a dead person, since they can happen to a person who is alive but not aware of them. 
Take, for example, honours and dishonours, and the good and bad fortunes of his children or his 
descendants generally. But this view also gives rise to a problem. Though a person may have lived a 
blessed life into old age and died accordingly, some reverses may happen in connection with his de-
scendants. Some of them may be good and meet with the life they deserve, others the contrary; and 
clearly the relation to their ancestors can vary to any degree. It would indeed be odd if the dead person 
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appreciate Aristotle’s more general point, which is that if humans enliven and ex-
hibit value, they do so in the context of a diachronic project: the pursuit of a 
flourishing life as a whole. We can take this general point from Book 1 of Nicho-
machean Ethics, furthermore, without engaging with the remaining Books 2-10, 
which discuss the virtues that are conducive to realizing a flourishing life as a 
whole. That is, we can accept the notion of a diachronic, life-based human good 
without accepting or denying a foundation of virtue ethics. 
To clarify the diachronic nature of the human good, let us consider 
Dworkin’s distinction between “experiential” and “critical” interests.159 “Experi-
ential interests” are, generally, interests in having pleasurable sensory experiences, 
including refined instances like playing an instrument, and in having positive emo-
tional states, and in avoiding displeasing sensory experiences and negative 
emotional states. “Critical interests,” meanwhile, are not essentially phenomeno-
logical; they are interests in realizing one’s personal values and commitments—
completing a project, seeing loved ones succeed, ending one’s life with dignity, and 
so forth. The value of realizing a critical interest is, of course, connected to the 
value of realizing a good life as a diachronic achievement. But so is the value of 
realizing experiential interests, it seems. The value of pleasure, for instance, seems 
to depend on its connection to the broader good life, a connection that is usually, 
but not always secure. Consider the heroin addict who has destroyed her life due 
to her drug use, rejecting her personal obligations and descending into depravity 
and indignity. It is only with an appreciation of her as a being that constructs value 
through time, in the context of a life as a whole, that we can appreciate the im-
mense disvalue of her shooting up, her temporary ecstasy notwithstanding. Connie 
                                               
also were to share in these vicissitudes, and be happy, sometimes wretched. But it would also be odd 
if the fortunes of descendants had no effect on their ancestors for any time at all.”) 
159 Dworkin, Life’s Dominion, supra note 157 at 199-208. 
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Rosati represents a diverse and distinguished group of contemporary theorists who 
have endorsed the diachronic conception of the human good when she writes: 
“[A] good life seemingly involves more than a person’s having many 
good moments or having many particular things that may be good 
for her; and it involves more precisely because of the peculiar capac-
ities of persons. Persons have capacities for reason, memory, and 
imagination, that (most) nonhuman animals evidently lack. Persons 
have the capacity to reflect on themselves and their lives. Moreover, 
they have the capacity to be moved not only by what they may desire 
but by their determinations about what is worth desiring; and so they 
have the capacity to decide, in light of these determinations, what 
sort of person to be and what sort of life to lead. The ordinary ex-
ercise of these sundry capacities has the result that persons not only 
attend to their lives from moment to moment; they also take up a 
view of their lives as a whole, reflecting on themselves and their ex-
istence over time. In so doing, they also take, so to speak, a ‘larger 
view’ of themselves and their lives.”160 
It is with such a conception of the essentially human capacities—at least reason, 
memory, and imagination—and of how they collectively enable the construction 
of a good life through time that we can understand the addict’s ecstasy to be with-
out value, since it makes her life as a whole worse.161 If viewed as a moment 
                                               
160 Connie S. Rosati, “The Story of a Life,” Social Philosophy and Policy, 30 (2013): 21-50, at 26-27. See 
also Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Uni-
versity Press, 1989), 50-51 (“We want our lives to have meaning, or weight, or substance, or to grow 
toward some fulness, or however the concern is formulated…But this means our whole lives. If neces-
sary, we want the future to ‘redeem’ the past, to make it part of a life story which has sense or purpose, 
to take it up in a meaningful unity.”); Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, 2d ed. 
(Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984), 216-19 (arguing that man is “essentially a 
story-telling animal,” such that the good life is one that unfolds through time with “narrative unity”); 
John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1971), 63-4 (maintaining that a good 
life consists in the approximate realization of a “rational life plan”—the pursuit of one’s foundational 
aims, which are grounded in one’s reflective desires, and with the plan’s details filled in over time, in 
the context of one’s evolving circumstances); Jeff MacMahan, The Ethics of Killing (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2002), 179-80 (“[W]e must also recognize that well-being is multidimensional and 
that some of its dimensions are relational—in particular those concerned with the meaning that a state 
or event has within a person’s life); Michael Stocker, Plural and Conflicting Values (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1990), 300–302, 323 (arguing that the value of a life is a Moorean “organic whole”). 
161 But are these essentially human capacities? What about intelligent animals? Can they not also “build 
lives”? David Velleman writes that we should not maintain that, say, a cow’s life considered as a holistic 
achievement matters, given that the cow itself (unlike a person) is incapable of understanding itself as 
a diachronic, life-building being: 
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standing alone, her ecstasy would be of great value, of course, since pleasure ab-
stractly conceived has value. But that is not how humans conceive of, or ought to 
conceive of, their existence, as if they had no memories, and were like goldish, 
born in each moment anew, untethered to the past or future.162 As C.I. Lewis 
writes: “The characteristic good of willing and achieving is not one found in this 
or that passing instant merely, nor in an aggregation of the goods thus momentarily 
and separately disclosed, but in the temporal and relational patterns of a whole of 
experience whose progression is cumulative and consummatory.”163 As I will dis-
cuss further in the following chapter, the most valuable goods that people can 
realize, things like maintaining families, careers, and friendships, are essentially 
“temporal” goods, which can only be realized through time in the context of a 
broader life project.164   
If a moment of pleasure might be devoid of value on this diachronic con-
ception of the human good, in the other direction, pain, stress, and suffering can 
                                               
 
“I assume that a cow cannot conceive of itself as a persisting individual and conse-
quently cannot conceive of itself as enjoying different benefits at different moments 
during its life. What the cow cannot conceive, it cannot care about; and so a cow 
cannot care about which sequences of momentary goods it enjoys…I am not sym-
pathetic to stronger versions of internalism, which make a thing’s intrinsic value for 
someone contingent on his being disposed to care about it under specified or spec-
ifiable conditions; but I am inclined to think that unless a subject has the bare 
capacity, the equipment, to care about something under some conditions or other, 
it cannot be intrinsically good for him.”  
 
David Velleman, “Well-being and Time,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 72 (1991): 48-77, at 67. If this 
works, it begins to explain the moral difference between killing a person and a cow. When you kill a 
person, you not only deprive her of access to future pleasurable or otherwise valuable standalone 
moments, as you would with the cow; you may have also ruined her ability to realize a good life as a 
whole. 
162 Memory has been grossly undervalued as an essential human capacity. Locke is an exception: 
“Memory, in an intellectual creature, is necessary in the next degree to perception. It is of so great a 
moment, that where it is wanting, all the rest of our faculties are in a great measure useless; and we, in 
our thoughts, reasonings, and knowledge, could not proceed beyond present objects, were it not for 
the assistance of our memories…” Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, supra note 93 at 
150 (Book II, Ch. X, Sect. 8). 
163 C.I. Lewis, Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation (New York: Open Court, 1946), 498.  
164 See Chapter 3 at 208-12. 
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sometimes have great value, insofar as they constitute investments toward a good life 
as a whole, or are analytically connected to such investments, as with the years of 
rigorous training required to become, say, a qualified surgeon.165 This generates a 
conception of human “disvalue,” which will come into play when we return to the 
discussion of torture. Disvalue is something distinct from, and worse than, the 
absence of value. If human flourishing in the context of a whole life is constitutive 
of human value, then wanton human suffering—suffering that does not represent 
an investment into one’s good life—is constitutive of human disvalue.   
 There are stronger and weaker versions of this theory. The stronger ver-
sion—which I accept—is that something is good for a person only if it is good for 
her life considered as a whole. The question of whether a certain activity or expe-
rience is good for me, on this stronger version, is identical to the question of 
whether it is good for my life considered as a whole. This need not be obsessively 
forward-looking, though, as I discuss further in the following chapter. That is, it 
has a central place for “momentary” goods, which do not require cultivation over 
time to be realized, and which are realized entirely in the moment, as it were, like 
the consumption of a random ice cream cone.166 For as a matter of general ten-
dency or personal principle, such goods are surely constitutive of a good life. That 
is, a life without such goods—without ice-cream cones—would be worse when 
considered as a whole. We might retreat to a more moderate version, however, with-
out impacting our overall argument. The more moderate position is that while 
people’s diachronic capacities are the fundamental basis of their value, constitutive 
of their ability to realize “temporal” goods like families, careers, friendships, and 
                                               
165 See Lewis, Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation, supra note 163 at 498 (“The goodness of pursuing and 
attaining is not the goodness found in striving, regardless of the end pursued, plus the goodness found 
in having something desired, regardless of how it is attained. It lies peculiarly in the relationship be-
tween the active intent, the conation, and the realization. The goodness of the end to be realized 
infuses the activity; and the goodness belonging to purposive action, and not to be found in mere 
good fortune, colors the realization of the end attained.”). 
166 See Chapter 3 at 208-10. 
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so forth, people can nonetheless generate “momentary” value that has nothing to 
do with their life project. That is, something could be good for me without being 
good for my life considered as a whole. Perhaps the heroin addict’s pleasure has 
value in this way, as a momentary experience of pleasure, valuable even though it 
detracts from the pursuit of her good life as a whole. David Velleman takes this 
position, writing that “a person has two distinct sets of interests, lying along two 
distinct dimensions—his synchronic interests in being well off at particular mo-
ments, and his diachronic interests in having good periods of time and, in 
particular, a good life.”167 However, given that “momentary goods” are constitu-
tive of a good life as a whole, as with the ice-cream cone, Velleman’s distinction, 
even if sound, is not of great analytical import. It would provide traction only for 
those purportedly momentary goods, like the addict’s ecstasy, that are valuable in 
the moment but bad for one’s life overall. 
 In this section, we were concerned to discover the mechanism by which 
human beings exhibit or realize value, in order to understand how an action—like 
torture—might interfere with that mechanism and therefore express disrespect for 
                                               
167 Velleman, “Well-being and Time,” supra note 161. As evidence of the independence of synchronic 
and diachronic well-being, Velleman introduces an interesting hypothetical. Consider two possible 
lives with the same total amount of synchronic, moment-to-moment well-being. One begins desper-
ately and ends wonderfully, while the other begins wonderfully and ends desperately. Velleman argues 
that we believe that the former is the better life overall, and that we can make this judgment only if 
the narrative sequence of events matters. And, he continues, the narrative sequence of events can 
matter only if diachronic well-being is distinct from synchronic well-being (given that both lives have 
the same amount of synchronic well-being). Velleman’s argument has generated considerable atten-
tion. For our purposes, however, we can maintain that human value is centered on the pursuit of 
temporal goods and a good life as a whole without accepting or rejecting the proposal that the “nar-
rative” or “story” of a life is an independent variable in making a good life. For arguments in favor of 
the view that a life’s narrative structure matters as an independent variable, see Taylor, Sources of the 
Self, supra note 160 at 50-51; MacIntyre, After Virtue, supra note 160 at 216-19; Daniel Dennett, “The 
Self as the Center of Narrative Gravity,” in Frank S. Kessel, Pamela M. Cole, and Dale L. Johnson 
(eds.), Self and Consciousness: Multiple Perspectives (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publish-
ers, 1992);  McMahan, The Ethics of Killing, supra note 160 at 178 (“[T]he order of events makes a life 
better by making it more meaningful.”). For criticism of the view, see Stephen Campbell, “When the 
Shape of a Life Matters,” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 18 (2015): 565-575, 571; Connie Rosati, “Story 
of a Life,” supra note 160; Galen Strawson, “Against Narrativity,” Ratio 17 (2004): 428–52; Fred Feld-
man, Pleasure and the Good Life (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), ch. 6; Johan Brännmark, 
“Leading Lives: On Happiness and Narrative Meaning,” Philosophical Papers 32 (2003): 321–43. 
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a person. What, then, is the relevant mechanism? It is the collection of capacities 
which enables one to stitch moments together and construct a meaningful life over 
time. Rosati mentions reason, memory, and imagination. We might break “reason” 
down into at least autonomy and value-recognition. Autonomy involves the ability to 
consciously see multiple practical options and then to select one, while value-
recognition involves the ability to see the relative objective value in such choices. 
I follow Donald Regan and David Enoch in thinking that the bare fact that some-
one has exercised her autonomy and freely chosen an option does not render that 
option valuable and constitutive of a good life; that is, people can freely exercise 
their agency—even passing a Kantian test of universalizability—but nonetheless 
make mistakes, by choosing an option that contains or entails less objective value 
than another.168 An agent could have the capacity for autonomy, in this way, but 
then be incapable of building a good life if she lacked the independent capacity of 
value-recognition; that might explain the future of artificially intelligent agents and 
possibly the current reality of psychopaths. We need not reach a firm conclusion 
on these issues, however, to understand that some such collection of relatively 
distinct capacities enables humans to realize and exhibit value in a diachronic, life-
building manner. Let us define this collection of capacities as a person’s meta-
capacity for practical reason.169 In sum, then, the mechanism by which human beings 
                                               
168 See David Enoch, “Agency, Schmagency: Why Normativity Won’t Come from What Is Constitutive 
of Action,” The Philosophical Review, 115 (2006): 169-198; Donald Regan, “How to be a Moorean,” Ethics 
113 (2003): 651-77 and “The Value of Rational Nature,” Ethics 112 (2002): 267-291.  
169 This would qualify a “range property” theory of human value, as it bases human value in a natural 
property that people exhibit unequally (i.e. people’s practical reasoning capacities, understood as their 
ability to construct good lives, will doubtfully be precisely equal). The “range property” idea is that, 
regardless of such inequalities, a sufficiency of the property renders one completely within the relevant 
category. Jeremy Waldron explains that “being in Scotland” in a range property. While Stirling is in 
the center of the country and Gretna is just over the border from England, both are equally “in Scot-
land.” See Jeremy Waldron, One Another’s Equals: The Basis of Human Equality (Cambridge, MA: Belknap 
Press, 2017), 84-127, 222-23; Ian Carter, “Respect and the Basis of Equality,” Ethics 121 (2011): 538-
71. Thus, the question here is not, “How easy is it for you to build a good life?” but rather, “Do you 
have the capacity to build a good life?” That bare capacity renders one deserving of full and equal 
respect on this view. Rawls introduced the idea of a range property. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra 
note 160 at 506 (grounding people’s worth in their moral personality and concluding that “while 
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exhibit or realize value is their capacity for practical reason, which enables them to 
build meaningful lives through time.170  
B. Metaphysical Objection 
Before moving forward and re-connecting this discussion to torture, let us 
consider a metaphysical objection to this temporal, life-based conception of the 
human good. Does it presuppose controversially, contra Derek Parfit, that I am 
identical with the “younger” and “older” people who have looked and who will 
look out to the world through “my” consciousness?171 How else could I be said to 
be working of the project of “my” good life? Charles Taylor writes perceptively on 
this objection: 
“It seems clear…that there is something like an a priori unity of a 
human life through its whole extent. Not quite, because one can im-
agine cultures in which it might be split. Perhaps at some age, say 
forty, people go through a horrendous ritual passage, in which they 
go into ecstasy and the emerge as, say, their reincarnated ancestor. 
That is how they describe things and live them. In that culture there 
is a sense to treating this whole life cycle as containing two persons. 
But in the absence of such a cultural understanding, e.g., in our 
world, the supposition that I could be two temporally succeeding 
selves is either an overdramatized image, or quite false. It runs 
against the structural features of a self as a being who exists in a 
space of concerns.”172 
 
                                               
individuals presumably have varying capacities for a sense of justice…[o]nce a certain minimum is 
met, a person is entitled to equal liberty on a par with everyone else.”). 
170 Margalit outlines three strategies for defending the ideal that each person deserves respect: a “pos-
itive” one that appeals to a particular human trait; a “skeptical” based on the empirical and cultural 
fact that in our way of life we respect each other; and a “negative” one that fails to justify the ideal, 
but forecloses disrespect (which Margalit understand as “humiliation”) because it is an instance of 
mental cruelty. Margalit, The Decent Society, supra note 140. The argument presented here would fall 
under the “positive” strategy, following Aristotle and others in finding the essentially human trait to 
be the capacity for practical reason (as defined above). Note, as well, that since Margalit focuses only 
on disrespect as humiliation, he fails to see how disrespect can involve physical as well as mental 
cruelty. 
171 See Derek Parfit, “Personal Identity and Rationality,” Synthese 53 (1982): 227-41; Reasons and Per-
sons (Oxford University Press; revised reprint, Oxford: Clarendon, 1987). 
172 Taylor, Sources of the Self, supra note 160 at 51. 
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While I accept Taylor’s argument, the more important point to make is that 
the metaphysical objection is not dispositive. If we do not share an identity with 
our past and future selves, that need not vitiate the conclusions from this section. 
The achievement of a “good life” would simply become something of a group 
project. That is, the teenager and the old man that he becomes could be different 
people, but nonetheless could be said to be living, and working on, the same life. 
They would be distinct and yet impossibly bonded, perhaps the purest form of 
family. And we could reasonably maintain that their respective capacities to work 
together and to honor one another, as it were, were their most essential and valu-
able capacities. I take no position on whether this indeed describes the 
metaphysical nature of our existence through time. Much more would need to be 
said to flesh out its details. The point is that some such view is coherent, at least, 
and that even a radical Parfittian metaphysics need not vitiate our moral convic-
tions about the diachronic nature of human value. 
VI. Torture as Extreme Disrespect 
We can now combine the analyses of respect and human value, and return 
to the inquiry into torture’s wrong-making features, for the purpose of discerning 
degradation-limiting reasons more generally. If a person’s value is constitutive of 
her capacity to stitch moments together through time and construct a good life, 
then torture, by forcing her ken into a terrifying, panic-stricken moment, is egre-
giously disrespectful of that capacity, and primarily in a non-symbolic or physical 
manner. If the value creation and exhibition machine that is a person depends for 
its functioning upon the employment of its practical reasoning capacities (at least 
autonomy, value recognition, imagination, and memory), then torture obliterates 
that machine—at least temporarily and while risking permanently damage, as I dis-
cuss further below. To force the torture victim into this maximally horrible moment is 
to force her outside of the pursuit of her good life and outside of time, as it were, 
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as she loses awareness of where she came from and where she is going, of who she 
is and what she values, losing the ability to “see” the world, as Scarry writes.  
When Améry writes that the torture victim is incapable of betrayal, given 
her lack of awareness of the commitments or values that she may betray by con-
fessing or informing, he demonstrates torture’s non-symbolic disrespect for a 
victim’s capacities of memory and value recognition. The demands of the past and 
the future lose their stringency, as the victim’s instinctual and utter panic collapses 
her sense of self and conception of value into a terrifying present, and she is pre-
pared to do or say anything to end the ordeal. At least that is the torturer’s 
intention. Torture, by inducing such panic, is similarly disrespectful in the non-
symbolic sense of one’s capacity for autonomy. It effectively ruins this capacity 
(again, at least temporarily). It is not just that genuine deliberation is impossible 
under the throes of panic, as it would be when experiencing extreme pleasure or, 
indeed, when sleeping. Panic takes a further step by actively hijacking one’s powers 
of deliberation and decision-making, as one’s mental apparatus is concentrated at 
full blast toward the singular aim of ending or escaping from the source of one’s 
terror. If suffusive pleasure tends to transfix, perhaps rendering action impossible, 
suffusive panic absolutely animates, demanding action—wild, unthinking action—
even if that just means desperately flailing about. Overwhelming pain, containing 
within it the likelihood of such panic, is thus generally the greater autonomy viola-
tion than overwhelming pleasure, contra Sussman.173 But should extreme pleasure, 
against odds, generate this experience, then there would be no difference between 
the two with regard to their impact on autonomy. 
 The disrespect of torture takes a step beyond preventing a person from 
generating value, as would death or forcing someone to sleep for the rest of her 
life. Torture also forces the victim into a locus of disvalue. It is not just that the 
victim loses the thread of her life and so fails to exhibit or create value, but that 
                                               
173 Sussman, “What’s Wrong With Torture?” supra note 38 at 15. 
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her new existence, as it were, is necessarily horrible for however long it may last. 
As argued above, disvalue constitutes wanton suffering, suffering that does not 
represent an investment into one’s flourishing life as a whole. If respect involves 
the duty to maintain the possibility of something’s engagement with value, it entails 
as a corollary the duty not to use that thing to generate disvalue.174 Torture does 
involve a “perversity,” then, as Sussman argues, but it is not the forced self-betrayal 
that he articulates. The perversity involves taking a creature capable of engaging 
with value in such a profound and interesting way, and then converting it into in a 
site of pure disvalue, of suffering and nothing else. We can return here to Beccaria’s 
point about how torture saturates the victim with suffering. The physics of the 
human brain are such that we can experience only a certain amount of suffering. 
If we imagine torture via running electricity though someone’s body, above a cer-
tain voltage the victim will experience the same maximum amount of pain and 
anxiety. The aim of torture is just to trigger the experience of panic which pushes 
someone over that threshold. The torture victim, suffused with suffering, is thus 
maxing out her capacity for disvalue. Whether he tortures to punish, to interrogate, 
to terrorize a populace, etc., the intended experience for the victim is the same, at 
least when viewed from this perspective on value. In sum, torture is the exemplar 
of disrespect. With regard to (a) the duty to enable or at least not to destroy a 
person’s capacity to generate value and (b) the correlated duty not to turn a person 
into a locus of disvalue, torture is the most disrespectful thing that you can do to 
someone, for as long as it lasts: it completely halts the victim’s value generating 
capacities and completely maximizes her disvalue generating capacities.175 
                                               
174 This corollary duty would only apply to conscious creatures, which are capable of generating dis-
value in the form of wanton suffering. By comparison, while it is possible to disrespect a painting, 
insofar as one precludes the possibility of its value realization by, say, burning it; it is not possible to 
make the painting itself a locus of disvalue, given that the painting cannot experience suffering. 
175 There are very unusual cases where the torturer inflicts a suffusive panic as a byproduct of realizing 
his intention to help the “victim.” In such cases, the torturer would affirm rather than reject the indi-
vidual’s essentially human value. Consider, for instance, emergency battlefield surgery without 
anesthesia, as well as Christopher Hitchens’ torture. See discussion supra 134-35. By waterboarding 
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Are there any purely symbolic forms of disrespect involved with torture? 
An element of symbolic humiliation inheres undeniably in converting someone 
from an upright, dignified being into a “shrilly squealing piglet,” given that all hu-
man cultures seem to value maintaining one’s composure in the presence of others. 
There is also the symbolically meaningful fact that torture converts a “person” into 
a squealing “animal,” as it were, as I discuss further below. It may also depend on 
the means of torture. To torture someone in public, for instance, as was the case 
with historic penal tortures, would add an additional layer of symbolic disrespect 
and humiliation.176 Certain forms of torture, furthermore, may be more culturally-
specific, using symbolic disrespect as a tool of bringing about a suffusive panic, 
perhaps forcing a religious person to violate a spiritual commitment in an extreme 
manner. In general, though, we should think that in the case of genuine torture, 
any purely symbolic disrespect would be drowned out by the non-symbolic, physical 
impact of a suffusive panic, consistent with the above conclusions regarding the 
“language-destroying” nature of torture, whereby torture effectively takes the vic-
tim outside of his linguistic and cultural setting, in which symbolic forms of 
expression have meaning and register. 
A. Degradation and the Spectrum of Disrespect 
Is all torture equally disrespectful? This conclusion is tempting, but it is not 
true. First, there seems to be a qualitative difference between very brief tortures, 
like breaking a single finger without any threat of further harm, and longer tortures, 
like those experienced by Améry, Timerman, Alleg, and Trung. We might think, in 
the former case, that the suffusive panic does not have an opportunity to sink in, 
                                               
Hitchens with his consent, Hitchens’s torturers were in fact aiding his realization of the good, a process 
which for him involved participatory journalism and engagement with foreign policy debates. We 
might excise these very unusual cases from the word “torture,” such that neither battlefield patient 
nor Hitchens were really “tortured,” even though they experienced the phenomenology of torture. 
176 For a critical explication of historic public tortures, in particular that of Robert-François Damiens 
in 1757, see Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan (New 
York: Vintage Books, 1977), Part One.  
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as it were, and obliterate the victim’s personality. We ought to remove the former 
cases from the term torture, I think, their brutality and cruelty notwithstanding. 
Let us move forward with the understanding that when we use the term torture, 
we are referring to experiences on a par with Améry, Timerman, Alleg, and 
Trung’s.  
Second, and more importantly, torture is traumatic and contains within it a 
serious risk of long-term damage, as seen with Trung, who experiences debilitating 
panic attacks decades after his ordeals. As Améry writes, “Whoever was tortured 
stays tortured. Torture is ineradicably burned into him…”177 Ian Thomson, Primo 
Levi’s biographer, argued that, in addition to his responsibility for his elderly 
mother and mother-in-law, traumatic memories of his time in Auschwitz caused 
his depression and ultimate suicide.178 Elie Wiesel was more succinct: “Primo Levi 
died at Auschwitz forty years later.”179 In many instances, torture entails the risk 
of long-term physical damage, as well. A willingness to inflict or to seriously risk 
long-term damage, psychological and physical, is absolutely a component of the 
disrespect of torture; I will discuss this issue further in the following chapter, which 
considers the risks inherent to sentencing someone to, say, twenty years in prison. 
We should not think, however, that all tortures pose the exact same long-term risks 
to a victim’s capacity to build a good life. Those that pose more of a risk are yet 
more disrespectful than those that pose less of a risk. To torture someone by cut-
ting off his fingers and toes seems yet more disrespectful than, say, waterboarding 
him, assuming he is ultimately released back into society. The reason is that build-
ing a good life is much more difficult without one’s fingers and toes, even if both 
forms of torture contain the risk of long-term psychological damage. But does this 
                                               
177 Jean Améry, At the Mind’s Limits, supra note 77 at 34. 
178 Ian Thomson, Primo Levi: A Life (New York: Metropolitan Books, Henry Holt and Company, 
2003). 
179 Diego Gambetta, “Primo Levi’s Last Moments,” Boston Review, June 1, 1999. 
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variation in the disrespectfulness of torture matter for the purposes of discerning 
dispositive degradation limitations?  
There is a spectrum from maximum respect to maximum disrespect for the 
value of an individual human being. Let us assume for the moment that all the 
harmful aspects of the acts on the spectrum are intentionally brought about (e.g. if 
a victim experiences a suffusive panic, let us assume that someone brings it about 
intentionally, as her means or end, and not accidentally or as an unwanted byprod-
uct of her intended means or end).180 This chapter clarifies the nature of maximum 
disrespect. I concluded that torture is the most disrespectful thing that you can do 
to someone for as long as it lasts. As such, torturing someone for an eternity—somehow 
rendering her immortal and somehow placing her under non-stop torture—is the 
most disrespectful thing imaginable.181 It does not merely risk long-term damage; 
it guarantees the worst possible long-term outcome: suffusive panic forever. As we 
work our way down the spectrum, we will see other forms of torture, with those 
entailing a greater risk of long-term damage higher up on the ladder than those 
that entail less of such risk. This idea of a spectrum of disrespect is key to under-
standing the concept of a dispositive degradation penal limitation. A form of 
punishment need not be the singularly most disrespectful thing imaginable to sur-
pass a dispositive degradation limitation. That is, assuming such limitations exists, 
they will rule out more than penal torture for an eternity. Even if certain forms of 
torture are yet more disrespectful than others, all forms of penal torture can still 
surpass a dispositive degradation penal limitation.182  
                                               
180 In Chapter 3, at 227-240, I consider how an agent’s intentions might impact the degree of disrespect 
embodied by his actions. 
181 James Joyce, in a fictional sermon, offers a searing description of Hell as torture for an eternity. 
James Joyce, A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man [1914-15] (London: Penguin, 2000), 128-143. 
182 We can appeal to the concept of a “range property” here, as well, with idea being that all forms of 
treatment above the line are impermissibly disrespectful, even if some are yet more disrespectful than 
others. See discussion of range properties supra note 169.
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But where, exactly, on the spectrum of disrespect shall the “dispositive” 
line be drawn, beyond which we would say not merely that such treatment is de-
grading, but that it is absolutely impermissibly degrading, such that you simply 
cannot do that to a human being as a form of state punishment, no matter the 
stringency of the other reasons pushing in favor of such treatment? We cannot 
determine this with precision. The central idea, however, is something like this: the 
treatment is so disrespectful that it embodies a rejection of the offender’s standing 
as a human being. This is a vague (and familiar183) formulation, but it gains some 
precision when understood in the context of the above analyses into respect and 
respect for persons. Given that respect involves the process of responding to 
something’s value, disrespect for a person always embodies a rejection, to some 
degree, of her value. But, as we have seen, there are different modes of disrespect; 
one might just disrespect another’s value as, say, a musician, consistent with 
Darwall’s conception of “appraisal” respect (e.g. the symbolic disrespect of saying 
“your song is not very good.”). But when delivered in a certain manner and degree, 
disrespect can embody a rejection of someone’s essentially human value, which is 
grounded on her capacity to build a good life through time. It expresses the con-
viction—the false conviction, the lie—that this creature does not matter, at least 
not like a normal human being does, such that we can ruin it or do whatever we 
want with it, without regard for its practical reasoning capacity or its capacity to 
suffer, as if it were a mere thing or animal.184 To “ruin” something involves 
                                               
183 See, e.g., Margalit, The Decent Society, supra note 140 at 143 (“Rejecting a human being by humiliating 
her means rejecting the way she expresses herself as a human. It is precisely this fact that gives content 
to the abstract concept of humiliation (i.e. degradation) as the rejection of human beings as human.”); 
Murphy, “Cruel and Unusual Punishments,” supra note 81 at 233 (“Sending painful voltage through a 
man’s testicles to which electrodes have been attached, or boiling him in oil, or eviscerating him, or 
gouging out his eyes—these are not human ways of relating to another person.”). 
184 This “mere thing or animal” language dovetails with Kantian themes. Kant writes: “In the kingdom 
of ends everything has either a price or a dignity. What has a price can be replaced by something else as 
its equivalent; what on the other hand is above all price and therefore admits of no equivalent has a 
dignity…Now, morality is the condition under which a rational being can be an end in itself, since 
only through this is it possible to be a lawgiving member in the kingdom of ends.  Hence morality, 
and humanity insofar as it is capable of morality, is that which alone has dignity.” Immanuel Kant, 
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destroying to some very significant degree its capacity to realize or exhibit value, 
e.g., ruining a sandcastle by pouring water on it.185 Above the “dispositive” line, 
we can say that punishment embodies a rejection of the offender’s humanity be-
cause it “ruins” his essentially human capacity to realize value in diachronic manner 
or, as I will discuss further, it embodies the legitimacy of ruining this capacity.186  
As suggested above, this degree of disrespect is much more likely to be 
present when the means are non-symbolic. What better way for a punishment to 
embody a denial of an offender’s humanity than for it to literally ruin his capacity 
to realize diachronic value as a non-symbolic matter of physics. But it seems that 
more symbolic forms of expressing disrespect could be so extreme as to reside 
above the “dispositive” line. Of course, merely saying a phrase like, “You’re worth-
less – you should be tortured to death!” would not qualify. But some non-linguistic, 
yet still symbolic forms of disrespect are inherently more serious and meaningful. 
Consider “Derby’s Dose,” a horrible punishment invented by the slave overseer 
Thomas Thistlewood in the mid-18th Century for runaway slaves. An addition to 
beating the runaway and rubbing salt pickle, bird pepper, and lime juice into his or 
her wounds, what made it “Derby’s Dose” was that another slave would defecate 
into the runaway’s mouth, after which he or she would be gagged for four or five 
hours.187 Let us just consider the process of forcing someone to eat human excre-
ment, ignoring the beatings and the gagging. This need not, as matter of physics, 
vitiate her ability to realize value, but it seems to embody the same message as 
                                               
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals [1785], in ed. and trans. Mary Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), 37-108, at 42 (4:434-35). Nonetheless, we should not think that the conclu-
sions presented here flow straightforwardly from Kant’s complex system, with its focus inter alia on 
people’s moral capacities and the universalizability of our maxims. 
185 Thanks to Peter Ramsay for helpful discussion on the concept of “ruin.” 
186 We can see here the connection between extreme disrespect and the dictionary definition of “de-
grade”: “To reduce from a higher to a lower rank, to depose from…a position of honour or 
estimation.” OED Online (Oxford University Press, April 2018), www.oed.com/view/Entry/49100. 
Impermissibly degrading treatment involves denying someone the “rank” of human and granting them 
the rank of some lesser creature or thing. 
187 See Malcolm Gladwell, Outliers: The Story of Success (London: Penguin Books, 2009), 282 
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something that does. A willingness to inflict that component of Derby’s Dose, like 
a willingness to torture, genuinely expresses the conviction that the victim does 
not matter—in the most direct sense that her capacities to generate human value 
and disvalue do not matter—and that no form of treatment is beyond the pale 
morally. 
The concept of “disgust” seems to be involved with such symbolic forms 
of extreme degradation. Martha Nussbaum argues that “disgust embodies a shrink-
ing from contamination that is associated with the human desire to be 
nonanimal…”188 By forcing the runaway to do something utterly disgusting, and 
thereby “contaminating” herself like an animal, Thistlewood acts to reject her hu-
manity and standing as a nonanimal person. This connects with the position that 
people’s diachronic capacities are their “essentially human” capacities. Animals—
unlike people—do not purposefully construct good lives, as Velleman explains; 
they are synchronic creatures that live moment-to-moment.189 To force a person to 
symbolically become an animal is thus to deny her humanity by denying the presence 
or worth of her diachronic capacities. It is to express the conviction that she is a 
synchronic animal and therefore not a diachronic person.190 The same can be said, 
of course, about the process of torturing someone and non-symbolically converting 
them into howling beast for a period of time.191    
 
 
                                               
188 Martha Nussbaum, Hiding from Humanity: Disgust, Shame, and the Law (Princeton: Princeton Univer-
sity Press, 2006), 74. See also Valerie Curtis, Don’t Look, Don’t Touch, Don’t Eat: The Science Behind Revulsion 
(Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2013). 
189 See discussion supra note 161. 
190 See Waldron, “Inhuman and Degrading Treatment,” supra note 26 at 282 (“The ‘higher than the 
animals’ sense of human dignity gives us a natural sense of ‘degrading treatment’: it is treatment that 
is more fit for an animal than for a human, treatment of a person as though he were an animal.”); 
Murphy, “Cruel and Unusual Punishments,” supra note 81 at 233 (arguing that a punishment is “in 
itself” degrading when it “treats the prisoner as an animal instead of a human being” or “perhaps even 
is an attempt to reduce him to an animal or a mere thing.”). 
191 I am grateful to Peter Ramsay for pressing me to explore the connection between degradation and 
animalization. 
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B. Inviolability and Degradation 
Such a rejection of someone’s value conflicts with the liberal commitment 
to the separateness of persons, discussed in the previous chapter, whereby each 
individual is deemed inviolate or sacred—somehow, a universe of value unto her-
self. This is a central point. We must remember, however, that we are concerned 
here with genuine offenders in a reasonably just society, not blameless runaway 
slaves. We are concerned, furthermore, with otherwise proportional forms of pun-
ishments. That is, we are assuming that the punishments in question are 
proportional means of realizing our legitimate penal aims—inflicting suffering or 
censure commensurate with the offender’s wrongdoing, forcing the offender to 
fulfill a duty of repair toward his victim, forcing the offender to fulfill a duty of 
repair toward society as a whole, or whatever it may be. The idea of a dispositive 
degradation limitation is that even if a form of treatment above the line is propor-
tional in accordance with such “internal” penal reasons, it is impermissible given 
that its degree of disrespect embodies a denial of the offender’s basic humanity or 
worth. It does not matter that the offender is culpable; we cannot reject or destroy 
his human value—ruining him or breaking him—as a tool for realizing our social 
aims. Human inviolability, in sum, requires that agents incorporate into their rea-
soning a certain profoundly high valuation of each person, as well as a commitment 
to the separateness of persons, such that we do not view individuals as merely 
fungible components of a wider social good. And it thus rules out actions, like the 
tortures considered above, and like Derby’s Dose, that could only be carried out if 
one rejected such a valuation and commitment.  
In this way, human inviolability, which forecloses sacrificing offenders to 
mitigate harms or threats for which they lack responsibility, also constrains the 
means by which we can force people to repair those harms or threats for which 
they are responsible. Deontology thus pushes and pulls. The individual offender, 
conceived of in the liberal mode as a responsible agent, is deemed (following 
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Chapter 1) to have a  duty to repair the wrongs that he has committed against other 
inviolable individuals, but then his own inviolability entails that there are methods 
that we cannot employ to force him to fulfill his duty, even if it goes unfulfilled as 
a result. All of this, of course, is not without cost. There may be, say, significantly 
more criminality in society as a result of our refusal to thoroughly degrade offend-
ers. That might not be true as an empirical matter, of course. But if it were true—
if our refusal to, say, inflict penal rape meant that rapists could not fulfill their 
duties of repair, such that there was significantly more rape in society—it would 
not impact our conclusion. We should not lose sight of this fact, though—that 
degradation-limiting penal reasons can have genuine costs, genuine moral costs. 
This, of course, is analytic to all deontological constraints. 
Finally, we should consider the possibility that otherwise dispositive degra-
dation-limiting reasons could be overwhelmed when the costs were above a certain 
threshold or when the offender’s duty was above a certain threshold of stringency, 
such that he effectively forfeits his standing as a human being, and we can do an-
ything to him permissibly (torture, rape, mutilation, etc.).192 If such a threshold 
exists, it seems far more likely to be passed by a forward-looking duty of preven-
tion than a backward-looking duty of rectification,193 when, say, the offender is 
responsible for an imminent threat of sufficiently great magnitude, we are suffi-
ciently sure of this fact, for some reason the only way to force him to prevent the 
threat involves extreme degradation, and there are no non-degrading means of 
forcing him to fulfill a lesser, but still significant portion of his duty. I take no 
                                               
192 This is Matthew Kramer’s position with regard to act-impelling torture being “always and every-
where wrong,” but nonetheless “morally optimal” in rare cases. See discussion supra at 120-21. 
193 Tadros considers why “the transition from self-defense to punishment may not be entirely 
smooth,” such that it may be permissible to inflict greater harms on someone (a) to force him to 
eliminate a threat for which he is responsible than (b) to force him to rectify a prior wrong. Victor 
Tadros, The Ends of Harm: The Moral Foundations of the Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2011), 347-48. 
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position here on the moral coherency of such a threshold,194 nor on whether, if 
such a threshold does exist, the potential for abuse means that we ought to rule it 
out as a legal matter.195 I will make two points, however, on the issue. First, if such 
a threshold exists, it need not vitiate the idea that degradation-limiting reasons rep-
resent relatively free-standing considerations, considerations which are 
overwhelmed in those very unusual cases, but which can be dispositive elsewhere. 
That is, those cases would involve a tragedy. The conclusion would not be that we 
simply harmed the wrongdoer to a proportional degree, akin to fining him $10, 
without any moral remainder; the conclusion would be that we harmed the wrongdoer 
to a proportional degree and, as a result, by denying his basic worth or standing as 
a human being, we enacted an abomination. Second, if such a threshold exists, 
there is little reason to believe that it is relevant in criminal court, where judges are 
concerned to sentence offenders with regard to their backward-looking duties or 
liabilities, possibly in addition to their non-imminent forward-looking looking du-
ties of prevention. It may be proven that an offender is a danger to people moving 
forward, insofar as he is unreasonably unreliable with regard to upholding the crim-
inal law’s prohibitions on violence, but very doubtfully will it be proven that he is 
imminently about to murder a great number of people. Thus, even if torture is 
somehow permissible above the threshold, let us move forward with the conclu-
sion that penal torture, at least, is absolutely impermissible, and for degradation-
limiting reasons derived from the liberal conception of the inviolable individual. 
In closing, I should emphasize that this was not an attempt to provide a 
knock-down argument for the existence of dispositive degradation-limiting penal 
reasons. Our understanding of the grounds of deontology is too limited for that, 
                                               
194 For clear discussion on threshold deontology, see Eyal Zamir and Barak Medina, Law, Economics, 
and Morality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), ch. 2 (“Threshold Deontology and its Critique”).   
195 See Jeff MacMahan, “Torture in Principle and in Practice,” Public Affairs Quarterly 22 (2008): 111-28 
(arguing that torture could be justified as a means of self-defense, but that it ought to be categorically 
outlawed due to its potential for abuse); but see Steinhoff, On the Ethics of Torture, supra note 40 at 53-
60.  
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and not just in the extra complicated penal context, where we are dealing with 
culpable individuals.196 We do not have anything close to a clean justification for 
even the easiest cases for deontology, say, the idea that it is wrong to harvest the 
organs of one innocent person to save five people’s lives.197 As such, the most 
honest thing to do might be to restate the conclusions in a conditional manner. 
That is, we have been interested to discern the basis and contours of degradation 
limitations, assuming they exist. Of course, such an assumption is relatively uncon-
troversial. Most people, I think, have the strong conviction not only that 
deontological limits exist with regard to innocent people, but also that they gener-
ate dispositive degradation limitations with regard to the culpable (e.g. most people 
would oppose penal rape for rapists, I think, even when proportional by reference 
to their favored positive theory of punishment). Moreover—and as further evi-
dence of the plausibility of degradation limitations—most legal systems have 
incorporated such limitations, as indicated above. We can restate our general con-
clusion, then, as follows: assuming that dispositive degradation-limiting reasons exist, then 
following the inquiry into the wrong-making features of torture, we ought to un-
derstand the metric of degradation to be disrespect for a person’s capacity to realize 
value, with dispositive degradation-limiting reasons emerging above a certain point 
on the spectrum of disrespect, above which the treatment embodies a denial of the 
                                               
196 Even Rawls and Nozick do not attempt to ground or justify their deontological commitments, and 
present them essentially as assumptions in the first few pages of their seminal works. See Rawls, A 
Theory of Justice, supra note 160 at 3-4 (“Each person possesses an inviolability founded on justice that 
even the welfare of society as a whole cannot override.”); Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: 
Basic Books, 1974), at ix (“Individuals have rights, and there are things no person or may do to them 
(without violating their rights).”); id. at xiv (“This book does not present a precise theory of the moral 
basis of individual rights…”). 
197 For attempts to ground deontological constraints, see, e.g., Frances Kamm, “Inviolability,” Midwest 
Studies in Philosophy 20 (1995): 165-75; Frances Kamm, Intricate Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2007), ch 7; Thomas Nagel, “The Value of Inviolability,” in ed. Paul Bloomfield, Morality and Self-
Interest (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). For relevant discussion, see, e.g., John M. Taurek, 
“Should the Numbers Count?” Philosophy & Public Affairs 6 (1977): 293-316; Michael Otsuka, “Saving 
Lives and the Claims of Individuals,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 34 (2006): 109-35, Kasper Lippert-
Rasmussen, “Kamm on Inviolability and Agent-Relative Restriction,” Res Publica 15 (2009): 165-178. 
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individual’s standing as a human, that is, as a creature with the capacity and right 
to build a good life through time.
 
 
 
 
174 
Chapter 3. Long-Term Incarceration and Human Value 
This chapter applies our inquiry into the bases of degradation limitations to 
assess the punishment of long-term incarceration. Where on the ladder of disre-
spect does long-term incarceration reside? Is it so disrespectful that, like penal 
torture or Derby’s Dose, it embodies a rejection of the offender’s standing as a 
human? Sections I – III (pages 175-207) begin the investigation by examining the 
meaning of incarceration simpliciter. What deprivations are inherent to incarcera-
tion, regardless of sentence length? There is a great diversity in prison quality, as I 
outline below, from a prison where thousands of inmates are packed in against one 
another without space even to sit down to a quiet penal island with beaches, bicy-
cles, and flocks of sheep. This diversity means that incarceration for any period of 
time can entail a wide array of possible deprivations. There is, however, one dep-
rivation inherent to all prisons: inmates will be unable to freely associate with other 
citizens in society. This, I argue, is the deprivational minimum and essence of in-
carceration. I refer to it as the denial of “the freedom of general association.”  
Sections IV and V (pages 207-28) add the variable of sentence length to the 
analysis, moving from the meaning of incarceration simpliciter to that of long-term 
incarceration. I define a prison term as long-term if it represents a severe risk of ruining 
an offender’s life, just in virtue of the amount of time that he is denied the freedom of general 
association. It is a slow-forming, essentially non-phenomenological injury to one’s 
life project.1 Long-term confinement away from society inhibits the realization of 
certain temporal and associational goods, that is, those goods which require cultivation 
                                               
1 By “phenomenological” I mean that which is consciously experienced. The injuries of physical pain 
and at least certain forms of humiliation are thus “phenomenological injuries,” as they depend on the 
victim’s conscious experience for their injuriousness (i.e. the victim needs to consciously feel the phys-
ical pain or the humiliation). By “essentially non-phenomenological injury,” I mean an injury which 
does not depend for its injuriousness on the victim’s conscious experience. An essentially non-phe-
nomenological injury may, however, also feature phenomenological components. That is, the injury 
of long-term incarceration need not hurt for it to be injurious, as I explain below; though, it very well 
may hurt and, in those cases, that fact will be part of what makes it injurious. 
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over time in association with other people, like maintaining a family and a mean-
ingful career. Such goods are central to almost all conceptions of the good life. 
If impermissible degradation embodies an affirmative rejection of some-
one’s humanity, then its degradation-making features must be intentionally 
inflicted, I argue in Section VI (pages 228-57). The permissibility of long-term in-
carceration thus depends on whether the state intends to ruin the offender’s life, or 
at least intends to severely risk that outcome. This depends, in turn, on the under-
lying theory of punishment (as well as one’s theory of intention). If the reason to 
long-term incarcerate is to incapacitate a dangerous individual, I argue, the costs 
to an inmate’s life project can be unintended byproducts of the state’s aim to pre-
vent him from committing very serious offenses. It would pose no problem on a 
genuine incapacitation theory if prison were somehow an inmate’s private Xanadu, 
where he could lead a flourishing (and crime-free) life. Long-term incarceration for 
reasons of retribution or deterrence, however, is different. On those two rationales, 
the state damages an offender’s life project intentionally, using the suffering and 
costs of long-term incarceration to generate moral desert and crime prevention, 
respectively. Retributivists would argue, for instance, that the offender does not 
deserve Xanadu; and deterrence theorists would argue that allowing him to live 
there would incentivize crime. This chapter concludes that long-term incarceration 
could only be justified for reasons of incapacitation. Non-long-term incarceration 
is a separate issue. As a dispositive degradation limitation on this view, a liberal 
state cannot intentionally ruin an offender’s life, nor can it intentionally create a 
severe risk of ruining of ruining his life, regardless of how heinous his offence or 
how useful it might be to do so, just as it cannot inflict penal torture.   
I. Deprivation of What Liberty? 
 What is incarceration simpliciter? When we hear that John has been sen-
tenced to a one-week term of imprisonment, what has the state done to him? If a 
punishment, by definition, involves a deprivation or set of deprivations, what 
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exactly has John been deprived of?2 The standard view, that incarceration is “the 
deprivation of liberty,” is inadequate.3 A fine deprives someone of the liberty to 
spend his money as he wishes, for instance, but a fine is not incarceration.4 “Lib-
erty” is a famously slippery concept and unadorned it is unhelpful as a guide to the 
meaning of incarceration.5 Rather than carrying out a forced conceptual analysis 
or “sharpening” of liberty as it relates to incarceration, let us consider a more direct 
question, derived from Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum’s “capability ap-
proach.” What valuable activities or states of being does incarceration limit an 
inmate’s access to, and to what degree?6 
 In accord with Aristotle and Marx, Sen and Nussbaum argue that we ought 
to assess political arrangements by examining people’s “real opportunity” to do or 
to be certain valuable things (e.g. to fly a kite, to get married, to watch television, to 
attend university, to be healthy, to be enthusiastic, etc.), as opposed to their level 
                                               
2 See, e.g., Hugo Adam Bedau and Erin Kelly, “Punishment,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
ed. Edward N. Zalta (Winter 2017 Edition), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2017/en-
tries/punishment/ (“Punishment…is the authorized imposition of deprivations…”). 
3 See, e.g., Victor L. Shammas, “Pains of Imprisonment,” in ed. Kent R. Kerley, The Encyclopedia of 
Corrections (Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, 2017), 1-5, at 2 (“The fundamental premise of prisons is to 
remove or restrict liberty.”).  
4 In Turner v. Rodgers, 564 U.S. ___ (2011), the US Supreme Court addressed whether states must 
provide an indigent defendant with counsel in civil contempt proceedings to enforce child support 
judgments, when he faces possible incarceration. The Court refers to the risk of erroneous incarcera-
tion, but not to the risk of making erroneous child support payments, as the risk of an erroneous 
“deprivation of liberty.” Id. at 14. In Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U. S. 71, 80 (1992) (quoting U.S. v. Salerno, 
481 U.S. 739, 750 (1987)), as well, the Court explained that it has been “careful not to ‘minimize the 
importance and fundamental nature’ of the individual’s right to liberty,” where “liberty” refers to free-
dom from confinement in a facility. 
5 See David Miller (ed.), Liberty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991). 
6 See Martha Nussbaum, Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2000); Creating Capabilities: The Human Development Approach (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2011); “Human Functioning and Social justice. In Defense of Aristotelian 
Essentialism,” Political Theory 20 (1992): 202–246; “Capabilities as Fundamental Entitlements: Sen and 
Social Justice,” Feminist Economics 9 (2003): 33–59; Amartya Sen, “Equality of What?” in ed. Sterling 
M. McMurrin, Tanner Lectures on Human Values (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1980); Com-
modities and Capabilities (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1985); “Capability and Well-being,” in eds. 
Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen, The Quality of Life (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993); “Capabilities, 
Lists and Public Reasons: Continuing the Conversation,” Feminist Economics 10 (2004): 77–80; “Ele-
ments of a Theory of Human Rights,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 32 (2004): 315–56. 
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of desire fulfillment, happiness, or resources.7 One’s circumstances, they explain, 
will to a significant degree govern what she wants, and what will make her happy. 
That a poor, disabled person has adapted to her misfortune, and feels happy and 
satisfied with her life, does not mean that society should not worry about her ina-
bility to be or to do certain things—her inability to realize certain “functionings,” 
in the language of Sen or Nussbaum—like her inability to, say, ride public trans-
portation. While the ability to be happy is a crucially important “capability,” Sen 
explains, it is only one of many such capabilities, and it warps public policy to 
pursue it monomaniacally.8 Meanwhile, resources are of merely instrumental worth 
on this view, relevant only insofar as one can convert them into valuable function-
ings. That is, two people with same amount of resources do not have the same 
standard of living, if one has a greater capacity to convert his resources into valu-
able functionings. Nussbaum explicates Aristotle’s view on the instrumental nature 
of resources (or “commodities”)—in the process clarifying the connection be-
tween the Aristotelean capabilities approach and the Aristotelean conception of 
human value discussed in Chapter 2: 
“The aim of political planning is the distribution to the city’s indi-
vidual people of the conditions in which a good human life can be 
chosen and lived. This distributive task aims at producing capabili-
ties. That is, it aims not simply at the allotment of commodities, but 
at making people able to function in certain human ways.”9 
On this view, resources are not ends in themselves, but rather the means of realiz-
ing the functionings that are constitutive of a good life as a diachronic whole. 
                                               
7 Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities, supra note 6 at x (“Known as the ‘Human Development’ approach, 
and also as the ‘Capability Approach’ or ‘Capabilities Approach,’ it begins with a simple question: 
What are people actually able to do and to be? What real opportunities are available to them?”) (emphasis 
added); Amartya Sen, Inequality Reexamined (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, Harvard University 
Press, 1992), 31 (explaining that our set of capabilities will determine “the real opportunity that we have 
to accomplish what we value.”) (his emphasis). 
8 Amartya Sen, “Well-being, Agency and Freedom: the Dewey Lectures,” Journal of Philosophy, 82 (1985): 
169-221, at 200. 
9 Martha Nussbaum, “Nature, Functioning and Capability: Aristotle on Political Distribution,” Oxford 
Studies in Ancient Philosophy (Supplementary Volume) 6 (1988): 145–84, at 145. 
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While Sen and Nussbaum employ the “capability approach” in the realms 
of distributive justice, development economics, and constitutional design, it is use-
ful as well in the realm of sentencing theory, as I hope will become clear, given its 
insight into the nature of injuries and deprivations. For the purposes of sentencing 
theory, however, we can leave behind the question of what qualifies as a “real op-
portunity” to realize a certain functioning, of how easy or costless it must be for 
someone to do or to be something before we can say with confidence that she has 
the “capability” to do or to be that thing.10 With such a flattened capability ap-
proach in mind, we can ask to what degree incarceration makes it harder or more 
difficult for an inmate to realize certain valuable functionings, that is, to what degree 
incarceration makes it harder or more difficult to engage in valuable activities or 
states of being. The emphasis on the degree of deprivation is important. Prison 
makes it harder, but not impossible for an inmate to realize a number of function-
ings, like, for instance, speaking to his family members. Though, of course, 
sometimes the limitation will be complete or near complete, as with an inmate’s 
ability to, say, take a ride on an airplane. Finally, and importantly for the argument 
below, the deprivations of incarceration, so conceived, could also be a matter of 
risk, in that incarceration risks limiting an inmate’s access to certain functionings.11 
At this stage, the inquiry is more semantic and sociological. There is a 
term—“incarceration” (or “imprisonment”)—and we are looking out to the world 
                                               
10 On the difficulty of determining when someone has a full-fledged “capability,” Bernard Williams 
writes: “How far should we consider the costs of doing something, when we are trying to decide 
whether someone has the capability of doing it? For instance, is it the case that I can go to Cortina 
d'Ampezzo for the winter? Well, I could go to that resort for the winter: it would merely involve my 
deserting my family, resigning my job, mortgaging my house, and going even further and irremediably 
into overdraft. So I can go, but there is a very high cost attached to it. Is it a capability that I have?” 
Bernard Williams, “The Standard of Living: Interests and Capabilities,” in Amartya Sen, The Standard 
of Living: The Tanner Lectures, ed. Geoffrey Hawthorne (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 
1987), 94-102, at 99. 
11 Adam Kolber writes, “Although we sometimes foresee harms that are virtually certain to befall a 
prisoner, other times we merely foresee risks of harm. For example, a judge might reasonably foresee 
that a particular offender will face a higher risk of physical or sexual violence in prison than outside 
prison. If so, the state ought to have some justification for increasing the offender’s risk of harm.” 
Adam Kolber, “Unintentional Punishment,” Legal Theory 18 (2012): 1-29, 18. 
 
 
 
 
179 
to see what practices the term captures. It refers to, as indicated above, a great 
variety of practices. The aim is to catalogue this diversity, while at the same time 
discovering which deprivations are shared by all instances of incarceration, under-
stood in terms of limited access to valuable functionings. In this way, we should 
be able to discover the “essence” of the punishment. Are there particular function-
ings that all prisons make impossible or very difficult to realize? It is important to 
catalogue non-universal deprivations, as well, to understand the full array of issues 
a judge might reasonably consider in sentencing someone to a term of incarcera-
tion. By comparison—and rather obviously—the punishment of fining involves 
fewer variables. Across time and place, the experience of being fined, whether in 
pesos, rubles, pounds, or dollars, whether in ancient Greece or in contemporary 
New York State, has been very similar.12  
II. Carceral Diversity 
Let us now demonstrate some of the diversity of incarceration—and also 
attempt to gain some limited understanding of what the punishment might feel like 
for an inmate in his day-to-day experience—by looking at a number of historical 
and contemporary examples. In this section, we are aiming to discover and con-
sider the deprivations of incarceration to a degree atemporally and amorally, that is, 
with relative ignorance of both (a) how long the offender experiences these depri-
vations and (b) the state’s penal rationale(s), which would inform us (partially) of 
the extent to which the state intends a particular deprivation, as opposed to it 
merely being an unwanted byproduct of the desired outcome. I will introduce the 
                                               
12 On the practice of fines in ancient Greece, see Edward M. Peters, “Prison Before the Prison: The 
Ancient and Medieval Worlds,” in eds. Norval Morris and David J. Rothman, The Oxford History of the 
Prison: The Practice of Punishment in Western Society (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 7-8. One 
exception to the similarity of fining across time and place is the Scandinavian policy of “day fines,” 
the amount of which depends on the offender’s wealth. See, e.g., Hans Thornstedt, “The Day Fine 
System in Sweden,” Criminal Law Review 9 (1975): 307-12. Another, related exception depends on the 
social safety net. Fines may have dramatically different impacts on low-income offenders in different 
jurisdictions, depending on the degree of welfare support within their respective societies. Thanks to 
Nicola Lacey for raising both of these exceptions. 
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examples of incarceration from most to least severe, in five steps—pausing along 
the way to consider some of the deprivations entailed. As indicated above, I will 
incorporate the variable of sentence length in Sections IV and V and then penal 
rationale and intent in Section VI. 
Step 1: Horror 
(1) In 1994 approximately 7,000 Hutus charged with genocide in Rwanda 
were held in the Gitarama Prison, a walled space half the size of a football pitch.13 
The complex was built for 400 inmates. There were only 20 latrines. Packed in 
against one another, most of the inmates had no option but to stand, constantly, 
in the open courtyard. Those too weak to stand squatted in filth. Foot sores be-
came gangrenous. At the end of the courtyard a concrete block housed the longest-
serving prisoners, a dark cellar filled with hundreds of men. One meager meal a 
day was passed throughout the prison. One in eight inmates died over a nine-
month period from 1994 to 1995, according to Médecins Sans Frontières.14   
(1A) The first-century B.C. historian, Diodorus Siculus, described the Tul-
lianum, a prison in which Perseus, the King of Macedonia, was placed by the 
Praetor of Rome after his capture by the Roman Army in the early second-century 
B.C.15 There were various levels to the facility, and Perseus was placed in the low-
est, and worst. It was not clear that Perseus himself was awaiting execution, but 
we should add to this gruesome picture the fact that his jailers threw down a sword 
and a noose, and urged him to commit suicide: 
“The prison is a deep underground dungeon, no larger than [a din-
ing-room that could hold nine people], dark and noisome from the 
large numbers [of people] committed to the place, who were men 
under condemnation on capital charges, for most in this category 
were incarcerated there at this period.  With so many shut up in such 
                                               
13 David Orr, “Hutus held in ‘worst prison in the world’: 7,000 suspects of Rwanda massacre are kept 
in a jail built for 400,” The Independent, July 15, 1995. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/hu-
tus-held-in-worst-prison-in-world-1591700.html. 
14 Médecins sans Frontières, “Diagnosing the State of Prisoner Health: The Gitarama Example,” 
March 1995 Report, http://speakingout.msf.org/en/node/643. 
15 Peters, “Prison Before the Prison,” supra note 12 at 19. 
 
 
 
 
181 
close quarters, the poor wretches were reduced to the appearance of 
brutes, and since their food and everything pertaining to their other 
needs was all so foully commingled, a stench so terrible assailed an-
yone who drew near it that it could scarcely be endured.”16 
 
An important variable in assessing the deprivations inherent to a particular prison 
is the nature of the relationship between inmates. How much and what sort of 
access do inmates have to one another, for better or for worse? In the Tullianum 
and the Gitarama Prison, the relationship between the inmates is perverse, marked 
by extraordinarily close physical proximity. The horror of these facilities derives, 
in large part, from being forced to live and breathe so close to other people and 
their bodies. The lack of access to more than a few feet of personal space, when 
combined with the lack of sanitation and nutrition, generates a nearly unending list 
of further deprivations. One would be deprived, almost completely, of access to 
quiet, friends, family, medical care, entertainment, consensual or private sex, clean 
water, fresh air, and so forth. In the “doings” and “beings” language of the capa-
bility approach, it would be extremely difficult, if not entirely impossible, as a result 
of these deprivations, to do or be much of anything of value (e.g. to be healthy, to 
make art, to be happy, etc.), let alone to maintain a sense of calm and composure. 
Indeed, these are places of suffering, perhaps in every single moment of confine-
ment. And while we can only speculate as to the severity of that suffering, 
confinement in either facility would surely risk, to some significant degree, the suf-
fusive panic which is constitutive of torture, as discussed in the prior chapter. 
Indeed, the jailers’ urging of Perseus to commit suicide relies on the dungeon gen-
erating a literally overwhelming disutility, where one is motivated to do anything 
to end the experience, even kill himself. 
 
 
                                               
16 Id. 
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Step 2: Solitary Confinement 
(2) Inspired by the works of John Howard, two acts of Parliament allowed 
for the building of the Pentonville “penitentiary,” which opened in 1842 on the 
Caledonian Road in north London.17 It housed 450 male inmates in solitary cells 
of 7.5 ft x 13.5 ft.18 I will recreate the mid-19th Century daily schedule at the Pen-
tonville, following Michael Ignatieff’s description in A Just Measure of Pain:19 
5:30 AM: A bell rings for wake-up. 
6:00 – 7:30 AM: You work in your cell at a cobbler’s bench or loom. 
7:30 AM: Breakfast of cocoa and a piece of bread is served through a 
trapdoor in your cell. 
7:50 AM: You put on a spade-shaped mask with holes for your eyes, to 
prevent recognition of friends and accomplices. 
7:50 AM – 8:00 AM: You are led to the chapel, where you sit in a boxlike 
compartment that prevents viewing other inmates. 
8:00 AM – 8:30 AM: Chapel service. 
8:30 AM – 9:00 AM: You are marched to the yard and placed in walled, 
small area. You march around in time shouted out by the warder. 
9:00 AM – 9:10 AM: You are marched back to your cell. 
9:10 AM – 12:00 PM: You work in your cell at a cobbler’s bench or loom. 
12:00 PM – 2:00 PM: Lunch of gruel is served. Time allotted for rest, con-
templation, and bible study. 
2:00 PM – 6:00 PM: You work in your cell at a cobbler’s bench or loom. 
6:00 – 9:00 PM: Dinner of stew, and sometimes cheese and onion, is served. 
Time allotted for rest, contemplation, and bible study. 
9:00 PM: Lights out. 
 
This schedule means that inmates spent approximately 23 hours a day in their cell, 
working for about 8.5 of those hours. The Pentonville allowed inmates one visit 
every six months, in a compartment divided in two by a screen and only big enough 
for two people.20 The visit could last for 15 minutes. Inmates could write and re-
ceive one letter every six months.21 Communication of any form between inmates 
                                               
17 Michael Ignatieff, A Just Measure of Pain: The Penitentiary in the Industrial Revolution, 1750-1850 (New 
York: Pantheon Books, 1978), 3. 
18 Id. at 4. 
19 Id. at 3-14. 
20 Id. at 7. 
21 Id. 
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was forbidden, and one could be sent to a cold, dark cell in the basement for a 
gesture, smile, or whisper. At night, the men, risking such punishment, tapped out 
the faintest of messages to each other through the walls and drainpipes.22 
(2A) The highest-security federal prison in the United States is the Admin-
istrative Maximum Facility (ADX) located in the mountains near Florence, 
Colorado. Created approximately 150 years later, it shares a number of features 
with the Pentonville. While the Pentonville had 450 solitary cells at 7.5 ft x 13.5 ft, 
the ADX Florence has 490 at 7 ft x 12 ft.23 Travis Dusenbury was sent to the ADX 
Florence after assaulting a prison guard in a Florida federal prison in 2005. He 
described his 10 years in the “supermax” facility after his release in 2015.24 Every-
thing in the cell is made out of concrete: walls, floor, desk, sink, even the bed frame. 
The exterior door is solid, preventing prisoners from seeing one another. He could 
not see the sky from his narrow, 4 in x 3 ft cell window.25 The windows are de-
signed so inmates do not know where they are housed in the complex.26 In 
California’s Pelican Bay State Prison, by comparison, the approximately 1,000 in-
mates in solitary confinement live in 7.6 ft x 11.6 ft cells without any windows at 
all, sometimes for decades.27 Five days a week, in parallel to conditions at the 
                                               
22 Id. at 9. A memorable fictional account of inmates in solitary confinement tapping out messages to 
each other through drainpipes is in Arthur Koestler, Darkness at Noon, trans. Daphne Hardy (London: 
Vintage Books, 1940). 
23 Catherine Tsai, “Prison Guards Say Supermax is Understaffed,” The Associated Press, November 7, 
2006. 
24 Eli Hager, “My Life in the Supermax,” The Marshall Project, January 8, 2016, https://www.themar-
shallproject.org/2016/01/08/my-life-in-the-supermax#.8fazd2Yje;  
see also Admission and Orientation Handbook, US Penitentiary Administrative Maximum Facility, Florence, 
Colorado (Department of Justice, November 2008), https://www.bop.gov/locations/institu-
tions/flm/FLM_aohandbook. 
25 Mark Binelli, “Inside America’s Toughest Prison,” The New York Times, March 26, 2015. 
26 Robert Windrem, “Worse than Guantanamo? Terror Suspects Face Infamous Colorado Supermax,” 
NBC News, April 19, 2016, https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/new-prison-would-be-safer-
harsher-much-colder-guantanamo-n542741 
27 Solitary confinement at Pelican Bay is designed to minimize human interaction. Cell doors open 
electronically and corrections officers communicate with inmates through an intercom. In 2012, there 
were 308 inmates who had been living in solitary confinement at Pelican Bay for more than a decade. 
Erica Goode, “Solitary Confinement: Punished for Life,” The New York Times, August 3, 2015. 
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Pentonville, Dusenbury spent 22 to 23 hours a day alone in his room, with one to 
two hours outside in an individual, fortified cage, though sometimes they cancelled 
this outside activity without explanation.28 There are also indoor “gyms,” window-
less cells containing chin-up bars that inmates can access alone.29 Prisoners are 
allowed a maximum of 10 hours of exercise a week outside their cell, between the 
“gym” and the outdoor cage.30 In distinction to the Pentonville, there is no work 
requirement at the ADX Florence. Inside his cell he had access to reading materi-
als, a radio, pen, and paper.  The lack of television indicates that Dusenbury was 
housed in the H-Unit, where inmates are under certain “Special Administrative 
Measures.”31 Most cells outside of the H-Unit have black-and-white televisions 
with limited programming; news shows are not permitted.32 Dusenbury’s pen was 
small and floppy, to prevent turning it into a weapon, and was therefore useless as 
a writing utensil.33 Meals enter through door slots.34 Any contact with guards, psy-
chiatrists, or clergy occurs through these slots, as well.35 Amnesty International 
reported that prisoners at the ADX Florence “routinely go days with only a few 
words spoken to them.”36 Dusenbury writes:   
“The one thing I would have liked to be able to do was sleep. But I 
had this monstrous insomnia. I just couldn’t sleep. I’d lie there all 
night…not being able to sleep, and by the end I had this sleep dep-
rivation that was absolutely monstrous. The cell just became my 
world and I couldn’t get out of it, not even into sleep…  
 
                                               
28 Hager, “My Life in the Supermax,” supra note 24. 
29 Windrem, “Worse than Guantanamo?” supra note 26. 
30 Binelli, “Inside America’s Toughest Prison,” supra note 25. 
31 Windrem, “Worse than Guantanamo?” supra note 26; see also Charles Montaldo, “Maximum Security 
Federal Prison: ADX Supermax,” ThoughtCo, April 5, 2008, https://www.thoughtco.com/adx-super-
max-overview-972970 (describing the differences between the six units within the prison). 
32 Windrem, “Worse than Guantanamo?” supra note 26. 
33 Hager, “My Life in the Supermax,” supra note 24. 
34 Windrem, “Worse than Guantanamo?” supra note 26. 
35 Binelli, “Inside America’s Toughest Prison,” supra note 25. 
36 Amnesty International, “USA: Prisoners held in extreme solitary confinement in breach of interna-
tional law,” July 16, 2004, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2014/07/usa-prisoners-held-
extreme-solitary-confinement-breach-international-law/ 
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It’s so claustrophobic in there. I know claustrophobia is a condition, 
but I think that place was claustrophobic. It got to the point where 
absolutely anything that changed, like if I saw snow falling outside, 
was what allowed me to survive.”37 
 
Dusenbury described the limited opportunities for communicating with 
other inmates: when they were moved to another unit together, when one was 
cleaning another’s cell as an assigned “orderly,” and when their recreational times 
matched up and they were in adjacent cages outside.38 The cages are similar to the 
individual walled areas on the Pentonville’s grounds. Sometimes, Dusenbury con-
tinues, he would yell as loud as he could down the unit until someone would yell 
back. In parallel to the Pentonville prisoners tapping out messages on the pipes, 
Dusenbury explains that it was sometimes possible to talk to people in adjacent 
cells, if the piping lined up, by speaking through a toilet paper roll held over a 
drain.39 While these were the limits of oral communication, the closest physical 
contact was “finger handshakes” through the fencing in adjacent outdoor cages.40 
Inmates at the ADX Florence are allowed five monthly “social visits” (as opposed 
to “attorney visits”) with up to five people per visit, from a list of 20 people ap-
proved after investigation, with a maximum of 7 hours per visit.41 Contact is not 
permitted during the visits.42 Prisoners in the H-Unit are only allowed visits from 
their immediate family and attorneys.43 If any inmate misbehaves he can be sent to 
                                               
37 Hager, “My Life in the Supermax,” supra note 24. 
38 Id. 
39 Id.  
40 Id.  
41 Visiting Procedures, Administrative Maximum Facility, Florence, Colorado (U.S. Department of 
Justice, May 7, 2014), https://www.bop.gov/locations/institutions/flm/FLM_visit_hours.pdf; Craig 
Haney, a social psychologist who has researched inmates held in long-term solitary confinement in 
California’s Pelican Bay State Prison reported that some inmates had not a had a single visitor during 
their sometimes decades-long sentences. “I got a 15-minute phone call when my father died,” said an 
inmate who had been isolated for 24 years to a reporter covering conditions in the facility. “I realized 
I have family I don’t really know anymore, or even their voices.” Goode, “Solitary Confinement,” 
supra note 27. 
42 Visiting Procedures, ADX Florence, supra note 41. 
43 Windrem, “Worse than Guantanamo?” supra note 26. 
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the Z-Unit, which contains darkened, sound-proofed cells, and at least the possi-
bility of being strapped down to a bed.44  
Whereas the Gitarama and the Tullianum inflict the extreme absence of pri-
vacy, the solitary confinement of the Pentonville and the ADX Florence inflict its 
extreme presence.  Whereas the former are filthy and loud, the latter are sterile and 
silent. Solitary confinement radically separates an inmate from other human beings. 
In this way, for as long as it lasts, it cleanses an inmate of the risks associated with 
contact with other people; unlike the Gitarama and the Tullianum, for instance, it 
represents no inherent risk to inmate’s bodily health. But at the same time, of 
course, solitary confinement removes the opportunities afforded by contact with 
others. Solitary confinement, that is, deprives an inmate of access to the function-
ings that he can only realize in concert with, or in the presence of, other people—
most of the valuable functionings in existence, undoubtedly, which I will discuss 
further below.45  
But what of those valuable activities or states of beings that an individual 
can realize alone, such as enjoying peace and quiet, or engaging in personal con-
templation or meditation, of which the Gitarama and Tullianum surely deprive their 
                                               
44 Id. 
45 In addition to being tortured by agents of the Argentinian junta, as discussed in the prior chapter, 
Jacobo Timerman was held in solitary confinement for extended periods. The openings in the cell 
doors were only big enough to risk punishment by looking out with one eye. Timerman expresses the 
need for human contact generated by solitary confinement, writing of a night in which he believes he 
and another inmate were looking at each other: 
 
“And now I must talk about you, about that long night we spent together, during 
which you were my brother, my father, my son, my friend. Or, are you a woman? If 
so, we passed that night as lovers. You were merely an eye, yet you too remember 
that night, don’t you?…You must remember, I need you to remember, for otherwise 
I’m obliged to remember for us both, and the beauty we experienced requires your 
testimony as well. You blinked. I clearly recall you blinking.”  
 
Jacobo Timerman, Prisoner Without a Name, Cell Without a Number (Weidenfeld and Nicolson: London 
1981), 5-6.   
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inmates of to some very high degree? Richard Lovelace, from inside the Gatehouse 
Prison in 1642, writes of such inherently “personal” functionings:  
“Stone walls do not a Prison make, 
    Nor I’ron bars a Cage;  
Mindes innocent and quiet take 
    That for an Hermitage;  
If I have freedome in my Love  
    And in my soule am free, 
Angels alone that soar above,  
    Enjoy such Libertie.”46  
 
Oscar Wilde echoes Lovelace: “After all, even in prison, a man can be quite free. 
His soul can be free. His personality can be untroubled. He can be at peace.”47 It 
would seem, in theory, that solitary confinement would afford an inmate unmiti-
gated access to such valuable functionings. Indeed, John Howard envisioned the 
Pentonville as an aggressive church of sorts, a place uniquely fertile for the realiza-
tion of such introspective goods, and of reformative penitence (i.e. a literal 
“penitentiary”). On his view, only by removing an offender from his chaotic and 
depraved social reality to a place of faith, diligence, and repose, could an offender 
reform his habits and character, and then return to society restored and responsi-
ble. Ignatieff explains that Howard’s spiritual concern to save inmates’ souls was 
closely associated with a materialist worldview, ascendant at the time, which main-
tained that a person comes into being as a tabula rasa, with his ideas formed entirely 
by external sensory inputs.48 The idea of the penitentiary, then, was to re-engineer 
inmates, as it were, by controlling and limiting their sensory inputs, with their 
minds ultimately reflecting the rigid order and rationality of their daily prison 
schedule. 
                                               
46 Richard Lovelace, “To Althea, From Prison,” in The Poems of Richard Lovelace (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1953), 78-9. 
47 Oscar Wilde, The Soul of Man and Prison Writings, ed. Isobel Murray (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1990), 11. 
48 Ignatieff, A Just Measure of Pain, supra note 17 at 67-70.  
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Solitary confinement, as it turns out, does alter the psychologies of inmates, 
but not in the salutary way envisioned by Howard. Howard’s rehabilitative vision 
emerges as ironical and farcical, and ultimately cruel, as the infliction of extreme 
peace and quiet tends to bring about anxiety and madness.49 Back in 1890 the US 
Supreme Court outlawed the use of solitary confinement on Colorado’s death row, 
recognizing its psychiatric risks, and holding that it was too cruel even for people 
sentenced to death: 
“This matter of solitary confinement is not…a mere unimportant 
regulation as to the safe-keeping of the prisoner…A considerable 
number of the prisoners fell, after even a short confinement, into a 
semi-fatuous condition, from which it was next to impossible to 
arouse them, and others became violently insane; others, still, com-
mitted suicide; while those who stood the ordeal better were not 
generally reformed, and in most cases did not recover sufficient 
mental activity to be of any subsequent service to the community.”50 
 
Stuart Grassian, a psychiatrist on the faculty of the Harvard Medical School, eval-
uated over two hundred prisoners in solitary confinement in various state and 
federal penitentiaries in the US.51 Among other symptoms, he found that more 
than half of the prisoners reported a progressive inability to tolerate ordinary stim-
uli, like the clanking of a cell door; almost a third experienced auditory 
hallucinations, often in whispers and saying frightening things; over half 
                                               
49 This was clear even in Howard’s time. Every year at the Pentonville, between five and fifteen men 
were taken away to the asylum. Id. at 9. From 1842-48, offenders were meant to spend 18 months in 
solitary confinement at the Pentonville, after which they would be “cured” and ideally sent to Australia. 
After evidence of the mental damage it inflicted on offenders, the period was reduced to 12 months 
from 1848-52, and thereafter to 9 months. By comparison, offenders were meant to serve out their 
entire sentences in solitary confinement in the Cherry Hill prison in Philadelphia, another mid-18th 
Century experiment in solitary confinement. Id. at 222 note 4; Phillip Collins, Dickens and Crime, 3d ed. 
(London: MacMillan, 1994), 143-45. For a fictional account of the mental illness induced by solitary 
confinement, see Charles Dickens’ portrayal of Dr. Manette in A Tale of Two Cities [1859] (London: 
Penguin Books, 2000) and that of Mr. Dorrit and his children in Little Dorrit [1857] (London: Penguin 
Books, 1998). For careful discussion of both Dickens and the history of the Pentonville and Cherry 
Hill, see Collins, id. at 117-63. 
50 In re Medley, 134 U.S. 160, 167-68 (1890). 
51 Stuart Grassian, “Psychiatric Effects of Solitary Confinement,” Washington University Journal of Law 
and Policy 22 (2006): 325-83. 
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experienced severe panic attacks; almost half reported the emergence of entirely 
unwelcome and uncontrollable revenge fantasies with regard to prison guards; and 
almost half reported paranoid and persecutory fears.52 He concludes that solitary 
confinement causes a discreet syndrome with characteristic symptoms—one that 
is “strikingly unique” by comparison to other psychiatric illnesses.53 In the beings 
and doing language of the capabilities approach, then, we can say that solitary con-
finement, to some significant degree, risks depriving an inmate of the capacity to be 
mentally healthy, or to be sane. Solitary confinement, that is, not only deprives an 
inmate of access to valuable interpersonal, social functionings, but also to a very 
significant degree risks depriving him of access to any of the valuable “personal” 
functionings that he might realize alone. 
Step 3: Medium Security 
(3) Michael Romero, convicted of five bank robberies in the San Diego 
area, described in November 2012 his daily life in the San Quinten State Prison in 
Marin County, California on the north side of the San Francisco Bay.54 Founded 
in 1852, San Quinten is the oldest prison in California.55 The facility provides a 
range of confinement: minimum and medium security general populations, the 
state’s only death row population, and a “Reception Center” that serves prisons in 
17 counties in the greater Bay Area.56 From his description, Romero is in the me-
dium-security general population. He is confined to a cellblock of 120 prisoners. 
From his cellblock, he can move to the courtyard, the mess hall, work areas, and 
                                               
52 Id. at 335-36. Chronic loneliness, from solitary confinement or otherwise, is also associated with an 
array of risks to bodily (and not merely psychological) health. See John T. Cacioppo and William Pat-
rick, Loneliness: Human Nature and the Need for Social Connection (New York: W.W. Norton, 2008). 
53 Grassian, “Psychiatric Effects of Solitary Confinement,” supra note 51 at 337. 
54 Michael Romero, “A Day in the Life of a Prisoner,” Pen America (pen.org), November 16, 2012, 
https://pen.org/a-day-in-the-life-of-a-prisoner/ 
55 Don Chaddock, “Unlocked History: Explore San Quinten, the State’s Oldest Prison,” Insider CDCR, 
December 4, 2014, https://www.insidecdcr.ca.gov/2014/12/unlocking-history-explore-san-quentin-
the-states-oldest-prison/ 
56 California State Auditor, California Department of Corrections: Its Plans to Build a New Condemned-Inmate 
Complex at San Quentin are Proceeding, but its Analysis of Alternate Locations and Costs was Incomplete (Sacra-
mento: California State Auditor, 2004), 7. 
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the visitor center. Movements from one area to another are only allowed hourly in 
ten-minute intervals. Except for meals, anyone leaving the cellblock must get a 
pass signed by a guard. Romero’s cell is approximately 6 ft x 12 ft. It was built for 
one person, but, given the overcrowding in California’s state prison system, he has 
a cellmate (who was also convicted of bank robbery, in Los Angeles).57 At the time 
of Romero’s writing, the prison had 3,943 inmates, but a design capacity of 3,082.58 
In his cell there is a wooden double bunk, a large, barred window looking outside, 
and a metal door with a narrow 3 in x 18 in window. Breakfast is at 6:00 AM, lunch 
at 12:00 PM, and supper at 5:00 PM. Everyone who is able to work must, with 
payment topping out at $3.10/hour, according to Romero.59 There is some choice 
in terms of one’s employment. Romero usually skips breakfast, rising around 7:00 
AM. He works for about an hour and a half tending to the grounds outside his 
cellblock, raking out footprints and caring for the sparse foliage. By comparison, 
James “JC” Cavitt, another San Quinten inmate, works from 8:00 AM – 2:00 PM 
in the prison’s general maintenance shop as a metal fabricator and welder (at 32 
cents/hour).60 Romero describes the scene before lunch, hinting at the threat of 
violence inside the prison:61 
“Some twenty cons are gathered in the dayroom now, waiting for 
lunch. The talk is of two recent stabbings here and other assorted 
                                               
57 The Supreme Court, in Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493 (2011), held that overcrowding in California state 
prisons constituted “cruel and unusual” punishment.  
58 This was down from 5,984 inmates in January 2003. Monthly Total Population Report, California 
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, https://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Reports_Research/Of-
fender_Information_Services_Branch/Monthly/Monthly_Tpop1a_Archive.html 
59 Romero, “A Day in the Life of a Prisoner,” supra note 54. According to available data, the average 
minimum wage for work in state prisons in the US is 86 cents/hour and the average maximum is 
$3.45/hour. Wendy Sawyer, “How much do incarcerated people earn in each state?” Prison Policy Initi-
ative, April 10, 2017, https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2017/04/10/wages/. With few exceptions, 
regular prison jobs are unpaid in Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, and Texas. Id. 
60 James “JC” Cavitt, “What is a Typical Inmate Day like in San Quinten? What’s the Schedule?” 
Huffington Post, March 2, 2012, https://www.huffingtonpost.com/quora/what-is-a-typical-in-
mate_b_1315012.html 
61 See Nancy Wolff and Jingh Shi, “Contextualization of Physical and Sexual Assault in Male Prisons: 
Incidents and their Aftermath,” Journal of Correctional Health 15 (2009): 58-82 (reporting, based on a 
random sample of 6,964 male inmates in US prisons, that 21% of were assaulted during a 6-month 
period and estimating the prevalence of sexual assault at between 2-5%). 
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mayhem. Boredom seems to breed talk of violence. Our dialogs 
continually drift toward violent acts and monstrous deeds. So much 
so that the talk becomes a form of monotony in itself. Many con-
victs become steeped in that way of thinking and completely lose 
their sense of humor. When they attempt to smile, their mouths are 
as rigid as the coin return on the Coke machine. Many guards suffer 
from that syndrome, too.”62 
 
Lunch in the mess hall is crowded and noisy, and food quality has improved some-
what after a one-meal strike, Romero explains.63 Romero eats quickly. Guards 
watch him eat. They are close by throughout Romero’s day, and though they are 
usually within earshot of inmates’ conversations, they rarely participate.64 After 
lunch, Romero heads out to the courtyard, where various athletic activities are 
available. “It’s the place where we play,” Romero writes, “shaking off the dust, 
disease, and gloom of the cage.”65 The yard is regularly closed, though, for security 
reasons during deliveries, for instance, and sometimes without explanation. As-
suming they are let outside, inmates are recalled to their cells at 3:45 PM for a 
“standing” count at 4:00 PM. They then wait about an hour for supper. Inmates 
are allowed one 15-minute collect call per evening, though they must make an ap-
pointment a day in advance. Romero is locked in his cell with his cellmate at 10:00 
PM. Recreational drugs are available—“not enough for a habit, but enough to take 
the edge off a bit.”66 While Romero does not mention rehabilitative programs, 
Cavitt writes that he spends two hours before and after dinner in self-help groups 
and college classes.67 Inmates in the general population may receive “contact visits” 
on Saturday and Sunday from 7:30 AM to 2:30 PM.68 That means that they may sit 
                                               
62 Romero, “A Day in the Life of a Prisoner,” supra note 54. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
67 Cavitt, “What is a Typical Inmate Day like in San Quinten?” supra note 60. 
68 Visiting a Friend or Loved One in Prison, California Department of Corrections Manual, 
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/visitors/docs/inmatevisitingguidelines.pdf 
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with their visitors, embrace and kiss at the beginning and end of the visit, and hold 
hands during the visit.69  
The medium-security section at San Quinten represents a significant reduc-
tion in the level of deprivation by comparison to the four facilities considered 
above. For starters, unlike the Gitarama and the Tullianum, the risk of a literally 
overwhelming suffering does not seem immediate; to hand Romero a sword and a 
noose and encourage him to commit suicide would not be of the same moment as 
it likely was for Perseus. San Quinten, that is, does not in short order force a person 
to the extreme of human misery. Nor does it represent any obvious risk to an 
inmate’s bodily health. Nor does it seem to represent an immediate risk to an in-
mate’s basic mental stability, though Romero implies that living there tends to 
harden one’s mentality.70 We might say, at a minimum, that placing someone inside 
San Quinten makes being happy or light-hearted or contented or joyful extremely chal-
lenging.71 
By comparison to the four facilities considered above, Romero and Cavitt 
have greater access to space and to other people. They have some freedom to move 
around the facility—around their cellblock, the yard, the mess hall, and their work 
areas—though only for specific reasons, and within limited periods. By compari-
son to the four facilities, there are also a number of people to talk to and interact 
with in a potentially meaningful manner.  We can assume, for instance, that the 
possibility of forming and maintaining a genuine friendship exists to some 
                                               
69 Id. 
70 For discussion on the mental health aspects of incarceration, see generally Seena Fazel, et. al. “The 
mental health of prisoners: a review of prevalence, adverse outcomes and interventions,” Lancet Psy-
chiatry 9 (2016): 871–881; Cherie Armour, “Mental Health in Prison: A Trauma Perspective on 
Importation and Deprivation,” International Journal of Criminology and Sociological Theory  5 (2012): 886-
894. 
71 We should be careful to appreciate the difference between such a medium-security facility and soli-
tary confinement in terms of the mental health risks. Craig Haney, a social psychologist who researched 
inmates at Pelican Bay State Prison, found that while 63 percent of those in solitary confinement for 
more than 10 years said they felt close to an “impending breakdown,” only 4 percent of those inter-
viewed in the maximum-security, non-solitary population reported such feelings. Goode, “Solitary 
Confinement,” supra note 27.  
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significant degree, unlike at the other facilities. Romero mentions having long con-
versations with his cellmate.72 Of course, with the exception of visiting hours, San 
Quinten inmates only have the opportunity to interact with other San Quinten 
inmates—and usually only a small subset of them—and to some artificial degree 
with the guards working at the facility. Additionally, these interactions are further 
constrained by the fact that they occur generally under human and video surveil-
lance. 
What does a term of imprisonment in a particular facility deprive an inmate 
of? The most relevant comparison in considering this issue is not, of course, how 
his access to valuable goods and activities compares to that of inmates at the ab-
solutely worst prisons, but rather how it compares to his prior access outside of 
prison. As we sentence him to a punishment we might ask ourselves: What does 
he have now, in terms of access to valuable goods or activities, that we are taking 
away from him? Again, this question is easy when we are talking about fines, where 
the state reduces, and only reduces, and offender’s access to money. When consid-
ering the medium-security San Quinten facility from this perspective, the list of 
day-to-day deprivations is limited only by one’s imagination (e.g. one cannot eat in 
a restaurant, go to a movie theater, start a business, talk with people not on the 
approved visitor list, etc.). Nonetheless, the comparison with “extreme” prisons is 
important for the purpose of isolating variables, and for understanding with at least 
some clarity what is and is not at issue in considering the deprivations inherent to 
a putatively “normal,” non-degrading prison when considered day-to-day—or 
when considered over longer periods of time. Whereas “extreme” prisons hurt, 
perhaps in every single moment, the injury of a sentence to a “normal” prison is 
subtler, and less phenomenological, as I discuss further below. Let us consider two 
further, yet more mild forms of contemporary confinement. 
 
                                               
72 Romero, “A Day in the Life of a Prisoner,” supra note 54. 
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Step 4: Minimum Security 
(4) Matthew Kluger, a lawyer convicted in US federal court in 2012 of in-
sider trading, described his life inside Federal Correctional Institution (FCI) 
Morgantown, a minimum-security federal prison in West Virginia.73 It is an all-
male facility built for approximately 1,300 inmates.74 While each inmate is required 
to work, more people are assigned to each task than necessary, Kluger explains. 
Kluger helps to serve breakfast and lunch in the dining room. He wakes at 5:30 
AM to help with breakfast, but his duties entail at most 20 minutes of wiping down 
a counter before returning to his cell. Lunch requires about an hour of work. He 
is free for the day from 11:30 AM.75 Options for spending his free time include a 
library, where he often helps people with legal work for an hour or two, a track, a 
form of paddle tennis, a gym with scheduled activities like spin classes, religious 
services, television in communal rooms, musical instruments, cards, and board 
games.76 There are also group athletic activities, including a softball league. “The 
daily life is not that bad,” Kluger says.77  
Kluger needs to be by his cell bunk at 4:00 PM and 9:00 PM for a count. 
There is no fence around the facilities and no guards posted outside. Inmates 
sometimes sneak away to a local store to purchase cigarettes to resell inside for 
profit inside. Once a week, inmates can purchase goods from a store, including 
hygiene items, packaged foods, and clothes to wear inside the prison (though, they 
must wear the prison uniform when interacting with visitors).  The main form of 
currency inside the facility, Kluger explains, is canned mackerel purchased from 
the store. Inmates can also purchase unlimited email access and up to 300 minutes 
                                               
73 Daniel Roberts, “Life Behind Bars: Matthew Kluger reveals all,” Fortune Magazine, July 7, 2014, 
http://fortune.com/2014/07/07/matthew-kluger-talks/ 
74 FCI Morgantown West Virginia, Admissions and Orientation Handbook 2016, 
https://www.bop.gov/locations/institutions/mrg/MRG_aohandbook.pdf 
75 Roberts, “Life Behind Bars,” supra note 73. 
76 FCI Morgantown, Handbook, supra note 74 at 19. 
77 Roberts, “Life Behind Bars,” supra note 73. 
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of phone calls a month. However, they are limited to $300 for all purchases each 
month. Bathrooms are communal with private showers with curtains. Kluger re-
marks, though, on the general lack of private spaces in the prison. New admissions 
usually live in open dormitory-style areas or semi-private cubicles before private 
double rooms become available.78 Kluger stated that the mattresses were thin, with 
no springs. He said he does not worry about physical or sexual violence.79 Emails 
are monitored and Kluger was sent to the Special Housing Unit (SHU) for eight 
weeks as punishment for emailing a corrections officer he had befriended at the 
medium-security facility the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) had placed him at 
initially. Such communication between inmates and officers is against BOP rules, 
which the prior facility enforced less rigorously, according to Kluger. Kluger was 
locked in a cold, small room with another inmate, and given food through a slot. 
The bathroom was in the room and he was let out to shower three days a week; 
whether he was let out otherwise is unclear.   
Visiting hours are on Friday, Saturday, Sunday, and Federal Holidays.80 
Members of the immediate family may be placed on the visiting list, but others will 
be included only pending investigation.81 Contact, according to the prison manual, 
is limited to one hug and kiss at the start and end of a visit.82 Any limitations on 
monthly visitor hours is unclear from Kluger’s interview and the prison’s visitor 
manual. BOP policy is that federal inmates are entitled to at least four hours of 
visitation a month, with possibility of more based upon the Warden’s discretion.83 
But we saw above that even at the ADX Florence inmates were granted the 
                                               
78 FCI Morgantown, Handbook, supra note 74. 
79 Inmates are selected for minimum security facilities in large part due to their low risk of violence. 
See U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Prisons, Program Statement P5100.08 (Sept. 2006) (setting 
forth procedures for determining whether to send offenders to minimum, low, medium, or high secu-
rity facilities). 
80 FCI Morgantown, Handbook, supra note 74 at 51. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. at 52. 
83 Federal Bureau of Prisons, General Visiting Information, https://www.bop.gov/inmates/visit-
ing.jsp 
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possibility of more than the four-hour minimum. Conjugal visits are not allowed 
for federal prisoners in the US.84 
The level of deprivation at the FCI Morgantown is yet less severe than that 
experienced by Romero and Cavitt at San Quinten, to say nothing of the other 
facilities considered above. Kluger has free reign of almost the entire facility during 
the day. Unlike Romero and Cavitt, he need not wait for special 10-minute inter-
vals, or a signed pass from a guard, to move between approved areas. Related, 
Kluger has access to significantly more recreational activities than Romero and 
Cavitt. He does not have to share a cell built for one. He has greater daily access 
to more people, and with less of a threat of violence than is present within San 
Quinten, consistent with the facility’s minimum-security status. Though, for 
Kluger as well, the population that he might interact with—again, with the excep-
tion of visiting hours—consists of other inmates and to a limited degree with the 
guards. As we see with Kluger’s punishment for emailing a guard, interactions with 
guards are limited as a formal, legal matter. Kluger highlights the importance of 
the fact that he is limited to interacting with other inmates.   
“[Y]ou know what, if this were filled with 1,100 people that you want 
to hang out with, this would be a fine place to be. Unfortunately it’s 
not. So, the biggest problem is other people. It’s being with this di-
verse crowd of people who are generally angry, somewhat antisocial, 
not the kinds of people that you want to spend your time with in the 
outside world. So that makes it hard.”85 
 
Kluger mentions two other issues relevant for considering the deprivations 
of imprisonment. First, he discusses what we might call the “dignitarian” depriva-
tions of prison, where one is denied the symbolic respect, as defined in the previous 
chapter, that he might expect to receive on the outside.86 
                                               
84 A handful of states permit conjugal visits for certain prisoners. See Christopher Hensley, Sandra 
Rutland, and Phyllis Gray, “Conjugal Visitation Programs: The Logical Conclusion,” in ed. Christo-
pher Hensley, Prison Sex: Practice and Policy (Boulder: Lynne Reinner, 2002), 143-57. 
85 Roberts, “Life Behind Bars,” supra note 73. 
86 See Chapter 2 at 146-48. 
 
 
 
 
197 
“[W]hat I would say is probably the hardest thing to get used to is 
that you’re just going to be a number. And that, by virtue of the fact 
that he got a federal job, someone who you probably don’t have a 
whole lot of respect for is going to tell you to mop the floor. You 
just have to shut up and mop the floor.”87 
 
Other “dignitarian” deprivations relate to the fact that inmates are treated to a 
significant degree like children, closely monitored and presented with an artificial 
array of choices for activities.88 The human dignity ideal—of an adult standing tall, 
freely and confidently determining his or her own existence, and looking other people 
in the eye as a social equal—is surely difficult to realize within any prison.89 Though, 
this consideration is a matter of degree, as well, and the dignity ideal is likely further 
difficult to realize in San Quinten (again, to say nothing of the other facilities), 
where, among other considerations, inmates are presumed to have less self-control 
than those in FCI Morgantown, as evidenced by the facility’s external walls and 
the greater presence of guards. 
Second, and finally, Kluger comments, interestingly, on the benefits of day-
to-day incarceration at the FCI Morgantown (as opposed to its deprivations).  
“There are frustrations, but I think for white-collar people, there’s 
also absence of frustrations. I don’t pay bills. I don’t deal with traffic. 
I don’t have a lot of the same commitments that I had on the out-
side. So life is much less stressful in a lot of ways. And it’s a bad 
thing to say that it’s kind of like a spa experience, but in some ways 
it is.”90 
                                               
87 Roberts, “Life Behind Bars,” supra note 73. 
88 See Jeremy Waldron, “Inhuman and Degrading Treatment: The Words Themselves,” Canadian Jour-
nal of Law & Jurisprudence 23 (2010): 269-286, at 282 (arguing that “infantilization,” the process of 
treating an adult like an infant, is one of the four species of indignity and degradation). 
89 See Jeremy Waldron, Dignity, Rank, and Right, ed. Meir Dan-Cohen (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2012), 21-22 (discussing the “moral orthopedics of human dignity,” the connection between having 
dignity and “uprightness of bearing.”); Philip Pettit, “Two Republican Traditions,” in eds. Andreas 
Niederberger and Philipp Schink, Republican Democracy: Liberty, Law, and Politics (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 2013), 169-204, at 173 (“[U]nder the republican vision, a citizen would be a liber or a 
free-man insofar as he enjoyed sufficient power and protection in the sphere of the basic liberties – 
and a corresponding normative status – to be able to walk tall among others and look any in the eye, 
without reason for fear or deference.”). 
90 Roberts, “Life Behind Bars,” supra note 73. 
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Of course, non-white-collar inmates would also enjoy the absence of bills to pay, 
traffic, and so forth. We should understand such benefits to represent the flip-side 
of the infantilization inherent to incarceration. What the facility provides, an in-
mate need not worry about providing for himself (nor derive any satisfaction from 
providing for himself). While Kluger is engaging in hyperbole by referring to the 
FCI Morgantown as “like a spa experience”—they do not have Special Housing 
Unit facilities for solitary confinement at most spas—what would it mean to sen-
tence someone to a literal spa for one year? For 5 years? For 15? For 30? Before 
considering the additional deprivations caused by incarceration when we add the 
variable of sentence length, let us consider one final institution, the one arguably 
more like a spa than any other prison in existence. 
Step 5: Norwegian Island 
(5) Norway’s present-day minimum-security Bastoy prison island lies a few 
miles off the coast in the Oslo fjord.91 One inmate described his life there as fol-
lows: 
“It’s like living in a village, a community. Everybody has to work. 
But we have free time so we can do some fishing, or in summer we 
can swim off the beach. We know we are prisoners but here we feel 
like people.”92 
 
The prison hosts approximately 115 inmates at a time, many of whom have been 
convicted of serious and violent crimes. (To break though the “amoral” wall for a 
moment, and consider the state’s penal purposes, inmates are selected for the Ba-
stoy based upon their commitment to and capacity for rehabilitation.93) Each hold 
                                               
91 Erwin James, “The Norwegian prison where inmates are treated like people,” The Guardian, February 
25, 2013; https://www.theguardian.com/society/2013/feb/25/norwegian-prison-inmates-treated-
like-people; John Sutter, “Welcome to the World’s Nicest Prison,” CNN.com, May 24, 2012, 
http://edition.cnn.com/2012/05/24/world/europe/norway-prison-bastoy-nicest/index.html 
92 James, “The Norwegian prison,” supra note 91. 
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the keys to his own room in either a dormitory or a house of up to six people.94 
Each house has a “house father.” There are no uniforms. One meal a day is pro-
vided in the dining hall. Inmates are expected to cook their other meals together 
in communal kitchens with food that they have grown on the island or purchased 
from the island’s mini-supermarket. In addition to a food stipend of around £70 a 
month, the men earn the equivalent of £6 a day. The working day begins at 8:30 
AM and ends at 3:30 PM. Jobs include tending to sheep, cows, and chickens, look-
ing after fruit and vegetable gardens, doing laundry, caring for the horses that pull 
the island’s carts, repairing bicycles that many prisoners purchase with their own 
money, or working ground maintenance. Only three or four guards remain on the 
island after 4:00 PM. There is a large building where weekly visits take place, in 
private family rooms. Conjugal relations are allowed. There is a church, a school, 
and a library. The “Bastoy Blues Band” was given permission to attend a music 
festival in support of the rock group, ZZ Top. A guard on the island who had 
worked there for 17 years said to a visiting journalist, “Let me tell you something. 
You know, on this island I feel safer than when I walk on the streets in Oslo.”95 
In what ways does the Bastoy prison represent a place of less deprivation 
than the FCI Morgantown? What valuable goods, activities, or states of being do 
inmates in the Bastoy have greater access to than inmates in the FCI Morgantown? 
It is a matter of interpretation, of course, and there can be no single authoritative 
list, but there are at least six considerations worth highlighting. First, it appears that 
Bastoy inmates have greater access to at least somewhat enjoyable or meaningful 
work, by comparison to Kluger’s description of nonchalantly wiping down coun-
ters in the FCI Morgantown’s dining hall. Though, it is easy to romanticize this 
issue, and it depends ultimately on the extent to which one finds seven hours of 
                                               
94 Sutter, “Welcome to the World’s Nicest Prison,” supra note 91. 
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manual labor and farming activities more enjoyable or meaningful by comparison 
to an hour or two of low-impact dining hall work. Second, it appears that Bastoy 
inmates have greater access to natural beauty, including a beach. Nussbaum argues 
that “[b]eing able to live with concern for and in relation to animals, plants, and 
the world of nature” is one of the ten “central human capabilities” essential to 
living a “truly human existence.”96 Aside from the FCI Morgantown, compare this 
to the experience of Dusenbury, who could not see the sky from his cell at the 
ADX Florence, or to the solitary inmates in Pelican Bay, who lack windows en-
tirely. Third, is the issue of privacy. A relative deprivation of privacy is inherent to 
any contemporary prison; but at the Bastoy it appears to be of a much lesser de-
gree, both with regard to the official gazing of prison guards and to the possible 
intrusions of other inmates, as evidenced by the fact that only a handful of guards 
remain on the island after 4:00 PM and by the existence of private rooms with 
personal locks. Fourth, and related, inmates have more privacy with their visitors, 
including the possibility of conjugal visits. Visits at the FCI Morgantown, by com-
parison, occur in a large public room. Fifth, it appears that inmates are treated with 
more symbolic respect by guards. The possibility of being told “to shut up and 
mop the floor” seems remote. Whether this is so because of legal rules constraining 
guards or because of the prison’s culture is unclear. Sixth, inmates have at least 
some opportunity to leave the prison during their sentence, as seen with the Bastoy 
Blues Band playing at the musical festival; though, the extent to which this oppor-
tunity remains severely limited is important, as I discuss below. 
III. The Freedom of General Association 
Robert Hood, the former warden at the ADX Florence, described the fa-
cility as “a clean version of hell.”97 If that is the case, then the Gitarama and the 
                                               
96 Nussbaum, Women and Human Development, supra note 6 at 80. 
97 Interview with CBS News, October 11, 2007, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/supermax-a-clean-
version-of-hell/ 
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dungeon at the Tullianum are something like the “normal” version. Indeed, prison, 
as we saw in the first four examples, can sometimes inflict extraordinary levels of 
deprivation, and even during relatively short-sentences. It can represent a very se-
vere risk of death, and of insanity. It can cause overwhelming physical and mental 
agony. It can make suicide a legitimate consideration. But as the other examples 
have demonstrated, prison need not be so extreme. It’s a rather variable form of 
punishment. Prison is not always hell. Sometimes, indeed, prison means playing 
softball in the hills of West Virginia, or swimming after a day of tending to a flock 
of sheep on a pleasant Norwegian island. 
A. Deprivational Essence 
What, then, is the punishment of imprisonment? What is the deprivation, 
or set of deprivations, that unite the seven institutions considered above, such that 
each inflict a punishment within the same linguistic or sociological category? The 
array of deprivations inherent to a given carceral institution will always be a matter 
of creative list making to a degree; but, as indicated above, I believe that one dep-
rivation is essential to a term of incarceration, and which must be included on all 
such lists. That is, a punishment that failed to entail this deprivation would not 
qualify as incarceration as a linguistic or sociological matter. This deprivation is the 
denial of the “freedom of general association.” What unites the seven institutions 
is their remove from the broader society. They each represent a form of quarantine, 
by severely depriving inmates of the ability to associate with other people.  
The degree to which prisons deprive inmates of the freedom of association 
will nonetheless vary, as we have seen, with the variables being how much access 
inmates have to (a) other inmates, (b) guards, (c) visitors, and (d) non-visitors. Ac-
cess to non-visitors would involve emails and other forms of internet 
communication, letters, and phone calls. While the Pentonville scores much lower 
than the Bastoy by reference to all four variables, inmates in the Bastoy are still 
profoundly deprived of meaningful access to other people in society, limited to the 
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115 men on the island, the limited number of guards, and their visitors, with whom 
they can only interact with once a week for short periods. There is also the very 
occasional opportunity to meet other people on field trips; though, we should sus-
pect that band members were not given free reign at the music festival. As 
discussed above, when we sentence someone to a punishment, to understand what 
exactly we are doing we might ask ourselves: What does he have now, in terms of 
access to valuable functionings, that we are taking away from him? Imprisonment, 
in terms of its deprivational essence and minimum, severely constrains one’s ability 
to associate with a great percentage of people in society, including every person he 
interacts with regularly outside of prison. In so doing, it severely deprives him of 
access to those functionings that he can only realize by associating freely with those 
people. 
Amy Gutmann expresses the importance—and the breadth—of the free-
dom of association. It enables people “to create and maintain intimate 
relationships of love and friendship, which are valuable for their own sake,” she 
writes, “as well as the pleasure that they offer.”98 She continues:   
“Freedom of association is increasingly essential as a means of en-
gaging in charity, commerce, industry, education, health care, 
residential life, religious practice, professional life, music and art, 
recreation and sports…By associating with one another we engage 
in camaraderie, cooperation, dialogue, deliberation, negotiation, 
competition, creativity, and the kinds of self-expression that are pos-
sible only in association with others.”99  
 
George Kateb concurs as to the intrinsically valuable nature of association: 
“There is a basic truth about almost all associative life and activity, 
a truth not confined to love and friendship. People find in associa-
tion a value in itself. The point is obvious, but it has not received 
enough judicial attention or protection. In pursuing their ends, and 
needing to associate in order to do so, people discover numerous 
                                               
98 Amy Gutmann, “Freedom of Association: An Introductory Essay,” in ed. Amy Gutmann, Freedom 
of Association (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 3-32, at 3. 
99 Id. at 4 
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sources of pleasure apart from the pleasure of success in their spe-
cific pursuits.”100 
 
Nussbaum writes that of her list of ten “central human capabilities,” those capa-
bilities which are constitutive “fully human” living, the capability of affiliation (as 
well as that of practical reason) stands out as being of “special importance,” since it 
“organize[s] and suffuse[s] all the others.”101 She writes: “To plan for one’s own 
life without being able to do so in complex forms of discourse, concern, and reci-
procity with other human beings is…to behave in an incompletely human way.”102 
Imprisonment, by separating an inmate from people in society, limits his 
ability to engage in a wide variety of valuable activities and modes of beings for as 
long as the term of confinement lasts. It limits his ability to realize the associational 
functionings that, as Gutmann, Kateb, and Nussbaum argue, are not merely in-
strumentally but also intrinsically valuable, in the sense that their realization just is 
what it means to live well or to flourish. While I am mostly concerned with inher-
ently “personal” associational functionings, like maintaining a marriage, we must 
remember, as Peter Ramsay argues, that prison also limits one’s access to more 
“political” associational functionings, which are central to democratic citizenship, 
like taking part in public debate.103 Aristotle, for one, understood political 
                                               
100 George Kateb, “The Value of Association,” in ed. Amy Gutmann, Freedom of Association (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1998), 35-63, at 36-7. 
101 Nussbaum, Women and Human Development, supra note 6 at 82. 
102 Id. 
103 Peter Ramsay, “A Democratic Theory of Imprisonment,” in eds. Albert Dzur, Ian Loaders, and 
Richard Sparks, Democratic Theory and Mass Incarceration (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 91 
(“Civil liberty is then an essential characteristic of political equality, and this explains why each and 
every act of imprisoning a citizen deprives that citizen of political equality for the duration of their 
imprisonment. At minimum, it strips the citizen of the right to move, assemble, associate, and enjoy a 
private life. While imprisonment does not deprive citizens of their nationality, or necessarily prevent 
them from exercising a right to vote or stand in elections, it does entail executive coercion that prevents 
a prisoner from participating in the political process on equal terms with other citizens.”); Peter Ramsay, 
“Voters Should Not Be in Prison! The Rights of Prisoners in a Democracy,” Critical Review of Interna-
tional Social and Political Philosophy 16 (2013): 421-38. 
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engagement to be the prime instance of virtuous practical activity and therefore to 
be constitutive of the good life—at least on some interpretations.104  
Beyond the particular—husbands and wives, parents and children, friends, 
fellow party members or parishioners, and so forth—prison also limits an inmate’s 
ability to interact and associate with the general—strangers and near-strangers. Con-
sider the immense number and diversity of new people that we come into contact 
with on a regular basis in modern society, on the street, in a café, in a work setting, 
friends-of-friends, and so forth. The opportunity to mix with new people is hugely 
valuable, most importantly as a potential source of close associates—new friends 
or colleagues or interlocuters or group members or lovers—but also for the sense 
of community and comradery that comes with “everyday” interactions, as well as 
being a great fount of entertainment and fascination. Life without a regular supply 
of strangers is impoverished, in part because it is more boring.105 
Once more, these associational deprivations—the personal and the politi-
cal, the particular and the general—need not be absolute. Depending on the 
facility, it will be possible, to some degree, to engage in some of the associational 
activities and exhibit some of the associational virtues that Gutmann mentions. 
The qualitative variation within prisons in terms of access to the internet and to 
phones106 will make a significant difference, to be sure, especially given the 
                                               
104 See Richard Kraut, Aristotle on the Human Good (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 5. 
105 There is concerted engagement in the sociological literature regarding chance interactions with the 
unfamiliar in society, including encounters between strangers. See, e.g., Lyn H. Lofland, A World of 
Strangers: Order and Action in Urban Public Space (Prospect Hills, IL: Waveland Press, 1973); Erving 
Goffman, Relations in Public: Microstudies of the Social Order (New York: Basic Books, 1971); Georg Sim-
mel, “The Metropolis and the Mental Life,” in On Individuality and Social Forms, ed. D. Levine (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1971), at 143-49; Patricia Simões Aelbrecht, “‘Fourth places’: the Con-
temporary Public Settings for Informal Social Interaction Among Strangers,” Journal of Urban Design 
21 (2016): 124-52. 
106 Many US prisons charge extortionate rates for using the phone, sometimes more than $1/minute, 
further constraining inmates’ ability to speak to family members and friends. In 2015, the Federal 
Communications Commission voted to cap intra- and inter-state call rates for state and federal inmates 
at 11 cents/minute. Telecommunications firms profiting from the high rates sued. The DC Circuit 
overturned the intra-state regulation on the grounds that the FCC lacked legal authority to regulate 
intra-state rates; as to interstate rates, the Court remanded the case to the FCC on a technical issue 
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increasing importance of online relationships.107 Also, one will certainly meet “new 
people” in prison—but generally in a context and setting that is far less conducive 
to meaningful interaction by comparison to life outside of prison. Furthermore, 
one will not be able to choose which sort of “new people” he might meet, as we 
can in free society by congregating in certain areas or places. 
We can invoke Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld’s dyadic legal relations to under-
stand the associational deprivations of prison with more precision, following 
Kimberly Brownlee’s analysis of the freedom of association simpliciter.108 An inmate 
loses the Hohfeldian “privilege”—the legal option—of forming certain associa-
tions, namely, those that require his presence outside of prison (i.e. not including 
associations that he might cultivate via the internet, phone calls, and prison vis-
its).109 Outside of prison one has the “privilege” of, say, attending religious services 
at a certain church. Once inside prison, however, he loses this privilege. We can 
conclude that he has a “no-right” to attend those services, or to form any associa-
tion that requires his presence outside of prison, as an incident of his “duty” to 
stay inside the prison and the related fact that not a single person has a “duty” to 
allow him to form such associations.110 We can also say that his presence inside 
                                               
related to determining ancillary fees. See Rates for Interstate Inmate Calling Services (“Order”), 30 FCC Rcd. 
12763, 12775–76, 12838–62 (Nov. 5, 2015), 80 Fed. Reg. 79136-01 (Dec. 18, 2015); Global Tel*Link v. 
FCC, No. 15-1461 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 
107 Thanks to Nicola Lacey for raising this point. Were we somehow to reach the stage where “online” 
society provided the immediacy, depth, and opportunities for advantage of the present-day “real 
world” society—and were prisoners afforded generally unmitigated and unmonitored access to such a 
society—then that would dramatically alter our conclusions about the injury of prison. 
108 Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, “Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reason-
ing,” Yale Law Journal 23 (1913): 16–59. See Kimberlee Brownlee, “The Freedom of Association: It’s 
Not What You Think,” Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 35 (2015): 267-82, at 268 (arguing that the freedom 
of association is more limited than the “standard liberal position” would indicate, and concluding that 
“intimate associative freedom is neither a general moral permission to associate or not as we wish nor 
a content-insensitive moral claim-right that protects us in behaving wrongly when we do so.”); “Free-
dom of Association,” in eds. Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen, Kimberly Brownlee, and David Coady, A 
Companion to Applied Philosophy (Chichester, UK; Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2016), 356-369. 
109 Hohfeld, “Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions,” supra note 108 at 32-44 (comparing “privileges” 
and “no-rights”). 
110 Id. at 32 (discussing “duties”). 
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prison severely diminishes his Hohfeldian “powers” of association, such that he 
has a general associational “disability.”111 Such “powers” endow one with the abil-
ity to alter other people’s moral and legal privileges or claims. I exercise an 
associational power when I offer to form or agree to form an association that entails 
privileges or claims (e.g. a marriage). Once inside prison, then, one loses those 
associational powers that require his outside presence. The “powers” to, say, form 
a new business partnership or a meaningful friendship with someone who resides 
outside of prison become almost impossible to exercise, such that they are at least 
de facto non-existent.  
Finally, one has a Hohfeldian “immunity” if he is free from “the legal power 
or ‘control’ of another as regards some legal relation,” and a “liability” if he is not 
so free.112 In free society people have, to a significant degree, an immunity from 
associating with people when they do not want to; there are, of course, limits—in 
public places, if one has a child (perhaps), in the context of military conscription, 
and so forth.113 Whatever the extent of this immunity outside of prison, inside of 
prison one is far less “immune” and far more “liable” to the powers of the state 
with regard to his associations. He will not choose those people with whom he will 
live, work, and eat together in close quarters, nor potentially the person or persons 
with whom he will share a cell, locked in together each night.  
B. The Freedom of Movement 
What about the freedom of movement? Is not the limitation on the free-
dom of movement also an essential deprivational component of prison, in addition 
to the denial of the freedom of general association?114 While it undoubtedly is, we 
should be careful not to fetishize the bare ability to move. Imagine that an offender 
                                               
111 See id. at 44-55 (comparing “powers” and “liabilities”). 
112 Id. at 55, 55-59 (comparing “immunities” and “disabilities”). 
113 See Brownlee, “The Freedom of Association,” supra note 108 at 271-77 (arguing that the “freedom 
to exclude” is more limited that the standard liberal view assumes). 
114 Thanks to Nicola Lacey for pressing me to clarify this point. 
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was banished, along with basic provisions for shelter and sustenance, to a vast, 
empty planet for the duration of his sentence, a planet many times bigger than 
Earth. Imagine, as well, that there are no legal restrictions on his movement on the 
planet, while the presence of non-inmates on the planet is illegal. In that scenario, 
where he loses any legal rights to move around Earth but gains the legal right to 
move around the larger penal planet, he would in fact be a net winner when it 
comes to the legal freedom of movement, having much more area in which, legally, 
he could roam. Nonetheless, such freedom would not be worth very much to him. 
In this way, the limitation on movement inherent to prison is not primarily a dep-
rivation because it limits the size of the area in which one can move. It is primarily 
a deprivation because it limits one’s access to the sources of value and flourish-
ing—most importantly, the other people—that reside within the prohibited areas. 
Nonetheless, beyond the associational deprivation, the limitation on movement 
also entails a lack of environmental diversity—with “environment” very broadly 
defined—with life limited to a series of prison buildings. Even if an inmate some-
how had normal access to people in prison—including to “new people” he might 
meet in public places or elsewhere—and in a way that was somehow equivalent to 
his access outside of prison in terms of the security of the interactions, his social 
status, the opportunities for advantage, and so forth, the fact that he could not 
leave the complex and experience other environments would surely represent an 
important deprivation in and of itself. While I will continue to focus on the asso-
ciational deprivations of prison, we ought to remain aware of what we might call 
the deprivation of environmental diversity. 
IV. Long-Term Deprivations 
 What does it mean to incorporate the variable of time into our analysis of 
prison’s deprivations? Why is it an interesting or complicated variable? Why 
doesn’t the argument work as follows? (1) Each day in prison entails a certain set 
of deprivations, the exact content of which will vary from prison-to-prison, but 
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which will always involve a severe deprivation of the freedom of association (and 
environmental diversity); (2) That set of deprivations will generate a Daily Disutil-
ity or Disvalue Level (DDL), which will incorporate not only the experience of 
boredom, loneliness, lack of satisfying work, anxiety, etc. within prison, but also 
the opportunity costs of prison. That is, it will account for the lost opportunities 
for utility or value that one would have had outside of prison; (3) To determine 
the severity of a term of imprisonment, we multiply DDL by the total days of 
confinement. So, a 100-day sentence is worth 100 DDLs and a 10,000-day sentence 
(27.4 years) is worth 10,000 DDLs, with latter being 100 times worse than the 
former. This argument, in one form or another, grounds the administration of or-
dinally “proportional” sentences in the US and England, such that—all else 
equal—an offender whose crime was 10 times “worse” than another’s ought to 
have a sentence 10 times as long.115 To understand what this gets wrong, and to 
understand what long-term incarceration does to people, we need to return to the 
discussion of human value. 
 
 
                                               
115 The US Federal Sentencing Guidelines includes a “Sentencing Table,” which is arranged along two 
axes: 43 “Offense Levels,” from 1 at the top to 43 at the bottom, which measure the culpability of the 
offense, and 6  “Criminal History Categories,” from Category I at the left to Category VI at the right, 
which measure the offender’s degree of recidivism. Within the resulting 258 boxes, the range of rec-
ommended months of incarceration increases gradually as one moves downward, increasing the 
Offense Level, or rightward, increasing the Criminal History Category. US Sentencing Guidelines 
Manual (US Sentencing Commission, 2016), ch. 5, pt. A, at 420. For instance, the “Base Offense 
Level” for “Burglary of a Residence” is 17, which for a first or second time offender (Criminal History 
Category I) means a recommendation of 24-30 months. Id. at §2B2.1, 118-19. However, the Offense 
Level for residential burglary can increase up to 8 levels, depending on the value of the property taken, 
damaged, or destroyed.  “More than $5,000” adds one level, “More than $20,000” adds another level, 
and so forth, with “More than $9,500,000” adding the full 8 levels. If the burglary involves “more than 
minimal planning” that will add 2 levels. If it involves the taking of a “firearm, destructive device, or 
controlled substance” that will add 1 level. And if the burglar possessed a “dangerous weapon (includ-
ing a firearm)” that will add 2 levels. That means a possible 13 additional levels on top of the Base 
Offense Level of 17. The resulting maximum Offense Level 30, at Criminal History Category I, entails 
a recommendation of 97-121 months; at Criminal History Category VI it is 168 to 210 months. Thus, 
the recommended range for residential burglary begins at 24 months (2 years) and then increases grad-
ually to 210 months (17.5 years). 
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A. Temporal Goods 
 As discussed in Chapter 2, humans construct and exhibit value diachroni-
cally, stitching moments together through time via the combined exercise of their 
capacities for, at least, autonomy, value recognition, memory, and imagination.116 
The concept of human flourishing, I argued, is wrapped up with this diachronic 
project. One flourishes on this Aristotelean view in the context of her good life as 
a whole. The point, once more, is not that a flourishing person will be singularly 
obsessed with “her life.” Her internal monologue need not be that of a fastidious 
“life planner.” The idea, rather, is that, unlike goldfish, we know that our past 
shapes our present and that our present shapes our future. We aren’t born com-
pletely anew each moment, or day, or year. We have the capacity, furthermore, to 
purposively act in the present to build a more valuable future, with a personal iden-
tity that retains sufficient integrity over time, such that “we” will still be there in 
the future, to some very significant degree, to reap the costs or benefits of our 
present decisions.117 Finally, and crucially, the idea is that our most valuable func-
tionings depend upon this knowledge and this capacity. Unlike goldfish, that is, we 
have the ability to work on projects, broadly conceived, that require cultivation 
over time. We can develop our personalities. We can build families. We can de-
velop expertise. We can maintain friendships. Let us refer to such functionings as 
temporal goods. The phrase “goods” should not distract us from our focus on func-
tionings; temporal goods are valuable activities and states of beings that require 
cultivation over time to realize. Let us contrast them with momentary goods, like en-
joying an ice-cream cone. These are functionings that do not require cultivation 
over time to be realized.118 To be clear, no good is entirely “momentary.” It will 
                                               
116 See Chapter 2 at 151-60. 
117 See id. at 136-37 (considering the metaphysical objection to the diachronic conception of the human 
good). 
118 See David Velleman, “Well-being and Time,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 72 (1991): 48-77 (distin-
guishing between synchronic and diachronic well-being); Chapter 2 at 156-57. 
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require some amount of time to be realized. And it will be realized within the con-
text of our overall, diachronic lives. We choose an ice-cream flavor, for instance, 
based upon years of careful experimentation. And, as argued in Chapter 2, the 
value of enjoying a momentary good depends on its connection to the pursuit of 
a good life over time. That is, a momentary good only qualifies as such insofar as 
it constitutes part of one’s broader good life; a putative momentary good, like the 
experience of ecstasy, would not qualify if it acts to drain rather than infuse one’s 
life considered as a whole with value, as might be the case with a heroin user’s ecstasy 
upon shooting up. 
But isn’t a temporal good, like maintaining a friendship or family, simply a 
number of momentary goods strung together? I think not. The ice-cream cones 
I’ve enjoyed have no meaningful relationship to each other. They each stand alone 
as momentary goods. By comparison, the moments I have enjoyed with a close 
friend are connected. They are stitched together, with the past moments governing 
the present ones, and the present ones governing the future ones. There is set of 
jokes, memories, and stories that make sense and have meaning only in the context 
of a relationship that exists through time. That is, the enjoyment that we might 
experience during an engagement with an old friend is not in fact a momentary 
good; it is a complex achievement that is connected with past and future engage-
ments. While temporal goods tend to enable the realization of momentary goods, 
they can have value even when they do not do this, and even when they provide 
little phenomenological benefit at all. We can still value an old friendship, for in-
stance, and aim to maintain it or honor it, even when we stop enjoying the friend’s 
company. Along the same lines, caring for an aging parent is generally not a phe-
nomenologically satisfying experience, but nonetheless we tend to see great value 
in doing so (and even if we knew that we would not ourselves reap the benefits of 
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this social practice as we aged ourselves).119 The concept of a temporal good helps 
to make sense of this conviction. 
Nussbaum expresses the centrality of temporal goods to human flourishing 
on the Aristotelean view:  
“Aristotle…argues that a total way or mode of life consisting only 
in the activities of nutrition and growth, or organized distinctively 
around those activities, would not count as a human life; so that total 
mode of life cannot be what we are seeking. Nor would a life orga-
nized around the activity of sense-perception, in which sense-
perception was the distinctive and organizing feature, the one that 
gave the life as a whole its distinctive character or shape. That would 
be merely an animal life. The truly human life, by contrast, is a life 
organized by the activity of practical reasoning (1098a3-4: praktike 
tis tou logon echontos), in which it is that activity that gives the life 
as a whole its distinctive shape and tone.”120 
 
Aristotelean practical reason aims beyond the animalistic pursuit of “nutrition or 
growth” or pleasing sense-perceptions. It aims, rather, at temporal goods: at activ-
ities and relationships that are long-term achievements rather than momentary 
enjoyments, those achievements which can infuse one’s “life as a whole” with 
value. We can conclude, on the Aristotelean view at least, that a “truly human life,” 
in contrast to an “animal life,” involves the pursuit of temporal goods. A life with 
only momentary goods—hooked up to a pleasure machine—is not a good human 
life overall.121 There is little worry here, I think, of an overly “western” bias, given 
                                               
119 See Karen I. Fredriksen-Goldsen and Andrew E. Scharlach, Families and Work: New Directions in the 
Twenty First Century (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 3 (reporting that more than one in 
seven adults in the US is involved in caring for ill or disabled friends or relatives, and that eighty-five 
percent of the care provided to the disabled elderly is provided informally and without pay by family 
members and other unpaid helpers). 
120 Nussbaum, “Nature, Functioning and Capability,” supra note 9 at 44. 
121 Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974), 42-45 (introducing the 
concept of the pleasure machine as a counter-example to hedonism, since hedonism entails that we 
would have an overriding reason to give up “real” life and to hook ourselves up to the machine).  
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that the pursuit of temporal goods—families, friendships, careers, artistic and in-
tellectual endeavors—seems central to every culture.122 
 This distinction between temporal and momentary goods dovetails 
closely—though, not perfectly—with Ronald Dworkin’s distinction between “ex-
periential” and “critical” interests, and Amartya Sen’s distinction between “well-
being freedom” and “agency freedom”123 As discussed in Chapter 2, according to 
Dworkin, “experiential interests” are interests in having pleasurable sensory expe-
riences and positive emotional states.124 “Critical interests,” by comparison, are not 
essentially phenomenological. They are interests in realizing one’s personal values 
and commitments, such as one’s interest in completing a work project or seeing a 
loved one succeed. To realize a critical interest would certainly qualify as a temporal 
good; it would represent a personal “achievement.” And while realizing an experi-
ential interest would normally qualify as a momentary good, realizing certain 
refined experiential interests would likely qualify as a temporal good. Consider 
someone enjoying herself as she plays a complicated concerto on a violin; or some-
one quietly meditating after years of training. It both cases, it would seem that one 
realizes a critical and an experiential interest at the same time. It represents a dia-
chronic achievement—a successful investment of one’s time, and an expression of 
her ethical values—that she can have that phenomenological experience. The med-
itation example reveals how even the Buddhist, who aims to “live in the moment” 
(if we might radically oversimply that belief system), pursues temporal rather than 
merely momentary goods. Rejecting her instinctual set of desires as entirely mis-
guided from the perspective of building and honoring value, she must work 
diligently for years to reshape her moment-to-moment mentality. 
                                               
122 For thoughtful discussion on objectivity and western bias within the capability approach, and for a 
defense of universal values, see Nussbaum, Women and Human Development, supra note 6 at 34-69. 
123 Ronald Dworkin, Life’s Dominion: An Argument about Abortion, Euthanasia, and Individual Freedom (New 
York: Knopf, 1993), 199-208; Sen, “Well-being, Agency and Freedom,” supra note 8. 
124 See discussion in Chapter 2 at 153. 
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“The central feature of well-being,” Sen writes, “is the ability to achieve 
valuable functionings.”125 “A person’s agency aspect,” however, “cannot be un-
derstood without taking note of his or her aims, objectives, allegiances, obligations, 
and—in a broad sense—the person’s conception of the good.”126 While “well-be-
ing freedom” concerns “a person’s capability to have various functioning vectors 
and to enjoy the corresponding well-being achievements,” “agency freedom” con-
cerns “what a person is free to do and achieve in pursuit of whatever goals or 
values he or she regards as important.”127 The distinction is between having access 
to valuable functionings, and having the power and control to choose which par-
ticular functionings one will pursue in light of her ethical and moral values.128 To 
see how they are distinct consider the following: Coffee A is far more delicious 
than Coffee B, but the workers who produce Coffee A are exploited. Alex, who is 
deeply committed to workers’ rights, would never knowingly drink Coffee A. Bob 
serves her Coffee A, but tells her that it is Coffee B. She enjoys it immensely. In 
this case, Alex would realize well-being, insofar as enjoying coffee is a valuable 
functioning, but not her agency. While realizing a temporal good would almost 
always involve the exercise of one’s agency freedom, at least in a liberal society 
where people can generally choose their own long-term projects, this need not be 
the case as a conceptual matter. If a pacifist were conscripted into her nation’s 
military, the strength, skills, and fortitude that she develops over time would rep-
resent temporal goods that failed to express her agency. She would be equipped 
with valuable functionings that required time to cultivate, but their presence would 
not result from her pursuit of her own conception of the good life. 
 
 
                                               
125 Sen, “Well-being, Agency and Freedom,” supra note 8 at 200. 
126 Id. at 203. 
127 Id.  
128 Id. at 209-10. 
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B. Temporal Goods as Associational Goods 
 We now have this concept of a temporal good, which closely but not per-
fectly aligns with Dworkin’s concept of a critical interest and Sen’s concept of 
agency freedom. And we have an understanding that temporal goods are funda-
mental to the successful pursuit of a good life considered as a diachronic whole. 
The next step is to point out that many of these temporal goods are also associational 
goods. That is, we can realize these valuable forms of functioning only by associ-
ating with other people. The temporal good could be intrinsically associational, as 
with the maintenance of a marriage, family, or friendship; that is, the good itself 
just is a special form of association. Or the temporal goods could be instrumentally 
associational, in the sense that associating with other people is the means by which 
one realizes that functioning, as with the development of most forms of profes-
sional expertise. This relates to Nussbaum’s point that associational functionings 
“organize and suffuse” all the other “central human capabilities.”129 
 Let us now reconnect this discussion to our inquiry into the deprivations 
of incarceration, and of long-term incarceration. What is missing in the conclusion 
that a 100-day sentence is worth 100 DDLs and a 10,000-day sentence (27.4 years) 
is worth 10,000 DDLs? What is missing is an understanding that the set of func-
tionings that one is deprived of during 100-days of incarceration is very different 
from the set that one is deprived of during 10,000-days. In analyzing the depriva-
tions of the 10,000-day sentence we cannot merely break it down into blocks of 
100 days. Given (a) the severe limitation on the freedom of association inherent to 
any prison and (b) the fact that most temporal goods are also associational goods, 
we can understand that 27 years of incarceration in any prison makes it profoundly 
more difficult, if not impossible, to realize a wide array of the most important tem-
poral goods: maintaining a family, a marriage, a home, long-term friendships, a 
career, developing a professional expertise, participating meaningfully in a political 
                                               
129 Nussbaum, Women and Human Development, supra note 6 at 82. 
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movement, and so forth. It generates this deprivation, as suggested above, both by 
limiting one’s access to people he associated with before his confinement, as well 
as by limiting his access to “new people” in an environment conducive to forming 
meaningful associations. Long-term incarceration, I believe, by depriving one of 
access to such functionings, represents a distinct form of punishment. If the Sin-
gaporean practice of “caning” entails bodily pain and public humiliation, the 
practice of long-term incarceration entails making it extremely difficult to realize a 
number of associational, temporal functionings, which are central to all or nearly 
all conceptions of a good life. 100 days in prison may complicate the realization of 
such functionings, to be sure, but in a manner and a degree qualitatively different 
than 10,000 days, as I discuss below.130 
In “Happiness and Punishment,” John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco, 
and Jonathan Masur argue that inmates adapt to a degree to prison life over time, 
in terms of their reported happiness levels.131 They conclude, then, that the mar-
ginal harm of incarceration actually decreases over time, and they then consider the 
implications of this for determining proportionate retributivist and deterrent sen-
tences. That hedonistic philosophies entail (or might entail) such conclusions is in 
large part what motivated Nussbaum and Sen to develop the capability theory. The 
relevant issue for assessing penal harm is not the offender’s happiness level, but 
rather his level of deprivation, understood in terms of the valuable functionings—
valuable activities and modes of being—that his punishment forecloses or makes 
                                               
130 Furthermore, the pursuit of associational, temporal goods tends to be challenging and to demand 
our full attention and therefore to be stimulating. We use our powers, as it were, when we attempt to 
maintain and realize such goods. There is a sense, along these lines, that long-term incarceration can 
be relatively monotonous and boring, given the limited opportunities to pursue such goods. The lack 
of environmental diversity will also contribute to this outcome, undoubtedly, as one looks at the same 
walls and courtyard day after day, month after month, year after year. So will the lack of “chance 
encounters” with people that one experiences outside of prison. See supra note 105. We can say, then, 
that long-term incarceration makes it considerably more challenging for inmates to realize the func-
tionings of being interested or being stimulated, functionings which themselves are constitutive of human 
flourishing. 
131 John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco, and Jonathan Masur, “Happiness and Punishment,” Uni-
versity of Chicago Law Review 76 (2009): 1037-81. 
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more difficult to realize. In parallel, as Nussbaum and Sen explain, that a woman 
in a deeply patriarchal and illiberal society has adapted to her situation, and is 
happy, does not mean that she has no complaint. John Vorhaus writes succinctly 
on this issue: “Familiarity and adjusted expectations may go some way towards 
alleviating levels of fear, anguish and humiliation, but the degrading status of ill-
treatment cannot be said to grow or diminish according to the extent to which 
prisoners successfully accommodate themselves to the brutality of the regime.”132  
How, though, are we to draw a line between “long-term incarceration” and 
“non-long-term incarceration”? Does 5 years count? 10 years? Given (a) the close 
relationship between the realization of associational, temporal goods and the real-
ization of a good life in the Aristotelean, diachronic sense and (b) the fact that we 
are embracing a “flattened” rather than “sufficentiarian” capability approach con-
cerned with the degree to which punishments threaten particular valuable 
functionings, we can best capture these concerns with the following definition. A 
sentence is “long term” if it represents a severe risk of ruining an inmate’s life, just in virtue 
of the amount of time he has to spend inside prison. Or, more precisely: A sentence is “long 
term” if it represents a severe risk of ruining an inmate’s life, just in virtue of the amount of time 
he is denied the freedom of general association. This idea of “ruining” someone’s life, I 
hope, concisely captures the notion that long-term incarceration, by severely lim-
iting one’s access to associational, temporal goods, endangers an inmate’s pursuit 
of his own conception of a good life.133 We could, however, if necessary, express 
the same idea with somewhat more modest language, arguing that long-term in-
carceration makes it much more difficult for an inmate to infuse his life considered 
as a whole with value, just in virtue of the amount of time he is denied the freedom 
of general association. Nonetheless, I think the “life ruining” definition clarifies 
                                               
132 John Vorhaus, “On Degradation Part Two: Degrading Treatment and Punishment,” Common Law 
World Review 32 (2003): 65-92, at 69. 
133 For discussion of the concept of “ruin,” see Chapter 2 at 166-67. 
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what is at stake, and so I will continue with that definition below. On either for-
mulation, that it is matter of degree and of risk is important. The point is not that 
it is impossible for the long-term incarcerated to build a good life or to infuse his life 
as a whole with value. And we must remain aware of the many offenders who have, 
against odds, rebuilt their lives after very long sentences.  
How many years, then? These considerations do not pop out a specific 
number of years that qualify as “long-term incarceration.” There will be a vague 
middle ground. We can conclude that the longer the sentence, the greater the rel-
evance of these concerns, while nonetheless rejecting the idea that a 10,000-day 
sentence merely represents 10,000 DDLs and thus while maintaining that there is 
a qualitative difference between long-term and non-long-term incarceration in 
terms of its impact on one’s life project. For the sake of clarity, however, let us 
continue the discussion with a sentence that I think is clearly above the zone of 
vagueness: 20 years.   
 How does the diversity of incarceration fit into this story, with its focus on 
the variable of sentence length? The other variables discussed above do not fade 
away. The point has been to bring attention to the variable of time due to its im-
mense importance—an importance that is nonetheless easy to miss, as I discuss 
further below. But we should not diminish the difference between the five steps 
discussed above. 20 years in the Gitarama or the Tullianum would almost certainly 
mean death. 20 years in the Pentonville or ADX Florence would represent a severe 
risk of insanity. And 20 years in San Quinten is worse than 20 years in the FCI 
Morgantown, which is worse than 20 years in the Bastoy. The point, however, is 
that 20 years in any of these latter three facilities—even in the Bastoy—is a pro-
found, potentially life ruining punishment. The variable of time converts the 
mundane and perhaps even the pleasant into the cruel and the degrading. Richard 
Lovelace, who wrote that prison could be a “hermitage” where one could enjoy 
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the liberty of angels if he had freedom in his love and if in his soul he was free, was 
only confined to the Gatehouse Prison from April 30 to June 21, 1642.134  
In the background of all of this is our mortality. We only have so much 
time to realize temporal goods en route to realizing a conception of the good life. 
And given our limited time, 20 years in the Bastoy would, I believe, represent a 
severe risk of ruining one’s life project, as he is forced to farm day-after-day, 
month-after-month, year-after-year on a small, isolated island, in the presence of 
“generally angry, somewhat antisocial” men, let us assume, sleeping alone in his 
little private room, with only a few hours each week with his gradually aging family, 
assuming they still go to the trouble of taking the ferry to the island to visit as the 
years pass on. Even if one is comfortable in the Bastoy during his 20 years—and 
thus can realize certain momentary goods—his ability to realize certain foundational 
temporal goods, like the functionings of being a good father or being a good husband is 
very limited. And when he returns to society, much older, without much of any 
professional experience, he will have “to start over,” as it were. It will, of course, 
depend on the particular offender. 20 years in the Bastoy might mesh with some 
people’s conception of the good life, or at least might not severely endanger its 
realization. It would then be impossible to “long-term” incarcerate those individ-
uals in the Bastoy, consistent with the “life ruining” definition provided above. 
Regardless, to return to the diversity point: just because one has difficulty in prison 
realizing certain functionings foundational to his life as a whole does not mean that 
he is indifferent to the quality of his everyday life. How much disvalue—wanton 
suffering—does confinement in a facility generate? What functionings does he 
have the opportunity to realize within the prison during his sentence? Even if he 
cannot, say, build a family or a career, it will still matter very much to him what 
else he can do with his time. These are distinct and crucial questions when 
                                               
134 Thomas Crofts (ed.), The Cavalier Poets: An Anthology (Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 1995), 68. 
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considering what we are doing to somebody, exactly, when we confine them to a 
facility for a long period of time.135 
 There is another penal variable that we have not yet considered. This is the 
variable of post-carceral deprivations. What deprivations are offenders subjected to af-
ter their release from prison? Examples include the presence of an intrusive and 
threatening probation officer, inability to access public housing, loss of the job one 
held before prison, difficulty finding work due to gaps on one’s CV, as well as 
                                               
135 Liora Lazarus is right, along such lines, to emphasize the differences between inmates’ rights inside 
Germany’s more rehabilitative prisons and England’s more retributive prisons. However, by largely 
ignoring the variable of sentence length, she fails to capture arguably the most important difference 
between the two regimes: that the average sentence length is much higher in England than in Germany. 
See Ministry of Justice, “The Story of the Prison Population: 1993–2012, England and Wales, 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attach-
ment_data/file/218185/story-prison-population.pdf; Richard S. Frase, “Sentencing in Germany and 
the United States: Comparing Äpfel with Apples,” Freiburg: Max Planck Institute, 2001, 
https://www.mpicc.de/shared/data/pdf/frase-endausdruck.pdf. However, this point only strength-
ens her broader argument that German criminal and sentencing law contains valuable lessons for the 
Anglophone world. See Liora Lazarus, Contrasting Prisoners’ Rights: A Comparative Examination of England 
and Germany (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); “Conceptions of Liberty Deprivation,” Modern 
Law Review 69 (2006): 738-69. More generally, though, Lazarus’s view of German criminal law and of 
German prisons, with their rehabilitative concern, may be overly sanguine. She argues that German 
criminal law has—or is conceived of having—three steps or pillars, each with a distinct purpose: (1) 
threats of punishment, with the purpose of deterrence, (2) criminal sentences, with the purpose of 
retribution, and (3) prison itself, with the purpose of rehabilitation. How these three purposes interre-
late is not entirely clear. They cannot, as Lazarus implies, fit together seamlessly. There will be 
tradeoffs. Most importantly, it is not as if even a German prison is the ideal place for rehabilitation. 
As John Pratt writes, “Of course, one must recognize that however relaxed a prison regime, whatever 
material comforts are provided, prisoners are still prisoners. There are rules, levels of surveillance, 
record-keeping, denials of choices, deprivations and sanctions that will differentiate any prisoner from 
free people.” John Pratt, “Scandinavian Exceptionalism in an Era of Penal Excess, Part 1: The Nature 
and Roots of Scandinavian Exceptionalism,” British Journal of Criminology 48 (2008): 119-37, at 123. If 
no prison is the ideal place for rehabilitation, but the German state sentences people to prison, is the 
German concern with rehabilitation thereby secondary to the pursuit of deterrence and retribution? 
Perhaps German criminal law is a form of limiting retributivism, whereby rehabilitation and deterrence 
are pursued within the confines of vague upper and lower retributive cardinal limits. Or is it some 
form of “limiting deterrence”? See discussion on limiting retributivism, Chapter 1 at note 15. There is 
also the issue that a harsher prison environment will generate more retributive harm than a gentler, 
more rehabilitative environment. As such, looking only to the deliverance of retributive harm, it seems that the 
state has a choice between shorter sentences in harsher prisons or longer sentences in milder prisons. 
See Lisa Kerr, “Sentencing Ashley Smith: How Prison Conditions Relate to the Aims of Punishment,” 
Canadian Journal of Law and Society 32 (2017): 187-207; Patrick Tomlin, “Time and Retribution,” Law 
and Philosophy 33 (2014): 655-82. Has the German state then made the decision to incarcerate offenders 
for longer periods of time in more rehabilitative prisons (though, still for less time than average English 
or American sentences)?  
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employers’ right to check their ex-convict status, placement on a sex offender reg-
istry, and losing one’s right to vote and sit on juries.136 What if these post-carceral 
deprivations, collectively, severely risk ruining an offender’s life, even after short-
term incarceration? If they do—if (a) short-term incarceration plus (b) post-car-
ceral deprivation—is not qualitatively different in terms of its impact on one’s 
pursuit of a good life than long-term incarceration, then there would be no differ-
ence between the two for the purposes of discerning dispositive degradation 
limitations. We should keep in mind, however, at least two issues. First, at an ab-
solute minimum, people have ready access to friends and family outside of prison. 
This is a huge difference. Second, many post-carceral deprivations are legal in na-
ture and, as such, could be easily remedied (at least as a matter of law, if perhaps 
not politics). Not every country presents great official obstacles to offenders’ rein-
tegration into society.137 There is, however, no such remedy for long-term 
incarceration. The denial of access to temporal and associational goods is analyti-
cally connected to the experience. But what about non-legal forms of post-
conviction deprivation? Any term of incarceration, even without legal post-carceral 
obstacles, will disrupt one’s personal and professional plans. While that is a crucial 
point, with serious implications for limiting the use of incarceration simpliciter, it 
seems unlikely to collapse the qualitative difference between short- and long-term 
incarceration with regard to their impact on one’s pursuit of a good life and with 
regard to the degradation question. If one serves six months in prison, but then 
has his civil and social rights restored—with employers lacking the right to look 
                                               
136 See generally James Jacobs, The Eternal Criminal Record (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
2015); Alice Goffman, On the Run: Fugitive Life in an American City (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2014); Amy E. Lerman and Vesla M. Weaver, Arresting Citizenship: The Democratic Consequences of 
American Crime Control (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2014); Christopher Uggen, 
et. al., “The Edge Of Stigma: An Experimental Audit of the Effects of Low-Level Criminal Records 
on Employment,” Criminology 52 (2014): 627-54.  
137 See Koichi Hamai, et. al. (eds.), Probation Round the World: A Comparative Study (London: Routledge, 
1995). 
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into his convict status, and so forth—the notion that such a punishment represents 
a severe risk of ruining his life, akin to living in prison for 20 years, is hyperbolic. 
V. A Quiet Injury: Long-Term Incarceration vs. Torture 
 The concepts of “temporal good,” “associational, temporal good,” and “the 
pursuit of a good life” are abstract. We cannot point to an associational, temporal 
good like an old friendship as easily as we can point to an apple or a car. If we see 
two old friends discussing a film over coffee, it requires an exercise of our imagi-
nation to distinguish it from two strangers who happen to sit next to each other in 
a cafe and have the exact same dialogue. The two old friends, we can assume, are 
committed to maintaining that old friendship qua temporal good. That is, con-
sistent with the discussion above, the friendship is not just a source of momentary 
goods for them, and they would (to some degree) sacrifice the realization of mo-
mentary goods to maintain their relationship. And yet, as they sit there chatting 
about the film, the fact that they are realizing the momentary good of enjoying a cup 
of coffee is likely conscious, while the fact that they are realizing the temporal good 
of maintaining an old friendship is likely unconscious or at least backgrounded in their 
awareness. Temporal goods are somehow both loud and quiet, demanding all and 
none of our attention at the same time. They are loud in that their pursuit takes up 
most of our day. We are impelled toward their realization, sometimes to the point 
of exhaustion, especially when it comes to family relationships and careers. And 
yet they are quiet in their abstraction, and also their gradualism. They take shape 
only over time, while we are constantly living in the present moment, as it were. 
They appear as somehow distinct from our real lives, which we live day-to-day—
and yet our day-to-day existences only make sense in the context of their pursuit. 
This “quiet” nature of temporal goods, I believe, makes it surprisingly easy to miss 
or underestimate how much disrespect the state demonstrates to offenders by di-
minishing their access to such goods. Indeed, their “quiet” nature helps to explain, 
I believe, how a punishment as extreme as long-term incarceration—a punishment 
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that may ruin your life—could become so commonplace and uncontroversial in sup-
posedly thoughtful, liberal societies like the United States. There are many political, 
economic, and sociological variables at play in understanding how we have reached 
this moment of mass incarceration.138 But the difficulty of perceiving and com-
municating the injury of long-term incarceration—due to the abstract and gradual 
nature of temporal goods—is, I think, an important piece of the story. Let us re-
turn to Elaine Scarry’s work on the body in pain. This will help us to develop this 
point, as well as to enable the comparison between long-term incarceration and 
penal torture with regard to the level of disrespect each demonstrate toward an 
offender. 
  Scarry argues that pain is “inexpressible,” given its presence inside some-
one, as I discussed briefly in the previous chapter.139 Language occurs by reference 
to objects in the external world, she argues, and pain cannot—or cannot easily—
be expressed by reference to such objects. She quotes Virginia Woolf: “English, 
which can express the thoughts of Hamlet and the tragedy of Lear has no words 
for the shiver or the headache…The merest schoolgirl when she falls in love has 
Shakespeare and Keats to speak her mind for her, but let a sufferer try to describe 
a pain in his head to a doctor and language at once runs dry.”140 She continues: 
“For the person whose pain it is, it is ‘effortlessly’ grasped (that is, 
even with the most heroic effort it cannot not be grasped); while for 
the person outside the sufferer’s body, what is ‘effortless’ is not 
grasping it (it is easy to remain wholly unaware of its existence; even 
with effort, one may remain in doubt about its existence or may re-
tain the astonishing freedom of denying its existence; and, finally, if 
with the best effort of sustained attention one successfully appre-
hends it, the aversiveness of the ‘it’ one apprehends will only be a 
shadowy fraction of the ‘it’). So, for the person in pain, so incon-
testably and unnegotiably present is it that ‘having pain’ may come 
to be thought of as the most vibrant example of what it is to ‘have 
                                               
138 See Chapter 1 at note 180. 
139 Elaine Scarry, The Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World (New York and Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1985), 3-11. See discussion Chapter 2 at 129-31. 
140 Id. at 4. 
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certainty,’ while for the other person it is so elusive that ‘hearing 
about pain’ may exist as the primary model of what it is to ‘have 
doubt.’ Thus pain comes unsharably into our midst as at once that 
which cannot be denied and that which cannot be confirmed.”141 
 
Scarry argues that pain’s lack of verbal representation leads to its lack of political 
representation: “It is not simply accurate but tautological to observe that given any 
two phenomena, the one that is more visible will receive more attention.”142 And 
because pain is “so nearly impossible to express, so flatly invisible,” Scarry argues, 
“even where it is virtually the only content in a given environment, it will be pos-
sible to describe that environment as though the pain were not there.”143 She points 
out that regimes can describe torture without mentioning the use and the presence 
of pain, as mere acts of “information-gathering” or “intelligence-gathering.”144 In this 
way, she concludes, it has been possible to neglect torture as an issue of moral and 
political concern. 
 Scarry elides two distinct issues here: (a) articulating the nature of an injury 
in detail and with precision and (b) communicating the very existence or severity 
of an injury. That the difficulty of communicating the very existence or severity of 
an injury may diminish the political attention drawn to that injury is a point that 
seems both important and true. We should take this to be Scarry’s central insight. 
But that a type of injury is difficult to articulate in detail and with precision need 
not vitiate the process of communicating its very existence or severity—and thus 
it need not have the implications with regard to political attention. Torture, along 
these lines, is not a good example for her central insight. That is, I doubt that the 
lack of a complex vocabulary to describe the experience of overwhelming pain 
impacts one’s ability to communicate its presence or urgency. We howl, groan, or 
scream in agony, and people understand. Indeed, the soundtrack of torture 
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illuminates in its very lack of vocabulary, as creatures with the capacity for complex 
speech become “shrilly, squealing piglets,” in Jean Améry’s words.145 When we 
hear someone howling, Scarry must be wrong when she writes that, as to the un-
derlying pain, “it is easy to remain wholly unaware of its existence; even with effort, 
one may remain in doubt about its existence or may retain the astonishing freedom 
of denying its existence.”146 Her argument makes sense with regard to minor or 
non-agonizing pain. In those cases—when someone calmly states, “my stomach 
hurts”—then not believing her is indeed all too easy.  
But given that Scarry’s focus is on torture, her argument seems misplaced. 
It is not, as she writes, easy to describe torture without describing the presence of 
pain. Doing so requires a great exercise in willful blindness, of looking away from what 
one knows is really happening.147 The torture victim, with electricity running 
through her body, with panic saturating her consciousness, does not need Shake-
speare or Keats to express or interpret her true feelings. Her involuntary shouts 
and pleas tell the whole story for anybody within earshot, no matter what language 
they speak. And, indeed, I think the natural communicability of agonizing pain has 
played a role in the level of empathy people have for torture victims—even for 
those victims who seek to murder innocent civilians as a means of installing total-
itarian political systems—and in the enormous political attention and moral 
condemnation brought to bear upon the practice of torture. Scarry must be 
wrong—and must have been wrong at the time of her writing, given that she wrote 
during Amnesty International’s ultimately successful drive to pass the Convention 
Against Torture148—that torture has been neglected as an issue of political 
                                               
145 Jean Améry, At the Mind’s Limit: Contemplations by a Survivor on Auschwitz and its Realities, trans. Sidney 
Rosenfeld and Stella P. Rosenfeld (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1980), 35. See discussion in 
Chapter 2 at 126-28. 
146 Scarry, The Body in Pain, supra note 139 at 4. 
147 On the centrality of “willful blindness” to the process of “disrespecting” something, see Chapter 2 
at 149. 
148 See Samuel Moyn, “Torture and Taboo: On Elaine Scarry,” The Nation, February 5, 2013. 
https://www.thenation.com/article/torture-and-taboo-elaine-scarry/ 
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concern. In sum, torture proves Scarry’s broader point about the communicability 
of a type of injury impacting the amount of attention it receives, but in the exactly 
opposite manner that she intended. 
 Long-term incarceration, however, proves her point in the intended direc-
tion. Given the abstract and gradual nature of temporal goods, the injury of limiting 
one’s access to such goods is comparatively difficult to communicate in terms of 
its existence and severity. As discussed above, the injury of long-term incarceration 
is not essentially phenomenological. It need not hurt. One need not cry out in pain. 
It goes beyond even the difficulties of communicating non-agonizing pain. For 
given that our awareness of our pursuit of temporal goods tends to be unconscious 
or at least backgrounded, the offender himself may lack a precise awareness of what 
exactly the state has done to him by long-term incarcerating him, as he goes about 
his day-to-day life inside the facility.149 Of course, there are many inmates, like 
Kevin Ott, who can articulate the injury with precision: 
“My name is Kevin Ott. My number’s 2030903. I’m in here for traf-
ficking methamphetamine. I start my 14th year in just a couple of 
months, and I will be here until I die. Yeah, I have life without parole 
for 3 ounces of methamphetamine. Yep. I fucked up, but I don’t 
think I should die for it. I have life without parole, which means I’ll 
stay in prison until I die. That’s a death sentence in my opinion, a 
slow death sentence. I have to wait until I die.”150 
 
While it seems impossible to witness someone being repeatedly waterboarded and 
not perceive his pain and his panic, it is very possible to visit a relatively clean and 
safe prison, chat with an inmate sentenced to a 20-year term, and then walk away 
without a clear awareness of his level of deprivation. There will not always be 
                                               
149 Bernard Williams writes: “There are forms of exploiting men or degrading them which…cannot 
be excluded merely by considering how the exploited or degraded men see the situation. For it is 
precisely a mark of extreme exploitation or degradation that those who suffer it do not see themselves 
differently from the way they are seen by the exploiters; either they do not see themselves as anything 
at all, or they acquiesce passively in the role for which they have been cast.” Bernard Williams, “The 
Idea of Equality,” in Problems of the Self (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1969), 230-49, at 237. 
150 From the 2012 documentary, The House I Live In, directed by Eugene Jarecki. 
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someone like Ott to articulate what is happening. And even when he’s there it 
requires a level of focus and imagination to understand his point, and to keep it in 
mind. It is not as easy and involuntary as understanding and worrying about the 
cries of the torture victim. And I think this helps to explain, in part, how the crim-
inal sentencing scales have risen so dramatically in the United States and also the 
United Kingdom since the 1970s. If the policy at the height of the crack epidemic 
in the United States in the 1980s was to literally torture crack dealers, there would 
have been outrage. It would have been impossible to look away from that. And yet, 
we need to understand that long-term incarcerating a crack dealer—at least when 
done with certain intentions in mind, as I explain in the following section—is not 
qualitatively different than penal torture with regard to the level of disrespect it 
demonstrates toward the offender, the most basic consideration, as I have argued, 
for understanding and comparing injuries, and assessing the degree of degradation. 
In the previous chapter, I argued that to “respect” something involves aid-
ing or at least not interfering with the possibility of that thing’s exhibition of value, 
as well as potentially symbolically expressing or honoring its value.151 With the un-
derstanding that an object has value when people might engage with it in beneficial 
ways, I explained that to pour water on a beautiful sandcastle is to disrespect the 
sandcastle’s value, while pouring water on a plant, generally, is to respect the plant’s 
value. The demands of respect, in this way, depend on what the object actually 
does to exhibit value, on the “mechanism” of its value exhibition, as it were, and 
the ways in which our actions help or hinder the working of that mechanism. To 
apply this logic to human beings directly, I argued, we need an understanding of 
what humans do, exactly, to exhibit value. I argued that human beings exhibit value 
due to their capacity to flourish, that is, due to their capacity to stitch moments 
together through time and construct a good life. They are diachronic creatures with 
pasts and futures of their own construction to a significant degree, capable not 
                                               
151 Chapter 2 at 142-50. 
 
 
 
 
227 
only of experiencing momentary goods, but also of achieving temporal goods, as I 
have argued in this chapter. While suffering may play a role in the production of 
temporal goods and in the pursuit of a good life, as with the suffering involved 
with certain forms of professional training, I argued that humans retain the capac-
ity to generate disvalue, which constitutes merely wanton suffering. With this 
conception of human value in mind, I concluded that torture is the exemplar of 
disrespecting a human being. It (a) completely halts his value generating capacities, 
as he loses the thread of his diachronic identity and (b) maximizes his capacity for 
disvalue, with his consciousness saturated with suffering. In short, it takes a being 
capable of living broadly and purposefully through time and, via the intentional 
infliction of a suffusive panic, restricts his ken to a maximally terrible present. 
Long-term incarceration, I contend, can express a level of disrespect for 
offenders that is not qualitatively different than certain forms of torture. Compare 
20 years in the Bastoy to being waterboarded 20 times. But they act in very differ-
ent ways. Whereas torture is immediate and urgent, long-term incarceration is 
gradual and subtle; torture explodes a person; long-term incarceration erodes a 
person. In the end, though, the question is the same: To what degree does the 
practice interfere with or symbolically dishonor the offender’s capacity to exhibit 
and construct value? Long-term incarceration, by severely limiting an offender’s 
access to certain temporal goods, which are fundamental to the pursuit of a good 
life as a whole, interferes with his value generating capacity in a direct and pro-
foundly damaging manner. If torture removes someone, entirely, from his 
diachronic process of value generation, long-term incarceration acts to ensure—or 
at least to severely risk—that this process fails. Both work to “erase” one’s exist-
ence as someone who builds value through time, we might say.  
But what about the individual who leads an utterly desperate existence, 
where he is merely trying to survive day-to-day, before his long-term incarceration? 
Have his diachronic capacities not already been “erased,” by his own choices or by 
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the neglect of a callous society? By intentionally harming him in a way that ensures 
that he does not turn his life around, as it were, the state demonstrates the same 
disrespect for his diachronic capacities as it does to the offender who was positively 
flourishing before incarceration. The conviction expressed by the state is the same: 
your essentially human capacity to build a good life does not matter.  
In sum, that the disrespect of torture is so shocking and undeniable does 
not mean that it stands alone on the pantheon of injuries, as something qualitatively 
different from any other form of aversive treatment. For, as discussed above, there 
is a reason why we are intuitively more concerned with the infliction of agonizing 
pain and suffusive panic than with non-phenomenological injuries like severely 
limiting one’s access to certain temporal, associational goods. The latter form of 
injury is vaguer and more difficult to perceive with definition. Nonetheless, upon 
reflection we can appreciate the epistemic limitations of our knee-jerk moral sen-
sibilities in these cases, and can grasp the reality and the profundity of the injury 
that long-term incarceration inflicts. 
VI. Intentional Disrespect 
 Given the above, it might seem straightforward to conclude that long-term 
incarceration rejects the offender’s status as a human being, that is, as a creature 
with the capacity and right to build a good life, and therefore surpasses a dispositive 
degradation limitation.152 It might seem straightforward to conclude, that is, that 
we must simply remove the arrow of long-term incarceration from our quiver of 
policy options, just as we have done with penal torture. While very tempting, there 
is an important—and somewhat challenging—complication to this conclusion. 
This is the matter of intent. If torture constitutes the intentional infliction of suffu-
sive panic, can we say, in parallel, that the state, when long-term incarcerating 
someone, intends to ruin his life or intends to severely risk that outcome? Does it 
really matter? I argue below that it does, that if impermissible degradation 
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constitutes an affirmative rejection of someone’s humanity, then the degradation-
making features of the treatment in question must be intentionally inflicted. To 
intentionally ruin someone as either your means or your end—to see his ruin as a 
reason for action—is profoundly more disrespectful than to knowingly ruin him as a 
byproduct of a permissible goal. It is not only a matter of consequences when 
determining whether one’s actions are impermissibly degrading, whether they em-
body—whether they bring into the world and honestly assert—an impermissibly 
low valuation of a person. One’s reasons for action, as constituted by her inten-
tions, are also paramount. 
 These considerations enable the conclusion indicated above, that long-term 
incarceration for the sole purpose of incapacitation can be permissible—beneath 
the line of dispositive disrespect. Unlike long-term incarceration for the purpose 
of retribution or deterrence, if administered for the sole purpose of incapacita-
tion—and if proportional to an established threat of future crime posed by the 
offender (a huge evidential if)—the damage that long-term incarceration causes to 
an offender’s life project can, in special circumstances, represent a permissibly in-
flicted byproduct of preventing him from committing crimes. If inflicted for the 
purpose of retribution or deterrence, however, I conclude that the potentially life-
ruining harm of long-term incarceration is intentionally delivered and impermissi-
bly degrading.   
A. Intentions and Side-Effects: Sophisticated and Vengeful Terror Bombers 
To insist that intentional harms are, all things equal, harder to justify than 
merely foreseen harms is to rely upon the Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE). 
Thomas Aquinas is credited with introducing the DDE to explain the permissibil-
ity of self-defensive killing, contra Augustine.153 Aquinas argued that killing in self-
                                               
153 Thomas Aquinas, On Law, Morality, and Politics, 2d edition, eds. William P. Baumgarth and Richard 
J. Regan, trans. Richard J. Regan (Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Co., 1988), 169-71 (ST 
II-II, Question 64). 
 
 
 
 
230 
defense is very different morally than killing in cold blood, and that the killer’s 
intentions must explain this difference. Unlike the cold-blooded killer, the self-
defensive killer does not intend to kill, but rather kills as a byproduct of realizing 
his “good intention” of preventing an unjust attack. Aquinas, importantly, added 
a proportionality requirement: “But an action originating from a good intention 
can be rendered unlawful if the action should be disproportionate to the end. And 
so it will be unlawful to use greater force than necessary to defend one’s life.”154 
Theorists since Aquinas have extended the DDE beyond self-defense cases. 
Douglas Husak explains how the intend-foresee distinction is foundational to nu-
merous provisions of substantive criminal law, as well as to everyday morality (e.g. 
burglary is defined at common law as the act of breaking and entering the house 
of another at night with the intention to commit a felony therein).155 It is also central 
to jus in bello just war theory, as outlined in the following example by Michael Brat-
man: 
“Both Terror Bomber and Strategic Bomber have the goal of pro-
moting the war effort against Enemy. Each intends to pursue this 
goal by weakening Enemy, and each intends to do that by dropping 
bombs. Terror Bomber’s plan is to bomb the school in Enemy’s 
territory, thereby killing children of Enemy and terrorizing Enemy’s 
population. Strategic Bomber’s plan is different. He plans to bomb 
Enemy’s munitions plant, thereby undermining Enemy’s war effort. 
Strategic Bomber also knows, however, that next to the munitions 
plant is a school, and that when he bombs the plant he will also 
destroy the school, killing the children inside. Strategic Bomber has 
not ignored this fact. Indeed, he has worried a lot about it. Still, he 
has concluded that this cost, though significant, is outweighed by 
                                               
154 Id. at 170. 
155 Douglas Husak, “The Costs to Criminal Theory of Supposing that Intentions are Irrelevant to 
Permissibility,” in The Philosophy of Criminal Law: Selected Essays (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 
69-90, at 77. See also S. Matthew Liao, Intentions and Moral Permissibility (UC Berkeley: Kadish Center for 
Morality, Law and Public Affairs, 2008) (providing cases in which intentions have intuitive moral sig-
nificance); David Enoch, “Intending, Foreseeing, and the State,” Legal Theory 13 (2007): 69-99, at 71 
(discussing the centrality of the intend-foresee distinction to everyday morality). 
 
 
 
 
231 
the contribution that would be made to the war effort by the de-
struction of the munitions plant.”156 
 
The DDE is meant to explain the conviction that Terror Bomber and Strategic 
Bomber are engaged in very different moral enterprises, and that the former’s ac-
tions are much harder to justify than the latter’s, even though the result is the same 
in terms of loss of life—in parallel to the cold-blooded and self-defensive killers. 
What Terror Bomber does, let us assume, is impermissible. But what about Stra-
tegic Bomber? The DDE, importantly, will not immediately endorse her actions. 
It depends on at least two further questions. First, is Aquinas’s proportionality require-
ment. Is the intended outcome important enough to justify causing the children’s 
deaths (e.g. Enemy was secretly developing nerve gas in the plant, with plans to 
kill tens of thousands of civilians as soon as the research was completed)? Second, 
is what we can call the minimization requirement. Has Strategic Bomber minimized 
the harmful byproduct? Michael Walzer argues that agents have duties to minimize 
foreseen harm even if this means foregoing some benefit or accepting additional 
risks.157 Could Strategic Bomber have killed fewer children, perhaps by bombing a 
different, similarly important munitions plant or research facility, or by somehow 
warning the children? If those were viable alternatives, then her action would con-
vert from permissible to impermissible, even though she does not intend to kill the 
children, and even though the bombing would otherwise be proportional. 
Some theorists, most notably Jonathan Bennett, have objected that the in-
tend-foresee distinction is too manipulable to have much meaning.158 It is 
important to see how this objection is ultimately irrelevant to our discussion. Ben-
nett raises the challenge of what we might call Sophisticated Terror Bomber. 
                                               
156 Michael Bratman, Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1987), 139-40. 
157 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Allusions (New York: Basic 
Books, 1977), 152–9. 
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Sophisticated Terror Bomber does not intend for Enemy civilians to die. She in-
tends, rather, for them to appear dead—long enough to demoralize Enemy and to 
cause it to surrender—after which the civilians will wake up, she hopes, as if from 
a deep sleep. It is extraordinarily unlikely that they will wake up, but it is also ex-
traordinarily unlikely that the civilians will survive the Strategic Bomber’s attack. 
In both cases, continues the objection, we can understand the civilians’ deaths to 
be foreseen, but unintended consequences of the bombers’ true intentions—mak-
ing the civilians appear dead and destroying the munitions plant, respectively. 
Neither bomber is positively aiming at “death to the civilians” as either her means 
or ultimate end; and, as such, neither kills them intentionally. Thus, the objection 
concludes, the DDE cannot distinguish between Sophisticated Terror Bomber and 
Strategic Bomber. And, therefore, its central distinction fails to provide much 
moral guidance, for any Terror Bomber who would prefer that Enemy civilians 
live, so long as her broader war aims were realized, is in fact a Sophisticated Terror 
Bomber.   
This is an important challenge to the DDE, especially as it relates to just 
war theory, and defenders of the DDE have introduced a number of interesting 
replies.159 I will not, however, engage with that debate, for the case of the 
                                               
159 See, e.g., William Fitzpatrick, “The Intend/Foresee Distinction and the Problem of  ‘Closeness,’” 
Philosophical Studies 128 (2006): 585-615, at 589-91 (arguing that Sophisticated Terror Bomber is an 
intentional killer, because she intends to kill the civilians as a means of making them appear dead); 
Philippa Foot, “The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect,” in Virtues and Vices 
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1978), 21-22 (arguing that, with Sophisticated Terror Bomber, killing the 
civilians is sufficiently “close” to making them appear dead, either conceptually or causally, such that 
one must treat the killing as if it were strictly intended); Warren S. Quinn, “Actions, Intentions, and 
Consequences: The Doctrine of Double Effect,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 18 (1989): 334-51 (arguing 
that Sophisticated Terror Bomber, unlike Strategic Bomber, uses the civilians as a means without their 
consent, treating them as if they existed only for her purposes); Victor Tadros, “Wrongful Intentions 
Without Closeness,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 43 (2015): 52-74 (arguing, first, that intentionally using 
people in a harmful manner bears an extra burden of justification because “people are entitled to 
determine for themselves which ends to pursue, even if their ends are not the most valuable ends 
considered impartially,” id. at 65, and, second, that intentionally affecting people in a harmful manner 
bears an extra burden of justification because “a person who lacks a duty to serve an end at a certain 
cost may not normally be compelled to serve that end at the same cost,” id. at 73.) 
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Sophisticated Terror Bomber is not relevant to our comparison: (a) long-term in-
carceration for the purpose of retribution or deterrence vs. (b) long-term 
incarceration for the sole purpose of incapacitation. This comparison requires only 
the most basic version of the DDE, with its distinction between clearly intentional 
and merely foreseen harming. For whether or not the DDE can distinguish be-
tween Sophisticated Terror Bomber and Strategic Bomber, it can surely distinguish 
between Vengeful Terror Bomber and Strategic Bomber. Vengeful Terror Bomber 
wants revenge for Enemy terror bombing her people. She would not be satisfied if 
Enemy civilians somehow woke up. She wants them to die. Retributivist and de-
terrent theorists, with regard to their intention to harm offenders, are like Vengeful Terror 
Bomber, not Sophisticated Terror Bomber. They are motivated to harm, using a 
broad understanding of harm as anything which is aversive or which negatively 
affects one’s interests.160 To realize their penal aims they require punishment, in-
carceration or otherwise, to be harmful. Retributivists generally see this harm as an 
end in itself, as the intrinsic good of deserved suffering or censure; though, Duff, 
at least, sees retributive penal harm as having instrumental value, as well, insofar 
as it enables the offender’s reformation and social reintegration.161 Deterrence the-
orists, meanwhile, see penal harm as an instrumental good, as a tool for threatening 
would-be future offenders. If it was not harmful, then it would fail as a deterrent. 
To emphasize this point, that retributivist and deterrent justifications of 
punishment entail intentional penal harming, let us consider Tadros’s examination 
of two famous hypotheticals: 
“Trolley: A trolley is heading on a track toward five people. If D, a 
bystander, does nothing, the five will be killed. D can save the five 
only by pulling a lever diverting the trolley to another track where V 
is situated. V will then be killed.”162 
 
                                               
160 See Joel Feinberg, The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law, Volume 1: Harm to Others (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1987), 31 (defining a “harm” as a “setback to interest”). 
161 See Chapter 1 at 32. 
162 Tadros, “Wrongful Intentions Without Closeness,” supra note 159 at 54 
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“Bridge: D is on a bridge with V. A trolley is heading on a track under 
the bridge toward five people who will be killed if D does nothing. 
D can save the five only by throwing V from the bridge onto the 
tracks. V’s body will stop the trolley, saving the five, but V will be 
killed.”163  
 
Tadros explains how the standard conception of the DDE, with its distinction 
between intended and merely foreseen harms, has some difficulty explaining why 
D’s actions in Bridge are harder to justify than D’s actions in Trolley. Tadros explains 
that in Bridge, just like in Trolley, D does not actually intend to harm V—akin to 
Sophisticated Terror Bomber. 
“D intends to stop the trolley with V’s body. The stopping of the 
trolley with V’s body, though, is not identical to V being harmed. As 
long as the trolley is stopped with V’s body, D completes his plan 
of saving the five, regardless of whether V is harmed.”164  
 
Retributivist and deterrent theorists are not like D in Bridge. They are aiming at the 
harm of offenders as their means or their end, and therefore are clearly intentional 
harmers. By comparison to Bridge, consider a hypothetical I will call Life Force, 
where V’s “life force” somehow powers the trolley, and the only way to stop the 
trolley is to kill V. If D kills V in Life Force, he would be stopping the trolley by 
killing V. The harm to V would be the means by which he realizes his aim; and, 
therefore, we can easily deem him an intentional harmer. With regard to their in-
tention to harm, retributivist and deterrence theorists are like D in Life Force. 
But what about the deterrent prospect of illusory penal harm, punishments 
that merely appeared harmful, such that they deterred others, but which were not 
in fact harmful? Retributivist theorists would, of course, object to illusory penal 
harm, since it would frustrate their ambition to inflict deserved suffering or cen-
sure, which requires the infliction of real penal harm. But could not deterrence 
theorists view illusory penal harm as their ideal, and therefore be said not to clearly 
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intend harm, akin to Sophisticated Terror Bomber? This cannot be the case. Unlike 
Sophisticated Bomber, who only needs the appearance of the civilians’ death to 
last for a short while before she can realize her goal of Enemy’s somehow irre-
versible surrender, deterrence theorists have a goal—protection from crime in 
society—that has an indefinite timeline. The idea that deterrent theorists could aim 
at illusory punishments is thus sophistic, given that people would soon enough 
learn that offenders were not in fact harmed, and the deterrent effect would be 
vitiated. 
By comparison, there is no analytic connection between harm borne by the 
offender and the successful pursuit of what I call “specific prevention” policies. 
These policies—only one instance of which is carceral incapacitation—aim to de-
crease the chances that a specific person offends in the future.165 This aim could 
be realized in any number of non-harmful or even beneficial ways, including ther-
apy and rehabilitation. Indeed, we might “specifically prevent” a career thief by, 
say, guaranteeing him a huge annual income and thereby draining him of the in-
centive to steal. Along these lines, if incarceration was a proportional means of 
specific prevention, and if incarceration happened to be non-harmful, the sen-
tencer concerned only to incapacitate would certainly not object. Indeed, she 
would prefer that the offender was somehow immediately rehabilitated and then 
released upon his first day in prison. Or, in another direction—as indicated 
above—it would pose no problem if prison were somehow an inmate’s private 
Xanadu, where he could lead a flourishing (and crime-free) life. By comparison, 
there is indeed an analytic connection between the infliction of harm and success-
ful retributive or deterrent incarceration. Retributivists would argue that the 
offender does not deserve Xanadu; and deterrence theorists would argue that 
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allowing him to live in such conditions would incentivize crime. Of course, the 
above discussion indicates that it is extremely unlikely that a long-term incarcerated 
offender will in fact flourish during his sentence (or become immediately rehabili-
tated). But that fact does not, in and of itself, mean that the state inflicts carceral 
harm intentionally, given that, as I discuss further below, the incapacitory state is not 
motivated to harm the offender, in the sense that it does not see the offender’s harm 
as an instrumental or intrinsic good. In parallel, it is extremely unlikely that Enemy 
civilians will survive Strategic Bomber’s attack, but we can maintain nonetheless 
that she does not kill them intentionally. 
B. Intent, Motive, and Respect 
Why should we should think that the intend-foresee distinction is a sound 
moral guide? Why is it that Strategic Bomber’s actions are easier to justify than 
Vengeful Terror Bomber’s, if Strategic Bomber knows that the result will be the 
same, in terms of killing innocent children? Why should we believe that intentions 
in such cases actually matter? We do not have a clean answer. But the explanation 
seems to lie in the connections between (a) intent and motive and (b) motive and 
reasons for action. Antony Duff argues that we intend a result when we act “in 
order” to achieve that result, that is, when we are motivated to bring about that 
result.166 He presents the “test of failure” for determining whether a result is in-
tended.167 A result is intended if the actor would consider it a failure if the result 
did not occur. Michael Bratman argues, similarly, that an outcome is intended if 
one engages in means-end reasoning about how to bring it about, screens out al-
ternative intentions inconsistent with the outcome, and endeavors to bring about 
the outcome.168 Intentions, then, are something like motivations in action, and 
motivations matter. Kimberly Kessler Ferzan argues, however, that not all 
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intentions are motivationally significant. She believes that we can intend to bring 
about an outcome without being motivated to bring about that outcome, that is, 
without seeing any reason to bring it about.169 She argues, furthermore: “Because 
intentions are not co-extensive with motivational significance, we would do better 
if our laws and our normative discourse focused directly on motivational signifi-
cance (when relevant) and stopped relying on intentions.”170 If Ferzan’s argument 
succeeds, that does not vitiate the DDE, but rather limits its focus to motivationally 
significant intentions. When using the words intent or intention, then, I mean moti-
vationally significant intent or intention (whether or not all intentions should be 
characterized in this manner).   
But why, to continue, do motivations matter morally? Finnis argues that 
they matter “because free choice matters.”171 
“And the states of affairs which one commits oneself to bringing 
about—one’s instrumental and basic purposes—are precisely those 
identified under the intelligible description which made them seem 
rationally appealing and choosable. And what one thus adopts is, so 
to speak, synthesized with one’s will, i.e., with oneself as an acting 
                                               
169 Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, “Beyond Intention,” Cardozo Law Review 29 (2008): 1147-91. Ferzan’s 
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subject; one becomes what one saw reason to do and chose and set 
oneself to do—in short, what one intended.”172 
 
Duff writes along similar lines: 
“It is through the intentions with which I act that I engage in the 
world as an agent, and relate myself most closely to the actual and 
potential effects of my actions; and the central or fundamental kind 
of wrong-doing is to direct my actions towards evil—to intend and to 
try to do what is evil.”173 
We judge agents, in very large part, on the “why?” question.174 Why did you do 
that? That is, what were you aiming at? Or, more precisely, what reasons did you 
have in mind when you chose to do that? An assessment of one’s intentions—that 
is, one’s motives—is central to answering these questions. To deny that motives 
matter is just to deny, then, that our reasons for acting matter in judging our ac-
tions; and it would entail, at the extreme, an inability to distinguish between even 
purposeful and accidental harms. Vengeful Terror Bomber and Strategic Bomber 
have very different motivations. That is, they positively aim at different outcomes 
and therefore they act for different reasons. This does not mean that Strategic 
Bomber’s actions are necessarily permissible. But it does mean that we can judge 
their actions differently, even though the result is the same. 
This dovetails with the theory of respect discussed in the prior chapter. 
Respect, as I explained, involves the process of seeing the objective value in some-
thing and then responding appropriately, as suggested by the Latin source of 
respect, respicere, which means “to look back at” or “to look again.” It concerns 
one’s subjective process of valuation, and then her non-symbolic and symbolic 
responses to that appraisal. One of these steps has gone awry for Vengeful Terror 
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Bomber. Either she fails to see or behold the civilians’ value, understanding them to 
have the value of Enemy buildings or tanks, or she sees their value but then fails to 
respond appropriately, understanding them to be undeserving of the treatment ac-
corded to “normal,” “good,” or “our” people. In this way, we can see how being 
motivated to destroy someone—to see the destruction of his capacity to realize value 
as a reason in favor of acting—involves a rejection or denial of his value. By com-
parison, Strategic Bomber’s process of valuation with regard to the civilians seems 
very different. She is not motivated to tear the civilians apart; that is, she does not 
see their destruction as a reason in favor of acting. Indeed, she deeply regrets their 
deaths, as evidenced by the fact that she will seek out ways to prevent their occur-
rence, following Walzer.175 There is not the same process of devaluation. The idea 
that Enemy civilians are like tanks or buildings, or that they have less value than 
“normal,” “good,” or “our” humans, does not feature in her reasoning. It seems 
that Strategic Bomber should be able to say to Enemy civilians, “Given the atroc-
ities that I will prevent by achieving my mission of destroying the munitions plant, 
I would drop these bombs even if they risked not your deaths, but the deaths of 
civilians from my own nation.” Respect involves a subjective recognition and ap-
preciation of something’s capacity to exhibit value, whatever it may be—a 
sandcastle, plant, person, etc. Whatever that thing is, it is impossible to recognize 
and appreciate its value while being motivated toward its destruction, while seeing 
its destruction as a reason for action, as an instrumental or intrinsic good. 
Elizabeth Anderson and Richard Pildes make a related argument in a dif-
ferent context, emphasizing the importance of the intend-foresee distinction to 
their “expressivist” theory of US constitutional law.176 The valuation “expressed” 
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by a particular law and therefore its constitutionality, they argue, depends on 
whether the questionable outcome was intended, among other considerations. 
They write on the constitutionality of “protectionist” legislation, by which one US 
state passes a regulation that favors the economic interests of its own residents:  
“As we would put it, protectionist legislation expresses a constitu-
tionally impermissible attitude toward the interests of other States 
in the political union. The harm inflicted on out-of-state interests is 
not a by-product of otherwise legitimate aims, but rather is directly 
intended as a mechanism through which to enhance local economic 
well-being. State A takes economic product from State B producers 
and gives it to State A producers just because they are in State A. 
Such behavior has no place in a genuine political union of any 
kind.”177  
 
They draw the same logic out of speech regulations that disparately impact partic-
ular messages or ideologies,178 as well as on laws that disparately impact racial 
groups.179 The message expressed to the speakers or racial groups in question, they 
explain, depends in part on whether the law intentionally impacts them disparately—
with the state directly motivated to disadvantage them—or whether it does so as a 
byproduct of another state aim.180 They explain, furthermore, that laws which have 
no demonstrable disparate impact can be unconstitutional if they were passed with 
a discriminatory purpose.181 We look beyond consequences when discerning the 
message expressed by state action, they explain, as “attitudes are expressed in the 
                                               
177 Id. at 1554. 
178 Id. at 1545-51. 
179 Id. at 1533-45. 
180 See City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 65-80 (1980) (holding that an at-large electoral system does 
not violate the Fifteenth Amendment just because it has a disproportionate racial impact); Washington 
v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 248 (1976) (holding that a facially neutral law is not unconstitutional solely 
because it has a racially disproportionate impact). 
181 See City of Richmond v United States, 422 U.S. 358 (1975). Richmond annexed land, which decreased 
the percentage of black voters in the city. This did not disparately impact the black community’s voting 
power, since, after annexation, the city converted from at-large to district voting, which favored the 
community. Whether or not the plan in fact decreased the black community’s voting power, the Court 
provided that it could still be unconstitutional if passed for that invidious purpose. Id. at 378-79. The 
Court remanded the case to a lower court, which overturned the annexation after finding that that the 
city indeed had such a purpose.  
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purposes for which people act and the principles that justify their action.”182  “A 
person suffers an expressive harm,” they continue, “in being treated in accordance 
with principles that express inappropriate attitudes toward her.”183  
Whether or not expressivism can ground all of law and morality, as Ander-
son and Pildes believe, it certainly has resonance in the degradation context, so 
long as we are clear on the relationship between “attitudes” and “reasons.” Ander-
son and Pildes can be slippery on this point. “Attitudes” are morally relevant, at 
least on my view, only to the extent that they emanate from one’s reasons and 
valuations. Someone concerned to act morally does not aim directly at having the 
right attitude, but rather at endorsing the right reasons and valuations. Also, the 
term “expressive harm” is too weak, especially in the degradation context (but also, 
one would think, in the racial discrimination context). The offender who has, say, 
experienced penal torture was not merely “expressively harmed.” The expression 
was written on his body, as it were, and the term “expressive harm” risks missing 
this point. Regardless, Anderson and Pildes provide support for a number of ideas 
pursued here: (1) the permissibility of state actions can depend on the valuations 
of people that they express or embody, (2) we must look beyond consequences to 
motivating reasons when interpreting and assessing state actions in this manner, 
and (3) whether or not the questionable outcome was intentional, in the sense that 
the state saw its occurrence as an instrumental or intrinsic good, is of paramount 
importance in making this assessment. 
C. Two Conclusions 
Let us take stock before moving forward. We have been maintaining that 
there are dispositive degradation limitations—that there is a line in the spectrum 
of disrespect above which punishments must not cross, no matter how heinous 
the offender’s crime nor how useful it might be to disrespect the offender to that 
                                               
182 Anderson and Pildes, “Expressivism,” supra note 176 at 1569. 
183 Id. 
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degree. A commitment to the ideal of human inviolability renders treatment above 
this line, like penal torture, impermissible. We are now clarifying the role of intent 
and motive within this story. We held these variables constant in Chapter 2, as-
suming that all the treatment on the spectrum of disrespect was intentionally 
inflicted.184 However, when the degradation-making features of degrading treat-
ment are delivered with intent, for reasons just discussed, that is profoundly more 
disrespectful, all things equal, than doing so accidentally or with mere foresight. 
This is so whether we are talking about symbolic or non-symbolic disrespect. Ac-
cidental symbolical disrespect is indeed possible, say, when you are ignorant of 
social customs (e.g. you offer to shake hands instead of bowing in Japan); this is 
surely less disrespectful than its intentional counterpart (e.g. you know the custom 
of bowing, but refuse out of nationalist pride). With long-term incarceration, 
though, we can focus on the non-symbolic aspects of disrespect, given that prison 
walls are, most importantly, non-symbolic, physical interferences with an inmate’s 
capacity to realize value (insofar as they prevent him from freely associating with 
people in society). 
In Chapter 2, we concluded that above the “dispositive” line, punishment 
rejects the offender’s status as a human, by “ruining” his essentially human capacity 
to realize diachronic value or by embodying the legitimacy of doing so. With this 
intent analysis in mind, we can refine the conclusion. A punishment is impermis-
sibly degrading when the state intentionally ruins the offender in this way as a form 
of punishment, or when it intentionally inflicts harms that embody the legitimacy of 
doing so. That is, our motivation to punish cannot be to ruin offenders or to inflict 
harms that embody the legitimacy of ruining them. 
We can now ask the following question: If (a) treatment that intentionally 
and  severely risks ruining someone’s life embodies the legitimacy of ruining his 
capacity to realize human value and (b) long-term incarceration represents a severe 
                                               
184 See Chapter 2 at 165. 
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risk of ruining an inmate’s life, then (c) does the state bring about this outcome 
intentionally? If it does—as would be the case when it long-term incarcerates for 
the purposes of retribution or deterrence—then, according to theory presented 
here, it is impermissibly degrading (Conclusion 1). If it does not—as it would be 
the case when the state long-term incarcerates for the sole purpose of incapacita-
tion—then we must ask the subsidiary questions of whether the state has met the 
demands of proportionality and minimization (Conclusion 2). Let us consider these 
two conclusions further. 
D. Motivated to Ruin 
Supporters of retributivist or deterrent long-term incarceration might ob-
ject that they are not motivated to ruin offenders’ lives, nor to severely risk that 
outcome. All they want is for offenders to experience a certain amount of suffer-
ing, consistent with their retributive desert or efficient crime deterrence. Perhaps 
they do not want 20 years in prison to be like living in Xanadu, they might continue, 
but that does not mean that they want to ruin offender’s lives. They might insist, 
indeed, that they would much prefer that offenders’ lives not be ruined. This is 
akin, however, to someone (say, Francis) arguing that all she wanted to do was to 
inflict physical pain on another (say, George) by repeatedly punching him in the 
face; she didn’t want to give him a black eye, and she would have much preferred if 
she could have caused George pain consistent with repeatedly punching him in the 
face without giving him a black eye. We cannot guarantee the result of any of our 
actions; we cast risks of good and bad outcomes with everything we do. And the 
pertinent question, I believe, is whether or not one is motivated to harm. Does the agent 
see the infliction of harm as a reason for action, like D in Life Force or Vengeful 
Terror Bomber? If one is indeed motivated to inflict harm, as either her means or 
her end, then we should understand her to positively aim at the full range of harms 
that her actions at least severely risk bringing about (and of which she was aware 
or perhaps ought to have been aware). Francis was motivated to harm George and 
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she succeeded; she could not have been sure which of the array of specific harms 
that she severely risked bringing about would emerge.  
If one is not motivated to harm, however, the analysis must be different. 
Consider a mother who drops her baby from the roof of a burning building, hop-
ing that the baby survives, but knowing that it is extremely likely—indeed, a 
“virtual certainty”—that the baby will die from the fall.185 She was never motivated 
to cause harm to her baby and so we cannot say that she aimed at the array of 
harms that her actions might cause. As such, if the baby dies, we ought not deem 
her an intentional or obliquely intentional killer. Recounting the statistical likeli-
hood of her action causing the baby’s death, and the fact that she knew of this 
likelihood, is not enough to consider her morally equivalent to someone who, with 
the same knowledge, was motivated to hurt the baby by dropping it from the roof. 
We need the DDE and the focus on motivations to reach this sensible conclusion, 
and to avoid the legal outcome that the mother obliquely intended to kill her 
baby.186  
Along these lines, Adam Kolber argues that retributivist theorists must ac-
count for all the harmful impacts of the prison experience. They cannot pick and 
choose, and maintain that only “purposeful” deprivations count as punishment or 
retribution. He asks us to consider two equally blameworthy offenders, Purp and 
Fore: 
“They are alike in all pertinent respects and receive identical sen-
tences in identical prisons. The only difference between them is that 
different aspects of their sentences are imposed intentionally. Purp 
is purposely limited in his liberty to move about, see family, have 
                                               
185 In R v Woollin [1999] A.C. 82 (providing that a jury can declare a defendant an intentional killer 
when death was a “virtual certainty” as a result of his actions, and he was aware of that fact). 
186 In R v Matthews and Alleyne [2003] EWCA Crim 192 (CA), the Court of Appeal clarified that when 
the Woollin standard is met the jury is entitled to find that the defendant killed intentionally, but that 
such a finding is not strictly required as a matter of substantive law. One instance where we should 
not find the defendant to be an intentional killer, even though she appreciated that her actions entailed 
a virtual certainty of death, is where she was not motivated to harm the decedent, as in the example of 
the mother and baby. This conclusion flows directly from the understanding that intentions matter, in 
very large part, only insofar as they are motivationally significant. 
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sex, express himself, possess personal property, vote, and so on. By 
contrast, Fore is purposely limited in moving about, but all of his 
other hardships are merely foreseen accoutrements of prison.”187 
 
Kolber explains that, if only “purposeful” deprivations count as punish-
ment or retribution, it would require the absurd conclusion that Fore was punished 
to a lesser degree than Purp, given that fewer harms were inflicted on him purpos-
ively. This would entail the yet more absurd conclusion that Fore deserves a longer 
sentence than Purp to account for his less severe punishment. Kolber only dis-
cusses retributive punishment. He does not consider how his argument relates to 
deterrent or incapacitory punishments. But, given the above discussion, the impli-
cations are relatively straightforward. We should understand the conclusion to be 
that when the state is motivated to harm offenders, as with retributive or deterrent 
punishment, the state must be deemed to have intentionally inflicted the full array 
of harms the punishment severely risks bringing about; when the state is not moti-
vated to harm offenders, however, as with specific prevention, this conclusion 
does not follow. To (A) restrict someone’s access to free society for 20 years for 
the intrinsic or instrumental purpose of harming him is to (B) harm him by severely 
limiting his access to associational, temporal goods, which, in turn, is to (C) se-
verely risk ruining his life. To intend A is to intend B and C, too. As such, 
retributivist or deterrence theorists, who are motivated to harm offenders via long-
term incarceration, cannot escape the dispositive degradation limitation. The pun-
ishment they endorse is egregiously disrespectful—to the humanity-denying 
degree—of offenders and their diachronic capacities of value generation. In sum, 
the maximum available sentence for the pursuit of deterrence or retribution must 
be “non-long-term.” It must not represent a severe risk of ruining an offender’s 
life, just in virtue of the amount of time that he is separated from free society. This 
determination is unavoidably vague, as discussed above, but it will not be difficult 
                                               
187 Kolber, “Unintentional Punishment,” supra note 11 at 3. 
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to identify communities, like contemporary America and Britain, that reject this 
principle or fail to apply it in good faith. 
 Let us consider a final, related objection to Conclusion 1. What if the 
state—or the collection of people charged with determining sentences—is not ac-
tually aware that long-term incarceration represents a severe risk of ruining an 
offender’s life? How, in those cases, could long-term incarceration represent an 
intentional denial of someone’s essentially human value?188 I argued myself that 
the deprivation of associational, temporal functionings is a “quiet” injury that is all 
too easy to overlook. Is long-term incarceration for the purposes of retribution or 
deterrence impermissibly degrading only when the state has awareness of these 
deprivations and therefore of the life-ruining component? We can assume that 
Francis was aware that she was risking a black eye for George when she punched 
him repeatedly. But what if the retributivist or deterrent state is not aware of the 
life-ruining risk of long-term incarceration? This objection is not especially worri-
some. The state surely has a positive duty to know what it is doing to people when 
it inflicts penal harm on them, lest it inflict a disproportionate and undeserved 
amount or type of harm. The very failure to look into the matter would evince the 
lack of respect for the offender’s capacity to build a good life that we have deemed 
impermissibly degrading. 
E. Proportional Long-Term Incapacitation 
I have argued that, with regard to the motivation to inflict harm, long-term incar-
ceration for the sole purpose of incapacitation is like Strategic Bombing, while 
long-term incarceration for the purpose of retribution or deterrence is like Venge-
ful Terror Bombing. The conclusion, though, was that, even if the latter is flatly 
                                               
188 Can the state—a corporate entity—even have “awareness” of facts and have related “intentions” 
or “attitudes” that evince respect or disrespect? For a careful argument that it can, see Anderson and 
Pildes, supra note 176 at 1514-27. Duff’s theory of punishment depends on answering this in the af-
firmative as well, with his vision of the community as a whole speaking to and censuring the offender 
via state punishment. Cf. Enoch, “Intending,” supra note 155 at 84-91. 
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impermissible, the former is permissible only if it meets the proportionality and 
minimization requirements. What do these two requirements demand in the con-
text of incapacitory long-term incarceration? I will consider five distinct issues.189 
1. Evidential Assumptions 
Proportionality analysis here concerns whether long-term incarceration is 
proportional to the threat of future crime posed by the offender. Determining this 
threat level depends upon challenging evidential questions, as briefly considered in 
Chapter 1 in relation to the social defense theory.190 Which types of evidence ought 
to be admissible? Surely, to have any hope of legitimacy, the central form of evi-
dence must be past instances of offending. But what is the role, if any, for actuarial 
statistics? How high should the state’s burden of proof be in establishing that the 
offender will commit future crimes? Presumably, it should be “beyond a reasona-
ble doubt”?191 Who ought to be empowered to make factual determinations (e.g. 
judge, multiple judges, jury of six, jury of twelve, psychiatrist, jury of psychiatrists, 
parole board)? Should we answer any of these questions differently when consid-
ering a sentence of incapacitation versus a sentence concerned with retribution or 
deterrence, where the issue is not what a person will do in the future, but what they 
did in the past?192 What if, as would likely be the case, the trial concerns both 
                                               
189 In Chapter 1, I argued that carceral incapacitation could, in rare cases, be a permissible form of 
social defensive punishment. As I discuss further in the Conclusion, what follows should thus be 
understood to form part of the social defense theory. 
190 See generally Mike Redmayne, Character in the Criminal Trial (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015). 
See Chapter 1 at 65-6. 
191 Cf. Carol Steiker, “Proportionality as a Limit on Preventive Justice: Promises and Pitfalls,” in eds. 
Andrew Ashworth, Lucia Zedner, and Patrick Tomlin, Prevention and the Limits of the Criminal Law (Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 194-213, at 202 (“The degree of procedural reliability that is 
required increases with the intrusiveness of the preventive intervention at issue, with long-term con-
finement requiring the greatest assurances of reliability.”); Michael Louis Corrado, “Punishment and 
the Wild Beast of Prey,” Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 86 (1996): 778-814, at 793-94 (arguing 
that the burden of proof ought to be lower for preventive detention than for backwards-looking pun-
ishment, because inaccuracy in the former case has greater costs, in the form of people harmed by 
those we ought to have detained). 
192 Note that forward-looking social defensive punishment, aiming to erase an offender’s ongoing crim-
inality contributions, could be geared toward deterrence and not incapacitation. See Chapter 1 at 58-9. 
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backward- and forward-looking questions? This is a very small subset of the many 
complex questions that we must answer in order to justify any form of preventive 
treatment, let alone preventive long-term incarceration.193 All of this is rife with 
the possibility for abuse, of course, with regard to the presumption of innocence 
and the broader prohibition on merely sacrificing individuals toward the greater 
good of crime prevention.194 Imagine, say, that the state could appeal only to actu-
arial statistics (e.g. about people from certain postcodes who pray at certain 
mosques), with the defendant bearing the burden of proof to establish with suffi-
cient confidence that he is committed to the authority of the law and the rights of 
others. Nonetheless, let us move forward with the assumption that the evidential 
questions can in some cases be answered sufficiently well, such that preventative 
treatment can in those cases be a legitimate and practicable penal reason. Consider, 
at the extreme, a serial killer who himself insists that he will try to kill again.195 To 
be clear, though, if this assumption proves altogether too brave, with sufficiently 
reliable predictions elusive or with the possibility of abuse uncontainable, then in-
capacitation would be impermissible. 
2. Life-Ruining Harm and the State’s Burden 
If the assumption indeed holds, the next question to consider is as follows. 
What would need to be proven at the incapacitation trial—or the incapacitation 
phase of the trial—in terms of an offender’s threat level, for long-term incarcera-
tion to be a proportionate means of incapacitation? Given that long-term 
incarceration involves, at a minimum, depriving someone of the freedom of 
                                               
193 For further discussion, see, e.g., Norval Morris, “Keynote Address: Predators and Politics,” Puget 
Sound Law Review 15 (1992): 517-23; D.J. Cooke and C. Michi, “Limitations of diagnostic precision and 
predictive utility in the individual case: a challenge for forensic practice,” Law and Human Behavior 34 
(2010): 259-74. 
194 See Peter Ramsay, The Insecurity State: Vulnerable Autonomy and the Right to Security in the Criminal Law 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012); Bernard Harcourt, Against Prediction: Profiling, Policing, and 
Punishing in an Actuarial Age (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2007). See also Chapter 
1 at 59-66. 
195 For real-world examples rather close to this, see Christopher Slobogin, “A Jurisprudence of Dan-
gerousness,” Northwestern Law Review 98 (2003): 1-62, at 1. 
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general association for many years, what needs to be proven, at a minimum, is that 
the state will prevent an equal or greater risk of life-ruining harm from being in-
flicted on at least one other person.196 Perhaps it ought to be understood as a 
statistical matter in terms of (a) the probability of harm inflicted or prevented and 
(b) the degree of harm inflicted or prevented, keeping in mind that we are less than 
100% sure than the offender will offend, but we are certain that we will inflict grave 
injuries on the offender via long-term incarceration. We might frame the question 
in this manner: Are we sufficiently convinced that the offender will inflict depriva-
tions on others as or more damaging than the potentially life-ruining deprivations 
that we will inflict upon him? This would seem to limit long-term incarceration to 
the prevention of the most severe offenses (e.g. murder, rape, child sexual abuse, 
and grievous bodily harm). If someone were extremely likely to, say, steal a car in 
the future, then long-term incarceration would be disproportionate and impermis-
sible. With this framework in mind, it seems that the first question that needs to 
be answered in the affirmative, so as to justify a term of incarceration that could 
well become long-term incarceration, ought to be at least close to this: Is it beyond 
a reasonable doubt that the offender will attempt to kill, rape, sexually abuse a 
child, or commit grievous bodily harm in the future, if he is not incarcerated? 
There is, however, a complication. What if it’s not one car, but 1,000 cars? 
Would not the inconvenience and economic cost to the 1,000 car owners equate 
to one life? What about 5,000 cars? I argued above that, when considering in-
trapersonal harms—100 days in prison for one person vs. 10,000 days in prison for 
that same person—there is a qualitative difference between those harms that se-
verely risk ruining a person’s life and those that do not. Implied was the conclusion 
that life-ruining harms are not only qualitatively worse than non-life-ruining harms 
for an individual, but also lexically worse. If we imagine non-life ruining harms on 
                                               
196 See id. at 20 (arguing that, given the grave harm it causes, preventive detention ought to be limited 
to exceptional cases). 
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one side (e.g. common allergies) and harms that severely risk ruining one’s life on 
the other (e.g. brain damage), no amount of non-life-ruining harm for an individual 
could be worse for that individual than a single life-ruining harm.197 This follows 
straightforwardly from the conclusion that value and disvalue need to be under-
stand in the context of a person’s life as a whole. Though the logic is not as tight, I 
think that we can extend this argument to the distinct issue of interpersonal harms. 
The idea is that a life-ruining harm for one person is worse, impartially considered, 
than any amount of non-life ruining harm inflicted on other people. This would lead 
us to conclude, again, that long-term incarceration is justifiable only when the per-
son is sufficiently likely to commit potentially life-ruining offenses like murder, 
rape, child sexual abuse, and grievous bodily harm were he released. Prevention of 
a great amount of non-life ruining harm, like the prevention of many car thefts, 
would not suffice. There is, however, an ongoing debate on when and how to 
aggregate harms when making interpersonal comparisons. It derives in large part 
from Thomas Scanlon’s hypothetical: Should we allow someone to be very pain-
fully shocked for 15 minutes, or save him from the pain at the cost of billions of 
people missing the final 15 minutes of a World Cup match?198 I think the concept 
of a life-ruining harm and the idea that life-ruining harms are lexically worse than 
non-life ruining harms can illuminate this debate. But I will not engage with the 
details of the contending arguments. Let us move forward with what I think is the 
intuitive position, that only preventing a life-ruining harm can justify inflicting a 
life-ruining harm, but with the understanding that the debate exists, and that how-
ever it concludes will decisively impact our analysis. If the counter-intuitive 
position prevails, such that we ought to, say, let a person die so that the billions 
                                               
197 This assumes that the putatively non-life ruining harms in question do not aggregate into a harm 
that severely risks ruining one’s life (e.g. one’s allergies, in combination, could be so bad that she has 
to live in a sanitized, indoor environment and loses the capacity to engage with the world in valuable 
ways). 
198 Thomas Scanlon, What We Owe To Each Other (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1998), 235. 
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can enjoy one extra scoop of ice cream during their lives, then long-term incapac-
itation would be proportionate if the collective harms the offender is sufficiently likely 
to cause would be as or more damaging, considered together, than severely risking 
the ruin of a single person’s life by denying him associative opportunities.  
3. Rehabilitation and Release 
 The third issue concerns the offender’s right to prove that he is no longer 
sufficiently unreliable with regard to upholding the criminal law for his incarcera-
tion to be proportional. The logic of long-term incapacitatory incarceration 
depends upon the offender maintaining a set of normative commitments that in-
volves denying the authority of the law and the rights of other people as an ongoing 
matter.199 Once that set of commitments changes sufficiently, such that the evi-
dential requirements for incapacitation are not met, then at that moment further 
incarceration becomes disproportional. Accordingly, the state ought to provide the 
offender with regular opportunities to prove that he no longer meets the evidential 
requirements.200 As Andrew Ashworth and Lucia Zedner write, “the absence of 
periodic review and impossibility of release suggests that the preventive element is 
subsidiary to the punitive.”201 It would seem, furthermore, that the burden ought 
to remain on the state to prove that the offender warrants further incapacitation.202 
As a corollary to these concerns, and as part of its minimization duty, the state 
must provide the incarcerated offender with appropriate educational or psycho-
logical resources, which might aid his rehabilitation.203 There is a certain analogy 
                                               
199 See Chapter 1 at 57-8.    
200 See Steiker, “Proportionality,” supra note 191 at 198, 203-4; Rinat Kitai-Sangero, “The Limits of 
Preventive Detention,” McGeorge Law Review 40 (2016): 903-34, at 298. 
201 Ashworth and Zedner, Preventive Justice, supra note 165 at 156. 
202 California’s “Sexually Violent Predator” law requires an application for extension every two years, 
at which point it must be determined at trial beyond a reasonable doubt that the offender fulfils the 
criteria for confinement. James Vess, “Preventive Detention versus Civil Confinement: Alternative 
Policies for Protection in New Zealand and California,” Psychiatry, Psychology and Law 12 (2005): 357–
66, at 360-62.  
203 See Case of M. v Germany (App no. 19359/04) IHLR 3709 (ECHR 2009), at para [129] (“persons 
subject to preventive detention orders must be afforded such support and care as part of a genuine 
attempt to reduce the risk that they will reoffend, thus serving the purpose of crime prevention and 
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between incapacitory incarceration and quarantine204; and we can understand the 
analogy here to involve the quarantining authority’s duty to regularly test the per-
son confined to ensure that she no longer has the disease, or is no longer 
contagious, as well as to provide medical care, so as to bring her back to health 
sooner.  
With regard to the state’s appreciation of the offender’s diachronic capaci-
ties, this sharpens the difference between incapacitory long-term incarceration and 
retributive or deterrent long-term incarceration. The incapacitory sentencer revisits 
the issue regularly, let us say every six to twelve months. At each interval, she hopes 
that the offender will rehabilitate himself in the interim and she will provide him 
with great resources toward this end; though, she knows that he very well may not 
rehabilitate himself, in part because prison is not the ideal environment for reha-
bilitation, and thus that she is adding 6-12 months to what may end up as a very 
long term.205 In this way, it is not long-term incarceration, but potentially long-term 
incarceration. At no point does she declare, as the retributive and deterrent long-
term sentencer will: “Go away from free society for 20 years.” She says: “Come 
back in 6-12 months.” There is thus not the same process, or the same moment, 
of seeing the offender’s life as a whole and then deciding to effectively erase a large 
portion. Of course, a reasonable retributive or deterrent sentencer will also be 
committed to providing the offender with opportunities for rehabilitation, but we 
are assuming—as is often the case in the US and the UK—that successful rehabil-
itation will not reduce the retributive or deterrent sentence, or at least will not 
                                               
making their release possible’); cf. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 US 346 (1997) (approving Hendrick’s con-
finement under Kansas’s “Sexually Violent Predator” law, even though the State had failed to prove 
him with therapeutic resources). See also Slobogin, “A Jurisprudence of Dangerousness,” supra note 
196 at 16. 
204 See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 34-35 (1905). 
205 Given that prison is not the ideal environment for rehabilitation, any argument that incarceration, 
long-term or otherwise, can be justified purely on rehabilitative grounds is immediately suspect. At 
best, rehabilitation in the prison context is a component of penal parsimony, as successful rehabilitation 
might limit the costs, both to the offender and to society, of pursuing whatever aim in fact justifies his 
confinement. See discussion supra at note 135. 
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reduce it to a “non-long-term” sentence. To be clear, this does not accurately por-
tray every real-world sentencer concerned to incapacitate. Often, their message 
indeed is: “Go away from free society for 20 years.” Nonetheless, we are examining 
principle here, and the point is that the logic of incapacitation could coherently em-
body a different message when it comes to long-term incarceration, by comparison 
to the logic of retribution and deterrence.  
This issue relates to the ECHR’s “right to hope” line of cases, which hold 
that life sentences without the possibility for parole violate Article 3 of the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights.206 Article 3 prohibits torture as well as 
“inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.” The judges were concerned, 
mainly, to prevent terms of incarceration that, given an offender’s rehabilitation, 
were no longer justifiable by reference to a member state’s penal rationale.  
“The Convention does not prohibit the imposition of a life sentence 
on those convicted of especially serious crimes, such as murder. Yet 
to be compatible with Article 3 such a sentence must be reducible 
de jure and de facto, meaning that there must be both a prospect of 
release for the prisoner and a possibility of review. The basis of such 
review must extend to assessing whether there are legitimate peno-
logical grounds for the continuing incarceration of the prisoner. 
These grounds include punishment, deterrence, public protection 
and rehabilitation.”207 
 
In this way, the Court aimed to establish a punishment limitation “internal” to the 
state’s positive theory of punishment. Do the reasons that you, Member State, have 
to inflict penal harm justify the offender’s continued incarceration? If not, the 
Court concludes, the offender’s further incarceration violates Article 3. While we 
are maintaining that long-term incarceration for the reason of incapacitation is, in 
some cases, not impermissibly degrading, the “internal” proportionality question 
                                               
206 Vinter and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], (App nos. 66069/09, 130/10 and 3896/10) [2013] 
ECHR 786; Trabelsi v Belgium (App no. 140/10) [2014] ECHR 893; Hutchinson v. the United Kingdom (App 
no. 57592/08) [2017] ECHR 65. See discussion of Article 3 in Chapter 2 at 106-110. 
207 Hutchinson, supra note 206 at para [42]. 
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nonetheless remains, as the Court understands, with regard to the amount and 
degree of carceral incapacitation, and it requires the possibility of “review” and 
“release.” In a few places, the Court does gesture toward a more robust external 
stop on the pursuit of non-rehabilitative penal rationales—akin to a dispositive 
degradation limitation—which would guarantee offenders the opportunity for re-
lease upon their rehabilitation, as a matter of their “human dignity.”208 Regardless, 
the most recent case, Hutchinson v the UK, limited the scope of the legal “right to 
hope” dramatically. The ECHR provided that an offender’s life term would be 
legal, so long as there was some chance, even a very remote chance, of release upon 
his rehabilitation, as set out in advance by relatively clear procedures. The Court 
found that Hutchinson’s life term was acceptable, given the UK Secretary of State’s 
power to release him, as set out in Section 30 of the Crime (Sentences) Act:  
“(1) The Secretary of State may at any time release a life prisoner on 
licence if he is satisfied that exceptional circumstances exist which 
justify the prisoner’ s release on compassionate grounds.”209  
 
The ECHR followed the (England and Wales) Court of Appeal’s judgment in R v. 
McLoughlin in holding that the “exceptional circumstances” and “compassionate 
grounds” language did not unduly limit the Secretary of State to the current prac-
tice of releasing offenders only when they were terminally ill, bedridden, or 
similarly limited.210 Such a thoroughly discretionary regime (“The Secretary of State 
may at any time release a life prisoner”), with a customarily if not necessarily legally 
constrained standard for release (“exceptional circumstances exist”), one that fur-
thermore denies offenders’ regular occasions to prove their rehabilitation, would 
be far too limited an opportunity for release when it comes to the logic of incapac-
itory long-term incarceration set out here. 
 
                                               
208 See Vinter, supra note 206 at para [113]. See also Judge Power-Forde’s concurrence, id. at 54.  
209 The Crime (Sentences) Act 1997, s.30(1). 
210 R  v. McLoughlin [2014] EWCA Crim 188. 
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4. Mixed Motives 
 The fourth issue concerns the question of “mixed motives.” Let us assume 
that the state has proven with sufficient confidence that the offender is sufficiently 
likely to, say, kill or rape again, such that long-term incapacitation—or, more pre-
cisely, potentially long-term incapacitation—is proportional. What if, however, the 
state does not only want to incapacitate the offender, but also has “retributive ha-
tred” for him and wants to make him suffer by preventing him from associating 
with other people outside of prison for thirty years?211 If the incapacitory penal 
motivation is permissible, but the retributive motivation is not—given that it em-
bodies a rejection of the offender’s essentially human value—is the offender’s 
long-term incarceration as a whole permissible? I think the answer has to be yes. 
Imagine that A is running across a very long hall toward B with sword, clearly 
intending to kill B. B has a gun and, when A is in range, he shoots at B. B has 
mixed motives, though. He wants to stop A’s attack and save his own life, but he 
also wants to act out his anger towards A by killing him. Indeed, as he sees A 
running across the hall, B makes a promise to himself that if he is able to prevent 
A’s attack without killing him, then he will later kill him in cold blood, as a matter 
of revenge. If B has no less harmful way of defending himself, it seems clear that 
he is permitted to shoot A, even if by doing so he acts upon an improper motive 
at the same time. To bring the analogy around, it would entail that if long-term 
incarceration is genuinely justified for incapacitory reasons, just like B is genuinely 
justified in shooting in self-defense, then it will be justified even if the state acts 
for impermissible reasons of retribution or deterrence at the same time. The justi-
fication of long-term incarceration will, however, still depend on the state fulfilling 
                                               
211 See Jeffrie G. Murphy, “Retributive Hatred: An Essay on Criminal Liability and the Emotions,” in 
eds.  
R. G. Frey and Christopher W. Morris, Liability and Responsibility: Essays in Law and Morals (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1991). 
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its “minimization” duty, as I discuss further presently, which it will be much less 
likely to fulfill if it also long-term incarcerates for reasons of retribution.212         
5. Non-Carceral Incapacitation and Penal Deprivation 
If long-term incarceration indeed represented a proportional means of in-
capacitation, given the severity of the offense or offenses that the inmate is 
sufficiently likely to commit, the “minimization of harm” question remains none-
theless. This involves at least two distinct components. First, the long-term 
incarcerating state has a duty to ensure that the punishment entails the smallest 
degree of deprivation possible beyond the unavoidable deprivation of the freedom 
of general association. While there will be constraints on resources, inevitably, the 
state has a duty to make incapacitory long-term incarceration much more like the 
Bastoy, and much less like San Quinten, to say nothing of the ADX Florence.213 
Second, just as the Strategic Bomber must, if possible, bomb the munitions factory 
without causing the children’s death, the incapacitating state must see if there are 
means less harmful than long-term incarceration of securing protection for other 
people in society. For instance, perhaps monitoring, tracking, probation, or some 
combination thereof, would be sufficient.214 While all such methods entail, among 
other things, a severe loss of privacy, the loss of privacy is surely greater within 
prison, to say nothing of the other deprivations inherent to incarceration. Most 
importantly, those non-carceral forms of restraint need not significantly limit one’s 
ability to associate with family, friends, and colleagues. I cannot determine here 
                                               
212 See Thomas Scanlon, Moral Dimensions: Permissibility, Meaning, Blame (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 
2008), 12 (arguing that an agent’s intention can have “predictive significance” in terms of how she will 
respond to real-world options). 
213 See Ashworth and Zedner, Preventive Justice, supra note 165 at 169. 
214 See generally Mike Nellis, Kristel Beyens, and Dan Kaminski (eds.), Electronically Monitored Punishment: 
International and Critical Perspectives (New York: Routledge, 2013); Mike Nellis, “Understanding the Elec-
tronic Monitoring of Offenders in Europe: Expansion, Regulation and Prospects,” Crime, Law and 
Social Change 62 (2014): 489-510; Kirsty Hudon and Trevor Jones, “Satellite Tracking of Offenders and 
Integrated Offender Management: A Local Case Study,” Howard Journal of Crime and Justice 55 (2016): 
188-206; Brian K. Payne and Matthew DeMichele, “Sex offender policies: Considering unanticipated 
consequences of GPS sex offender monitoring,” Aggression and Violent Behavior 16 (2011): 177-187. 
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whether non-carceral forms of protection are sufficient for those especially dan-
gerous individuals for whom incarceration would otherwise represent a 
proportionate means of incapacitation. We can conclude, at a minimum, that the 
state has a duty to find out, especially given recent advances in technology.  
Conclusion 
This chapter was concerned to assess the permissibility of long-term incar-
ceration by reference to our degradation limitations. It examined the wide array of 
possible deprivations inherent to incarceration simpliciter before arguing that the 
deprivational minimum and essence of incarceration is the denial of the freedom 
of general association. It then argued that, regardless of prison quality, denying an 
offender the freedom of general association for a long enough period of time 
makes it extremely difficult for him to realize certain temporal and associational 
goods which are constitutive of a good life. Long-term incarceration, in this way, 
represents a severe risk of ruining an offender’s life. This chapter continued that 
the permissibility of long-term incarceration depends on whether or not the state 
is motivated to harm the offender. If the state is so motivated, in accordance with 
retributivist or deterrent theories of punishment, then long-term incarceration sur-
passes a dispositive degradation limitation. It is impermissible morally, violating 
our most basic liberal commitment to human inviolability, and it ought to be illegal. 
It disrespects the offender in a manner that is not qualitatively different than penal 
torture, insofar as both “ruin” the offender’s capacity to realize human value or 
embody the legitimacy of doing so. This chapter concluded, however, that if the 
state long-term incarcerates purely for reasons of incapacitation, such that it is in 
no way motivated to harm the offender, then long-term incarceration can in prin-
ciple be permissible, so long as it is proportional to the offender’s established threat 
of harm, and so long as the state fulfills its duty to minimize penal harm.
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Conclusion 
This thesis has attempted to outline a distinctly liberal conception of the 
criminal law and criminal sentencing. The underlying question has been this: how 
much and what sort of harm may the state inflict on an offender, given that, con-
sistent with our liberal ideals, he is inviolable? In pursuing this question, I have 
argued that two sets of reasons are determinative: the reasons that justify the in-
fliction of penal harm and the reasons that limit the infliction of degrading 
punishments. While these sets of reasons are relatively independent from one an-
other, as I argued in the Introduction, both are grounded upon the same 
commitment to individual inviolability. 
A. Corrective Justice and Social Defense 
 In Part I, I explained that this commitment is constitutive of a moral prin-
ciple: we must not sacrifice individuals as a means of mitigating harms or threats 
for which they are not responsible. The challenge, in justifying the infliction of any 
penal harm, is to understand how this principle is consistent with the practice of 
deterrent punishment. When it comes to deterrent punishment, the state harms an 
offender for the purpose of scaring off would-be future offenders, for whom the 
offender has no responsibility. How is this not in violation of the non-sacrifice 
principle? In responding to this challenge, I first considered and ruled out possible 
utilitarian, retributivist, and Hegelian solutions. I then examined the function of 
the criminal law as a state institution. I argued that its function is to provide citizens 
with a system of protections—protections against murder, rape, assault, and so 
forth—which they can rely upon for their assured civic liberty. An effective crim-
inal law thus enables the pursuit of the associational human good that I forwarded 
in Chapter 3, by affording the possibility of secure human interactions. I then ar-
gued that an offender hinders the institutional aims of the criminal law, and thereby 
diminishes the assured liberty of people within the jurisdiction when he fails to 
self-apply a criminal law norm. When he does this, he contributes to the social 
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threat of “criminality.” Criminality—the objective threat of crime within a jurisdic-
tion—represents a form of socio-legal pollution. It chills the exercise of our rights, 
forces us to take expensive precautions, and exposes us to unreasonable risks of 
harm. The offender thus has a duty, owed to society as a whole, to repair the harm 
caused by his criminality contributions. The presence of this duty, I argued, ex-
plains how the infliction of deterrent punishment can be consistent with his 
inviolability. When the state harms him as a prudential warning to would-be future 
offenders, it not merely sacrificing him for the greater good, to mitigate a problem 
for which he has no responsibility. The state is rather enforcing an equitable rem-
edy in response to his own wrongdoing. It is compelling him to fulfill his own 
personal duty to “erase” his criminality contributions. Over time, ideally—with 
future offenders appropriately deterred—it would be as if he had never contrib-
uted to criminality at all, in terms of the average threat level faced by society. 
This conceptual framework, I explained, entails two related theories of pun-
ishment: the corrective justice and the social defense theories of punishment. The 
corrective justice theory concerns the offender’s past criminality contributions, 
while the social defense theory concerns the offender’s possibly ongoing criminality 
contributions. The two theories, while both conceiving of punishment as a means 
of repairing criminality contributions, have very different evidential bases. With 
the corrective justice theory, the completed or attempted past offense is dispositive 
proof that the offender contributed to criminality in the past and thus that he owes 
a duty of rectification. What evidence suffices to prove that the social defense the-
ory applies—such that the offender is unreasonably unreliable with regard to 
upholding the criminal law as an ongoing matter—is considerably more fraught. 
The corrective justice and social defense theories generate three “internal” 
punishment limits, I argued—that is, three limits associated with the demand to 
inflict penal harm only insofar as it furthers the realization of its own justificatory 
goods. According to these two theories, legitimate punishment must be (1) 
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parsimonious, (2) reparative, and (3) equitable. The limitations ought to be consid-
ered in that order. Before asking whether it is equitable, we ask whether it is 
reparative; and before asking if it is reparative, we ask if it is parsimonious. Penal 
harm is parsimonious when it acts to deter criminality and when it is the most effi-
cient use of crime prevention resources. This first limit derives from the two 
theories’ non-retributivism. That is, the two theories conceive of penal harm as, at 
best, an instrumental and not an intrinsic good. Penal harm is reparative when it is 
the means by which the offender fulfills his duty of repair. Thus, if Alex, with his 
intention to steal a car, increased criminality by 10 units, he (and other car thieves) 
can be harmed to deter 10 units of criminality, but no more. Beyond the 10 unit mark, 
any further harm would be non-reparative. It would be an impermissible violation of 
the non-sacrifice principle. It might be beneficial for society to inflict further harms 
upon him, but securing those benefits is not his responsibility. Finally, penal harm 
is equitable when it is not entirely out of proportion to the stringency of the of-
fender’s duty of repair. This limitation applies—or would apply—in those cases 
where penal harm was somehow inefficient. If, in the case of Alex and other car 
thieves, the only way to generate their respective 10 units of deterrence was to 
incarcerate them for 30 years each, the two theories would deem such a punish-
ment inequitable and therefore impermissible. Such a degree of harm would bear 
the entirely wrong relationship or proportion to the stringency of Alex’s own duty 
and to the reparative benefit gained by society as a result. 
While the deterrent threat of at least some state punishment is almost cer-
tainly necessary for maintaining civic order in modern society, as I argued, these 
three internal limitations would rule out the US Federal Sentencing Guidelines, at 
least, as impermissibly severe. This results from the tenuous relationship between 
sentence severity and deterrence, as well as all that we might otherwise do with 
crime preventative resources, from increased investment in childhood education 
to increased police presence. That is, the extremely long American sentences inflict 
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merely wanton or gratuitous harm, with the state wasting its crime preventive re-
sources on injuring and warehousing offenders, who are forced to bear harms that 
have little relationship to their own personal duties of repair. The ideal from the 
perspective of the two theories is low levels of criminality and low sentence sever-
ity; certain European nations have proven that this is not overly idealistic, though 
I emphasized that many variables contribute to such an outcome. Finally, these 
three internal limitations cannot ground all of our intuitive sentencing principles 
regarding the pursuit of deterrence. Were the offender’s criminality contributions 
especially severe, these limits could not rule out long-term incarceration for the 
purpose of deterrence—or any other severely degrading punishment—as an inter-
nal matter of principle. They could only rule them out, as I explained, as a 
contingent empirical matter regarding the deterrent impact of such punishments. 
This was a key point. Degradation could very well be parsimonious, reparative, and 
equitable. There is nothing conceptually incoherent in that statement. 
While the corrective justice and social defense theories are primarily con-
cerned to justify a schedule of deterrent punishments, I argued that the social 
defense theory can also justify forms of specific prevention, including carceral in-
capacitation. But, once more, why does this forward-looking theory not always 
justify carceral incapacitation? There are two reasons, as I explained. First, depend-
ing on the structure of the prison and the types of criminal norms that the offender 
is failing to self-apply, carceral incapacitation may simply shunt the costs of an 
offender’s unreliability with regard to the criminal law onto other imprisoned of-
fenders, who do not lose their right to the criminal law’s protections inside prison. 
As such, the offender’s duty to erase his ongoing criminality contributions would 
often remain unfulfilled unless his imprisonment acted to deter other offenders. 
Second, for reasons that have become clearer in Chapter 3, we should not assume 
that prison, for any length of time, is the preferred method of punishment. Even 
if a short-term sentence does not represent a severe risk of ruining the offender’s 
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life, it is still hugely disruptive, especially when taking into account post-carceral 
deprivations.1 Imposing fines, terms of community service, and forms of monitor-
ing should be the presumptive methods of reducing the ongoing level of criminality 
in society—and even if that means that offenders remain free and potentially un-
reformed in society. Consistent with the demand for “parsimonious” punishments, 
we must prefer those punishments that enable an offender to fulfill his duty with 
the smallest degree of injury in the process. When, though, is carceral incapacita-
tion an appropriate social defensive remedy, given that it could very well become 
long-term carceral incapacitation, if the offender does not reform himself? As I ar-
gued in Chapter 3, this ought to be a possibility only when they state can 
sufficiently prove—something close to beyond a reasonable doubt—that the of-
fender will attempt to commit a potentially life-ruining offense like murder, rape, 
child sexual abuse, or grievous bodily harm in the future if he is not incarcerated. 
This assumes, furthermore, that prison will be structured or monitored in such a 
way that he does not pose such a risk to other inmates. 
B. Long-term Incarceration and Degradation 
The second set of reasons that I considered in this thesis are degradation-
limiting penal reasons. These reasons operate with relative independence from 
other penal considerations. They preclude certain punishments as impermissibly 
degrading, regardless of the fact that the corrective justice and social defense the-
ories may recommend such treatment as the appropriate response to the offender’s 
wrongdoing. In considering the content and nature of this set of reasons, I exam-
ined the wrong-making features of torture, generally considered the exemplar of 
impermissibly degrading treatment. The wrong-making features of torture, I main-
tained in Chapter 2, simply are our degradation-limiting reasons, or at least the 
most fundamental of such reasons.  
                                               
1 See Chapter 3 at 218-19. 
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In assessing torture’s normative features, I first ruled out the legal concep-
tion of torture’s wrongness (“the intentional infliction of severe suffering”), as well 
as the conceptions forwarded by Henry Shue (“an assault on the defenseless”), 
David Sussman (“a kind of forced self-betrayal”), and Matthew Kramer (“torturers 
sully their moral integrity by endeavouring to elevate themselves to a position of 
minutely directive dominance”), because, among other reasons, they are all overly 
broad, encompassing practices that are clearly not torture. I then considered a 
number of first-hand accounts by victims as I developed a novel conception of 
torture, concluding that torture constitutes the intentional infliction of a suffusive panic. 
Torture overwhelms and obliterates, converting the victim into a “shrilly, squealing 
piglet,” in Jean Améry’s words.2  
The concepts of respect and disrespect, I continued in Chapter 2, are cen-
tral to understanding the wrong-making features of torture, and therefore of 
impermissible degradation more generally. Disrespect constitutes a rejection, to 
some degree, of something’s value. It may take non-symbolic or symbolic forms, 
with the former representing a physical interference with something’s value-gen-
erating mechanism, and with the latter being more cultural means of expression 
(e.g. language, but also actions like spitting on someone). I was careful to empha-
size, however, that non-symbolic forms of disrespect are also means of expression. 
Indeed, they are usually the strongest, most authentic means of expression. Com-
pare Alex saying to Billie, “You’re worthless; you should die!,” a symbolic form of 
disrespect, with Alex murdering Billie, a non-symbolic form of disrespect.  
To understand the degree of torture’s disrespect, I continued, we need to 
know what humans do to exhibit value; only then could we understand, most im-
portantly, how torture non-symbolically interferes with someone’s value-
generating mechanism. I argued that the human value-generating mechanism is the 
                                               
2 Jean Améry, At the Mind’s Limit: Contemplations by a Survivor on Auschwitz and its Realities, trans. Sidney 
Rosenfeld and Stella P. Rosenfeld (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1980), 35. 
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meta-capacity for practical reason—the combined capacities of at least autonomy, 
value-recognition, memory, and imagination—which a person can employ to stitch 
moments together through time to construct a good life as a whole. While suffering 
may sometimes represent an investment into one’s good life, I argued that humans 
retain the capacity to generate disvalue, which constitutes merely wanton suffering. 
With this conception of human value in mind, we saw how torture, by inflicting a 
make it stop right now panic, is the archetype of disrespect for a person, with her 
special capacities for generating value and disvalue. Torture completely halts the 
victim’s value generating capacities, as she loses the thread of her diachronic iden-
tity, and completely maximizes her capacity for disvalue, with her consciousness 
saturated with panic. Torture forces a diachronic being capable of living broadly and 
purposefully through time into howling synchronic being whose awareness is re-
stricted to a perfectly miserably present. 
There is a spectrum of disrespect, I continued, with torture for an eternity—
suffusive panic forever—at the very top. Actions less disrespectful than eternal 
torture, however, can still be impermissibly disrespectful and degrading. Treatment 
is dispositively disrespectful, I argued, when it “ruins” someone’s capacity to build 
a good life, or embodies the legitimacy of doing so. Such an action rejects some-
one’s humanity, by rejecting the worth of her essentially human, diachronic 
capacities. Certain symbolic forms of disrespect could be so extreme as to qualify, 
I argued, as with Derby’s Dose. Forcing someone to eat human excrement and 
then gagging them for four hours—just like strapping someone down and running 
electricity through her body until her flesh burns and she wails—is to genuinely 
reject her humanity, to express the view that her essentially human capacities for 
generating value and disvalue are of no moment. This is so even if this rejection is 
primarily symbolical, related to the process by which forcing someone to do some-
thing utterly disgusting symbolically associates them with nonhuman animals.  
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We can see here how a commitment to human inviolability, with its refusal 
to merely sacrifice people for the greater good, grounds our degradation limita-
tions, as well. These limitations foreclose actions that genuinely reject someone’s 
humanity, regardless of how useful or satisfying such a rejection might be to the 
wider society, and indeed regardless of any other reasons pushing in favor of such 
treatment. Human inviolability, I argued, requires that agents incorporate into their 
reasoning a certain profoundly high valuation of each person, as well as a commit-
ment to the separateness of persons, such that we do not view individuals as merely 
fungible and tradeable components of a wider social good. And it thus rules out 
actions, like the tortures suffered by Améry, Timerman, and Alleg, and like Derby’s 
Dose, that could only have been carried out intentionally if the agent rejected such 
a valuation and commitment.  
 In Chapter 3, I employed this framework to assess whether long-term in-
carceration is impermissibly degrading—in addition to it generally being ruled out 
by the corrective justice and social defense theories as a contingent empirical mat-
ter. I first considered the deprivations inherent to incarceration simpliciter, ignoring 
the variable of sentence length. I followed the capability approach of Martha Nuss-
baum and Amartya Sen in defining a deprivation as a limitation of access to a 
valuable activity or state of being. I examined the great diversity of penal depriva-
tions, from the foul horror of the Tullianum and the Gitarama Prison, to the austere 
misery of the Pentonville and the ADX Florence, to San Quinten, where the threat 
of violence tempers the boredom, to the FCI Morgantown, with its empty days, 
and, finally, to the Bastoy Prison, where inmates are separated from society, but to 
a quiet island of beaches, bikes, and farm animals.  
It is this separation from society, I argued, which represents the depriva-
tional minimum and essence of incarceration. I referred to it as the deprivation of 
the freedom of general association. To some very significant degree,  inmates lose 
access to those people they associated with before their incarceration, as well as to 
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those new people that they might have interacted with in free society. I then added 
the variable of sentence length to the analysis, considering what it means to deprive 
someone of the freedom of general association for decades. I distinguished be-
tween temporal goods, which require cultivation over time to realize, and momentary 
goods, which can be realized fully in the moment. I then argued that the most im-
portant goods from the perspective of building a good life as a whole are both 
temporal and associational, in the sense that they require cultivation over time in con-
cert with other people, like maintaining a family or long-term friendship or 
developing professional expertise. I concluded that long-term incarceration, by se-
verely limiting an inmate’s access to temporal, associational goods, represents a 
severe risk of ruining his life. It becomes extremely challenging for him to use his 
practical reasoning capacity to infuse his life as a whole with value.  
If impermissible degradation embodies an affirmative rejection of some-
one’s humanity, then its degradation-making features must be intentionally 
inflicted, I argued in Chapter 3. Whether long-term incarceration is impermissibly 
degrading thus depends on the underlying theory of punishment. When carried 
out for the purpose of incapacitation, I concluded that long-term incarceration can 
in principle be permissible. This applies to the social defense theory in the rare case 
where it justifies carceral incapacitation. Given that the incapacitory state is not 
motivated to harm the offender, the life injuries that long-term incarceration gen-
erates can be unintentional. They can be byproducts of the aim to prevent him from 
committing very serious offenses in the future. This is evidenced by the fact that 
the incapacitory state inflicts only potentially long-term incarceration, assuming the 
state fulfills its duty to provide the offender with significant rehabilitative re-
sources, as well as regular opportunities to prove that the state can no longer meet 
its evidential burden.  
When long-term incarceration is carried out for reasons of retribution or 
deterrence, however, I argued that the moral considerations are very different. This 
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applies to deterrent long-term incarceration in accordance with the corrective jus-
tice theory, as well as the social defense theory in those cases where it licenses 
deterrent punishment. In all such instances, the state is indeed motivated to harm 
the offender. It sees harming the offender in a way that severely risks ruining his 
life as a reason for action, that is, as an intrinsic or instrumental good to positively aim 
at. This is impermissibly disrespectful and degrading. With regard to respecting an 
offender’s value, which is grounded on his diachronic capacities, I concluded that 
it is not qualitatively different from penal torture. It affirmatively rejects the of-
fender’s humanity, by intentionally and severely risking that he fails to exercise his 
essentially human capacities successfully. In sum, when a liberal state pursues de-
terrence or retribution, the maximum available sentence cannot be “long-term.” 
For a liberal state—that is, a state committed to human inviolability—cannot in-
tentionally ruin an offender’s life, nor can it intentionally inflict a severe risk of that 
outcome, just as it cannot inflict penal torture.  
C. Future Research 
This has been a moral argument about a legal institution. If it has succeeded 
that means that we ought to reform our criminal sentencing laws in the US, as well 
as the UK. This thesis is thus directly relevant for debates within the Congress and 
Parliament, and relevant agencies, like the US Sentencing Commission. However, 
the courts also play a crucial role in this context; and this had not been a legal brief. 
Nonetheless, the jurisprudence over the 8th Amendment prohibition on “cruel and 
unusual” punishments is distinctly moral, as indicated above, with its concern for 
offenders’ “human dignity,” and its architectonic prohibition on penal torture. As 
such, the moral reasons presented here are, to some significant degree, distinctly 
legal reasons, and I hope to see how we might convert this moral argument into a 
full-fledged legal argument that long-term incarceration, at least for reasons of de-
terrence or retribution, is “cruel and unusual” and therefore unconstitutional. 
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Coda: Joe Byrd Cemetery 
When inmates die in Texas state prison, and their families are unable or 
uninterested in claiming their remains, they are buried on “Peckerwood Hill” in 
Walker County.3 Officially known as Joe Byrd Cemetery, it has been in operation 
since the 1850s. Many of the tombstones only have prison identification numbers; 
and some are completely blank. Jack Washman, from Corpus Christi, is in his mid-
50s. Clad in his white uniform, in the Texas summer heat, under the gaze of his 
crew boss, he worked to place tombstones over seven new graves. “I can’t judge 
them. Only God can do that,” he said of the recently deceased. “You can’t work 
out here and not recognize your own mortality.”  
Washman is serving 38 years for heroin possession. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
3 Allan Turner, “Eternity’s gate slowly closing at Peckerwood Hill,” The Houston Chronicle, August 3, 
2012, https://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/article/Eternity-s-gate-slowly-closing-at-Peck-
erwood-Hill-3761731.php  
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Freiburg: Max Planck Institute, 2001, https://www.mpicc.de/shared/data/pdf/frase-
endausdruck.pdf.  
 
Fredriksen-Goldsen, Karen I.  and Scharlach, Andrew E. Families and Work: New Directions in the 
Twenty First Century (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001). 
 
Freeman, Samuel. “Original Position,” in ed. Edward N. Zalta, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philoso-
phy (Winter 2016 Edition), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/original-position/. 
 
 
 
 
 
276 
Fried, Charles and Fried, Gregory. Because it is Wrong: Torture, Privacy and Presidential Power in the Age of 
Terror (New York: W.W. Norton, 2010). 
 
Friedman, Barry and Ponomarenko, Maria. “Democratic Policing,” NYU Law Review 90 (2015): 
1827-1907.  
 
Frowe, Helen. “Equating Innocent Threats and Bystanders,” Journal of Applied Philosophy 25 (2008): 
277-90. 
 
Fuller, Lon L. The Morality of Law, rev. ed. (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1969). 
 
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
 
Gambetta, Diego. “Primo Levi’s Last Moments,” Boston Review, June 1, 1999. 
 
Gladwell, Malcolm. Outliers: The Story of Success (London: Penguin Books, 2009). 
 
Global Tel*Link v. FCC, No. 15-1461 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 
 
Goffman, Alice. On the Run: Fugitive Life in an American City (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2014). 
 
Goffman, Erving. Relations in Public: Microstudies of the Social Order (New York: Basic Books, 1971). 
 
Goode, Erica. “Solitary Confinement: Punished for Life,” The New York Times, August 3, 2015. 
 
Gramlich, John. “Voters’ Perceptions of Crime Continue to Conflict with Reality,” Pew Research Cen-
ter, November 16, 2016, http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/11/16/voters-perceptions-
of-crime-continue-to-conflict-with-reality. 
 
Grassian, Stuart. “Psychiatric Effects of Solitary Confinement,” Washington University Journal of Law 
and Policy 22 (2006): 325-83. 
 
Greenberg, Karen J. and Dratel, Joshua L. (eds.), The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
 
Greenwood, Peter and Hawken, Angela. An Assessment of the Effect of California’s Three-Strikes Law 
(Santa Monica: Greenwood Associates, 2002).  
 
Griffin, James. “Are There Incommensurable Values?,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 39 (1977): 39-59.  
 
Gross, Hyman. A Theory of Criminal Justice (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979). 
 
Gutmann, Amy. “Freedom of Association: An Introductory Essay,” in ed. Amy Gutmann, Freedom of 
Association (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 3-32. 
 
Hagengimana, Athanase, et. al. “Somatic panic-attack equivalents in a community sample of Rwan-
dan widows who survived the 1994 genocide,” Psychiatry Research 117 (2003): 1-9. 
 
Hager, Eli. “My Life in the Supermax,” The Marshall Project, January 8, 2016, https://www.themar-
shallproject.org/2016/01/08/my-life-in-the-supermax#.8fazd2Yje. 
 
 
 
 
277 
Hamai, Koichi, et. al. (eds.). Probation Round the World: A Comparative Study (London: Routledge, 
1995). 
 
Hampton, Jean. “Correcting Harms Versus Righting Wrongs: The Goal of Retribution,” UCLA Law 
Review 39 (1992): 1659-1702. 
 
Harcourt, Bernard. Against Prediction: Profiling, Policing, and Punishing in an Actuarial Age (Chicago and 
London: University of Chicago Press, 2007). 
 
Hart, HLA. Punishment and Responsibility (Oxford: Clarendon, 1968). 
 
Hartlepool Gas and Water Co v West Hartlepool Harbour and Rly Co (1865) 12 LT 366. 
 
Heckman, James, Pinto, Rodrigo, Savelyev, Peter. “Understanding the Mechanisms Through Which 
an Influential Early Childhood Program Boosted Adult Outcomes,” American Economic Review 103 
(2013): 2052-86. 
 
Henderson, Lynn N. “The Wrongs of Victim’s Rights,” Stanford Law Review 37 (1985): 933-1021. 
 
Hensley, Christopher, Rutland, Sandra and Gray, Phyllis. “Conjugal Visitation Programs: The Logi-
cal Conclusion,” in ed. Christopher Hensley, Prison Sex: Practice and Policy (Boulder: Lynne Reinner, 
2002), 143-57. 
 
Hershovitz, Scott. “Corrective Justice for Civil Recourse Theorists,” Florida State University Law Re-
view 39 (2011): 107-28. 
 
Hinton, Devon E., et. al. “Orthostatic Panic Attacks Among Vietnamese Refugees,” Transcultural Psy-
chiatry 44 (2007): 515-44. 
 
Hinton, Devon, et. al. “Panic disorder among Cambodian refugees attending a psychiatric clinic: 
Prevalence and subtypes,” General Hospital Psychiatry 22 (2000): 437-44. 
 
Hitchens, Christopher. “Believe Me, It’s Torture,” Vanity Fair, July 2, 2008. 
 
Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan [1651], ed. Richard Tuck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1996). 
 
Hohfeld, Wesley Newcomb. “Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reason-
ing,” Yale Law Journal 23 (1913): 16–59.  
 
Hudon, Kirsty and Jones, Trevor. “Satellite Tracking of Offenders and Integrated Offender Manage-
ment: A Local Case Study,” Howard Journal of Crime and Justice 55 (2016): 188-206.  
Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 20, 1992. 
 
Hume, David. “Of the Original Contract” [1748] in his Essays: Moral, Political, and Literary [1777] (re-
printed Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1985), 465–87. 
 
Husak, Douglas. “Does Criminal Liability Require an Act?” in ed. Antony Duff, Philosophy and the 
Criminal Law: Principle and Critique (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 60-100. 
 
Husak, Douglas. “Holistic Retributivism,” California Law Review 88 (2000): 991-1000. 
 
 
 
 
 
278 
Husak, Douglas. “The Costs to Criminal Theory of Supposing that Intentions are Irrelevant to Per-
missibility,” in The Philosophy of Criminal Law: Selected Essays (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 
69-90. 
  
Hutchinson v. the United Kingdom (App no. 57592/08) [2017] ECHR 65.  
 
Ignatieff, Michael. A Just Measure of Pain: The Penitentiary in the Industrial Revolution, 1750-1850 (New 
York: Pantheon Books, 1978). 
 
Ignatieff, Michael. The Lesser Evil (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2004). 
 
In re Medley, 134 U.S. 160 (1890). 
 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
 
Ireland v. United Kingdom (App No 5310/71) [1978] ECHR 1. 
 
Jacobs, James. The Eternal Criminal Record (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015). 
 
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905). 
 
James, Erwin. “The Norwegian prison where inmates are treated like people,” The Guardian, Febru-
ary 25, 2013; https://www.theguardian.com/society/2013/feb/25/norwegian-prison-inmates-
treated-like-people. 
 
Joyce, James. A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man [1914-15] (London: Penguin, 2000). 
 
Kamm, Frances. “Inviolability,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 20 (1995): 165-75. 
 
Kamm, Frances. Intricate Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). 
 
Kamm, Frances. Ethics for Enemies: Terror, Torture and War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
 
Kansas v Hendricks, 521 US 346 (1997). 
 
Kant, Immanuel. Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals [1785], in ed. and trans. Mary J. Gregor, Practi-
cal Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 
 
Kant, Immanuel. “On the common saying: That may be correct in theory, but it is of no use in prac-
tice” [1793], in ed. and trans. Mary Gregor, Practical Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1996). 
 
Kant, Immanuel. The Philosophy of Law: An Exposition of the Fundamental Principles of Jurisprudence as the 
Science of Right [1796], trans. William Hastie (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1887). 
 
Kateb, George. “The Value of Association,” in ed. Amy Gutmann, Freedom of Association (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1998), 35-63. 
 
Katz, Lawrence, Levitt, Steven D., and Shustorovich, Ellen. “Prisons Conditions, Capital Punish-
ment, and Deterrence,” American Law and Economics Review 5 (2003): 318-43. 
 
Kelly, Erin I. “Criminal Justice Without Retribution,” Journal of Philosophy 106 (2009): 440-62. 
 
 
 
 
279 
Kennedy, David. Deterrence and Crime Prevention: Reconsidering the Prospect of Sanction (Abingdon: 
Routledge, 2009). 
 
Kerr, Lisa. “Sentencing Ashley Smith: How Prison Conditions Relate to the Aims of Punishment,” 
Canadian Journal of Law and Society 32 (2017): 187-207. 
 
Kilarjian v. Vastola, 877 A.2d 372 (2004).  
 
Kitai-Sangero, Rinat. “The Limits of Preventive Detention,” McGeorge Law Review 40 (2016): 903-34. 
 
Kleiman, Mark. When Brute Force Fails: How to Have Less Crime and Less Punishment (Princeton: Prince-
ton University Press, 2009). 
 
Klein, Naomi. “Baghdad Year Zero,” Harper’s Magazine, September 2004, 43–53. 
 
Kleinfeld, Joshua. “Reconstructivism: The Place of Criminal Law in Ethical Life,” Harvard Law Re-
view 129 (2016): 1485-1565. 
 
Kleinig, John. “The Hardness of Hard Treatment,” in Fundamentals of Sentencing Theory, ed. A. J. Ash-
worth and M. Wasik (Oxford: Clarendon, 1998), 273-98. 
 
Koestler, Arthur. Darkness at Noon, trans. Daphne Hardy (London: Vintage Books, 1940). 
 
Kolber, Adam. “Unintentional Punishment,” Legal Theory 18 (2012): 1-29. 
 
Kramer, Matthew. Torture and Moral Integrity: A Philosophical Enquiry (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2014). 
 
Kraut, Richard. Aristotle on the Human Good (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989). 
 
Kreimer, Seth. “Too Close to the Rack and the Screw: Constitutional Constraints on Torture in the 
War on Terror,” University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law 6 (2003): 278-325. 
 
Lacey, Nicola and Pickard, Hanna. “The Chimera of Proportionality: Institutionalising Limits on 
Punishment in Contemporary Social and Political Systems,” Modern Law Review 78 (2015): 216-40.  
 
Lacey, Nicola and Pickard, Hanna. “A Dual-Process Approach to Criminal Law: Victims and the 
Clinical Model of Responsibility Without Blame,” Journal of Political Philosophy 26 (forthcoming 2018) 
(manuscript on file with author). 
 
Lacey, Nicola and Soskice, David. “Crime, Punishment and Segregation in the United States: The 
paradox of local democracy,” Punishment & Society 4 (2015): 454-81  
 
Lacey, Nicola, Soskice, David, and Hope, David. “Understanding the Determinants of Penal Policy: 
Crime, Culture, and Comparative Political Economy,” Annual Review of Criminology 1 (2018): 195-217. 
 
Lacey, Nicola. State Punishment: Political Principles and Community Values (London and New York: 
Routledge, 1988). 
 
Lacey, Nicola. The Prisoners’ Dilemma: Political Economy and Punishment in Contemporary Democracies (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).  
 
 
 
 
 
280 
Lacey, Nicola. In Search of Criminal Responsibility: Ideas, Interests, and Institutions (Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2016). 
 
Lazarus, Liora. Contrasting Prisoners’ Rights: A Comparative Examination of England and Germany (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2004); “Conceptions of Liberty Deprivation,” Modern Law Review 69 (2006): 
738-69.  
 
Leasco Corp. v. Taussig, 473 F.2d 777  (2d Cir. 1972). 
 
Lee, Youngjae. “Desert and the Eight Amendment,” Journal of Constitutional Law 11 (2008): 101-112. 
 
Lemos, Ramon M. “A Defense of Retributivism,” Southern Journal of Philosophy 15 (1977): 53-65. 
 
Lerman, Amy E. and Weaver, Vesla M. Arresting Citizenship: The Democratic Consequences of American 
Crime Control (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2014). 
 
Lewis, C.I. Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation (New York: Open Court, 1946). 
 
Liao, S. Matthew. Intentions and Moral Permissibility (UC Berkeley: Kadish Center for Morality, Law and 
Public Affairs, 2008). 
 
Lippert-Rasmussen, Kasper. “Kamm on Inviolability and Agent-Relative Restriction,” Res Publica 15 
(2009): 165-178. 
 
Loader, Ian and Walker, Neil. Civilizing Security (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
 
Locke, John. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding [1689], ed. Roger Woolhouse (London: Pen-
guin, 1997). 
 
Lofland, Lyn H. A World of Strangers: Order and Action in Urban Public Space (Prospect Hills, IL: Wave-
land Press, 1973). 
 
Lovelace, Richard. “To Althea, From Prison,” in The Poems of Richard Lovelace (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1953), 78-9. 
 
Luban, David and Shue, Henry. “Mental Torture: A Critique of Erasures in U.S. Law,” Georgetown 
Law Journal 100 (2011): 624-41. 
 
Luban, David. “Liberalism, Torture, and the Ticking Bomb,” Virginia Law Review 91 (2005): 1425–
61. 
 
Luban, David. Torture, Power, and Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014). 
 
M’Naghten [1843] UKHL J16. 
 
MacCormack, Neil. Institutions of Law: An Essay in Legal Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2007). 
 
MacIntyre, Alasdair. After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, 2d ed. (Notre Dame, IN: University of 
Notre Dame Press, 1984). 
 
MacMahan, Jeff. The Ethics of Killing (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). 
 
 
 
 
281 
 
MacMahan, Jeff. “Torture in Principle and in Practice,” Public Affairs Quarterly 22 (2008): 111-28. 
 
McMahan, Jeff. Killing in War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011, reprinted edition), 155-202. 
 
McMahan, Jeff. “What Rights May Be Defended by Means of War?” in eds. Cecile Fabre and Seth 
Lazar, The Morality of Defensive War,  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 115-58. 
 
MacMahan, Jeff. “Proportionality and Time,” Ethics 125 (2015): 1–24.   
 
Margalit, Avishai. The Decent Society (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996). 
 
Marmor, Andrei. “What Is the Right to Privacy?” Philosophy & Public Affairs 43 (2015): 3-26. 
 
Martins, Mark S. and Bronsther, Jacob. “Stay the Hand of Justice? Evaluating Claims That War 
Crimes Trials Do More Harm Than Good,” Daedalus 146 (2017): 83-99. 
 
Marx, Karl. “The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte,” in ed. David McLellan, Karl Marx: Se-
lected Writings (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), 329-55. 
 
McDermott, Daniel. “The Permissibility of Punishment,” Law and Philosophy 20 (2001): 403-32. 
 
Médecins sans Frontières, “Diagnosing the State of Prisoner Health: The Gitarama Example,” 
March 1995 Report, http://speakingout.msf.org/en/node/643. 
 
Melissaris, Emmanuel. “Toward a Political Theory of Criminal Law: A Critical Rawlsian Account,” 
New Criminal Law Review 15 (2012): 122-55. 
 
Memorandum from Office of the Assistant Att'y Gen. to Alberto R. Gonz Counsel to the President 
(Aug. 1, 2002). 
. 
Michael, Mark A. “Utilitarianism and Retributivism: What’s the Difference?” American Philosophical 
Quarterly 29 (1992): 173-82. 
 
Miller, David (ed.). Liberty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991). 
 
Miller, Richard W. “Beneficence, Duty and Distance,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 32 (2004): 357-83. 
 
Miller, Seamus. “Is Torture Ever Morally Justifiable?,” International Journal of Applied Philosophy 19 
(2005): 179–92. 
 
Ministry of Justice, “The Story of the Prison Population: 1993– 2012, England and Wales, 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attach-
ment_data/file/218185/story-prison-population.pdf. 
 
Mocan, H. Naci and Gittings, R. Kaj. “Getting off Death Row: Commuted Sentences and the Deter-
rent Effect of Capital Punishment,” The Journal of Law and Economics 46 (2003): 453-78.  
 
Model Penal Code (American Law Institute 1962). 
 
Montaldo, Charles. “Maximum Security Federal Prison: ADX Supermax,” ThoughtCo, April 5, 2008, 
https://www.thoughtco.com/adx-supermax-overview-972970. 
 
 
 
 
282 
 
Monthly Total Population Report, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, 
https://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Reports_Research/Offender_Information_Ser-
vices_Branch/Monthly/Monthly_Tpop1a_Archive.html. 
 
Moore, Adam. “Privacy: Its Meaning and Value,” American Philosophical Quarterly 40 (2003): 215-27. 
 
Moore, Michael S.  “The Moral Worth of Retribution,” in ed. Ferdinand Shoeman, Responsibility, 
Character, and the Emotions: New Essays in Moral Psychology (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1987), 179-219. 
 
Moore, Michael S. Placing Blame: A Theory of Criminal Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997). 
 
Moreno, Alejandro and Peel, Michael. “Posttraumatic Seizures in Survivors of Torture: 
Manifestations, Diagnosis, and Treatment,” Journal of Immigrant Health 6 (2004): 179-186. 
 
Morris, Christopher W. “Punishment and Loss of Moral Standing,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 21 
(1991): 53-79. 
 
Morris, Herbert. “Persons and Punishment,” The Monist 52 (1968): 475-501. 
 
Morris, Norval. Madness and the Criminal Law (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982). 
 
Morris, Norval. “Keynote Address: Predators and Politics,” Puget Sound Law Review 15 (1992): 517-23. 
 
Mosanya, Lola. “‘Crazy Violence’ in Brazilian State During Police Strike,” BBC News, February 11, 
2017, http://www.bbc.co.uk/newsbeat/article/38942911/crazy-violence-in-brazilian-state-during-
police-strike. 
 
Moyn, Samuel. “Torture and Taboo: On Elaine Scarry,” The Nation, February 5, 2013. 
https://www.thenation.com/article/torture-and-taboo-elaine-scarry/. 
 
Murphy, Jeffrie G. “Marxism and Retribution,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 2 (1973): 217-43. 
 
Murphy, Jeffrie G. Retribution, Justice, and Therapy (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing, 1979). 
 
Murphy, Jeffrie G. “Retributivism and the State’s Interest in Punishment,” in eds. J. Roland Pennock 
and John W. Chapman, Criminal Justice: Nomos XXVII (New York: New York University Press, 
1985), 156-64. 
 
Murphy, Jeffrie G. “Retributive Hatred: An Essay on Criminal Liability and the Emotions,” in eds. 
R. G. Frey and Christopher W. Morris, Liability and Responsibility: Essays in Law and Morals (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). 
 
Murphy, Liam B. “The Demands of Beneficence,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 22 (1993): 267-92. 
 
Murtagh, Kevin J. “Is Corporally Punishing Criminals Degrading?” Journal of Political Philosophy 20 
(2012): 481-89. 
 
N.Y. Times: Dealbook, “Preet Bharara’s Key Insider Trading Cases, Oct. 6, 2015, https://www.ny-
times.com/interactive/2014/07/09/business/dealbook/09insider-timeline.html. 
 
 
 
 
 
283 
Nagel, Thomas. The View from Nowhere (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986). 
Nagel, Thomas. “The Value of Inviolability,” in ed. Paul Bloomfield, Morality and Self-Interest (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2007). 
 
Nagin, Daniel S. “Deterrence in the Twenty-First Century: A Review of the Evidence,” in ed. Mi-
chael Tonry, Crime and Justice in America: 1975–2025 (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2013).  
 
Nance, Malcolm. “Waterboarding is torture…Period (Links Updated…#9),” Small Wars Journal, Oc-
tober 31, 2007, http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/waterboarding-is-torture-period-links-updated-9. 
 
Nellis, Mike, Beyens, Kristel, and Kaminski, Dan (eds.), Electronically Monitored Punishment: International 
and Critical Perspectives (New York: Routledge, 2013).  
 
Nellis, Mike. “Understanding the Electronic Monitoring of Offenders in Europe: Expansion, Regu-
lation and Prospects,” Crime, Law and Social Change 62 (2014): 489-510. 
  
Neocleous, Mark. Critique of Security (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2008). 
 
New York State Constitution. 
 
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. 
 
Norrie, Alan. “Freewill, Determinism and Criminal Justice,” Legal Studies 3 (1983): 60-73. 
 
Norrie, Alan. Law, Ideology, and Punishment (Norwell, MA: Kluwer, 1991). 
 
Nozick, Robert. “Coercion,” in Philosophy, Science, and Method: Essays in Honor of Ernest Nagel, eds. Sid-
ney Morgenbesser, Patrick Suppes, and Morton White (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1969). 
 
Nozick, Robert. Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974). 
 
Nussbaum, Martha. “Nature, Functioning and Capability: Aristotle on Political Distribution,” Oxford 
Studies in Ancient Philosophy (Supplementary Volume) 6 (1988): 145–84. 
 
Nussbaum, Martha. “Human Functioning and Social justice. In Defense of Aristotelian Essential-
ism,” Political Theory 20 (1992): 202–246. 
 
Nussbaum, Martha. Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000). 
 
Nussbaum, Martha. “Capabilities as Fundamental Entitlements: Sen and Social Justice,” Feminist Eco-
nomics 9 (2003): 33–59. 
 
Nussbaum, Martha. Hiding from Humanity: Disgust, Shame, and the Law (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2006). 
 
Nussbaum, Martha. Creating Capabilities: The Human Development Approach (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2011). 
 
O’Hara, Erin Ann. “Victim Participation in the Criminal Process,” Journal of Law and Policy 13 (2005): 
229-47. 
 
 
 
 
 
284 
Orr, David. “Hutus held in ‘worst prison in the world’: 7,000 suspects of Rwanda massacre are kept 
in a jail built for 400,” The Independent, July 15, 1995. http://www.independ-
ent.co.uk/news/world/hutus-held-in-worst-prison-in-world-1591700.html. 
 
Orwell, George. 1984 (New York: Harcourt, 1949). 
 
Otsuka, Michael. “Saving Lives and the Claims of Individuals,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 34 (2006): 
109-35. 
 
“Panic,” OED Online. December 2016. Oxford University Press, http://www.oed.com/view/En-
try/136852?rskey=EVMqyn&result=2. 
 
“Panic.” Merriam-Webster.com, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/panic. 
 
Parfit, Derek. “Personal Identity and Rationality,” Synthese 53 (1982): 227-41. 
 
Parfit, Derek. Reasons and Persons (Oxford University Press; revised reprint, Oxford: Clarendon, 
1987). 
 
Patel v Ali [1985] Ch 283. 
 
Payne, Brian K.  and DeMichele, Matthew. “Sex offender policies: Considering unanticipated conse-
quences of GPS sex offender monitoring,” Aggression and Violent Behavior 16 (2011): 177-187. 
 
Pennock, Roland J. and Chapman, John W. (eds.), Nomos XIV: Coercion (Chicago: Aldine-Atherton, 
Inc., 1972). 
 
Perry, Stephen R. “The Moral Foundations of Tort Law,” Iowa Law Review 77 (1992): 449-514.  
 
Peters, Edward M. “Prison Before the Prison: The Ancient and Medieval Worlds,” in eds. Norval 
Morris and David J. Rothman, The Oxford History of the Prison: The Practice of Punishment in Western Soci-
ety (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998). 
 
Pettit, Philip and Braithwaite, John. “Not Just Deserts, Even in Sentencing,” Current Issues in Criminal 
Justice 4 (1993): 225-39. 
 
Pettit, Philip. “Freedom as Antipower,” Ethics 106 (1996): 576-604. 
 
Pettit, Philip. Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1997). 
 
Pettit, Philip. “Two Republican Traditions,” in eds. Andreas Niederberger and Philipp Schink, Repub-
lican Democracy: Liberty, Law, and Politics (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2013), 169-204. 
 
Pettit, Philip. “Criminalization in Republican Theory,” in eds. R.A. Duff, et. al., Criminalization: The 
Political Morality of the Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). 
 
Philips, Michael. “The Justification of Punishment and the Justification of Political Authority,” Law 
and Philosophy 5 (1986): 393-416. 
 
Piquero, Alex R., et. al. “Effects of early family/parent training programs on antisocial behavior and 
delinquency,” Journal of Experimental Criminology 5 (2009): 83–120.  
 
 
 
 
285 
Posner, Eric A. “The Regulation of Groups: The Influence of Legal and Nonlegal Sanctions on Col-
lective Action,” University of Chicago Law Review 63 (1996): 133-97. 
 
Pratt, John and Eriksson, Anna. Contrasts in Punishment: An Explanation of Anglophone Excess and Nordic 
Exceptionalism (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013). 
 
Pratt, John. “Scandinavian Exceptionalism in an Era of Penal Excess, Part I: The Nature and Roots 
of Scandinavian Exceptionalism,” British Journal of Criminology 48 (2008): 119-37. 
 
Pratt, John. “Scandinavian Exceptionalism in an Era of Penal Excess, Part II: Does Scandinavian 
Exceptionalism Have a Future?” British Journal of Criminology 48 (2008): 275-292. 
  
Punamäki, Raija-Leena, et. al. “Nature of torture, PTSD, and somatic symptoms among political ex-
prisoners,” Journal of Traumatic Stress 23 (2010): 532-36. 
 
Quinn, Warren S. “Actions, Intentions, and Consequences: The Doctrine of Double Effect,” Philoso-
phy & Public Affairs 18 (1989): 334-51.  
 
Quinn, Warren. “The Right to Threaten and the Right to Punish,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 14 
(1985): 327-73.  
 
Quinton, Anthony. “On Punishment,” Analysis 14 (1954): 133-42. 
 
Quinton, Anthony. “Humiliation,” Social Research 64 (1997): 77-89. 
 
Quong, Jonathan. “Killing in Self-Defense,” Ethics 119 (2009): 507-37. 
 
Quong, Jonathan. “Liability to Defensive Harm,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 40 (2012): 45-77.  
 
R  v. McLoughlin [2014] EWCA Crim 188. 
 
R v Matthews and Alleyne [2003] EWCA Crim 192 (CA). 
 
R v Quick [1973] 3 WLR 26. 
 
R v. Valderrama-Vega [1985] Crim LR 220. 
 
R. G. Frey & Christopher W. Morris, Liability and Responsibility: Essays in Law and Morals (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1991). 
 
Rachels, James. “Why Privacy Is Important,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 4 (1975): 323-33. 
 
Ramsay, Peter. “Preparation Offences, Security Interests, Political Freedom,” in eds. R.A. Duff, et. 
al, The Structures of Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).  
 
Ramsay, Peter. The Insecurity State: Vulnerable Autonomy and the Right to Security in the Criminal Law (Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press, 2012).  
 
Ramsay, Peter. “Voters Should Not Be in Prison! The Rights of Prisoners in a Democracy,” Critical 
Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 16 (2013): 421-38. 
 
 
 
 
 
286 
Ramsay, Peter. “Imprisonment and Political Equality” (LSE Legal Studies, Working Paper No. 
8/2015). 
 
Ramsay, Peter. “A Democratic Theory of Imprisonment,” in eds. Albert Dzur, Ian Loaders, and 
Richard Sparks, Democratic Theory and Mass Incarceration (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016). 
 
Rates for Interstate Inmate Calling Services (“Order”), 30 FCC Rcd. 12763, 12775–76, 12838–62 (Nov. 5, 
2015), 80 Fed. Reg. 79136-01 (Dec. 18, 2015). 
 
Rawls, John. “Two Concepts of Rules,” Philosophical Review 64 (1955): 3-32. 
 
Rawls, John. A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1971). 
 
Rawls, John. Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy, ed. Barbara Herman (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard 
University Press, 2000). 
 
Raz, Joseph. “The Rule of Law and Its Virtue,” in The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), 210-229. 
 
Raz, Joseph. Value, Respect, Attachment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). 
 
Redmayne, Mike. Character in the Criminal Trial (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).  
 
Regan, Donald. “The Value of Rational Nature,” Ethics 112 (2002): 267-291. 
 
Regan, Donald. “How to be a Moorean,” Ethics 113 (2003): 651-77. 
 
Reiman, Jeffrey. “Justice, Civilization, and the Death Penalty: Answering Van den Haag,” Philosophy 
& Public Affairs 14 (1985): 115-48. 
 
Restatement (Second) Of Contracts (1981). 
 
Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965). 
 
Ribitsch v. Austria (App no 18896/91) [1995] ECHR 55. 
 
Ristroph, Alice. “When Freedom Isn’t Free,” New Criminal Law Review 14 (2011): 468-485. 
 
Ristroph, Alice. “Hobbes on “Diffidence” and the Criminal Law,” in ed. Markus D. Dubber, Founda-
tional Texts in Modern Criminal Law  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). 
 
Robert Hood interview with CBS News, October 11, 2007, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/su-
permax-a-clean-version-of-hell/. 
 
Roberts, Daniel. “Life Behind Bars: Matthew Kluger reveals all,” Fortune Magazine, July 7, 2014, 
http://fortune.com/2014/07/07/matthew-kluger-talks/. 
 
Roberts, Julian V. “The Role of Criminal Record in the Sentencing Process,” Crime & Justice 22 
(1997): 303-62. 
 
Robinson, Paul. “Punishing Dangerousness,” Harvard Law Review 114 (2001): 1429-56. 
 
 
 
 
 
287 
Rodley, Nigel S. “The Definition(s) of Torture in International Law,” Current Legal Problems 55 
(2002): 467-493, at 468.  
 
Roeder, Oliver, et. al. What Caused the Crime Decline? (New York: Brennan Center for Justice, 2015). 
 
Romero, Michael. “A Day in the Life of a Prisoner,” Pen America (pen.org), November 16, 2012, 
https://pen.org/a-day-in-the-life-of-a-prisoner/. 
 
Rosati, Connie S. “The Story of a Life,” Social Philosophy and Policy, 30 (2013): 21-50. 
 
Rosen, Michael. Dignity: Its History and Meaning (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012). 
 
Rosen, Michael.  “Dignity Past and Present,” in Jeremy Waldron, Dignity, Rank, and Right, ed. Meir 
Dan-Cohen (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 79-98. 
 
Roxin, Claus. “Prevention, Censure, and Responsibility: The Recent Debate on the Purposes of Pun-
ishment,” in eds. A.P. Simester, Antje du Bois-Pedainand Ulfrid Neumann, trans. Antje du Bois-
Pedain, Liberal Criminal Theory: Essays for Andreas von Hirsch (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2014), 23-42. 
 
Sawyer, Wendy. “How much do incarcerated people earn in each state?” Prison Policy Initiative, April 
10, 2017, https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2017/04/10/wages/.  
 
Scanlon, Thomas. What We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press, 1998). 
 
Scanlon, Thomas. Moral Dimensions: Permissibility, Meaning, Blame (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 
2008). 
 
Scarry, Elaine. The Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World (New York and Oxford: Ox-
ford University Press, 1983). 
 
Seidman, Louis. “Torture’s Truth,” University of Chicago Law Review 75 (2005): 881–918. 
 
Sen, Amartya. “Equality of What?” in ed. Sterling M. McMurrin, Tanner Lectures on Human Values 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1980). 
 
Sen, Amartya. Commodities and Capabilities (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1985). 
 
Sen, Amartya. “Well-being, Agency and Freedom: the Dewey Lectures,” Journal of Philosophy, 82 
(1985): 169-221. 
 
Sen, Amartya. Inequality Reexamined (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, Harvard University Press, 
1992). 
 
Sen, Amartya. “Capability and Well-being,” in eds. Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen, The Quality 
of Life (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993). 
 
Sen, Amartya. “Capabilities, Lists and Public Reasons: Continuing the Conversation,” Feminist Eco-
nomics 10 (2004): 77–80. 
 
Sen, Amartya. “Elements of a Theory of Human Rights,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 32 (2004): 315–
56. 
 
 
 
 
 
288 
Shammas, Victor L. “Pains of Imprisonment,” in ed. Kent R. Kerley, The Encyclopedia of Corrections 
(Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, 2017), 1-5. 
 
Sheid, Don E. “Davis and the Unfair-Advantage Theory of Punishment: A Critique,” Philosophical 
Topics 18 (1990): 143–70. 
 
Sher, George. Desert (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987). 
 
Shue, Henry. “Torture,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 7 (1978): 124-43.  
 
Simester, A. P.  and Von Hirsch, Andrew. Crimes, Harms, and Wrongs: On the Principles of Criminalisation 
(Oxford: Hart, 2011). 
 
Simmel, Georg. “The Metropolis and the Mental Life,” in On Individuality and Social Forms, ed. D. 
Levine (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1971), at 143-49. 
 
Simpson, Thomas W. “The Impossibility of Republican Freedom,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 45 
(2017): 27-53. 
 
Singer, Peter. “Famine, Affluence, and Morality,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 3 (1972): 229-243. 
 
Skinner, Quentin. Liberty Before Liberalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). 
 
Slobogin, Christopher. “A Jurisprudence of Dangerousness,” Northwestern Law Review 98 (2003): 1-62. 
 
Smilansky, Saul. “Utilitarianism and the ‘Punishment’ of the Innocent: The General Problem,” Anal-
ysis 50 (1990): 256-61. 
 
Smith, Steven K., et. al. Criminal Victimization and Perceptions of Community Safety in 12 Cities, 1998 (Bu-
reau of Justice Statistics; Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, May 1999). 
 
South African Constitution. 
 
Steiker, Carol. “Proportionality as a Limit on Preventive Justice: Promises and Pitfalls,” in eds. An-
drew Ashworth, Lucia Zedner, and Patrick Tomlin, Prevention and the Limits of the Criminal Law 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 194-213. 
 
Steinhoff, Uwe. “Review of Matthew Kramer, Torture and Moral Integrity: A Philosophical Inquiry,” Ken-
nedy Institute of Ethics Journal 25 (2015): E-1—E-6. 
 
Steinhoff, Uwe. On the Ethics of Torture (Albany: SUNY Press, 2013). 
 
Stocker, Michael. Plural and Conflicting Values (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990). 
 
Stolzenberg, Lisa and D’Alessio, Stewart J. “‘Three strikes and you’re out’: The impact of California’s 
new mandatory sentencing law on serious crime rates,” Crime & Delinquency, 43 (1997): 457–469. 
 
Strawson, Galen. “Against Narrativity,” Ratio 17 (2004): 428–52. 
 
Sussman, David. “What’s Wrong with Torture?” Philosophy & Public Affairs 33 (2005): 1-33. 
 
 
 
 
 
289 
Sutter, John. “Welcome to the World’s Nicest Prison,” CNN.com, May 24, 2012, http://edi-
tion.cnn.com/2012/05/24/world/europe/norway-prison-bastoy-nicest/index.html. 
 
Tadros, Victor. The Ends of Harm: The Moral Foundations of the Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2011). 
 
Tadros, Victor. “Responses,” Law and Philosophy 32 (2013): 241-325. 
 
Tadros, Victor. “Wrongful Intentions Without Closeness,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 43 (2015): 52-
74.  
 
Tadros, Victor. “Causation, Culpability, and Liability,” in eds. Christian Coons and Michael Weber, 
The Ethics of Self Defense (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 110-30. 
 
Tamplin v. James (1880) 15 Ch.D. 215.  
 
Tasioulas, John. “Punishment and Repentance,” Philosophy 81 (2006): 279-322. 
 
Taurek, John M.  “Should the Numbers Count?” Philosophy & Public Affairs 6 (1977): 293-316. 
 
Taylor, Charles. Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univer-
sity Press, 1989). 
 
Texas State Constitution. 
 
The Crime (Sentences) Act 1997. 
 
The Elements of Crimes (The Hague: The International Criminal Court, 2011). 
 
The Greek Case (App Nos 3321-3/67, 3344/67) [1969] 12 ECHR Yearbook 1. 
 
 The House I Live In, directed by Eugene Jarecki, 2012 documentary. 
 
Thomas v Dering (1837) 1 Keen 729. 
 
Thomson, Ian. Primo Levi: A Life (New York: Metropolitan Books, Henry Holt and Company, 2003). 
 
Thornstedt, Hans. “The Day Fine System in Sweden,” Criminal Law Review 9 (1975): 307-12. 
 
Thornton v. State, 397 Md. 704 (2007). 
 
Timerman, Jacobo. Prisoner Without a Name, Cell Without a Number (Weidenfeld and Nicolson: Lon-
don 1981). 
 
Tomasi v France (App no 12850/87) [1992] ECHR 53. 
 
Tomlin, Patrick. “Innocence Lost: A Problem for Punishment as Duty,” Law & Philosophy 37 (2017): 
225-254. 
 
Tomlin, Patrick. “Time and Retribution,” Law and Philosophy 33 (2014): 655-82.  
 
 
 
 
 
290 
Toobin, Jeffrey. “The Showman: How U.S. Attorney Preet Bharara Struck Fear into Wall Street and 
Albany,” The New Yorker, May 9, 2016, https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/05/09/the-
man-who-terrifies-wall-street. 
  
Trabelsi v Belgium (App no. 140/10) [2014] ECHR 893. 
 
Tribe, Laurence. “Policy Science: Analysis or Ideology?,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 2 (1972): 66-110. 
 
Triple-A Baseball Club Assocs. v. Ne. Baseball, Inc., 832 F.2d 214, 224 (1st Cir. 1987). 
 
Tsai, Catherine. “Prison Guards Say Supermax is Understaffed,” The Associated Press, November 7, 
2006. 
 
Turner v. Rodgers, 564 U.S. ___ (2011). 
 
Turner, Allan. “Eternity’s gate slowly closing at Peckerwood Hill,” The Houston Chronicle, August 3, 
2012, https://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/article/Eternity-s-gate-slowly-closing-at-Peck-
erwood-Hill-3761731.php.  
 
Twining, W.L. and Twining, P.E. “Bentham on Torture,” Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 24 
(1973): 305–56. 
 
Twining, William. “Torture and Philosophy—I,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Vol-
umes 52 (1978): 143–68. 
 
Tyrer v UK [1978] 2 EHRR 1. 
 
U. S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (US Sentencing Commission, 2016). 
 
U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Prisons, Program Statement P5100.08 (Sept. 2006). 
 
U.S. Reservations, Declarations, and Understandings, Convention Against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Cong. Rec. S17486-01 (daily ed., Oct. 27, 
1990). 
 
U.S. v. Blair, 54 F.3d 639 (10th Cir. 1995). 
 
Uggen, Christopher, et. al. “The Edge Of Stigma: An Experimental Audit of the Effects of Low-
Level Criminal Records on Employment,” Criminology 52 (2014): 627-54.  
 
UN Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punish-
ment. 
 
UN Convention Against Torture. 
 
Uniform Code of Contracts (1999).  
 
United States Constitution. 
 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.  
 
US Sentencing Guidelines Manual (US Sentencing Commission, 2016). 
 
 
 
 
291 
 
Van Wagner Adver. Co. v. S & M Enter., 492 N.E.2d 756 (N.Y. 1986). 
 
Velleman, David. “Well-being and Time,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 72 (1991): 48-77.  
 
Vess, James. “Preventive Detention versus Civil Confinement: Alternative Policies for Protection in 
New Zealand and California,” Psychiatry, Psychology and Law 12 (2005): 357–66.  
 
Vinter and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], (App nos. 66069/09, 130/10 and 3896/10) [2013] ECHR 
786.  
 
Visiting a Friend or Loved One in Prison, California Department of Corrections Manual, 
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/visitors/docs/inmatevisitingguidelines.pdf. 
 
Visiting Procedures, Administrative Maximum Facility, Florence, Colorado (U.S. Department of Jus-
tice, May 7, 2014), https://www.bop.gov/locations/institutions/flm/FLM_visit_hours.pdf. 
 
Von Hirsch, Andrew and Ashworth, Andrew. Proportionate Sentencing: Exploring the Principles (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2005).  
 
Von Hirsch, Andrew. Censure and Sanctions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993). 
 
Von Hirsch, Andrew. “Extending the Harm Principle: ‘Remote’ Harms and Fair Imputation,” in eds. 
A. P. Simester and A. T. H. Smith, Harm and Culpability (Oxford: Clarendon, 1996), 259-77. 
 
Von Hirsch, Andrew, et. al. Criminal Deterrence and Sentence Severity: An Analysis of Recent Research (Port-
land: Hart, 1999). 
 
Von Hirsch, Andrew. Fairness, Verbrechen und Strafe: Strafrechtstheoretische Abhandlungen (Berlin: Berliner 
Wissenschafts-Verlag, 2005). 
 
Vorhaus, John. “On Degradation - Part One: Article 3 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights,” Common Law World Review 31 (2002): 374-99. 
 
Vorhaus, John. “On Degradation Part Two: Degrading Treatment and Punishment,” Common Law 
World Review 32 (2003): 65-92. 
 
Wagenaar, Alexander C.,  et. al. “General Deterrence Effects of U.S. Statutory DUI Fine and Jail 
Penalties: Long-Term Follow-Up in 32 States,” Accident Analysis & Prevention 30 (2007): 982-994. 
  
Waldron, Jeremy. “Lex Talionis,” Arizona Law Review 34 (1992): 25-52. 
 
Waldron, Jeremy. “When Justice Replaces Affection: The Need for Rights,” in Liberal Rights: Collected 
Papers 1981–1991 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 370-91. 
 
Waldron, Jeremy. “Moments of Carelessness and Massive Loss,” in ed. David G. Owen, Philosophical 
Foundations of Tort Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 387-409. 
 
Waldron, Jeremy. “Torture and Positive Law: Jurisprudence for the White House,” Columbia Law Re-
view 105 (2005): 1681–1750. 
 
 
 
 
 
292 
Waldron, Jeremy. “Inhuman and Degrading Treatment: The Words Themselves,” Canadian Journal of 
Law & Jurisprudence 23 (2010): 269-286. 
 
Waldron, Jeremy. Dignity, Rank, and Rights, ed. by Meir Dan-Cohen (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2012). 
 
Waldron, Jeremy. The Rule of Law and the Measure of Property (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2012). 
 
Waldron, Jeremy. “How Law Protects Dignity,” Cambridge Law Journal 71 (2012): 200-222. 
 
Waldron, Jeremy. One Another’s Equals: The Basis of Human Equality (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 
2017). 
 
Walen, Alec. “Retributive Justice,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2016 Edition), 
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/justice-retributive/. 
 
Walzer, Michael. Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical (New York: Basic Books ). 
 
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
 
Weinrib, Ernest J. “Corrective Justice in a Nutshell,” Toronto Law Journal 52 (2002): 349-52.  
 
Weinrib, Ernest J. Corrective Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). 
 
Wemmie, John A. “Neurobiology of panic and pH chemosensation in the brain,” Dialogues in Clinical 
Neuroscience 13 (2011): 475-83. 
 
Whalen, Alec. “Retributive Justice,” in ed. Edward N. Zalta, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
(Winter 2016 Edition), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/justice-retributive. 
 
Whitaker, Paulo and Garcia, Pablo. “Over 100 Dead in Brazil as Police Strike Spurs Anarchy,” Reu-
ters, February 9, 2017, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-brazil-violence-espirito-santo-
idUSKBN15O1ZT.  
 
Whitaker, Paulo. “Some Brazil Police Break Strike Following Wave of Homicides,” Reuters, February 
12, 2017, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-brazil-violence-idUSKBN15R0SU. 
 
Whitman, James Q. Harsh Justice: Criminal Punishment and the Widening Divide between America and Europe 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). 
 
Wilde, Oscar. The Soul of Man and Prison Writings, ed. Isobel Murray (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1990). 
 
Williams, Bernard. “The Idea of Equality,” in Problems of the Self (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 
1969), 230-49. 
 
Williams, Bernard. “The Standard of Living: Interests and Capabilities,” in Amartya Sen, The Standard 
of Living: The Tanner Lectures, ed. Geoffrey Hawthorne (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 
1987), 94-102. 
 
 
 
 
293 
Windrem, Robert. “Worse than Guantanamo? Terror Suspects Face Infamous Colorado Supermax,” 
NBC News, April 19, 2016, https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/new-prison-would-be-safer-
harsher-much-colder-guantanamo-n542741. 
 
Wisnewski, Jeremy. Understanding Torture (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010). 
 
Wolff, Nancy and Shi, Jingh. “Contextualization of Physical and Sexual Assault in Male Prisons: In-
cidents and their Aftermath,” Journal of Correctional Health 15 (2009): 58-82. 
 
Wood, Allan. Kant's Ethical Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 
 
Wright v. Best, 19 Cal. 2d 368, 386 (1942). 
 
Zamir, Eyal and Medina, Barak. Law, Economics, and Morality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2010). 
  
Zedner, Lucia. Security (London: Routledge, 2009). 
 
Zellick, Graham. “Corporal Punishment in the Isle of Man,” International and Comparative Law Quar-
terly 28 (1978): 665-71. 
 
Zimring, Franklin E., Hawkins, Gordon and Kamin, Sam. Punishment and Democracy: Three Strikes and 
You’re Out in California (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001).  
